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  • Caselist.RoundClass[3]
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1		-2016-10-10 17:47:40.799
	1	+2016-10-10 17:47:40.0

Caselist.CitesClass[3]

Cites

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	1	+1AC
	2	+Plan text: Resolved: The People’s Republic of China ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power. This means I affirm the prohibition of nuclear power for electrical purposes.
	3	+Tickell 15 (Oliver Tickell – The Ecologist; Journalist/BBC Broadcaster, “China’s Nuclear Energy Boom Threatens Global Catastrophe. Coastal Array of 300 Reactors Vulnerable to Earthquakes and Tsunamis.”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/chinas-nuclear-energy-boom-threatens-global-catastrophe-coastal-array-of-300-nuclear-reactors-vulnerable-to-earthquakes-and-tsunamis/5485346, EmmieeM)
	4	+China’s plans for 400 nuclear reactors threaten global catastrophe, writes Oliver Tickell. In the normal way of things we could expect major accidents every few years, but with 300 reactors along China’s seismically active coast, a major tsunami would be a Fukushima on steroids – wiping out much of China and contaminating the whole planet. “China shows the way to build nuclear reactors fast and cheap.” That was the bullish headline in a Forbes magazine article last week. It went on to praise the scale of the planned nuclear investment in China’s new Five-Year Plan that runs from 2016 to 2020. Under the plan the government is to invest over US$100 billion to build seven new reactors a year until 2030. “By 2050″, James Conca wrote for Forbes, “nuclear power should exceed 350 GW in that country, include about 400 new nuclear reactors, and have resulted in over a trillion dollars in nuclear investment.” Now Conca is pretty enthusiastic about this. But the reality is a potential nuclear nightmare in the making. Experience to date shows that we should, on average, expect a major nuclear accident to take place for every 3,000 to 4,000 years of reactor operation. And with over 400 reactors running at once, it doesn’t take long to clock up those 3,000 years. In fact, you could reasonably expect a major Chernobyl or Fukushima level accident every seven to ten years – in China alone, if it pursues nuclear build on that scale.
	5	+Framework (5:45)
	6	+The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing as contextualized by impacts on case
	7	+The constitutive obligation of the state is to protect citizen interest—individual obligations are not applicable in the public sphere. Goodin 95
	8	+Robert E. Goodin. Philosopher of Political Theory, Public Policy, and Applied Ethics. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1995. p. 26-7
	9	+The great adventure of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures as best we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that policies are sensitive to people’s interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realms, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one’s duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation on motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows. The reason public action is required at all arises from the inability of uncoordinated individual action to achieve certain morally desirable ends. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing that makes those excuses valid at the individual level – the same thing that relieves individuals of responsibility – makes it morally incumbent upon individuals to organize themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not. When they organize themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different circumstances and their conclusions inevitably take very different forms. Individuals are morally required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their collective mode. And those special constraints characterizing the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that make utilitarianism peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. Government house utilitarianism thus understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy.
	10	+Util is axiomatically true - all value stems from experienced wellbeing. Harris 10
	11	+Sam Harris 2010. CEO Project Reason; PHD UCLA Neuroscience; BA Stanford Philosophy. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values.”
	12	+I believe that we will increasingly understand good and evil, right and wrong, in scientific terms, because moral concerns translate into facts about how our thoughts and behaviors affect the well-being of conscious creatures like ourselves. If there are facts to be known about the well-being of such creatures—and there are—then there must be right and wrong answers to moral questions. Students of philosophy will notice that this commits me to some form of moral realism (viz. moral claims can really be true or false) and some form of consequentialism viz. the rightness of an act depends on how it impacts the well-being of conscious creatures). While moral realism and consequentialism have both come under pressure in philosophical circles, they have the virtue of corresponding to many of our intuitions about how the world works. Here is my (consequentialist) starting point: all questions of value (right and wrong, good and evil, etc.) depend upon the possibility of experiencing such value. Without potential consequences at the level of experience—happiness, suffering, joy, despair, etc. —all talk of value is empty. Therefore, to say that an act is morally necessary, or evil, or blameless, is to make (tacit) claims about its consequences in the lives of conscious creatures (whether actual or potential).I am unaware of any interesting exception to this rule. Needless to say, if one is worried about pleasing God or His angels, this assumes that such invisible entities are conscious (in some sense) and cognizant of human behavior. It also generally assumes that it is possible to suffer their wrath or enjoy their approval, either in this world or the world to come. Even within religion, therefore, consequences and conscious states remain the foundation of all values.
	13	+Moral uncertainty means we default to preventing extinction under any ethical framework
	14	+BOSTROM 11
	15	+(2011) Nick Bostrom, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School and Faculty of Philosophy
	16	+These reflections on moral uncertainty suggests an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not or even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
	17	+Death is the worst form of evil since it destroys the subject itself.
	18	+Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics.
