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  • Caselist.RoundClass[11]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[8]

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1		-2017-02-04 02:27:54.764
	1	+2017-02-04 02:27:54.0

Caselist.CitesClass[8]

Cites

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	1	+=1AC Universal Aisthesis=
	2	+
	3	+
	4	+====I Affirm and value morality
	5	+
	6	+We can never know others objectively, meaning any judgments we make are tainted by our own subjective perspectives. This means ethics must be pluralistic and inclusive of others experiences.
	7	+Friedrich NietzscheFriedrich Nietzsche ~~German Philosopher~~ Human All Too Human. Translated by R.J.Hollingdale. Cambridge University Press. http://archive.org/stream/NietzscheHumanAllTooHuman/Nietzsche-HumanAllTooHuman_djvu.txt. A.S.====
	8	+Injustice necessary. - All judgements as to the value of life have evolved illogically and are therefore unjust. The falsity of human judgement derives firstly from the condition of the material to be judged, namely very incomplete, secondly from the way in which the sum is arrived at on the basis of this material, and thirdly from the fact that every individual piece of this material is in turn the outcome of false knowledge, and is so with absolute necessity. Our experience of another person, for example, no matter how close he stands to us, can never be complete, so that we would have a logical right to a total evaluation of him; all evaluations are premature and are bound to be. Finally, the standard~~s~~ by which we measure, our own being, is ~~are~~ not an unalterable magnitude, we are subject to moods and fluctuations, and yet we would have to know ourselves as a fixed standard to be able justly to assess the relation between ourself and anything else whatever. Perhaps it would follow from all this that one ought not to judge at all; if only it were possible to live without evaluating, without having aversions and partialities! - for all aversion is de- pendent on an evaluation, likewise all partiality. A drive to something or away from something divorced from a feeling one is desiring the beneficial or avoiding the harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist in man. We are from the very beginning illogical and thus unjust beings and can recognize this: this is one of the greatest and most irresolvable discords of existence.
	9	+An external system of ethics that is detached from the ethical agent makes no sense
	10	+AND
	11	+outside view, but if we are tainted by subjectivity that becomes impossible.
	12	+
	13	+
	14	+====Therefore, there is no essence to persons. Rather, each agent creates their own ethical norms and identity in relation to themselves. This means that ethical systems must not be focused on creating a certain universal content to impose on all agents- but rather must be amenable to multiple perspectives on what is good and bad. This entails we must create a system that allows for pluralism in viewpoints. Nietzsche 2 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Genealogy of Morals. Translated by Walter Kaufmann ====
	15	+To renounce belief in one's ego, to deny one's own "reality" — what a triumph! not merely over the senses, over appearance, but a much higher kind of triumph, a violation and cruelty against reason — a voluptuous pleasure that reaches its height when the ascetic self-contempt and self-mockery of reason declares: "there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is excluded from it!"But precisely because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to such resolute reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations with which the spirit has, with apparent mischievousness and futility, raged against itself for so long: to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation for its future "objectivity" — the latter understood not as "contemplation without interest" (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject"; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason," absolute spirituality," "knowledge in itself": these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this — what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?
	16	+Therefore, the standard is embracing multiple perspectives-
	17	+Our thesis and sole contention
	18	+AND
	19	+neg interps. Just ask me in cross or prep time.
	20	+
	21	+
	22	+
	23	+
	24	+===Part Two: Assessment
	25	+===
	26	+
	27	+
	28	+====Sub-Point A:
	29	+Information- In order to engage in critique one must assess the culture of expression- that requires open communication and understanding.
