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	5	+==== NovDec Deont AC ====
	6	+
	7	+== Part 1 is the Standard ==
	8	+
	9	+The Meta-ethic is practical reason. Metaethical frameworks establish the bindingness of moral constraints, and precede other ethical justifications, because they answer the question from where morals arise, independent of ontological or epistemic discussion. Prefer practical reason:
	10	+
	11	+
	12	+==== To have any obligations, we have to derive them from the structure of practical reason. ====
	13	+
	14	+**David Velleman, 2006, Self To Self, Cambridge University Press.**
	15	+As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source
	16	+AND
	17	+the requirement to act for reasons without escaping the force of requirements altogether.
	18	+
	19	+
	20	+==== Moral theories can only assign blame to actors through practical reason—it holds agents morally responsible. ====
	21	+
	22	+**Dwight Furrow. 2005, Moral Agency, Ethics**
	23	+This is because the source of human dignity is our capacity for freedom. We are distinguished from all other beings by our capacity to rationally choose our actions. If God, nature or other persons imposed moral requirements on us, against our will, our freedom would be fatally compromised. What is more, if our moral decisions were not free but imposed on us, we would not be morally responsible for them, thus undermining the system of praise and blame that is central to our moral framework. Thus, according to Kant, the basic condition for moral agency is moral autonomy – the capacity that each of us has to impose moral constraints on ourselves. Thus far, Kant's thrilling praise of moral freedom seems compatible with ethical egoism. If moral decisions are up to me then it would seem that I am free to choose in accordance with my self-interest. However, Kant goes on to argue that I cannot achieve moral autonomy if desires, emotions and inclinations govern my moral judgements. Kant was convinced that nature is a mechanical system governed by deterministic, physical laws – causal relationships determine the behaviour of plants, animals and inanimate objects. They have no capacity to choose. But human desires, emotions and inclinations are also part of that deterministic universe, since they are a function of our bodily nature. When we act in accordance with desires, emotions and inclinations, we are simply responding to physical urges much as an animal does. How can human beings escape this deterministic physical world? The only way we can exercise our freedom and autonomy is to rationally assess our actions independently of our desires. Moral reasoning will set us free – free from desires and emotions that chain us to nature. In contexts where moral judgement is required, by reasoning independently of desires, I am imposing ~~[impose~~] moral principles on ~~[ourselves~~] myself. My actions are self-directed rather than caused by external forces. Kant is not arguing that we should never act on our desires or inclinations. In fact, most of the time we act on what he calls hypothetical imperatives, which involve desires. 'If you want to earn money, go to work.' 'If you are afraid of tigers, then stay out of the jungle.' These are perfectly acceptable as a basis for action. Actions based on these hypothetical imperatives have instrumental value – they get us something we want. But such actions have no moral value. When our actions reflect only our desires and inclinations, and not our capacity for moral reason, they are not free and thus they have no moral worth, since morality requires freedom.
	24	+Thus, we cannot evaluate agent's normative states under theories that do not flow from practical reason.
	25	+
	26	+
	27	+==== Proper understanding of the world around us first requires a unified conception of the world, which only practical reason allows. ====
	28	+
	29	+**Christine Korsgaard, The Normative Constitution of Agency, Harvard University.**
	30	+The parallel point about theoretical reason comes in two steps. First of all, unity is needed for our conception of the world, because the business, the function, of a conception of the world is to enable you to find your way around in it and to act effectively in it. In order to conceive the world as the sort of place in which you can find your way around and act effectively, you have to conceive it as a unified place. What that means is that ~~[so that~~] the relations between the various things in the world can be traced and established. If we can say nothing about how two things or events or regions of space-time are related to each other, we cannot think of them as parts of a single unified world. If we cannot trace causal relations, in particular, we cannot act effectively, since we cannot take means to our ends. So it is the business of a conception of the world to establish these various relations. Further argument is required, of course, but I suppose that we may think of the relations in question as logical, spatiotemporal, and causal. Speaking very roughly, these are the relations established by the principles of logic and what Kant thought of as the a priori principles of the understanding. But – and this is the second step - in unifying our conception of the world, we are also unifying our minds themselves, and unifying them in a way that makes us the agents of that conception – that is, in a way that makes us active knowers. This is because the unity of the mind and the unity of its object are interdependent. Unless we conform our beliefs to logical and rational principles, our minds themselves are a mere heap of unrelated ideas that cannot really qualify as beliefs. A mere heap of unrelated ideas is not about anything, and therefore cannot count itself as thinking about anything or knowing anything.
