Tournament: x | Round: 1 | Opponent: x | Judge: x
F1
I negate and value morality because the word ought implies moral obligation 

Morality has to be a universal guide to action, since it is defined as “a code of conduct guiding social interaction.” This means that its first priority is making sure that everyone who ought to follow moral commands will are included in the scope of morality. That means that questions of structural violence must come first because they determine the scope of morality. Winter and Leighton:
Deborah DuNann Winter, Dana C. Leighton (Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas). “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” 1999. Pp. 4-5.
Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be are so oblivious to it structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual/cognitive processes we divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listen to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it.

Since the first priority of morality is moral inclusion, the standard is minimizing structural violence. This not only meets a necessary requirement of morality, but also is the most important question of the content of morality since it allows us to see when society is unjust. Looking at and attempting to minimize people’s past and present exclusion helps us to solve for larger social issues.. Mills: (bracketed for grammar)
Mills, C. W. (2009), “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls. The Southern Journal of Philosophy,” 47: 161-184.
Now how can this an ideal—a society not merely without a past history of racism but without races themselves—serve to adjudicate the merits of competing policies aimed at correcting for a long a history of white supremacy, manifest in Native American expropriation, African slavery, residential and educational segregation, large differentials in income and huge differentials in wealth, nonwhite underrepresentation in high-prestige occupations and overrepresentation in the prison system, contested national narratives and cultural representations, widespread white evasion and bad faith on issues of their racial privilege, and a corresponding hostile white backlash against (what remains of) those mild corrective measures already implemented? Obviously, it cannot. As Thomas Nagel concedes: “Ideal theory enables you to say when a society is unjust, because it falls short of the ideal. But it does not tell you what to do if, as is almost always the case, you find yourself in an unjust society, and want to correct that injustice” (2003a, 82). Ideal theory It represents an unattainable target that would require us to roll back the clock and start over. So in a sense it is an ideal with little or no practical worth. What is required is the nonideal (rectificatory) ideal that starts from the reality of these injustices and then seeks some fair means of correcting for them, recognizing that in most cases the original prediscrimination situation (even if it can be intelligibly characterized and stipulated) cannot be restored. Trying to rectify systemic black disadvantage through affirmative action is not the equivalent of not discriminating against blacks, especially when there are no blacks to be discriminated against. Far from being indispensable to the elaboration of nonideal theory, as in ideal theory would have been revealed 

CP --- ICCPR
A: Counter Plan Text --- The United States Federal Government’s congress should comply with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The ICCPR prohibits hate speech. Tsesis 10
Alexander Tsesis (Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law at Loyola University, Chicago), "Burning Crosses on Campus: University Hate Speech Codes.", 43 Connecticut Law Review 617 (2010), lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1125andcontext=facpubs
Typically, the balance is struck more in favor of the victims' rights, in contrast to the United States' inclination towards the interests of speakers. The international trend began in the aftermath of World War II, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It obligates signatory states to punish the "direct and public incitement to commit genocide."' 6 9 Not satisfied with the rather limited scope of the Genocide Convention, multiple members of the United Nations broadened the coverage through the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The latter convention requires signatories to punish "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, and incitement to racial discrimination." 7 0 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is yet another relevant international agreement. It requires that "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" be "prohibited by law."

 The US doesn’t follow the UN and legalizes hate speech Volokh 15
 Eugene Volokh (American law professor, the Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, “No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment”) May 7, 2015
I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans.

B: Mutually Exclusive --- The speech is still constitutionally protected when outside of the colleges, but it is now legal to implement restrictions in the public colleges and universities. 

Complying with ICCPR allows US to solve for structural violence. Ash 05
 Kristina Ash ( “U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global Influence”, Northwest ern University School of Law/Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights) 2005
Often, if the United States does not involve itself in issues concerning human rights, “nothing happens, or worse yet, as in Rwanda and Bosnia, disasters occur.”5 Thus, it is important that the U.S. have a voice in global leadership so that it may prevent these human rights atrocities. The tragedy of current U.S. foreign policy is that by excepting itself from international standards and policies, the US undermines the its role in global leadership and activism, and allows grave human rights violations to proliferate.6 The United States must reevaluate its foreign policy. A starting point is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).7 The ICCPR is an early United Nations treaty which “guarantees a broad spectrum of civil and political rights.” In 1992, the United States ratified the ICCPR, twenty-six years after it was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and fifteen years after President Carter signed the covenant.9 With its ratification, the United States attached “an unprecedented number” 10 of reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”), specifically five reservations, five understandings, four declarations, and one proviso.  When it was considering the ratification of the ICCPR, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations articulated two goals. First, it sought to underscore its commitment to the protection of human rights. Criticizing other countries’ human rights violations while refusing to sign the international treaty has made the United States appear hypocritical in the view of other states.11 Second, ratification of the treaty would allow the United States to participate in the Human Rights Committee, a committee established in the ICCPR to “monitor compliance.”12 This would allow the United States to actively participate in the development and enforcement of human rights around the world.

