Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[15]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[15]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[15]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2016-10-08 18:17:56.573
	1	+2016-10-08 18:17:56.0

Caselist.CitesClass[15]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,20 @@
	1	+===-CP Text: Countries ought to
	2	+- adopt the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety
	3	+- designate sub-seabed disposal as the sole candidate for its permanent nuclear waste repository. ====
	4	+
	5	+====IAEA regulations produce concrete results to strengthen power plant safety. Amano 11====
	6	+Yukiya Amano (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency), Draft IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, 9/5/11, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/Documents/gc55-14.pdf VC
	7	+The purpose of the Action Plan is to define a programme of work to strengthen the global nuclear safety framework. The plan consists of actions building on the Ministerial Declaration, the conclusions and recommendations of the Working Sessions, and the experience and knowledge therein, including the INSAG letter report (GOVINF/2011/11), and the facilitation of consultations among Member States. The success of this Action Plan in strengthening nuclear safety is dependent on its implementation through the full cooperation and participation of Member States and will require also the involvement of many other stakeholders. They are therefore encouraged to work cooperatively to implement the Action Plan to maximize the benefit of the lessons learned from the accident and to produce concrete results as soon as possible. Progress on the implementation of the Action Plan will be reported to the September 2012 meeting of the Board of Governors and the 2012 General Conference and subsequently on an annual basis as may be necessary. In addition, the extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) in 2012 will provide an opportunity to consider further measures to strengthen nuclear safety Strengthening nuclear safety in light of the accident is addressed through a number of measures proposed in this Action Plan including 12 main actions, each with corresponding sub-actions, focusing on: safety assessments in the light of the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station; IAEA peer reviews; emergency preparedness and response; national regulatory bodies; operating organizations; IAEA Safety Standards; international legal framework; Member States planning to embark on a nuclear power programme; capacity building; protection of people and the environment from ionizing radiation; communication and information dissemination; and research and development. Safety assessments in the light of the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Undertake assessment of the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants in the light of lessons learned to date from the accident • Member States to promptly undertake a national assessment of the design of nuclear power plants against site specific extreme natural hazards and to implement the necessary corrective actions in a timely manner. • The IAEA Secretariat, taking into account existing experiences, to develop a methodology and make it available for Member States that may wish to use it in carrying out their national assessments. • The IAEA Secretariat, upon request, to provide assistance and support to Member States in the implementation of a national assessment of the design of nuclear power plants against site specific extreme natural hazards. • The IAEA Secretariat, upon request, to undertake peer reviews of national assessments and to provide additional support to Member States. IAEA peer reviews Strengthen IAEA peer reviews in order to maximize the benefits to Member States • The IAEA Secretariat to strengthen existing IAEA peer reviews by incorporating lessons learned and by ensuring that these reviews appropriately address regulatory effectiveness, operational safety, design safety, and emergency preparedness and response; Member States to provide experts for peer review missions. • The IAEA Secretariat, in order to enhance transparency, to provide summary information on where and when IAEA peer reviews have taken place, and to make publicly available in a timely manner the results of such reviews with the consent of the State concerned. • Member States to be strongly encouraged to voluntarily host IAEA peer reviews, including follow-up reviews, on a regular basis; the IAEA Secretariat to respond in a timely manner to requests for such reviews. • The IAEA Secretariat to assess, and enhance as necessary, the effectiveness of the IAEA peer reviews. Emergency preparedness and response Strengthen emergency preparedness and response • Member States to conduct a prompt national review and thereafter regular reviews of their emergency preparedness and response arrangements and capabilities, with the IAEA Secretariat providing support and assistance through Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) missions, as requested. • The IAEA Secretariat, Member States and relevant international organizations to review and strengthen the international emergency preparedness and response framework, taking into account recommendations given in the final report of the International Action Plan for Strengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies, and encouraging greater involvement of the relevant international organizations in the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations. • The IAEA Secretariat, Member States and relevant international organizations to strengthen the assistance mechanisms to ensure that necessary assistance is made available promptly. Consideration to be given to enhancing and fully utilizing the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET), including expanding its rapid response capabilities. • Member States to consider, on a voluntary basis, establishing national rapid response teams that could also be made available internationally through RANET. • The IAEA Secretariat, in case of a nuclear emergency and with the consent of the State concerned, to conduct timely fact-finding missions and to make the results publicly available. National regulatory bodies Strengthen the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies • Member States to conduct a prompt national review and thereafter regular reviews of their regulatory bodies, including an assessment of their effective independence, adequacy of human and financial resources and the need for appropriate technical and