	19	+Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82
	20	+Accidents (4:52)
	21	+China is expanding its construction of nuclear power plants at previously unseen rates, using broken material and stretching engineers and safety experts too thin in the plants’ riskiest stages. An accident will happen – none of their generic defense will take into account our specific scenario
	22	+Neuhauser 16 (Alan Neuhauser – US News; Journalism degree from Columbia; Awarded by Garden State Journalists Association 3 times, “30 Years After Chernobyl, Anxious Eyes Turn to China”, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-04-26/30-years-after-chernobyl-anxious-eyes-turn-to-china, EmmieeM)
	23	+In the realm of nuclear power, there is China, and then there is the rest of the world. By any count, the pace of construction is astronomical: Half the reactors built around the world in the past two decades were constructed in the People's Republic of China. Aiming to expand the country's electric grid and clean the air, another 22 are under construction. Still another 42 are proposed. Yet 30 years after the catastrophe at Chernobyl in Ukraine – the worst nuclear disaster in world history, one triggered by a design flaw that had been known about in Moscow but hidden from the world by Soviet secrecy – discerning the safety risks at China's nuclear plants is akin to trying to peer through a reactor's concrete containment dome. "China is totally nontransparent on these issues," says Albert Lai, founding chairman of the Professional Commons, a public policy think tank in Hong Kong. "The only information we've gotten so far – strangely – is from France." France generates three-quarters of its electricity from nuclear, and it's long exported that technology. In 2007, French and Chinese companies partnered to build two of the newest reactor design in Taishan, a coastal city in Guangdong province. Another two would be built in Finland and a fifth in France. Yet the project was soon mired by delays and cost overruns: Regulators discovered flaws in the reactors' concrete foundations in Finland, and there were problems with the French reactor's steel dome and base. Yet in China, the work pressed on – until French regulators pointed out the very same issues there last year. "What if the French did not notify the Chinese authorities?" Lai says. "The nuclear fuel would have been put into the plant, the plant would have been up and running with the flaw." China is hardly the only country where nuclear safety is under scrutiny. More than three-fourths of the nuclear power plants in the U.S. have leaked radiation and faced pointed questions about maintenance and security. The meltdown at Fukushima Dai-ichi in Japan in March 2011 was triggered by a tsunami, but adamning parliamentary investigation concluded "collusion between the government, the regulators and Tepco" – the plant's operator – created conditions that made it even worse. Even the French nuclear powerhouse Areva, which sells nuclear fuel and builds power plants, went virtually bankrupt in January, inflaming concerns over whether it's able to guarantee the safety and security of sensitive nuclear materials. "If you let your guard down for a moment, you can have a billion-dollar investment become a billion-dollar liability in about an hour," says David Lochbaum, director of the nuclear safety project at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a science advocacy group. Yet China, between its nuclear building boom and cloak of secrecy, stands alone. China's first-ever white paper on its nuclear industry, released in January, found its ability to respond to an emergency is "inadequate." A visit by a delegation from the International Atomic Energy Agency in July 2010 uncovered dozens of safety problems, including a lack of resources for the agency in charge of regulating the country's nuclear plants. "The speed with which they've been building the nuclear power program is insane," says Mycle Schneider, an independent energy and nuclear policy analyst based in Paris, and convening lead author of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report. It's stretched the country's nuclear workforce, thinly spreading engineers and experts across dozens of different projects, rather than keeping that expertise concentrated at just a handful of plants, Schneider says. And that's occurred just as the plants are in the riskiest stages of their lives. The reactors at Chernobyl were not some aging, crumbling legacy of the Soviet Union;Unit 4 exploded just two years after it started commercial operation, as workers were still learning and kinks were being worked out. The same was true at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, where a partial meltdown of a new reactor released a plume of radiation in the worst nuclear accident in the U.S. It's what's known in engineering as the bathtub curve: Danger is most pronounced at the beginning and at the end – before new knowledge becomes institutional experience – and later, when infrastructure begins to crumble. "Where you want to be is one of the countries that has reactors in the flat part of the curve, where the risk is not zero, but lower," Lochbaum says. "China has a lot of plants on the break-in area of this curve."
	24	+Even if safety regulations can be resolved, most of China’s reactors are near the coast and they’re planning to add 300 more – 13 chance of tsunami in near future and nearby earthquake cycle is about to begin it’s active phase. This guarantees 300 separate Fukushimas.
	25	+Tickell 15 (Oliver Tickell – The Ecologist; Journalist/BBC Broadcaster, “China’s Nuclear Energy Boom Threatens Global Catastrophe. Coastal Array of 300 Reactors Vulnerable to Earthquakes and Tsunamis.”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/chinas-nuclear-energy-boom-threatens-global-catastrophe-coastal-array-of-300-nuclear-reactors-vulnerable-to-earthquakes-and-tsunamis/5485346, EmmieeM)
	26	+It’s also instructive to look at the map of nuclear reactors scheduled for completion in the next decade provided by Forbes. The great bulk of them – 77 reactors in all – are built along China’s east and south coasts, for two reasons: that’s where the demand is, and that’s where the cooling water is readily available, from the sea. But of course that’s just the ones due to be completed in the next decade. If the full plan for 400 reactors by 2050 is fulfilled, probably some 300 of them would be sea-facing. There are, of course, nuclear hazards to inland reactors from flooding on the Yellow and Yangtse rivers and tributaries. But a much greater danger arises from the sea. China’s south and east coasts face out to seismically active waters. And as the Japanese discovered at Fukushima, nuclear power, earthquakes and tsunamis make a dangerous combination. Interest in the danger of tsunamis on China’s south and east coast was stimulated by the two Hengchun Earthquakes off Taiwan in December 2006, which damaged buildings and disrupted communications by severing undersea cables. One recent study put the risk of a powerful tsunami greater than 2m in height striking Hong Kong or Macau at about 10 over the coming century, mainly due to seismic activity in the Manila Trench. But head further north and east and the chances go up significantly to 13.34 at Shantou in Guangdong province. And it may be more than that, the authors note: “This probability estimate may increase with a recent rise in the earthquake activities, which started with the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake, because the Taiwan region has a earthquake cycle time of around 80-100 years.” What is certain is that the tsunami hazard is real and substantial. Literature of historical seismic records of this region is “abundant”, the authors write. The northern Manila Trench near Taiwan is “is likely to have a very large earthquake in the future. In addition the region is a volcanic belt. If volcano and earthquake occur in concert, a much larger tsunami disaster would develop. “Although the southern part of the Manila Trench is far away from the coast of China, the local historical records of this region have many tsunami earthquakes up to the magnitude of around 8.0. Since the oceanic portion of the South China Sea is mostly deep, tsunamic waves generated in the Manila Trench region can reach the coast of China with little loss in energy. “The wave energy can then be released in the shallow water region, and can impose a tremendous tsunami hazard to the coastal regions.” I have done no study of the tsunami vulnerability of all the 300 nuclear reactors that could end up being built along China’s east and south coasts. But at least one – the CANDU reactor shown in the photo(above right) at Qinshan, where seven reactors are currently operational, looks vulnerable in the extreme. And the consequences of a really big earthquake and tsunami hitting China’s coastal array of 300 nuclear reactors would be catastrophic. Many dozens of reactors could be struck down, each doing their own ‘Fukushima’. This would not just bring massive radioactive contamination to China’s most developed, prosperous, productive and populated regions, but spread around the world in air and sea currents to make the world’s first truly global nuclear catastrophe. The only good news in all this is that nuclear construction in China is not proceeding anything like as fast as Forbes magazine claims. Most of the more modern ‘Generation III’ reactors are well behind in their completion times, echoing the European experience with the failed EPR design. We can only hope that construction difficulties persist and abound – and that China’s rulers realise that investments in solar, wind and other renewables are a quicker, surer, safer way to bring power to the masses – and one that poses no existential threat to their country, and the world.
