Summary

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  • Caselist.RoundClass[8]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[10]

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Caselist.RoundClass[8]

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Caselist.CitesClass[10]

Cites

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	1	+Foucauldian Biopolitics K=
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	6	+====Police don't reform because they want to change, they do so in order convince society to let them remain facets of the state's control. Police reform aims to build biopolitical power by convincing people that they are solving violence by changing the system when in reality that change is just done so that people grow to accept the power relations that constitute the police state====
	7	+Summerhays
	8	+J.J. Summerhays, Political Thesis Paper, American Police Reform - An Alternative Perspective 1979
	9	+https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=66749
	10	+To explain why efforts since the 1960's to increase police effectiveness through education have failed
	11	+AND
	12	+societal inscriptions imbedded in the positionality of the non-political agent.
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	14	+
	15	+====Limitation of qualified immunity opens the floodgates of the legal system, wherein hope is put in legality to make sure that officers are prosecuted when they commit acts of violence, but courts and the legal system don't make choices based on guilt or innocence, but rather categorization and power relations. These trials transform into judgements of the victim's souls instead of evaluating whether or not an officer has violated the law; passions, motivations, room for insanity, and other behavioral characteristics are assessed to determine culpability of the victim at hand. However, such criteria pave the way for the systematic regulation of bodies and allows for the worst form of biopolitical control.====
	16	+Foucault
	17	+Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish. 1977.
	18	+By this I do not mean that one has suddenly set about punishing other crimes. No doubt the definition of offences, the hierarchy of their seriousness, the margins of indulgence, what was tolerated in fact and what was legally permitted - all this has considerably changed over the last 200 years; many crimes have ceased to be so because they were bound up with a certain exercise of religious authority or a particular type of economic activity; blasphemy has lost its status as a crime; smuggling and domestic larceny some of their seriousness. But these displacements are perhaps not the most important fact: the division between the permitted and the forbidden has preserved a certain constancy from one century to another. On the other hand, 'crime*, the object with which penal practice is concerned, has profoundly altered: the quality, the nature, in a sense the substance of which the punishable element is made, rather than its formal definition. Undercover of the relative stability of the law, a mass of subtle and rapid changes has occurred.Certainly the 'crimes' and 'offences* on which judgement is passed are juridical objects defined by the code, but judgement is also passed on the passions, ~~and~~instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environment or heredity; acts of aggression are punished, so also, through them, is aggressivity; rape, but at the same time perversions; murders, but also drives and desires. But, it will be objected, judgement is not actually being passed on them; if they are referred to at all it is to explain the actions in question, and to determine to what extent the the subject's will was involved in the crime.This is no answer. For it is these shadows lurking behind the case itself that are judged and punished.They are judged indirectly as 'attenuating circumstances' that introduce into the verdict not only 'circumstantial' evidence, but something quite different, which is not juridically codifiable: the knowledge of the criminal, one's estimation of him, what is known about the relations between him, his past and his crime, and what might be expected of him in the future. They are also judged by the interplay of all those notions that have circulated between medicine and jurisprudence since the nineteenth century (the 'monsters' of Georget's times, Chaumie's 'psychical anomalies', the 'perverts' and 'maladjusted' of our own experts) and which, behind the pretext of explaining an action, are ways of defining an individual. They are punished by means of a punishment that has the function of making the offender 'not only desirous, but also capable, of living within the law and of providing for his own needs'; they are punished by the internal economy of a penalty which, while intended to punish the crime, may be altered (shortened or, in certain cases, extended) according to changes in the prisoner's behaviour; and they are punished by the 'security measures' that accompany the penalty (prohibition of entering certain areas, probation, obligatory medical treatment), and which are intended not to punish the offence, but to supervise the individual, to neutralize his dangerous state of mind, to alter his criminal tendencies, and to continue even when this change has been achieved.The criminal's soul isnot referred to in the trial merely to explain his crime and as a factor in the juridical apportioning of responsibility; if it is brought before the court, with such pomp and circumstance, such concern to understand and such 'scientific' application, it is because it