	30	+Franklin. A.Todd Franklin ~~Sidney Wertimer Professor of Philosophy and Chair Africana Studies~~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 1: Kindred Spirits:Nietzsche and Locke as Progenitors of Axiological Liberation. ====
	31	+Equally concerned about the ways in which value absolutism promotes "authoritarian conformity and subordination,"26 Locke follows Nietzsche in proposing a new critical methodology aimed at demystifying and delegitimizing tyrannical forms of culture. In its earliest formulation, Locke's critical methodology describes the development of a conscientious understanding of any given culture as predicated on first, its analytic and complete description in terms of its own culture-elements, ~~and~~ second, its organic interpretation in terms of its own intrinsic values as a vital mode of living, combined if possible with an historical account of its development and derivation.27 Basically speaking, Locke avers that in order to truly understand a culture one must first patiently and thoroughly compile a comprehensive catalogue of all of the values, standards, and ideals that uniquely define it. Once this is completed, one must then develop a psychologically and historically sensitive interpretation of the culture that contextualizes it in terms of the peculiar needs, interests, goals, and conditions that give rise to its emergence and evolution. Moreover, as Ernest Mason aptly points out, Locke's organic methodological approach holds that "we must undertake a functional and historical interpretation of values in order to gain some understanding of their validity or appropriateness in the context in which they are employed."28 Emphasizing the pedagogical merits of this organic, or integrative, approach to systems of value, Locke later baptizes it as "critical relativism" and touts its usefulness as a means of promoting a broader recognition and acceptance of diverse cultures and ways of life. Committed to the "humanist ideal and objective of the best possible human and self-understanding," Locke sees his critical relativism as a blueprint for "the concrete study of man in all of his infinite variety."29 True to its name, Locke's critical relativism treats values as historically relative and strives to elucidate~~s~~ the various ways in which they change and develop while also subjecting them to comparative analyses in an effort to facilitate the development of a broader understanding and appreciation of cultural diversity.30 Detailing the elements of critical relativism more specifically, Locke goes on to characterize it as a powerful methodology that would 1. implement an objective interpretation of values by referring them realistically to their social and cultural backgrounds; 2. interpret values concretely as functional adaptations to these backgrounds, and thus make clear their historical and functional relativity; 3. claim or impute no validity for values beyond this relativistic framework, and so counteract value dogmatism based on regarding them as universals good and true for all times and all places; 4. confine its consideration of ideology to the prime function and real status of being the adjunct rationalization of values and value interests; and 5. trace value development and change as a dynamic process instead of in terms of unrealistic analytic categories, and so eliminating the traditional illusions produced by generalized value terms—viz., static values and fixed value concepts and "ideals."31 Thus constituted, Locke's critical relativism denotes a rigorous methodological strategy that bears a striking resemblance to Nietzsche's genealogy insofar as both endeavor to break the hegemony of recalcitrant expressions of value absolutism by fostering a critical consciousness that recognizes the dynamic, relativistic, and thereby human, all-too-human nature of all prevailing systems of value. The Dawn of Critical Consciousness and the Promise of Axiological Liberation Once enlightened by the dawn of critical consciousness, those who face social coercion and psychological debasement become cognizant of the open possibility of contesting their situation. Having developed a critical awareness of the contingent and dynamic nature of all systems of value, one realizes that one need not revere any particular culture or way of life as sacrosanct and definitive. Quite the contrary, for once one successfully comprehends the provincial and perspectival character of all systems of value, one also begins to realize that no particular system of values is unequivocally binding and absolute. For those whose eyes, "whose suspicion in whose eyes is strong and subtle enough" for such insight, the dawn of their critical consciousness marks the advent of the realization that alternative systems of value are indeed permissible and that this being the case,the horizon is once again free (GS 343). In addition to recognizing the opportunity to chart new systems of value and sail proverbial new seas, those who become critically conscious also concomitantly become cognizant of the fact that they need no longer see themselves in terms of prejudicial and distortive racial perspectives that impugn their character and worth by denouncing their valued idioms, practices, and traditions as crude, shameful, and savage. Throwing off the psychological shackles of a false sense of abject inferiority, these newly freed spirits stand poised to self-confidently assume the task of cultivating and articulating what Locke aptly refers to as one's own racial sense, one's own racial consciousness, and one's own racial tradition.32 At base,what all of these new and liberating forms of enlightenment speak to is the fundamental significance of rigorous and circumspect forms of axiological critique.Looking beyond,or rather beneath,the more obvious ideological differences between Nietzsche and Locke, what one ultimately finds are two kindred spirits whose common aversion for absolute values propels them to develop potent methodological strategies that empower people to consciously reject the objective pretensions of insidious systems of value and in doing so free themselves from the psychological fetters of various forms of axiological oppression.
