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+==1NC - Agency== |
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+====Because states are legal fictions created for a scheme of social cooperation, obligations of states must derive from the people's condition in the state of nature and the conditions that allow for the authority of the state. Pre-government people have an innate right to independence. ==== |
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+====First, all moral obligations must derive from reason, since it is necessarily an authoritative basis for action.==== |
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+**Velleman 6 ~~David. Self To Self. Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pg 18-19~~** |
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+As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source |
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+AND |
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+something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons. |
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+====Reason is a necessary starting point for all moral questions that no agent can escape because it's impossible to question the authority reason without conceding that authority.==== |
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+====Second, Agency is the fundamental enterprise involved in taking any action, whereby the agent submits to a normative reason for action. It's impossible to reflect on whether we should exercise agency without already having engaged in the activity of agency. It follows that agency is the inescapable and universal across all rational agents. If the constitutive principle of agency is merely agency, then any valid practical judgment must be true of every practical agent and for every agent. ==== |
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+====Furthermore, in tending toward any action, the agent must actually align herself with the pursuit of her end—you can't decide to do A and not A at the same time, since that doesn't make any decision at all. This involves willing compatible ends, which demands outer freedom because in tracking any end, you hold yourself to being able to reach it free from others' choice, which requires that you will consistently with your freedom as a precondition for bringing about that end at all. Thus, any maxim that subjects one person to someone else's choice is internally contradictory.==== |
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+====This places the coercive state seemingly at a contradiction. However, freedom is only possible if agents jointly will a common end, i.e. system of reciprocal constraints; else people could arbitrarily infringe upon the pursuit of your respective ends. You can't will yourself into a state of nature on pain of contradiction, since that would make the means of your action incompatible with the end. Thus, agents in willing any end at all are committed to willing a system of equal and outer freedom, that is, the state. Thus the standard is consistency with a system of equal outer freedoms.==== |
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+====I contend that banning private ownership of handguns violates the independence of individuals. ==== |
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+====Prohibiting nuclear power production is a violation of property rights because:==== |
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+====It would require government confiscation of power plants owned by private companies, which directly violates their ownership rights of the reactors.==== |
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+**World Nuclear 16 "World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power" June 2016 AT** |
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+Government policy is central to any discussion of nuclear power in the USA. The |
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+AND |
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+-level nuclear waste that has accumulated at reactor sites across the nation. |
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+====That's offense for me —- individual sovereignty is absolute —- any excess limitation on freedom is domination and inconsistent with a system of equal freedoms. ==== |
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+**Ripstein,** (Arthur Ripstein, "Beyond the Harm Principle," University of Toronto, http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Ripstein/beyond_harm_principle.pdf//FT |
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+Finally, the sovereignty principle ~~warrants~~ gives defenders of the harm principle the |
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+AND |
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+of others, the individual's sovereignty is, as Mill says, absolute. |
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+====It would close off nuclear power production to everyone. The government cannot unilaterally declare certain industries as illegal to own and operate even if doing so will reduce accident risk, just as it cannot prohibit people from owning cars for the same purpose, because mere ownership does not violate the rights of any other person. At worst, the government can pass safety regulations to prohibit nuclear plants from posing a threat to others, but cannot outright prohibit it. Nuclear energy doesn't intrinsically interfere with anyone's ends because it doesn't involve force. It's illegitimate to prohibit it.==== |
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+**Levendis et al 6 John Levendis (Dr. John V. Connor Professor in Economics and Finance Associate Professor of Economics at Loyola University New Orleans), Walter Block and Joseph Morrel "Nuclear Power" Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Aug., 2006), pp. 37-49** |
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+Let us make a more philosophical rebuttal to at the zoning chaUenge. Under the |
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+AND |
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+one, advocates grounding all planes for this or any other such reason. |