	27	+Radioactive pollution leaking into the ocean as a result of an accident leads to loss of marine biodiversity – the impact is magnified for China because most of their power plants are on the coast
	28	+Alexeev 16 (Denis Alexeev and Valentina Galtsova are from the Department of Applied Ecology at the Russian State Hydrometeriological University, “Effect of Radioactive Pollution on the Biodiversity of Marine Benthic Ecosystems on the Russian Arctic Shelf”, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1873965212000138, EmmieeM)
	29	+Radioactive pollution of marine ecosystems is one of the most dangerous anthropogenic impacts on the biota. Radioactive pollution results from the discharge of contaminated water from industry, the disposal of radioactive waste, and accidental contamination following mechanical failures on atomic submarines. Several areas in the Russian Arctic seas have been exposed to significant contamination by radionuclides. Chernaya Bay is the location of one of the former underwater, atmospheric, and underground Novaya Zemlya nuclear test sites; the Abrosimova and Stepovogo inlets on the east coast of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago have been used for underwater storage of barges, ships and containers containing radioactive waste. The Obskaya Inlet and the Yenisei Gulf were exposed to radionuclides from contaminated inflow via rivers for many years. The spatial distribution of radiocaesium in marine sediments of the Arctic seas of Russia is presented in Fig. 7. In sandy and gravel-pebble sediments of offshore areas, radiocaesium has accumulated in low quantities (1-8 Bq/kg). To the east of Novaya Zemlya on the continental shelf, the concentration of radiocaesium in the sand and coarse-grained sediments varies from 3 to 10 Bq/kg, although the value is much higher in some depressions in the bays; e.g., the Stepovoy gulf, where muddy bottom sediments contain high concentrations of Cs, up to 90Bq/kg. The concentration of Cs is 0.8-6.2 Bq/kg in sediments of Baidaratskaya Bay and in shallow waters near Sharapov Cats. This is typical for these types of coastal marine sediments. The bottom sediments at depths of 95 m to the north of the Ugra Peninsula, where silty sediment radiocaesium content is up to 27-31 Bq/kg, appear anomalous. In the sandy sediments of the shallow waters between the Yamal Peninsula and the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago, 137Cs concentration varies from 4 to 10 Bq/kg; in this zone the level of radiocaesium increases to 15–18 Bq/kg in silt-filled hollows. The highest concentrations recorded are in the clayey mud channels associated with Siberian rivers. Along the Ob-Yenisey coast, large volumes of suspended contaminants in river water drain into the Kara Sea. Fig. 8 shows a schematic diagram of the migration of radionuclides in aquatic ecosystems. The biotic components of aquatic ecosystems play an essential role in the redistribution of pollutants, including radionuclides. We can conclude, from available research (Ilus et al., 1993 and Kuznetsov et al., 1995), that macrobenthic communities are the most inert component of marine bottom ecosystems. Many of the major macrobenthic organisms can live for several years. Therefore, this category of benthos is slow to respond to an increase in radioactivity levels in their environment, which would be reflected either by a change in population structure or species diversity. A substantial build-up of radionuclide concentration in the macrobenthos is therefore highly probable and to be expected, especially in mobile and fixed sestonophages, detritophages, and deposit-feeders. There are few studies focusing on the influence of radioactive pollution on meiofauna. Galtsova and Alexeev (2009) analyzed the relationship between the biodiversity and abundance of meiobenthic organisms and radiocaesium volumetric activity using material collected from: around the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site in the Chernaya Bay (depth 31–87 m) during an expedition on the RV Geologist Fersman; the Stepovogo and Abrosimova inlets (44–74 m); around the Novozemelskaya Depression (333–403 m); and the shelf zone of the Barents and Kara seas, including the Ob Inlet and Yenisei Gulf aboard the hydrographic ship Captain Smirnitsky in 1995. There is a positive correlation between radiocaesium concentration and the taxonomic diversity of meiobenthos (Fig. 9). However, the effect of cesium-137 concentration on the quantitative measure of meiobenthos abundance is ambiguous. It is likely that small concentrations of 137Cs have no effect on, or can even lead to insignificant increases in, the abundance of the meiobenthos. At greater levels of contamination (c. 20 Bq/kg), however, there is a negative effect on meiobenthos abundance that may be irreversible, representing a tolerance threshold (Fig. 10). In conclusion, the meiobenthos reacts to radioactive pollution through changes in diversity and abundance faster than the macrobenthos, which is more stable and shows fewer effects in the short-term. However, in the long-term, the macrobenthos may show greater accumulation of radionuclides in their cells and tissues.