	32	+Impacts:
	33	+
	34	+A- We need to understand all modalities of expression if
	35	+AND
	36	+principles work in history which is a tiebreaker argument if they contest this.
	37	+
	38	+
	39	+====Sub-Point B is Subject Position: Whenever we act- we act in relation to an audience. For some bodies that performance is reduced to arbitrary characteristics as opposed to the content of the performance- that causes an internalization of inferiority. DuBois refers to this as the veil of double consciousness. For example, black Americans aren't seen as real Americans by many citizens who have internalized that view. This internalization has manifested in incomplete social demands and a resignation to failure.
	40	+Higgins 1
	41	+Kathleen Marie Higgins ~~Professor of Philosophy @ UT Austin~~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 3: Double Consciousness and Second Sight ====
	42	+The self-consciousness that such observation engenders is an internalization of external surveillance. One may choose to defy the pressures imposed by those watching, but one is well aware of them as one's audience. Indeed, one's self-conception comes to involve a sense that one is performing for others. Audience reaction becomes a test of one's success.10 This reactive self-perception takes on a negative cast when the audience is predisposed to respond in a disparaging manner. This is certainly the situation of African Americans, according to DuBois: . . . the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but bring the inevitable self-questioning, self-disparagement, and lowering of ideals which ever accompany repression and breed in an atmosphere of contempt and hate.11 Thus far I have indicated three features of double consciousness: (1) the sense of being identified by virtue of a single trait (skin color), and thus being invisible in one's particularity, (2) the sense of being under the surveillance of parties predisposed to be unsympathetic, and (3) the ~~one internalizes~~ internalization of the mechanisms of surveillance and the adoption of associated self-disparaging judgments. Double consciousness also involves an awareness of oneself as a mixed being. DuBois emphasized the unreconciled character of one's aspirations, the "two warring ideals in one dark body." This condition obstructs fulfillment of one's human potential and one's participation in societal life. DuBois says of the African American: This, then, is the end of his striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture,to escape both death and isolation,to husband and use his best powers and his latent genius. These powers of body and mind have in the past been strangely wasted, dispersed, or forgotten. And yet it is not weakness—it is the contradiction of double aims.The double-aimed struggle of the black artisan—on the one hand to escape white contempt for a nation of mere hewers of wood and drawers of water,and on the other hand to plough and nail and dig for a poverty-stricken horde — could only result in making him a poor craftsman, for he had but half a heart in either cause.12 Double consciousness easily drains one's energies while this tension remains unresolved. But the inner tension it creates also motivates one to aim at a new synthesis, which Du Bois describes as the African American's "longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self."13 Although painful, the tension wrought by double consciousness provokes the desire for a more integrated self and instigates the self-questioning that might bring it about. The tension within the soul is thus ambivalent. One's duality provides ample resources for the development of a transfigured, comprehensive self, not just the potential for self-interference. In DuBois's characterization, as Byerman observes,"Blacks . . . are not nothing, but two things, both of which are coherent and meaningful; the difficulty is in successfully joining them for a greater self and, by implication, a greater culture."14 Although hopeful, DuBois sees the project of forging a synthetic self as inherently difficult. This difficulty is exacerbated by the temptation to be co-opted. In the Black World, the Preacher and Teacher embodied once the ideals of this people—the strife for another and a juster world,the vague dream of righteousness,the mystery of knowing; but to-day the danger is that these ideals, with their simple beauty and weird inspiration, will suddenly sink to a question of cash and a lust for gold."15 The allure of wealth is particularly dangerous, because riches are a clearer goal than that of forging an integrated self. The quest for gold