too, as well as the crime itself, isto be judged and to share in the punishment.Throughout the penal ritual, from the preliminary investigation to the sentence and the final effects of the penalty, a domain has been penetrated by objects that not only duplicate, but also dissociate the juridically defined and coded objects. Psychiatric expertise, but also in a more general way criminal anthropology and the repetitive discourse of criminology, find one of their precise functions here: by solemnly inscribing offences in the field of objects susceptible of scientific knowledge, they provide the mechanisms of legal punishment with a justifiable hold not only on offences, but on individuals; not only on what they do, but also on what they are, will be, may be.Theadditional factor of theoffender's soul, which the legal system has laid hold of,is only apparently explanatory altered by the fact that its author was insane, nor the punishment reduced as a consequence; the crime itself disappeared. It was impossible, therefore, to declare that someone was both guilty and mad; once the diagnosis of madness had been accepted, it could not be included in the judgement; it interrupted the procedure and loosened the hold of the law on the author of the act. Not only the examination of the criminal suspected of insanity, but the very effects of this examination had to be external and anterior to the sentence. But, very soon, the courts of the nineteenth century began to misunderstand the meaning of article 64. Despite several decisions of the supreme court of appeal confirming that insanity could not result either in a light penalty, or even in an acquittal, but required that the case be dismissed, the ordinary courts continued to bring the question of insanity to bear on their verdicts. They accepted that one could be both guilty and mad; less guilty the madder one was; guilty certainly, but someone to be put away and treated rather than punished; not only a guilty man, but also dangerous, since quite obviously sick, etc. From the point of view of the penal code, the result was a mass of juridical absurdities. But this was the starting point of an evolution that jurisprudence and legislation itself was to precipitate in the course of the next 150 years: already the reform of 1832, introducing attenuating circumstances, made it possible to modify the sentence according to the supposed degrees of an illness or the forms of a semi-insanity. And the practice of calling on psychiatric expertise, which is widespread in the assize courts and sometimes extended to courts of summary jurisdiction, means that the sentence, even if it is always formulated in terms of legal punishment, implies, more or less obscurely, judgements of normality, attributions of causality, assessments of possible changes, anticipations as to the offender's future. It would be wrong to say that all these operations give substance to a judgement from the outside; they are directly integrated in the process of forming the sentence.Instead of insanity eliminating the crime according to the original meaning of article 64, every crime and even every offence now carries within it, as a legitimate suspicion, but also as a right that may be claimed, the hypothesis of insanity, in any case of anomaly. Andthe sentencethat condemns or acquits is not simply a judgement of guilt, a legal decision that lays down punishment; itbears within it an assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normalization. Today the judge - magistrate or juror - certainly does more than 'judge*.
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	21	+====Allowing the state to construct power relations via position in society leads to biopolitical management as certain bodies are seen as deviant and evil when constructed in opposition to the idea of a flawless protector; The police and the prison it serves apply normative ideas based on past judgements of crimes allow police to get away near freely in the justice system. Through the affirmation of an officer's innocence in an instance of violence, passive judgements mark bodies as inherent criminals.====
	22	+Johnson 1 explains Foucault ~~Bracketed for Grammar~~
	23	+"Foucault: Critical Theory of the Police in a Neoliberal Age" 2014 Andrew Johnson University of California, Santa Barbara, Political Science, Graduate Student He is currently a Doctoral Student in Political Science at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He received a BA in Philosophy from the University of Maine and an MA in Philosophy from Louisiana State University. He was formerly a Professor at Husson University, Guangxi University and Beijing Huijia International School. Main research fields: Marxism, Critical Theory, Post-Structuralism, Social/Political Philosophy, Literary Theory (esp. Pynchon and Borges), Chinese Politics, Critical Criminology, and Global Political Economy
	24	+ https://www.academia.edu/222087/Foucault_Critical_Theory_of_the_Police_in_a_Neoliberal_Age
	25	+Discipline and Punish distinguishes changes in punishment between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century.
	26	+AND
	27	+go. The 1AC reifies structures of biopolitical control through legalistic reliance
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	32	+====This also means I control the internal link to all your oppression args- the only reason why certain bodies are oppressed is because you allow individuals to pass determinations on the normative worth of certain bodies which ends up compartmentalizing certain groups as criminal A criminal violates the law because now, since the system has judged the victim in relation to the officer, the victim is by nature a criminal. The law immediately presumes such bodies are suspect to deviancy and violence and as such they must be contained. ====