	30	+Biodiversity loss is an impact filter – exacerbates existing crises and leads to extinction.
	31	+Torres 16 (Phil is a graduate of Cornell University with degrees in Entomology and Biology; "Biodiversity Loss: An Existential Risk Comparable to Climate Change"; 5-20-2016; FLI - Future of Life Institute; http://futureoflife.org/2016/05/20/biodiversity-loss/; DT)
	32	+Catastrophic consequences for civilization The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.
	33	+Independently, the radioactive steam just from one meltdown would be enough to kill thousands and irreversibly destroy thousands of square miles of ecosystems
	34	+Wasserman, 02 (Harvey, American journalist, author, democracy activist, and advocate for renewable energy, author of The Last Energy War and co-author of Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America's Experience with Atomic Radiation, Spring, Earth Island Journal, http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/nuclear_power_and_terrorism/, “Nuclear Power and Terrorism” | ADM)
	35	+Had one of those hijacked jets hit one of the operating reactors at Indian Point, the ensuing cloud of radiation would have dwarfed the ones at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work force. A terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would render all five boroughs of New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed. Spiritually, psychologically, financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover.
	36	+
	37	+Terror (3:10)
	38	+PRC’s previous restricted use of HEU and plutonium checked terror threats, but recent explosion of nuclear development guarantees attacks - risk of dirty bomb creation and attacks on the plants that causes spent fuel pool fires
	39	+Zhang 14 (Hui Zhang – Kennedy School; Senior Research Associate at the Project of Managing the Atom in the Belfast Center for Science and International Affairs; Has authored books about China’s nuclear policy, “Reducing the Danger of Nuclear Terrorism in China”, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/ChinaNT-INMM2014_hzhang.pdf, pg. 2-4, EmmieeM)
	40	+Chinese nuclear weapons experts believe that, once terrorists acquire enough fissile materials through theft, smuggling, purchase, or other means, they would be able to manufacture a crude nuclear weapon and explode it, although such a weapon would not be as easily deliverable, complicated or high-yield as those of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, a gun-type bomb made of HEU is quite possibly within the capabilities of a sophisticated terrorist group. While HEU would therefore be the material most coveted by terrorists, a terrorist bomb made from plutonium is also plausible. Chinese experts agree that any grade of plutonium, including reactor-grade plutonium, could be used to build an implosion bomb.9 According to unclassified estimates, the Chinese military’s inventory of fissile material includes approximately 16 metric tons of weapons-grade HEU and 1.8 tons of weapons-grade plutonium. 10 China stopped producing HEU for all purposes in 1987 and halted plutonium production for military purposes in 1991. China has the smallest military stocks of fissile materials among the P5 nuclear weapon states. Most of China’s weapon-usable fissile materials are tightly controlled within the military. Less than half of China’s military stocks of fissile materials are believed to be contained in its nuclear warheads.11 Sites at which the remaining stocks may be stored include: the Jiuquan and Guangyuan plutonium production complexes, which conduct HEU and plutonium processing, warhead component production and weapon assembly; the China Academy of Engineering Physics, which conducts research, development and design of nuclear weapons; and dedicated fissile material storage facilities. Use in China of HEU and plutonium for non-weapon purposes are very limited. China has become the central focus of the international nuclear industry, due to its ambitious plans for its nuclear energy program before and continuing after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. Currently, China has a relatively small fleet of 20 nuclear reactor units in operation with a total capacity of 16 GWe. However, China leads the world in term of nuclear development pace and new reactor construction. 31 reactors in China, capable of producing a total of 34 GWe, are now under construction Beijing officially plans to increase its total nuclear capacity to 58 GWe by 2020,14and much more are under consideration for the coming decades. Chinese nuclear experts consider the risk of sabotage at civilian nuclear facilities, in particular a nuclear power plant, is plausible.15 As the number of nuclear power plants in China is rapidly increasing such a risk poses a challenge to China’s nuclear security. The Fukushima accident may also increase the terrorists’ interest in targeting China’s power reactors. In a comprehensive assessment of the risk of sabotage of nuclear facilities, the China Academy of Engineering’s 2005 book “Management of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Incidents” concluded that, “one possible route nuclear terrorists would take is to sabotage a nuclear facility. Once it happens, it could seriously affect the environment and public. China has a number of nuclear facilities that have a variety of vulnerabilities if attacked.”16 Based on the design features of China’s power reactors and the likely characteristics of a terrorist attack, the book’s authors identified five potential modes of attack against a nuclear power plant.17 These are: 1) attacks against the reactor building with the goal of causing a large-scale release of radioactive materials, which would lead to serious consequences including social and psychological disruption; 2) thefts of nuclear materials for future terrorist acts, including passive, explosive (i.e. dirty bomb) or atmospheric dispersal of the materials to incite public panic; 3) attacks against secondary facilities that would disrupt reactor operations, causing a shutdown with economic and psychological effects; 4) attacks against conventional facilities at nuclear power plants that would result in economic and psychological effects; and 5) attacks against plant workers, leading to a collapse in reactor operations and/or plant command structures, and inflicting a psychological setback. Among these five modes of attack, the experts concluded that the first, an attack against a reactor building, is the only mode that could result in the severe consequence of a radioactive release. The impact of the others would be limited to social and psychological disruption.18 However, it should be noted that the above conclusions are incomplete. As the Fukushima accident demonstrated, the destruction of off-site power supplies and on-site diesel generators could also lead to a major radioactive release even while the reactor building remained intact. Destroying the reactor’s connection to the ultimate heat sink would be another possible out-of-building strategy. So might be causing a fire in the 4 spent fuel pool if it is outside the building. Post-Fukushima reviews have concluded that assets outside the protected area of the reactor also need to be protected to avoid major releases. Those Chinese experts have also discussed sabotage scenarios against the reactor and spent-fuel pool buildings. Sabotage attempts by an outsider against a reactor could involve the use of portable weapons and limited amounts of explosives outside the reactor building. Experts believe that the safety measures incorporated in the existing DBA (design base accident), combined with security measures already in place, would prevent terrorists causing a radioactive release with those tools. However, they neglect to consider that terrorists would probably be able to take out off-site power and diesel generators from outside buildings. Chinese experts have also suggested that the current DBA also prescribes protection for the containment of damage to a reactor caused by the impact of a small airplane. However, like most other countries, it does not protect against a commercial plane impact or heavy weapons including missiles, which would damage the containment and cooling system of the reactor, resulting in reactor core meltdown and a radioactive release. In addition, if explosives are used inside the reactor building, the explosion could also lead to release of some radioactive material. Commercial planes and missiles could damage the spent fuel pool and create a loss of cooling water. This could overheat the spent fuel or damage it directly, leading to a radioactive release.19 However, many experts argue that the risk of an attack involving commercial planes and heavy weapons is extremely low in China.