cultivates the illusion that the deficiencies of one's position can be rectified through fulfilled material ambition. DuBois sees the promise of wealth as a false promise. Even if the aim is achieved, wealth does not eliminate the veil. Although wealth might be envied by individuals on both sides of the color divide, with accommodations from both sides to the person possessing it, wealth cannot resolve the psychological problem of developing a sense of one's own identity.To put it in Hegelian terms, wealth does not compel others to bestow human recognition on its possessor. Moreover, as we observed earlier, DuBois believes that the divided mind that has been cultivated in African Americans interferes with whole-hearted pursuit of any dream. They are therefore at a disadvantage from the start in any effort as competitive as that of amassing wealth. Worst of all, money distracts attention from the goal of selfrealization in a higher sense, which involves the construction of oneself as a harmonious being and self-assertion as a full participant in political and cultural life. The danger that goals of self-development and a sense of dignity will be abandoned is particularly acute at the time DuBois is writing, when Booker T. Washington's "Atlanta Compromise" has become the doctrine of many on both sides of the veil. This compromise is the concession that "In all things purely social we can be as separate as five fingers, and yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."16 DuBois sees Washington's compromise as capitulation, as a blatant abdication of spiritual and cultural aspirations to secure the satisfaction of African Americans' physical needs. Of Washington he comments, . . . so thoroughly did he learn the speech and thought of triumphant commercialism, and the ideals of material prosperity, that the picture of a lone black boy pouring over a French grammar amid the weeds and dirt of a neglected home soon seemed to him the acme of absurdities. One wonders what Socrates and St. Francis of Assisi would say to this.17 Explicitly abandoned in Washington's program are political power, civil rights, and higher education for African Americans. According to DuBois, the disappearance of these aims from the agenda of black leaders such as Washington risks the permanent consignment of African Americans to a subordinate role within American society and the endless prolongation of unfulfilled inner conflict. Indeed, the abandonment of these goals reinforces the inferiority that African Americans have been taught to feel. DuBois comments: Mr. Washington's programme practically accepts the alleged inferiority of the Negro races.Again,in our own land,the reaction from the sentiment of war times has given impetus to raceprejudice against Negroes, and Mr. Washington withdraws many of the high demands of Negroes as men and American citizens. . . . In the history of nearly all other races and peoples the doctrine preached at such crises has been that manly selfrespect is worth more than lands and houses, and that a people who voluntarily surrender such respect, or cease striving for it, are not worth civilizing.18 DuBois's own view is that the resolution of the inner turmoil of African Americans can only be achieved through self-respect and self-assertion, and any policy that interferes with either should be resisted by all legitimate means. The growing spirit of kindliness and reconciliation between the North and South after the frightful differences of a generation ago ought to be a source of deep congratulation to all, and especially to those whose mistreatment caused the war; but if that reconciliation is to be marked by the industrial slavery and civic death of those same black men, with permanent legislation into a position of inferiority, then those black men, if they are really men, are called upon by every consideration of patriotism and loyalty to oppose such a course by all civilized methods. . . .We have no right to sit silently by while the inevitable seeds are sown for a harvest of disaster to our children,black and white.19
	43	+Impacts:
	44	+
	45	+A- this relationship is inevitable so learning to navigate is key to making any meaningful praxis
	46	+
	47	+B- means imagining away the problems does nothing because oppressive hierarchies will just recreate themselves
	48	+
	49	+
	50	+====
	51	+Means rights claims are necessary to operate in society- doing away with them propagates helplessness- However, bodies in these positions have a unique vantage point because they get a "second sight" that lets them understand power relations that shape their lives.