	33	+Dilts
	34	+Andrew Dilts, Foucault and Felon Disenfranchisement. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Albuquerque, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mar 17, 2006 Not Available. 2013-12-17http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p97690_index.html
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	36	+First is the doubling of the offence. The specific offence is linked up with any manner of other activities that become associated with the offence.The actual offence is doubled with "… a whole series of other things that are not the offense itself but a series of forms of conduct, of ways of being that are, of course, presented in the discourse of the psychiatric expert as the cause, origin motivation, and starting point of the offense" (AB, 15). There are two importantfunctions of this, first a shifting from action to way of being: "its function is to repeat the offense tautologically in order to register it and constitute it as an individual trait. Expert psychiatric opinion allows one to pass from action to conduct, from an offense to a way of being, and to make this way of being appear as nothing other than the offense itself, but in general form, as it were, in the individual's conduct" (AB 16). Second,ways of being that are not crimes subsequently take on criminal character: "the function of this series of notions is to shift the level of reality of the offense, since these forms of conduct do not break the law" (AB 16). The doubling of the offenses has the effect of extending the law's reach beyond the action that has brought the offender before the court.The actual offense is taken off the table, and in its place the biographical narrative of the individual is substituted. A series of non-offenses become the evidence of the criminal before the crime to explain the subsequent real offense. The psychiatric expert tells us, Foucault states, that "when they are asked to assess a delinquent, psychiatrists say, 'After all, if he has stolen, it is basically because he is a thief,'" (AB 16). This odd inversion of causality (that the thief was a thief before stealing anything) is troubling because this logic does not, Foucault insists, actually explain the crime but rather explains "… the thing itself to be punished that the judicial system must bite on and get hold of" (AB 16). It is an explanation of the criminal subject, not the crime.In the end, we find the judge does not condemn an offender for the crime, but for being a criminal that already existed, in essence the role of such opinion is "to legitimize, in the form of scientific knowledge, the extension of punitive power to something that is not a breach of the law" (AB 18), namely any prior conduct of the "criminal" before the actual crime has been committedThis leads Foucault to invoke the emergence of the delinquent as the second doubling that takes place. The offender becomes both the "author of the offense" and a delinquent someone characterized by criminal conduct. Recall the line in Discipline and Punish quoted above describing the delinquent as, "an individual in whom the offender of the law and the object of a scientific technique are superimposed – or almost – one upon the other" (DP 256). At this stage, while still in the grasp of the court, the accused is both a responsible subject and an object suitable for correction. This doubling occurs because Article 64 requires the expert to "determine whether a state of dementia allows us to consider the author of the action as someone who is no longer a juridical subject responsible for his actions" (AB 18). But once expert opinion is included, it turns out that this is not what actually happens at all. According to Foucault, the expert instead works to "show how the individual already resembles his crime before he has committed it" (AB 19). Obviously related to the first doubling, in which past actions that are possibly deviant or improper but not themselves illegal become evidence of the pre-existing criminality of the offender, the offender is revealed to have already been a criminal long before being brought before the court. The purpose is not to demonstrate merely "potential criminality" but rather, "… of describing his delinquent character, the basis of his criminal or paracriminal conduct since childhood, is clearly to facilitate transition from being accused to being convicted" (AB 22). The judge is thus able to see the offender not as a subject characterized by free agency, responsible for a specific criminal offense, but as a determinate object characterized by need for the penitentiary technique. "Magistrates and jurors no longer face a legal subject," Foucault writes, "but an object: the object of a technology and knowledge of rectification, readaptation, reinsertion, and correction. In short, the function of the expert opinion is to double the author of the crime, whether responsible or not, with a delinquent who is the object of a specific technology" (AB 21). This is the precisely the condition of possibility that connects the juridical discourse and the penitentiary discourse described in Discipline and Punish. Legal subjects responsible for a specific transgression call for punishment in a purely retributive sense, in relation only to the criminal action. But delinquents, as a class of dangerous persons, must be handled differently, as the object of the penitentiary techniques.
	37	+