scientific support, to fulfil their responsibilities. • The IAEA Secretariat to enhance the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) for peer review of regulatory effectiveness through a more comprehensive assessment of national regulations against IAEA Safety Standards. • Each Member State with nuclear power plants to voluntarily host, on a regular basis, an IAEA IRRS mission to assess its national regulatory framework. In addition, a follow-up mission to be conducted within three years of the main IRRS mission. Operating organizations Strengthen the effectiveness of operating organizations with respect to nuclear safety • Member States to ensure improvement, as necessary, of management systems, safety culture, human resources management, and scientific and technical capacity in operating organizations; the IAEA Secretariat to provide assistance to Member States upon request. • Each Member State with nuclear power plants to voluntarily host at least one IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission during the coming three years, with the initial focus on older nuclear power plants. Thereafter, OSART missions to be voluntarily hosted on a regular basis. • The IAEA Secretariat to strengthen cooperation with WANO by amending their Memorandum of Understanding to enhance information exchange on operating experience and on other relevant safety and engineering areas and, in consultation with other relevant stakeholders, to explore mechanisms to enhance communication and interaction among operating organizations. IAEA Safety Standards Review and strengthen IAEA Safety Standards and improve their implementation • The Commission on Safety Standards and the IAEA Secretariat to review, and revise as necessary using the existing process in a more efficient manner, the relevant IAEA Safety Standards2 in a prioritised sequence. • Member States to utilize as broadly and effectively as possible the IAEA Safety Standards in an open, timely and transparent manner. The IAEA Secretariat to continue providing support and assistance in the implementation of IAEA Safety Standards. International legal framework Improve the effectiveness of the international legal framework • States parties to explore mechanisms to enhance the effective implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and to consider proposals made to amend the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. • Member States to be encouraged to join and effectively implement these Conventions. • Member States to work towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that might be affected by a nuclear accident with a view to providing appropriate compensation for nuclear damage. The IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) to recommend actions to facilitate achievement of such a global regime. Member States to give due consideration to the possibility of joining the international nuclear liability instruments as a step toward achieving such a global regime.
	8	+
	9	+====The counterplan solves the accidents advantage – it enhances nuclear safety and creates high quality standards. Amano 11====
	10	+Yukiya Amano (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency), Draft IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, 9/5/11, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/Documents/gc55-14.pdf VC
	11	+In June 2011 a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety was convened to direct, under the leading role of the IAEA, the process of learning and acting upon lessons following the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in order to strengthen nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and radiation protection of people and the environment worldwide. At the conference a Ministerial Declaration was adopted which inter alia: • “Requested the IAEA Director General to prepare a Report on the June 2011 IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and a draft Action Plan, building on the Declaration of the Ministerial Conference and the conclusions and recommendations of the three Working Sessions, and the expertise and knowledge available therein, and to promote coordination and cooperation, as appropriate, with other relevant international organizations to follow up on the outcomes of the Conference, as well as facilitate consultations among Member States on the draft Action Plan”; • “Requested the IAEA Director General to present the Report and the draft Action Plan covering all the relevant aspects relating to nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and response, and radiation protection of people and the environment, as well as the relevant international legal framework, to the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference at their forthcoming meetings in 2011”; • “Called upon the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference to reflect the outcome of the Ministerial Conference in their decisions and to support the effective, prompt and adequately resourced implementation of the Action Plan”. In considering this Action Plan, it is important to note that: • The responsibility for ensuring the application of the highest standards of nuclear safety and for providing a timely, transparent and adequate response to nuclear emergencies, including addressing vulnerabilities revealed by accidents, lies with each Member State and operating organization. • The IAEA Safety Standards provide the basis for what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, and will continue to be objective, transparent and technologically neutral. • Transparency in all aspects of nuclear safety through timely and continuous sharing and dissemination of objective information, including information on nuclear emergencies and their radiological consequences, is of particular importance to improve safety and to meet the high level of public expectation. Nuclear accidents may have transboundary effects; therefore it is important to provide adequate responses based on scientific knowledge and full transparency. • As understanding of the accident develops, additional analysis of the root causes will be carried out. Further lessons may be learned and, as appropriate, be incorporated into the proposed actions by updating the Action Plan. The High Level Conference to be organized by Japan and the IAEA in 2012 will provide an opportunity for learning further lessons and for enhancing transparency.
	12	+
	13	+====SSD is the best storage option – buries nuclear waste under the sea. Wilson 14====