	31	+
	32	+Therefore, morality must flow from the structure of reason itself. The standard is rejecting contradictory maxims.
	33	+
	34	+
	35	+==== Reasons must be universizable. ====
	36	+
	37	+**Stephen Engstrom, Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge, Manuscript, Pgs. 8-9**
	38	+2. As I mentioned, however, there is another sense in which rational cognition can be said to be universal. All cognition, be it theoretical or practical, has what Kant calls subjective universal validity: if a certain judgment counts as knowledge, then it must be valid for every knowing subject, so that all such subjects could agree in the matter and share the same judgment, the same cognition. If I know that the next hurricane to hit Florida will rotate in a counterclockwise direction, then all subjects who share the cognitive capacity I exercise in this judgment will necessarily agree, provided, of course, that this capacity in them is not in some way defective, that they are exercising it properly, and that they are sufficiently acquainted with hurricanes, the location of Florida, and so forth, to form such a judgment. And since this judgment, as rational cognition, is cognition, not just of the particular, but of the particular in the universal and hence is a judgment that depends on a universal judgment, the possibility that all subjects capable of rational cognition can share this judgment about the next hurricane to hit Florida likewise depends on the possibility that they can all share the universal judgment about tropical storms in the northern hemisphere on which the particular judgment is based.Thus a principle of reason, being itself a cognition, is universally valid in two respects: in addition to being valid of every object falling under its subject concept, it's valid ~~[and~~] for every subject capable of rational cognition. This double universal validity is characteristic of principles of both theoretical and practical knowledge.3. In the case of practical cognition, however, these two sorts of universality are identical in respect of their extension. For unlike theoretical cognition, which is of independently existing objects distinct from the cognizing subject and given to it from elsewhere by means of the senses, practical cognition, as practical, works to bring its object into existence, or to make it actual, and therefore is essentially efficacious, indeed self-consciously so, hence always knowledge subjects have that they themselves, as practically cognizing subjects, should act in a certain way, and so always cognition of the very subjects who have such cognition.8 Therefore in the case of a principle of practical cognition the two sorts of universal validity necessarily coincide in the sense that the principle is valid for the very subjects of which it's valid: the principle applies to the will of every practically cognizing rational being, and every such being can recognize this universal applicability. This is as much as to say that a principle of practical cognition is necessarily such that every subject can agree to every subject's acting on it. Now such agreement would actually be achieved if all subjects were jointly to legislate this principle for themselves. Kant thus gives expression to ~~[calls~~] this necessary feature of all principles of practical knowledge by speaking, in the Critique of Practical Reason, of "the mere form of a universal legislation", the form that distinctively characterizes practical, as opposed to theoretical, laws (KpV 27). Such universal legislation must therefore be possible if, for example, the shopkeeper's practical judgment that where there is much trade one should keep a fixed general price for everyone can rightly be said to be practical knowledge.
	39	+All rational agents can reach the same rational conclusions even if circumstantial reasons differ—
	40	+AND
	41	+So force that restores freedom is just the restoration of the original right.
	42	+
	43	+
	44	+== Part 2 is the Offense ==
	45	+
	46	+
	47	+=== Adv 1 is Torts ===
	48	+
	49	+Immunity hinders essential tort litigation
	50	+Chen 06
	51	+Chen, Alan K. (Professor @ University of Denver Sturm College of Law)"The Facts about Qualified Immunity." Emory Law Journal 55.2 (2006): 229-278. ~~[Premier~~]
	52	+The law provides a damages action to people whose constitutional rights have been violated by federal, state, and local public officials acting under the color of their governmental authority. 18 These "constitutional torts" serve critical compensatory and deterrent functions in the scheme of constitutional enforcement. 19 While acknowledging these values, the Supreme Court nonetheless has established substantial barriers to such suits against public officials. Through its decisions, it has developed a bifurcated system under which public officials who carry out certain functions are entitled to absolute immunity from constitutional tort actions, while all other officials are protected by only "qualified" immunity. Officials performing prosecutorial, judicial, or legislative functions when they commit the act for which they are sued may successfully claim absolute immunity. The Court's functional approach means that officials who ordinarily perform these types of functions are not entitled to claim absolute immunity when they perform official acts that are not within the scope of these protected functions. 23 For example, a prosecutor may claim absolute immunity for prosecutorial but not investigative acts. 24 She may still, however, assert qualified immunity.