	38	+ 1) Uniquely turns the Aff, if the legal system is supposed
	39	+AND
	40	+for the alt, ladies this spicy piece of white chocolate is still single
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	42	+
	43	+====ALT- Vote Neg to endorse discourses of self-policing, a method wherein the idea of an objective, state-based police force is deconstructed in favor of a system in which individuals begin to form their own coalitions to protect themselves from harm.
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	45	+Everyone in a neighborhood, area or city coalesces into a faction and takes turns actively participating in the role of regional protection. This prevents violence amongst the people as the community constantly experiences a transfer of power via exiting and entering and re-entering into the service. Also solves antagonistic relations, the root cause of the violence which would trigger qualified immunity, as everyone is accepted and equal in the police-public power relation, which solves for the biopolitical conditions that manufacture anti-police antagonisms in the first place, all whilst transforming the prison from a place of suffering and punishment, to one of healing and rehabilitation.====
	46	+Leadbeater
	47	+"The Self-Policing Society" 1996 Charles Leadbeater
	48	+Charles Leadbeater is a leading authority on innovation and creativity. He has advised companies, cities and governments around the world on innovation strategy and drew on that experience in writing his latest book We-think: the power of mass creativity, which charts the rise of mass, participative approaches to innovation from science and open source software, to computer games and political campaigning. We-think was the latest in a string of acclaimed books: Living on Thin Air, a guide to living and working in the new economy; Up the Down Escalator, an attack on the culture of public pessimism accompanying globalisation and In Search of Work, published in the 1980's, which was one of the first books to predict the rise of more flexible and networked forms of employment. In 2005 Charles was ranked by Accenture, the management consultancy, as one of the top management thinkers in the world. A past winner of the prestigious David Watt prize for journalism, Charles was profiled by the New York Times in 2004 for generating one of the best ideas of the year, the rise of the activist amateur, outlined in his report The Pro-Am Revolution. As well as advising a wide range of organisations on innovation including the BBC, Vodafone, Microsoft, Ericsson, Channel Four Television and the Royal Shakespeare Company, Charles has been an ideas generator in his own right. As an associate editor of the Independent he helped Helen Fielding devise Bridget Jones's diary. He wrote the first British report on the rise of social entrepreneurship, which has since become a global movement. His report on the potential for the web to generate social change led to the creation of the Social Innovation Camp movement. Charles has worked extensively as a senior adviser to the governments, advising the 10 Downing St policy unit, the Department for Trade and Industry and the European Commission on the rise of the knowledge driven economy and the Internet, as well as the government of Shanghai. He is an advisor to the Department for Education's Innovation Unit on future strategies for more networked and personalised approaches to learning and education. He is a co-founder of the public service design agency Participle. A visiting senior fellow at the British National Endowment for Science Technology and the Arts, he is also a longstanding senior research associate with the influential London think-tank Demos and a visiting fellow at Oxford University's Said Business School and the Young Foundation. He is co-founder of Participle, the public service innovation agency, which is working with central and local government to devise new approaches to intractable social challenges. Charles spent ten years working for the Financial Times where he was Labour Editor, Industrial Editor and Tokyo Bureau Chief before becoming the paper's Features Editor. In 1994 he moved to the Independent as assistant editor in charge of features and became an independent author and advisor in 1996.
	49	+Perhaps the most interesting development in this field of cultural explanations for crime is a
	50	+AND
	51	+reconvicted after two years, rising to 72 per cent for young males.
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	54	+====Alt- This system of shifting and transferring control deconstructs the notion of stable power-relations and formulates a mode of policing that operates outside the realm of the state's control. 1NC rejects the totalizing biopolitical control of modern policing in favor of a system where power-relations are fluid and therefore non-coercive====
	55	+Johnson 2 explains Foucault
	56	+Foucault: Critical Theory of the Police in a Neoliberal Age" 2014 Andrew Johnson University of California, Santa Barbara, Political Science, Graduate Student He is currently a Doctoral Student in Political Science at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He received a BA in Philosophy from the University of Maine and an MA in Philosophy from Louisiana State University. He was formerly a Professor at Husson University, Guangxi University and Beijing Huijia International School. Main research fields: Marxism, Critical Theory, Post-Structuralism, Social/Political Philosophy, Literary Theory (esp. Pynchon and Borges), Chinese Politics, Critical Criminology, and Global Political Economy
	57	+ https://www.academia.edu/222087/Foucault_Critical_Theory_of_the_Police_in_a_Neoliberal_Age