	14	+Wilson, founder of BuildingGreen, Inc. and executive editor of Environmental Building News, founded the Resilient Design Institute Alex, "Safe Storage of Nuclear Waste", Green Building Advisor, www.greenbuildingadvisor.com/blogs/dept/energy-solutions/safe-storage-nuclear-waste SP
	15	+
	16	+The big question now is how long it will be until the plant can be decommissioned and what to do with the large quantities of radioactive waste that are being stored onsite. Terrorism risks with nuclear power My concern with nuclear power has always been more about terrorism than accidents during operation or storage. I continue to worry that terrorists could gain entry to nuclear plant operations and sabotage plants from the inside — disabling cooling systems and causing a meltdown. There is also a remote risk of unanticipated natural disasters causing meltdowns or radiation release, as we saw so vividly with the Fukushima Power Plant catastrophe in Japan in March, 2011. For more than 30 years, the nuclear industry in the U.S. and nuclear regulators have been going down the wrong path with waste storage — seeking a repository where waste could be buried deep in a mountain. Nevada’s Yucca Mountain was the place of choice until… it wasn’t. Any time we choose to put highly dangerous waste in someone’s backyard, it’s bound to cause a lot of controversy, even in a sparsely populated, pro-resource-extraction place like Nevada. NIMBY opposition can be boosted by people in powerful places, and in the case of Yucca Mountain, Nevada senator Harry Reid has played such a role. (He has been the Senate Majority Leader since 2006 and served prior to that as the Minority Leader and Democratic Whip.) Aside from NIMBYism, the problem with burying nuclear waste in a mountain (like Yucca Mountain) or salt caverns (like New Mexico’s Carlsbad Caverns — an earlier option that was pursued for a while in the 1970s) is that the maximum safety is provided at Day One, and the margin of safety drops continually from there. The safety of such storage sites could be compromised over time due to seismic activity (Nevada ranks fourth among the most seismically active states), volcanism (the Yucca Mountain ridge is comprised mostly of volcanic tuff, emitted from past volcanic activity), erosion, migrating aquifers, and other natural geologic actions. A better storage option I believe a much better solution for long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste is to bury it deep under the seabed in a region free of seismic activity where sediment is being deposited and the seafloor getting thicker. In such a site, the level of protection would increase, rather than decrease, over time. In some areas of seabed, more than a centimeter of sediment is being deposited annually. Compacted over time, such sediment deposition could be several feet in a hundred years, and in the geologic time span over which radioactive waste is hazardous, hundreds to thousands of feet of protective sedimentary rock would be formed. The oil and gas industry — for better or worse — knows a lot about drilling deep holes beneath a mile or two of ocean. I suspect that the deep-sea drilling industry would love such a growth opportunity to move into seabed waste storage, and I believe the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or other agencies could do a good job regulating such work. The waste could be placed in wells extending thousands of feet below the seabed in sedimentary rock in geologically stable regions. Let's say a 3,000-foot well is drilled beneath the seabed two miles beneath the surface of the ocean. Waste could be inserted into that well to a depth of 1,000 feet, and the rest of the well capped with 2,000 feet of concrete or some other material. Hundreds of these deep-storage wells could be filled and capped, and such a sub-seabed storage field could be designated as forever off-limits. Industry or the Department of Energy would have to figure out how to package such waste for safe handling at sea, since the material is so dangerous, but I believe that is a surmountable challenge. For example, perhaps the radioactive waste could be vitrified (incorporated into molten glass-like material) to reduce leaching potential into seawater should an accident occur at sea, and that waste could be tagged with radio-frequency emitters so that any lost containers could be recovered with robotic submarines in the event of such accidents. While I’m not an expert in any of this, I’ve looked at how much money taxpayers and industry have already poured into Yucca Mountain — about $15 billion by the time the Obama Administration terminated federal funding for it in 2010, according to Bloomberg News — and the estimates for how much more it would take to get a working waste storage facility of that sort operational had risen to about $96 billion by 2008, according to the U.S. Department of Energy at the time. I believe that sub-seabed storage would be far less expensive.
	17	+
	18	+====Solves the aff ssd is able to isolate any radioactive nuclear waste from humans. Bala 2014====
	19	+Amal Bala, Sub-Seabed Burial of Nuclear Waste: If the Disposal Method Could Succeed Technically, Could It Also Succeed Legally?, 41 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 455 (2014),SP
	20	+In general, two related methods of underwater disposal of SNF exist: dumping containers of radioactive waste into the ocean, and sub-seabed disposal. 92 The purpose of underwater disposal of SNF is the same as any other type of SNF disposal, which is to isolate radioactive waste from human contact and the environment long enough for any release of radiation to become harmless.93 The potential advantages of certain types of underwater SNF disposal for the United States could include effective containment of the waste and avoiding the controversy of a land-based national repository, such as the failed project at Yucca Mountain. 94 Underwater disposal of SNF, specifically subseabed disposal, could occur far from the coast of any state or nation and could thereby avoid the NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) syndrome, but this result is not guaranteed considering existing laws and a popular belief that Earth’s oceans are a global commons

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2016-10-08 18:17:58.742

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+David Dosch

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Mission San Jose PB

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+15

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+1

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Harvard Westlake Chaudhary Neg

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+SEPT-OCT Multi-Plank CP

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Voices