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+The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing as contextualized by impacts on case |
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+The constitutive obligation of the state is to protect citizen interest—individual obligations are not applicable in the public sphere. Goodin 95 |
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+Robert E. Goodin. Philosopher of Political Theory, Public Policy, and Applied Ethics. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1995. p. 26-7 |
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+The great adventure of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids |
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+AND |
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+thus understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy. |
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+Util is axiomatically true - all value stems from experienced wellbeing. Harris 10 |
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+Sam Harris 2010. CEO Project Reason; PHD UCLA Neuroscience; BA Stanford Philosophy. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values.” |
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+I believe that we will increasingly understand good and evil, right and wrong, |
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+AND |
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+, therefore, consequences and conscious states remain the foundation of all values. |
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+Moral uncertainty means we default to preventing extinction under any ethical framework |
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+BOSTROM 11 |
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+(2011) Nick Bostrom, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School and Faculty of Philosophy |
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+These reflections on moral uncertainty suggests an alternative, complementary way of |
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+AND |
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+value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. |
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+Death is the worst form of evil since it destroys the subject itself. |
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+Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics. |
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+Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that |
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+AND |
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+the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82 |