	53	+There's no recourse in the face of powerful QI
	54	+Reinhardt 15
	55	+Stephen R. Reinhardt, (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.) The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1219 (2015). Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol113/iss7/3 ~~[Premier~~]
	56	+Unfortunately, the Court's actions no longer match its rhetoric. In fact, they now directly contradict it. Once again, the Court's concern for protecting government officials in general and state and local law enforcement officers in particular has prevailed over the constitutional rights of individuals. In recent years, the Court has used the qualified immunity doctrine, which shields officials from civil liability as long as their actions do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,"128 to severely restrict the ability of individuals to recover for constitutional violations that they suffer at the hands of law enforcement. The problem is that, due to sovereign immunity protections for the federal government and state governments, and the need to prove an unlawful policy or custom to hold a municipality liable under § 1983,129 claims against law enforcement officers are often the only remedy for individuals who suffer violations of their constitutional rights. However, in the name of protecting these officers from being held formally accountable for "minor" errors made in the line of duty, the Court has through qualified immunity created such powerful shields for law enforcement that people whose rights are violated, even in egregious ways, often lack any means of enforcing those rights. As law enforcement officers benefit from qualified immunity, so do municipalities, indirectly, because indemnification agreements would otherwise force them to pay the damages for which the officers have been held responsible; in fact, when officers receive the benefit of qualified immunity, it is in reality the municipality that is relieved of its duty to compensate the victim of a constitutional violation.
	57	+Tort law captures the unique responsibility to other persons while maintaining freedom to pursue one's own conception of the good
	58	+Ripstein 04
	59	+Arthur, pf of law @ UToronto, PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER NO. 04-02 THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW OF TORT ARTHUR ~~[Premier~~]
	60	+All of these effects that one person might have on another are consistent with each of us having a special responsibility for how our own life goes, because they are simply the inevitable side effects of separate persons making separate decisions in the presence of others. But there are other ways in which we have effects on others that are different. If I use what is yours without your consent, then I subordinate your pursuit of your purposes to my pursuit of mine. If I injure you, or damage your goods, I prevent you from using your powers to set and pursue your own conception of the good. So while the former class of side effects must simply be accepted80 as inevitable, th~~[is~~] latter set is inconsistent with each of us having a special responsibility for our own life. However, to say that they are inconsistent is not to say that they will never happen, and here too, the division of responsibility sheds considerable light on the doctrinal structure of tort law. If I wrongfully injure you, I am liable to you in damages, just because the payment of damages aims to "make you whole," that is, to restore to you, as much as it is possible to do so, means equivalent to those of yours that I have injured. To put you back in the same place is to put you back in the same place with respect to your ability to set and pursue your own conception of the good.
	61	+
	62	+
	63	+=== Adv 2 is Intentions ===
	64	+
	65	+The court intentionally decided that the protections of officers matter more than rights of the people, Reinhardt 15
	66	+Stephen R. Reinhardt, (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.) The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1219 (2015). Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol113/iss7/3 ~~[Premier~~]
	67	+As in the habeas context, the doctrinal evolution of qualified immunity was not inevitable; it was the product of a conscious choice to exempt constitutional violations from civil liability because of a concern over other lesser values. Here, the Court was purportedly concerned that officers not face litigation and, ultimately, harsh financial consequences for mistakes made in the line of duty. As a practical matter, this justification is based on a false premise—that officers would pay for the liability they incur in civil rights suits. As explained above, indemnification agreements generally shield officers from any monetary harm. To the extent, however, that qualified immunity serves a justifiable purpose of protecting officers from undergoing litigation for innocent, reasonable mistakes, even in the absence of any risk of financial liability, that purpose does not justify the Court's extreme construction of the qualified immunity doctrine—a construction that has once again exalted a lesser concern over the protection of constitutional rights.
	68	+
	69	+
	70	+
5	5	== 1AC ==
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