	41	+Scientific studies prove that one spent fuel pool fire would affect over 3.5 million people and dwarf the effects of Fukushima
	42	+Stone 16 (This card cites research done at Princeton using mathematical calculations and computer programs in order to gauge probability and magniture. Richard Stone has a degree in biophysics from UPenn and has written for National Geographic and Smithsonian, http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/05/spent-fuel-fire-us-soil-could-dwarf-impact-fukushima, “Spent Fuel Fire on U.S. Soil Could Dwarf Impact of Fukushima”, EmmieeM)
	43	+A fire from spent fuel stored at a U.S. nuclear power plant could have catastrophic consequences, according to new simulations of such an event. A major fire “could dwarf the horrific consequences of the Fukushima accident,” says Edwin Lyman, a physicist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nonprofit in Washington, D.C. “We’re talking about trillion-dollar consequences,” says Frank von Hippel, a nuclear security expert at Princeton University, who teamed with Princeton’s Michael Schoeppner on the modeling exercise. The revelations come on the heels of a report last week from the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine on the aftermath of the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northern Japan. The report details how a spent fuel fire at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant that was crippled by the twin disasters could have released far more radioactivity into the environment. The nuclear fuel in three of the plant’s six reactors melted down and released radioactive plumes that contaminated land downwind. Japan declared 1100 square kilometers uninhabitable and relocated 88,000 people. (Almost as many left voluntarily.) After the meltdowns, officials feared that spent fuel stored in pools in the reactor halls would catch fire and send radioactive smoke across a much wider swath of eastern Japan, including Tokyo. By a stroke of luck, that did not happen. But the national academies’ report warns that spent fuel accumulating at U.S. nuclear plants is also vulnerable. After fuel is removed from a reactor core, the radioactive fission products continue to decay, generating heat. All nuclear power plants store the fuel onsite at the bottom of deep pools for at least 4 years while it slowly cools. To keep it safe, the academies report recommends that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and nuclear plant operators beef up systems for monitoring the pools and topping up water levels in case a facility is damaged. The panel also says plants should be ready to tighten security after a disaster. At most U.S. nuclear plants, spent fuel is densely packed in pools, heightening the fire risk. NRC has estimated that a major fire at the spent fuel pool at the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania would displace an estimated 3.46 million people from 31,000 square kilometers of contaminated land, an area larger than New Jersey. But Von Hippel and Schoeppner think that NRC has grossly underestimated the scale and societal costs of such a fire. NRC used a program called MACCS2 for modeling the dispersal and deposition of the radioactivity from a Peach Bottom fire. Schoeppner and Von Hippel instead used HYSPLIT, a program able to craft more sophisticated scenarios based on historical weather data for the whole region. In their simulations, the Princeton duo focused on Cs-137, a radioisotope with a 30-year half-life that has made large tracts around Chernobyl and Fukushima uninhabitable. They assumed a release of 1600 petabecquerels, which is the average amount of Cs-137 that NRC estimates would be released from a fire at a densely packed pool. It’s also approximately 100 times the amount of Cs-137 spewed at Fukushima. They simulated such a release on the first day of each month in 2015. The contamination from such a fire on U.S. soil “would be an unprecedented peacetime catastrophe,” the Princeton researchers conclude in a paper to be submitted to the journal Science and Global Security. In a fire on 1 January 2015, with the winds blowing due east, the radioactive plume would sweep over Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and nearby cities. Shifting winds on 1 July 2015 would disperse Cs-137 in all directions, blanketing much of the heavily populated mid-Atlantic region. Averaged over 12 monthly calculations, the area exposed to more than 1 megabecquerel per square meter ~-~- a level that would trigger a relocation order ~-~- is 101,000 square kilometers. That’s more than three times NRC’s estimate, and the relocation of 18.1 million people is about five times NRC’s estimates. NRC has long mulled whether to compel the nuclear industry to move most of the cooled spent fuel now held in densely packed pools to concrete containers called dry casks. Such a move would reduce the consequences and likelihood of a spent fuel pool fire. As recently as 2013, NRC concluded that the projected benefits do not justify the roughly $4 billion cost of a wholesale transfer. But the national academies’s study concludes that the benefits of expedited transfer to dry casks are fivefold greater than NRC has calculated. “NRC’s policies have underplayed the risk of a spent fuel fire,” Lyman says. The academies panel recommends that NRC “assess the risks and potential benefits of expedited transfer.” NRC spokesperson Scott Burnell in Washington, D.C., says that the commission’s technical staff “will take an in-depth look” at the issue and report to NRC commissioners later this year.