	58	+
	59	+It is true that we can separate 'the police', its institutional form, from policing, understood as various techniques of control. '~~P~~olice and policing should not be identified with the police, and … one must stifle the impulse to equate police with men in uniforms. Policing is undertaken partly by the uniformed public police, but their actions are coordinated with agencies of policing situated throughout the state' (Neocleous 2000: xi, emphasis in original). The police is the science of governmental rationale. Governmentality is the knowledge of policing, the technocratic mastery of control. The police cannot be reduced to the State institution we are familiar with. Rather, we are policed in all sorts of ways, in all sorts of places, by people and institutions that are not authorised to enforce the law. Thus, we can identify policing throughout the social milieu: the surveillance and collection of bulk data by the National Security Agency, as well as by private intelligence firms such as Team Themis and Stratfor (Ludlow 2013); high-technology human tracking systems (referred to as geospatial information systems) and the popularity of social networks (which induce a deluge of daily confessions, alongside archival tracking put to profitable uses) illuminates the rise of a generalised dataveillance (Dobson and Fisher 2007; Ericson and Haggerty 2006; Ewald 2011); the registration, assessment and classification of homo economicus into enumerated credit ratings (by private corporations such as Moody's, Standard and Poor's and the Fitch Group, but also including Experian, EquiFax and TransUnion) (Deleuze 1992); the self-regulatory mechanism which governs futures trading in state-sponsored private associations (Harcourt 2012a); the upsurge in diet regiments, local yoga clinics and fitness centres; the mapping of the human genome (Human Genome Project) and all manners of advanced biometric control of life (Rose 2006, 2008).10 Neoliberalism subcontracts policing throughout the whole social field. We are in an age of self-policing: everywhere we are policing and policed, complicit in a circular surveillance of mutual reinforcement.11 Police is a mode of conducting conduct; police deals with living, and more than just living. Is it surprising that the police resemble factories, schools, barracks and hospitals, which all resemble the police? Foucault's history of the police uncovers the complex transmutations of the police institution; his critical project categorises techniques of control into multifarious modalities of power (ubiquitous, but also diverse and precise). However, he is unable to reassemble this complexity into a coherent whole; Foucault fails to characterise what the police are, their essential raison d'être. What is constant in the police? What is invariable, persistent and unceasing? Foucault's critical project is a failure if it is revealed to be nothing more than a hollow ontology of power. The police remain institutionalised, ebbing and flowing, transforming along with changes in politics and society. The police is the State. However, the police are also de-institutionalised; policing is dispersed throughout the social field, swarming freely, such that we are always already policing ourselves and others. Foucault reveals that liberalism disguises its effects; state power is concealed by its bureaucratic structure, a law-administration continuum, divorced from but conditioned by the State, obscuring its effect. Police will not be ameliorated with better laws or more judicious officers; discretion and control are inherently linked up with the policing function. Indeed, the police are a cold-monster, exemplifying a spirit of opposition and control (Agamben 2014; Pasquino 1991). Any decapitation of the State results in the hegemonic sway of market-forces; one cold-monster exchanged for another. Foucault's sympathetic endorsement of neoliberalism, alongside his cautious reluctance to engage in 'state phobia', is diametrically opposed to the critique of capitalism that propels his analysis in History of Madness and Discipline and Punish. 12 We cannot abide a normative nominalism when it comes to the police. The police act in service of the State, and the modern neoliberal State acts in service of capital. The best path forward for critical theories of modern police power is a ruthless criticism of neoliberalism, its functional mechanics and its organising principle.13 Foucauldians have laid much of the groundwork for a greater understanding of the neoliberal age/order and have advanced ruthless criticisms of over-policing (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Harcourt 2012a). However, so too have scholars who do not confess an allegiance to Foucault (Graeber 2005; Wacquant 2009). The modern-day American police are organised along a military model, violently unleashed to fortify and perpetuate neoliberal capitalism, its surreptitious puppeteers, the moneyed class and their elected envoys, resulting in the domination and control, both disarmed and assimilated, given no real alternative, of a permanent pauperism.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-01-02 21:02:32.359

Judge

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	1	+idk

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ParentRound

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	1	+8

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+Dulles Kurian Neg

Title

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	1	+ND Biopower K

Tournament

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	1	+UT