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123	123	AND
124	124	construed to provide disabled individuals with broad remedies should they suffer discrimination. n14
125	125
	126	+== JanFeb Deont Aff ==
	127	+
	128	+
	129	+=== 1AR ===
	130	+
	131	+
	132	+==== The plan is a reversal of HR hypocrisy – ensures an effective coalition that will pressure Russia and China ====
	133	+
	134	+**Roth 9**
	135	+**(Kenneth, Kenneth Roth is executive director of Human Rights Watch, Graduate of Yale Law School and Brown University, "Taking Back the Initiative from the Human Rights Spoilers," pg online @ http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2009/taking-back-initiative-human-rights-spoilers //um-ef)//**//
	136	+Shifts in global power have emboldened spoiler governments in international forums to challenge human rights
	137	+AND
	138	+whether he can resist pressures to sustain the Bush-led status quo.//
	139	+
	140	+
	141	+==== ~~[insert plan increases U.S. HR Cred here if necessary~~] ====
	142	+
	143	+
	144	+==== U.S.-Russia War ====
	145	+
	146	+**Cohen 14**
	147	+**(Roger, "Yes, It Could Happen Again," pg online @ http://m.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/08/yes-it-could-happen-again/373465/ //um-ef)//**//
	148	+Pessimism is a useful prism through which to view the affairs of states. Their
	149	+AND
	150	+dignity of their nation has been trampled by an American and European strategic advance //
	151	+
	152	+
	153	+=== Part 1 is the Framework ===
	154	+
	155	+
	156	+==== The Meta-ethic is practical reason. Metaethical frameworks establish the bindingness of moral constraints, and precede other ethical justifications, because they answer the question from where morals arise, independent of ontological or epistemic discussion. Prefer practical reason: ====
	157	+
	158	+
	159	+==== To have any obligations, we have to derive them from the structure of practical reason. ====
	160	+
	161	+**David Velleman, 2006, Self To Self, Cambridge University Press.**
	162	+As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source
	163	+AND
	164	+the requirement to act for reasons without escaping the force of requirements altogether.
	165	+
	166	+
	167	+==== Moral theories can only assign blame to actors through practical reason—it holds agents morally responsible. This means we cannot evaluate agent's normative states under theories that do not flow from practical reason. ====
	168	+
	169	+**Dwight Furrow. 2005, Moral Agency, Ethics**
	170	+This is because the source of human dignity is our capacity for freedom. We
	171	+AND
	172	+free and thus they have no moral worth, since morality requires freedom.
	173	+
	174	+
	175	+==== Proper understanding of the world around us first requires a unified conception of the world, which only practical reason allows. ====
	176	+
	177	+**Christine Korsgaard, The Normative Constitution of Agency, Harvard University.**
	178	+The parallel point about theoretical reason comes in two steps. First of all,
	179	+AND
	180	+, and therefore cannot count itself as thinking about anything or knowing anything.
	181	+
	182	+
	183	+==== Therefore, morality must flow from the structure of reason itself. ====
	184	+
	185	+
	186	+==== The standard is rejecting contradictory maxims. Prefer this standard: ====
	187	+
	188	+
	189	+==== Reasons must be universizable. ====
	190	+
	191	+**Stephen Engstrom, Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge, Manuscript, Pgs. 8-9**
	192	+2. As I mentioned, however, there is another sense in which rational
	193	+AND
	194	+fixed general price for everyone can rightly be said to be practical knowledge.