	44	+Even if foreign terrorists can’t attack outright, they’ll cyber-attack, which triggers a meltdown and is another internal link to theft of nuclear materials
	45	+Metzger 16 –(Matt Metzger, internally cites Nuclear Security Index (Developed with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and with input from a respected international panel of nuclear security experts, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Nuclear Security Index) “Cyber-security threat could cause 'Fukushima-like disaster,'” 1/20/16, accessed 7/16/16, http://www.scmagazineuk.com/cyber-security-threat-could-cause-fukushima-like-disaster/article/466160/)
	46	+A new report has warned of the danger of cyber-threats to nuclear facilities around the world, notably how an act of cyber-sabotage could “produce a similar release of radiation” to Fukushima. The report, the Nuclear Security Index: Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability and Action, was released by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a nonprofit which monitors the security of nuclear facilities worldwide. It is unambiguous in its findings: “A cyber attack against a nuclear facility could facilitate the theft of nuclear materials or an act of sabotage leading to a catastrophic radiation release. Yet most states are not effectively prepared to deal with this emerging threat.” While much of global public infrastructure could be said to be open to cyber-attack, the report details the multiple ways in which cyber-threats could pose a nuclear danger of catastrophic proportions. If a wilful hacker were to compromise the access control systems of a nuclear facility, it could allow someone to sabotage or steal nuclear material. Someone could also compromise the accounting systems of a nuclear facility, hiding the theft of nuclear material. Or, perhaps the most worrying of these threats, notes the report: “Reactor cooling systems could be deliberately disabled, resulting in a Fukushima-like disaster.” The NTI are certainly not the first to issue these kinds of warnings. Chatham House conducted its own study into the cyber-security of nuclear facilities, saying “as cyber-criminals, states and terrorist groups increase their online activities, the fear of a serious cyber-attack is ever present. This is of particular concern because of the risk – even if remote – of a release of ionising radiation as a result of such an attack.” The report points to the fact that many countries, though they are looking at and developing nuclear technology, lack the regulatory and technological capacity to make sure that it's safe. Since 2012, 17 countries with weapons-grade nuclear materials have updated their laws to bring cyber-security to nuclear facilities, but many have not. Of the 47 countries that the report surveyed, 20 “do not even have basic requirements to protect nuclear facilities from cyber attacks.” These include China, Iran, Italy, Argentina, North Korea, Italy, Algeria, Spain, Uzbekistan, Mexico and Indonesia. To this end, the report makes several recommendations for those individual states. Firstly, that governments have to including cyber-risks within the national threat assessment. Secondly, strengthening physical security for nuclear materials and facilities to protect against theft and sabotage is a requirement. States, the report recommends, should refrain from starting nuclear energy programmes before an effective nuclear security regime is established, and independent regulatory agencies should be established to watch over the cyber-security of that state's nuclear facilities. Tony Dyhouse, a man with a long history in industrial control systems and current knowledge transfer director at the Trustworthy Software Initiative, told SCMagazineUK.com that while the threat to nuclear facilities is, according to Dyhouse, “very large”, the UK is well equipped to deal with them. And while the world nuclear has a particular way of causing mass public panic, cyber-security threats to nuclear power will not always be overt. While state actors may try to steal data, ideological warriors like the so-called Islamic State may be interested in causing real damage. Dyhouse added: “We're lucky in the UK, this was realised very early.” He said nuclear and industrial regulators work with all critical industry in the UK and understand these specific dangers. And the industry, too, is “well aware of the threat" and can fall back on the government for support if needed.
	47	+Chinese nuclear power plants are uniquely threatened by home-grown Uyghur terrorists – checks defense about costs, transportation, and lack of motivation
	48	+Zhang 16 (Hui Zhang - Kennedy School; Senior Research Associate at the Project of Managing the Atom in the Belfast Center for Science and International Affairs; Has authored books about China’s nuclear policy, “China’s Nuclear Security: Progress, Challenges, and Next Steps”, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas20Nuclear20Security-Web.pdf, pg. 7-10, EmmieeM)
	49	+Terrorist attacks from outside groups may someday pose a real threat to China’s nuclear facilities. China faces a growing threat from extremists in the predominantly Muslim Uighur community who want to form a separate state called East Turkestan in the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) claimed responsibility for more than 200 acts of terrorism between 1990 and 2001. Since 2013, members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement have carried out more than forty attacks, resulting in several hundred deaths. Typical events include: October 28, 2013: A car crashed into a group of tourists in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, killing five people (including three inside the car) and injuring 38. The ETIM claimed responsibility for this suicide attack. Beijing described it as the first terrorist attack in Beijing’s recent history. More importantly, the attack targeted China’s symbols of power. March 1, 2014: A group of eight knife-wielding men and women pulled out long-bladed knives and stabbed and slashed passengers at Kunming railway station (the capital city of Yunnan province), resulting in the deaths of 29 civilians and 4 attackers with over 140 others injured. April 30, 2014: ETIM conducted a suicide bomb attack on the Urumqi railway station (in the capital of Xinjiang province), killing three and injuring 79. May 22, 2014: A car bomb attack on an open-air market in Urumqi killed 31 and injured 94. This attack was commanded from abroad by ETIM. Since 2013, the nature of domestic terrorist attacks has changed. Incidents are more geographically dispersed, the targets are more diverse, and the methods of attack have varied. Religiously inspired terrorist attacks have become significantly more frequent, more violent, and more sophisticated. From the 1990s to the late 2000s, most of the terrorist acts were limited to Xinjiang locals. However, recent attacks have been spreading over several large cities beyond Xinjiang including Beijing, Kunming, and Guangzhou (the capital of Guangdong). The types of targets are also expanding. In the past, most of the targets focused on government buildings and police stations. But recently the attacks have extended to civilians, for example train stations and super markets, and have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of civilian casualties. The type of attacks has changed significantly. In the past, attackers relied mainly on simpler tools including knives and axes. But recently, attackers have engaged in suicide bombings, car bombings, and have used grenades and other explosives. Nevertheless, so far, China has not seen complex terrorist attacks such as the terrorist attacks on heavily guarded targets. Terrorists operating in Xinjiang are also known to have close relations with international groups. Beijing has confirmed that the ETIM has long received training, financial assistance, and support from al Qaeda. Moreover, hundreds of Xinjiang’s Uighur Muslims are reportedly fighting alongside the Islamic State in the Middle East. Some of them, after receiving terrorist training and gaining actual combat experience, return for attacks in China. Also, terrorist attacks inside China could be inspired or supported by the Islamic State due to its connections with local groups. Returning militants have recently been arrested in Xinjiang. In the years to come, it is plausible that terrorist groups might be able to put together an attack on civilian nuclear facilities, in particular a nuclear power plant – especially as the number of such plants rapidly increases. The Fukushima accident may also increase terrorists’ interest in targeting China’s power reactors. In addition, China’s neighbors in Central Asia and Pakistan have served as safe havens for ETIM members. These countries also are home to a high level of terrorist activity and have been at the center of nuclear smuggling and proliferation activities. It is possible that East Turkestan extremists could acquire fissile material or nuclear weapons from their bases in these areas, which they could also use to plan and launch attacks. In short, both the domestic threats to China’s nuclear materials and facilities and the nuclear dangers that foreign terrorists might pose to China are rapidly evolving. Chinese nuclear security planners must design security systems able to continue to provide effective protection as these threats continue to evolve in the future.
	50	+Independently, the impact to terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons is extinction due to precipitated global warfare
	51	+Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33(7), July)
	52	+A Catalytic Response: Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers
	53	+A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.
	54	+1AR (1:17)
	55	+Semantics and common usage flow Aff – bare plurals are commonly used to make specific statements all the time in everyday language
	56	+Leslie no date (SJ Leslie. Generics. Princeton University. No date. https://www.princeton.edu/~sjleslie/RoutledgeHandbookEntryGenerics.pdf. FZ)
	57	+The truth conditions of generics have proved quite elusive for semanticists. For example, “dogs are mammals” seems to require for its truth that all (possible) dogs be mammals. “A tiger is striped” or “ravens are black”, however, are is somewhat more forgiving, since it is they are compatible with the existence of a few stripeless tigers (as Siegfried and Roy’s performances attest), and white albino ravens. “Ducks lay eggs” and “a lion has a mane” are more forgiving still; these generics are true even though it is only a subset the mature members of one gender which possess the relevant properties. This truth conditional laxity is limited in scope, however: we do not accept “ducks are female” or “lions are male”, even though every egg laying duck is a female duck, and similarly mutatis mutandis for maned lions. Finally, we accept “mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, even though fewer than one percent of mosquitoes do carry the virus, while also rejecting “books are paperbacks”, when over eighty percent of books are paperbacks. The correct analysis of the truth conditions for generics is a matter of great controversy among theorists working on the problem.
	58	+China has developed carbon capture storage, which solves greenhouse gas emissions even if it shifts to fossil fuels – prefer my evidence for specificity
	59	+Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 09, November, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is transforming the nation's ability to predict climate change and its impacts. This research was supported and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy; the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China; the multilateral Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum; the many public and private sector sponsors of the PNNL-led Global Energy Technology Strategy Program, “China Shows Promise in Carbon Capture and Storage,” https://www.pnl.gov/science/highlights/highlight.asp?id=685. JG
	60	+China's rapid industrial growth has come at a price—the country now ranks as the world's top emitter of carbon dioxide, the chief culprit in global warming. But new research points to a cost-effective, promising option to dramatically reduce industrial greenhouse gas emissions while meeting China's growing energy demands. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory scientists, working with their Chinese partners, showed that China has adequate deep geologic storage capacity for carbon dioxide storage to meet likely demand for more than 100 years. Furthermore, these natural storage reservoirs already are located near many of China's stationary carbon dioxide-emission sources. Why it matters: Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technologies may represent a cost-effective, viable option to help China continue to meet its growing energy demands while also delivering deep and sustained reductions in industrial greenhouse gas emissions.
	61	+
	62	+This research defines the pivotal role that CCS technologies can play in cost effectively reducing China's greenhouse gas emissions over the course of this century. Until now, the discussions around China's options were limited. "A lot of the policy dialogue and technical discussions have this really sharp dichotomy: Either China continues to use its vast supplies of coal and bad things happen to the environment, or they agree to forgo the use of this valuable coal and bad things happen to their economy," stated James Dooley, PNNL scientist and co-author of the report. Dooley leads CCS research for the Joint Global Change Research Institute (a collaboration of PNNL and the University of Maryland) and the Global Energy Technology Strategy Project. But the new study shows there is a much-needed third option for addressing these twin challenges—large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage technologies. The study is the first to map enormous and widely distributed deep geologic CO2 storage formations in China that could allow for long-term, cost-effective, large-scale deployment of CCS. The mapping of over 2,300 billion metric tons of theoretical geologic CO2 storage capacity in 90 onshore storage formations represents a vast and valuable domestic natural resource for China. The team has also identified an additional 780 billion metric tons of CO2 capacity in 16 offshore geologic formations along mainland China's heavily developed coastal regions, which could prove immensely valuable in this part of China where there is strong potential demand for storage. The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum(Offsite link) awarded the team its recognition award for this project in October 2009.
	63	+Nuclear power plants exacerbate warming and rejection is key to bolster the renewable industry
	64	+Mez 16 (Lutz Mez works for the Berlin Center for Caspian Region Studies at the University of Berlin, http://thebulletin.org/experts-nuclear-power-and-climate-change8996, EmmieeM)
	65	+In the coming decades, indirect carbon dioxide emissions from nuclear power plants will increase considerably, because high-grade resources of uranium are exhausted and much more fossil energy will have to be used to mine uranium. In view of this trend, nuclear power plants will no longer have an emissions advantage over modern gas-fired power plants, let alone in comparison to the advantages offered by increased energy efficiency or greater use of renewable energies. Nuclear power plants may also contribute to climate change by emitting radioactive isotopes such as tritium or carbon 14 and the radioactive noble gas krypton 85. Krypton 85 is produced in nuclear power plants and released on a massive scale in the reprocessing of spent fuel. The concentration of krypton 85 in earth’s atmosphere has soared over the last few years as a result of nuclear fission, reaching a new record. Krypton 85 increases the natural, radiation-induced ionization of the air. Thus the electrical balance of the Earth’s atmosphere changes, which poses a significant threat to weather patterns and climate. Even though krypton 85 is “one of the most toxic agents for climate,” according to German physicist and political figure Klaus Buchner, these emissions have no received any attention in international climate-protection negotiations down to the present. As for the assertion that nuclear power is needed to promote climate protection, exactly the opposite would appear to be the case: Nuclear power plants must be closed down quickly to exert pressure on operators and the power plant industry to redouble efforts at innovation in the development of sustainable and socially compatible energy technologies and especially the use of smart energy services.
	66	+Put away your politics DA – Xi doesn’t need political capital to pass policies – he’s an autocrat who uses his “anti-corruption campaign” as an excuse to murder any opposition – this also means he’s guaranteed re-election
	67	+Anderlini 14
	68	+
	69	+
	70	+(Jamil Anderlini – Asia Editor of the Financial Times writer. Was awarded Journalist of the Year at the Society of Publishers for Asia Editorial Excellence Awards, “Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Drive in China Takes Autocratic Turn”, https://www.ft.com/content/9b645f40-fac1-11e3-8959-00144feab7de, EmmieeM)
	71	+Ever since Mao Zedong launched the devastating 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution that wiped out China’s intelligentsia and much of its traditional culture, scholars and China watchers have wondered what the lingering effects of that period would be. A little over a year into his first term as president, China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, is providing the beginning of an answer. Mr. Xi came of age in that turbulent time and watched as his elite revolutionary family and everything he knew were torn to pieces. Now it seems it is his turn to wreak havoc on the cozy networks of power and wealth that have established themselves in the era of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In recent weeks, the president’s signature campaign against official corruption appears to have spilled into something more significant and potentially destabilizing for the increasingly autocratic regime. In his efforts to clean house, Mr. Xi is targeting a broad swath of individuals, families, factions and societal forces that do not answer directly to him. The tantalizing signs of a full-blown political purge are coming thick and fast, even if they are still mostly hidden between the lines of the country’s tightly controlled state media. In a typically terse one-line statement late last week, China’s anti-corruption authorities revealed they were investigating a mid-ranking provincial official by the name of Ling Zhengce for “serious crimes and breaches of Communist party discipline”. There was nothing particularly special about the announcement – except for one thing: Ling Zhengce is the older brother of Ling Jihua, head of the United Front Work Department- a government agency that seeks to influence non-party elite – and a former right-hand man of retired president Hu Jintao. In the Chinese system, arrests like that are not accidents since everyone in the power structure is acutely aware of where invisible patronage linkages lie. Mr. Ling has been particularly vulnerable since his only son died in a Ferrari crash in 2012 that also badly injured two naked female passengers. But the assault on the Ling clan, and by extension Mr. Hu, is just the latest jab at some of the most powerful ruling families in China, including some who were previously seen as patrons to Mr. Xi. In late March, the Financial Times reported that China’s two living retired paramount leaders, Mr. Hu and his immediate predecessor Jiang Zemin, had both warned Mr. Xi not to take his anti-corruption campaign too far. Not only did the campaign have the potential to undermine morale and loyalty within party ranks, some retired elders and their families were getting nervous they could become targets themselves. But in the months since, Mr. Xi has only ramped up his onslaught. Former internal security chief Zhou Yongkang, officially the ninth most powerful man in China until late 2012, has been in detention since late last year. An investigation into power sector corruption has been interpreted as a direct attack on the family and network of former premier Li Peng, the man known to many as the “Butcher of Beijing” for his role in the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. The son of former anti-corruption boss He Guoqiang, previously the eighth most powerful man in China, and at least one of his close business associates have been detained on corruption charges. The Chinese military is also in turmoil as several top-ranking generals from the previous administration have been charged with corruption and selling officer ranks. The official line is that Mr. Xi is serious about tackling corruption and blind to where he might find it. But in Beijing’s political circles, many are muttering about the vindictive nature of this purge and the autocratic turn that has accompanied it. Journalists, lawyers, non-governmental organisations, activists and other vestiges of civil society have all been subject to greater controls and repression over the past year. Most telling have been the harsh prison sentences handed down to transparency advocates for their peaceful anti-corruption campaigns and calls for party officials to disclose their assets. The message is clear: the authority to decide who is corrupt and who is not is the exclusive domain of Mr. Xi and his closest allies. As the purge rumbles on, many of the pundits who initially compared Mr. Xi to Deng Xiaoping, the architect of marker reforms and modern China, are starting to think he may be more like Mao.

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	1	+2016-10-10 17:47:43.4

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	1	+Tim Alderete, Nick Steele, Scott Phillips

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	1	+China AFF

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	1	+Voices