The US needs to act multilaterally to increase the scope on structural violence impacts. Tharoor reads:
Tharoor, ShashiIndian politician and a former diplomat who is currently serving as Member of Parliament, “Why America Still Needs the United Nations” 2003
In September 2002, a radical new document declared that "no nation can build a safer, better world alone." These words came not from some utopian internationalist or ivory-tower academic, but from the new National Security Strategy of the United States. For all its underpinnings in realpolitik, the strategy committed the United States to multilateralism. This statement should not have been surprising, for multilateralism, of course, is not only a means but an end. And for good reason: in international affairs, the choice of method can serve to advertise a country's good faith or disinterestedness. Most states act both unilaterally and multilaterally at times: the former in defense of their national security or in their immediate backyard, the latter in pursuit of global causes. The larger a country's backyard, however, the greater the temptation to act unilaterally across it -- a problem most acute in the case of the United States. But the more far-reaching the issue and the greater the number of countries affected, the less sufficient unilateralism proves, and the less viable it becomes. Hence the ongoing need for multilateralism -- which the U.S. National Security Strategy seemed to recognize.

 War is only a possibility when Ilaw is not followed Pickering 14
 HEATH PICKERING (“Why Do States Mostly Obey International Law?”, Masters of International Relations degree from the University of Melbourne) 2014
  All states in the contemporary world, including great powers, are compelled to justify their behaviour according to legal rules and accepted norms. This essay will analyse the extent to which states comply and the reasons for their compliance. Essentially, the extent to which states follow their international obligations has developed over the past 400 years. From a historical perspective, international obligations and accepted norms were founded following two key developments in European history. In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War by acknowledging the sovereign authority of various European princes.1 This event marked the advent of traditional international law, based on principles of territoriality and state autonomy. Then in 1945, again following major wars initiated in Europe, states began to integrate on a global scale.2 The UN Charter became the international framework for which norms of sovereignty and non-intervention were enshrined. Now, as a result of modern technology, communication, transport, and more, the evolving process of Globalisation, “The internationalization of the world”,3 has provided an opportunity for international law and accepted norms to reach every corner of the globe. However, the development of international law and accepted norms has not compelled states to comply all the time. Instead, the trend over the past 400 years has shown that states have been mostlycompelled to justify their behavior according to legal rules and accepted norms. The emphasis on mostly should be stressed. Even though the UN Charter does not permit violating sovereignty through the use of aggression, the extent to which states follow their international obligations varies. Louis Henkin’s book, How Nations Behave, articulates the extent of compliance.4 He said, “Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time”.5 As such, the trend in contemporary international relations is that war remains possible, but it is much less acceptable now than it was a century or even half a century ago.6 The benefit of the trend is that almost full compliance is said to leads states into a pattern of obedience and predictable behaviour.7 Therefore, conflict only arises when countries fail to comply.

Conflict drags us into the endless cycle of increased war and more violations.
 Maiese ‘03
 -Michelle Maiese: 2003 (“Human Rights Violations” Student of Philosophy at University of Colorado)
Many have noted the strong interdependence between human rights violations and intractable conflict. Abuse of human rights often leads to conflict, and conflict typically results in human rights violations. It is not surprising, then, that human rights abuses are often at the center of wars and that protection of human rights is central to conflict resolution.20 Violations of political and economic rights are the root causes of many crises. When rights to adequate food, housing, employment, and cultural life are denied, and large groups of people are excluded from the society's decision-making processes, there is likely to be great social unrest. Such conditions often give rise to justice conflicts, in which parties demand that their basic needs be met. Indeed, many conflicts are sparked or spread by violations of human rights. For example, massacres or torture may inflame hatred and strengthen an adversary's determination to continue fighting. Violations may also lead to further violence from the other side and can contribute to a conflict's spiraling out of control. On the flip side, armed conflict often leads to the breakdown of infrastructure and civic institutions, which in turn undermines a broad range of rights. When hospitals and schools are closed, rights to adequate health and education are threatened. The collapse of economic infrastructure often results in pollution, food shortages, and overall poverty.21 These various forms of economic breakdown and oppression violate rights to self-determination and often contribute to further human tragedy in the form of sickness, starvation, and lack of basic shelter. The breakdown of government institutions results in denials of civil rights, including the rights to privacy, fair trial, and freedom of movement. In many cases, the government is increasingly militarized, and police and judicial systems are corrupted. Abductions, arbitrary arrests, detentions without trial, political executions, assassinations, and torture often follow. In cases where extreme violations of human rights have occurred, reconciliation and peacebuilding become much more difficult. Unresolved human rights issues can serve as obstacles to peace negotiations.22 This is because it is difficult for parties to move toward conflict transformation and forgiveness when memories of severe violence and atrocity are still primary in their minds.