	195	+
	196	+
	197	+==== All rational agents can reach the same rational conclusions even if circumstantial reasons differ—this is a reason to prefer categorical maxims as opposed to hyperspecific hypothetical maxims. ====
	198	+
	199	+**David Velleman, Self to Self: Selected essays, 2006, A Brief Intro to Kantian Ethics, NYU Philosophy Professor, http://www.tc.umn.edu/~~ston0235/3311/velleman.pdf**
	200	+Rational creatures have access to a shared perspective, from which they not only see
	201	+AND
	202	+the sum is authoritative, because it speaks for the judgment of all. **
	203	+
	204	+
	205	+==== The only thing constitutive of the structure of agency is that the will is free. The will is free rather than undetermined when it acts for a law of its own choosing, rather than no law at all. Acting under a law is just demanding that reasons be universal, since laws are universal principles of willing. ====
	206	+
	207	+Reath, Andrews. Formal Approaches to Kant's Formula of Humanity. Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Oxford University Press. 2009. Pgs. 11-12.
	208	+One way to represent this conception of volition philosophically has been suggested by Barbara Herman
	209	+AND
	210	+influence.15 Thus the FUL is the formal principle of free agency.
	211	+
	212	+
	213	+=== Part 2 is Offense ===
	214	+
	215	+
	216	+==== Speech must be free, it doesn't violate others' rights, restricting it violates external freedom, but speech can never do that. ====
	217	+
	218	+**Varden '09 (Helga Varden, April 2009, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, "A Kantian Conception of Free Speech*" | SP)**
	219	+This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains
	220	+AND
	221	+cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.
	222	+
	223	+
	224	+==== Banning certain forms of speech like hate speech imposes arbitrary conceptions of allowed speech. We are not saying hate speech is good, but rather that the government banning it is bad. ====
	225	+
	226	+**Brown '15 summarizes Dworkin (Alex Brown, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Social and Political Theory at the University of East Anglia (UEA). He is the author of Ronald Dworkin's Theory of Equality: Domestic and Global Perspectives (2009) and Personal Responsibility: Why it Matters (2009). 2015, "Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination" https://books.google.com/books?id=9AfwBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA95&lpg=PA95&dq=kant+%2B+no+hate+speech+ban&source=bl&ots=-rlxGxh5vy&sig=wYnYCuGZM2sPOoznKfFZlrKkVFo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjn4t7Y7frQAhUG6WMKHWjwChMQ6AEIJjAC~~#v=onepage&q=kant%20%2B%20no%20hate%20speech%20ban&f=false | SP)**
	227	+The challenges do not end there, however. For one thing, some scholars
	228	+AND
	229	+full treatment of his approach until Ch. 7 ~~[7.2~~].
	230	+
	231	+
	232	+==== Even if freedom of expression might result in a loss of rights that doesn't justify a prohibition ====
	233	+
	234	+**Ripstein 9** (Arthur, Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and Chair of the Department of Philosophy, "Force and Freedom", Harvard University Press, 2009//LADI)
	235	+If you violate a duty of right, however, others are entitled to hinder
	236	+AND
	237	+made in accordance with rational concepts, but is not exhausted by them.//
	238	+
	239	+
	240	+==== But speech that is intrinsically harmful and that follows through on threats is unconstitutional anyways. ====
	241	+
	242	+**Ruane 14 (Kathleen Anne Ruane – Legislative Attorney. Her report was published by the Congressional Research Service, which is a branch of government, "Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment", https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf,pgs. 1-5, EmmieeM)**
	243	+The First Amendment to the united States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no
	244	+AND
	245	+constitutes a "true threat," and not against mere "political hyperbole."
	246	+
	247	+
	248	+==== At the very least, the neg cannot have offense because the aff defends negative state action. Kant cannot say that negative state action is immoral, but rather that it is impermissible, which means you defer to permissibility, which we will win flows aff. This is not a "trigger" of any sort, just that even if the neg wins what they will call a term, there is still an easy out to vote aff. ====
	249	+
	250	+
	251	+
	252	+
126	126	== Part 1 is the Standard ==
127	127
128	128	The Meta-ethic is practical reason. Metaethical frameworks establish the bindingness of moral constraints, and precede other ethical justifications, because they answer the question from where morals arise, independent of ontological or epistemic discussion. Prefer practical reason: