Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[28]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[29]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[28]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-10-16 14:22:47.788
	1	+2016-10-16 14:22:47.0

Caselist.CitesClass[29]

Cites

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	1	+Prolif solves conflict—4 reasons. Waltz 81
	2	+(Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981)
	3	+1. States risk too much going to nuke war
	4	+2. States don’t win very much in a nuclear war – everything is destroyed
	5	+3. Deterrent means states don’t have to fight/expand to scare away other countries – security concerns are a HUGE reason they go to war
	6	+4. An attacker knows the defenders will be much more likely to drop nukes because they’re defending their home, so they’re dissuaded from attacking
	7	+
	8	+Weapons and strategies change the situation of states in ways that make them more or less secure, as Robert Jervis has brilliantly shown. If weapons are not well suited for conquest, neighbours have more peace of mind. According to the defensive-deterrent ideal, we should expect war to become less likely when weaponry is such as to make conquest more difficult, to discourage pre-emptive and pre­ventive war, and to make coercive threats less credible. Do nuclear weapons have those effects? Some answers can be found by con­sidering how nuclear deterrence and how nuclear defence may improve the prospects for peace. First, wars can be fought in the face of deter­rent threats, but the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. Wars between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that.states will want to draw back. Not escalation but de-escalation becomes likely. War remains possible. but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. If states can score only small gains because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight. Second, states act with less care if the expect­ed costs of war are low and with more care if they are high. In 1853 and 1854, Britain and France expected to win an easy victory if they went to war against Russia. Prestige abroad and political popularity at home would be gained. if not much else. The vagueness of their plans was matched by the carelessness of their acts. In blundering into the Crimean War they acted hastily on scant information, pandered to their people's frenzy for war, showed more concern for an ally's whim than for the adversary's situation, failed to specify the changes in behaviour that threats were supposed to bring. and inclined towards testing strength first and bargaining second. In sharp contrast, the presence of nuclear weapons makes States exceedingly cautious. Think of Kennedy and Khruschev in the Cuban missile crisis. Why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything? Third, the question demands a negative answer all the more insistently when the deter rent deployment of nuclear weapons contributes more to a country's security than does conquest of territory. A country with a deter-rent strategy does not need the extent of terri­tory required by a country relying on a conven­tional defence in depth. A deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and this removes a major cause of war. Fourth, deterrent effect depends both on one's capabilities and on the will one has to use them. The will of the attacked, striving to preserve its own territory, can ordinarily be presumed stronger than the will of the attacker striving to annex someone else's territory. Knowing this, the would-be attacker is further inhibited.
	9	+
	10	+Conventional wars are more common and more catastrophic than nuclear war. Johnson 99.
	11	+Johnson ’99, Robert Johnson, Strategic Planning, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: The Key to Global Security?” CSIS Prospectus, Fall 1999, http://www.csis.org/pubs/prospectus/99FallJohnson.html, accessed 8/11/02
	12	+Conventional wars are no doubt less horrible and less destabilizing to civilization than nuclear wars may be, but they may be fought more often, with far more casualties, and environmental damage, than the world is used to today. And if nuclear weapons are the only Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that are removed, biological and chemical weapons will still remain. Biological weapons are much more indiscriminate and can have more devastating effects on civilization than nuclear weapons can. Ridding the world of only nuclear weapons may remove us from the somewhat benign fear of war that exists today and place us in a world where the threat of war is much more imminent and the consequences equally catastrophic.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-10-16 14:22:48.276

Judge

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	1	+Rebecca Kuang

Opponent

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	1	+Evanston HS

ParentRound

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	1	+27

Round

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	1	+6

Team

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	1	+Harvard Westlake Chaudhary Neg

Title

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	1	+SEPT-OCT Conventional War DA

Tournament

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	1	+St Marks