	52	+Higgins 2 Kathleen Marie Higgins ~~Professor of Philosophy @ UT Austin~~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 3: Double Consciousness and Second Sight ====
	53	+Although the pain of inner turmoil makes the temptation to cooption a real danger, the turmoil within the African American's soul nevertheless yields a spiritual advantage, according to DuBois. This is the power of discernment that he calls "second sight."Wald describes DuBois's notion as "a rift between experience and evaluation,"20 and she emphasizes the positive potential of this ability to refrain from giving whole hearted assent to unevaluated surface appearances. "DuBois describes not only the pain of measuring oneself by a contemptuous and pitying world, but also the empowerment that comes with knowing one is doing so." 21 Second sight, for DuBois, involves the ability to see through the debilitating judgments that one has absorbed and to recognize their dubious origins. The second sight that DuBois describes is a function of having a perspective on everyday experience that differs from the majority's. Even if one soul within the African American takes the majority's outlook on most experiences, the second soul provides alternative, modifying insights that are equally part of one's perception. For the person with double consciousness, common opinion cannot be naively accepted.The second sight that DuBois indicates is the multidimensional awareness that emerges from double consciousness, a deeper perspective than that of less complex contemporaries. The ideal is to utilize this more penetrating perception to enhance one's effectiveness in the world. For the African American, awareness of how the white world views things can be useful knowledge, as long as one does not accept this outlook as something to which one should give deference. Moreover, double consciousness can provide the basis for distancing oneself from the contemptuous judgments of others, in that it prevents its possessor from giving simple assent to any judgment encountered. The gap between disparaging judgments that one has absorbed and the assent of one's entire consciousness is a starting point for refusing those judgments. Unfortunately, all too often, the African American's double awareness does not develop into a deeper perspective that is enriched by this duality but instead nurtures feelings of incapacity or inspires self-deception. DuBois reflects: From the double life every American Negro must live, as a Negro and as an American as swept on by the current of the nineteenth while yet struggling in the eddies of the fifteenth century—from this must arise a painful self-consciousness, an almost morbid sense of personality and a moral hesitancy which is fatal to self-confidence.The worlds within and without the Veil of color are changing, and changing rapidly, but not at the same rate, not in the same way; and this must produce a peculiar wrenching of the soul, a peculiar sense of doubt and bewilderment. Such a double life, with double thoughts, double duties, and double social classes, must give rise to double words and double ideals, and tempt the mind to pretence or to revolt, to hypocrisy or to radicalism.22 DuBois's book illustrates with examples the extreme difficulty of this situation and the tragic consequences to which it has led many. It serves as a stirring call to conscience for his readers on either side of the veil. DuBois directs the attention of all of his readers to their obligation to assist the reconstruction of social policies in a way that grants full social and cultural participation to all citizens. He is unswerving in his efforts to reveal the mechanisms by which African Americans are oppressed and the psychological toll that this has taken.At the same time, he rejects stances of submission and victimization, insisting that African Americans must assert their own dignity in order to successfully rectify the situation. He emphasizes the political goals that should be sought and the specific attitudes African Americans should cultivate, as well as some they should shun. DuBois offers hints as to how African Americans' inner distress might be navigated, but these hints remain more suggestive than explicit. The Hegelian goal of the black man "merging his double self into a better and truer self"23 is held out as the ideal. Some of Nietzsche's insights consider similar psychological territory, and I think that they can help clarify both the challenges, the temptations, and the positive potential of double consciousness. Accordingly, at this juncture I will direct the discussion to Nietzsche. In Nietzsche's writings we find a parallel with DuBois's account in his frequent discussions of inner tensions and self-conceptions in conflict. Like DuBois, he describes conditions of being seen in a manner that fails to recognize who he is. Although we can only infer which particular experiences were most crucial to Nietzsche's sense of being an outsider, his works reveal that he did consider himself disconnected from many aspects of the way of life that those around him took for granted. He speaks of himself as "untimely" or "unfashionable" even in early works. The "free spirits" that he often mentions represent his assertion of a positive attitude toward his inability to fit his time and place; his letters, on the other hand, often reveal his disturbance with the same situation. Seemingly, he had ambivalent attitudes toward his sense of distance from the cultural mainstream. His autobiography, Ecce Homo, provides further evidence that Nietzsche considered himself marginalized. He comments that he is not read, that one cannot communicate where there are no ears for what one says, and that it is possible to be born posthumously. The Gay Science also abounds in suggestions that Nietzsche considers himself a member of a misunderstood minority."There is a time for us, too!" he claims exuberantly at the end of the book's first section.24 Elsewhere he insists,"The moral earth, too,has its antipodes.The antipodes,too,have the right to exist"(GS 289). Nietzsche was quite conscious of the discrepancy between his multidimensional sense of himself and the reactions he provoked from other people.In the following passage,he uses humor to express this awareness. We are too prone to forget that in the eyes of people who are seeing us for the first time we are something quite different from what we consider ourselves to be: usually we are nothing more than a single individual trait which leaps to the eye and determines the whole impression we make. Thus the gentlest and most reasonable of men can, if he wears a large moustache, sit as it were in its shade and feel safe there—he will usually be seen as no more than the appurtenance of a large moustache, that is to say a military type, easily angered and occasionally violent—and as such he will be treated.25 A mustache hardly seems to distinguish a person enough to be taken seriously, and Nietzsche seems to be playing with the cliché of using a mustache to go incognito. Nevertheless, Nietzsche draws attention here to his perception of distance from other people.Although he is the outsider, we readers are insiders—we know that Nietzsche is a sensitive philosophical person and what others miss when they see him merely as a man with a mustache. Nietzsche's claims that his ideas (particularly those about morality) marginalize him indicate a difference between his sense of not fitting and that experienced by African Americans. One's ideas are not so obvious to others as one's skin color, and one might think that ideas are somewhat under one's voluntary control. Nietzsche would deny the latter. (He claims, "A thought comes when it wishes, not when 'I' wish."26) Nevertheless, reports of his almost excessive politeness toward acquaintances suggest that Nietzsche aimed to prevent others from noticing what he perceived as a gap between himself and them. In this respect, he was able to stave off to some extent the impact of other people's surveillance in a way that is not available to someone who is judged as suspect on the basis of pigmentation. Nietzsche's comment about the mustache also indicates a major difference between the trait for which he is mistaken and that for which African Americans are mistaken. It was a matter of Nietzsche's own choice that he grew and groomed his mustache as he did (at least until he went mad). Skin color, in contrast, is not selected or varied by the person whose skin it is (except rather trivially through cosmetics and tanning,or more eccentrically through certain extreme forms of surgery); it is assigned, one might say, whether one likes it or not. As for the mustache, Nietzsche apparently wanted to seem a bit eccentric (though one might ask whether his desire to seem eccentric does not reveal a sense of inferiority disguising itself as pride in being nonstandard). Nietzsche seems to have been able to limit or manipulate other's reactions to some degree. Nevertheless, he was aware of the internalization of a sense of being seen and judged by others, and the difficulty of asserting oneself in opposition to the observer's evaluations. For example, he reflects: The reproaches of conscience are weak even in the most conscientious people compared to the feeling:"This or that is against the morals of your society." A cold look or a sneer on the face of those among whom and for whom one has been educated is feared even by the strongest. What is it that they are really afraid of? Growing solitude! This is the argument that rebuts even the best arguments for a person or cause. Thus the herd instinct speaks up in us. (GS 50)
	54	+
	55	+
	56	+====That means you affirm- all speech is necessary- even if some speech is hateful it gives us a vantage position that allows us to navigate the dialectic that orders social relations.
	57	+Higgins 3 Kathleen Marie Higgins ~~Professor of Philosophy @ UT Austin~~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 3: Double Consciousness and Second Sight ====
	58	+There is yet a further way in which Nietzsche's writing may be valuable for furthering DuBois's project, this time with respect to the psychological situation of African Americans themselves. Nietzsche offers guidance for those suffering from double consciousness from the standpoint of one who has been there. He makes suggestions relevant to self-reevaluation that might counter the pressures toward self-hatred arising from those who control the status quo. He also warns against some of the same dangers that DuBois sees for those afflicted by the conflict born of double consciousness, elaborating on the psychological mechanisms involved. Nietzsche offers several strategies for overcoming self-disparagement motivated by the hostile attitudes of those who are comfortably ensconced within mainstream society. First, Nietzsche encourages the marginalized to recognize the limitations of the majority's viewpoint. Like all perspectives, the hegemonic viewpoint is incomplete."We cannot look around our own corner," Nietzsche tells us (GS 374). No one is entitled to claim, as those in the majority are prone to do, that their own outlook is the objective view of things. There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about a matter, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more complete will our "concept" of this matter, our "objectivity" be.34 Those who claim objectivity have less of the only "objectivity" available than those who recognize other perspectives. The perspective of those unfairly advantaged by the status quo is in fact far from dispassionate.Those who are particularly respected within a reigning social structure are easily moved to brutal reactions toward those who would question the legitimacy of the social support they receive. Nietzsche's character Zarathustra challenges the grounds for such individuals' "good" reputations. . . . beware of the good and the just! They like to crucify those who invent their own virtue for themselves — they hate the lonely one. Beware also of holy simplicity! Everything that is not simple it considers unholy; it also likes to play with fire — the stake. And beware also of the attacks of your love! The lonely one offers his hand too quickly to whomever he encounters. To some people you may not give your hand, only a paw: and I desire that your paw should also have claws.35 Zarathustra goes on, however, to point out that the person who would transform society's current ways of valuing should not be surprised to feel inner conflict.While this conflict itself may be unavoidable, Nietzsche urges the individual tormented in this way to resist the temptation to use this as a basis for self-flagellation. Zarathustra proclaims, "I say unto you: One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star" (Z P 5). He cautions against too much caution, and he indicates that the solution to this inner tension is self-transformation along the lines that DuBois also suggests. But the worst enemy you can encounter will always be you, yourself; you lie in wait for yourself in caves and woods. Lonely, you are going the way to yourself. And your way leads past yourself and your seven devils.You must wish to consume yourself in your own flame: how could you wish to become new unless you had first become ashes! (Z: 1 "The Creator") Instead of viewing tension as a sign that one is doing something wrong, those suffering from marginalization and the inner strife that it occasions should reassess their situation, Nietzsche contends.As he comments in Beyond Good and Evil,"The great epochs of our life come when we gain the courage to rechristen our evil as what is best in us" (BGE 116). Instead of viewing oneself as deficient for not fitting in, one can view oneself as occupying a particularly valuable role. One might see oneself as a pioneer, an adventurer, or a legislator of new values. The last of these is particularly relevant to African Americans who seek a transformation of society's values. Seeing oneself in this manner, one is in a position to heal the self-doubt that typically arises in those who are exceptions to the communal norm. Nietzsche points out that the innovator is necessarily marginalized.Thus one's sense of being outside the mainstream, even of being cast outside it, may be an unavoidable feature of being a cultural pioneer. One also can attempt to interpret one's own position as central to the unfolding development of humanity, even if this centrality is not recognized by those comfortable with their positions within the status quo. Nietzsche argues that each individual's perceptions are limited by virtue of being perspectival but are simultaneously real contributions to human understanding for exactly the same reason. This suggests that individual and minority outlooks represent an enhancement to society generally, the more so because they are not viewpoints taken for granted by the majority. Marginalization, on this view, is a precondition for assuming a particularly significant cultural role. Nietzsche also suggests the possibility of the marginalized person's reversing the sense of separation from others by absorbing what one can from other perspectives. This is a way of developing second sight through double consciousness. Because one is aware that multiple perspectives exist and command one's attention in certain ways, one has an access to their implicit insights that is foreclosed to the literally more simpleminded.
	59	+Impacts:
	60	+
	61	+A- you have to know what the oppressor plans to
	62	+AND
	63	+impact happens regardless and it becomes value neutral as opposed to being bigoted.
	64	+
	65	+
	66	+====Sub-Point C is agency. Even if communication persuades no one-it allows agents to engage in aisthesis – this allows access to an imaginary plain where subjects see themselves as capable of change and gain the capacity to revolt against value systems that demarcate them. Frederick Douglas fought his slave master, and through that experience saw himself in a new light.
	67	+Acampora
	68	+Christa Davis Acampora ~~Associate professor of philosophy at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.~~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 8:Unlikely Illuminations: Nietzsche and Frederick Douglass on Power, Struggle, and the Aisthesis of Freedom. ====
	69	+In the course of the struggle Douglass does more than seize the standards of measure of the master and apply them to himself. In fighting, in the activity of struggling—of transforming the situation and the outcome—Douglass derives a new sense of justice (and not merely a new route to it for himself).This new sense of justice enables him to see himself not as someone with (the right to) dominion but rather as an agent full of possibilities. It is that which produces the feeling of himself as free—this is what I call the aisthesis of agency. The aisthesis of agency is more than simply a sensation. It is an experience that carries cognitive import—something previously unknown is disclosed, and this opens new possibilities for action and the production of meanings. It is significant that this experience stems from a physical, bodily encounter7 rather than from the intellectual or spiritual labors characteristic of the nineteenth-century Bildungsroman tradition,among which Douglass's writings might be included but from which they should be distinguished. Meaningful freedom is not just a state of mind for Douglass: it is fully embodied; it gives the body new meaning.The occasion of his naissance into freedom was not a contest or game or rite of passage that was abstracted from the ordinary and everyday as in the heroic tradition of ancient Greek literature. What Douglass acquires is not a concept of himself as a person with a claim to power over others but rather the feeling of having forged a path to a new domain—one "as broad as his own manly heart," one characterized not by recognition of autonomy or self-control but rather by possibility and the power to imaginatively create a future. Douglass's fight with Covey provides him entrée to what Drucilla Cornell describes as "the imaginary domain," "that psychic and moral space in which we ~~ . . . ~~ are allowed to evaluate and represent who we are." 8 She considers how such imaginative resources are crucial for the formation of identity and one's capacity for self-representation. The imaginary domain, she writes, is what "gives to the individual person, and her only, the right to claim who she is through her own representation of her ~~ . . . ~~ being."9 This capacity, Cornell suggests, is what gives real import to our concerns for autonomy, which she conceives not simply as freedom from others but rather as the power to be the authors of our lives, to be the sources of the lives we live and the ways in which they differ from the lives of others. A new kind of agency is possible in the imaginary domain, and this is particularly significant for those whose situation is utterly abysmal and lacks options for viable action for change. Cornell writes that "the imaginary domain is the space of the 'as if' in which we imagine who we might be if we made ourselves our own end and claimed ourselves as our own person."10 In the imaginary domain, we are free to imaginatively experience not only possible objects of desire but the kind of desire (or the shape of desire) that will animate our actions and orient our larger goals and projects.When, in the fight with Covey, Douglass feels himself to be "a power on earth" rather than merely an agent who either lacks or possesses superior force, he acquires a different sense of human possibility. In this encounter, the intelligible end of the meaning of human being shifts from being cast only in terms of domination— the completion and perfection of which might be total subjection or even annihilation—to being considered in terms of agency that aims chiefly at becoming a creator of ends and the standards by which they might be judged. He moves, in short, from conceiving the good of human reality as power that is realized in terms of possession to defining that good in terms of possessing the possibility of reshaping the good itself. When one is free to be good not merely in terms of values constituted by others but free to participate in the determination of those values oneself, one engages a thoroughly different, and I would argue more powerful, sense of agency than before.As Douglass himself plays a role in defining the terms of his fight with Covey, as he determines for himself what will constitute superior moral character in his resistance, he experiences the felt quality of the imaginary domain in which his freedom positively acquires its significance and meaning. It is an experience that opens a whole new set of possibilities, and it enables him to surmount if not the physical subjection of his body the subjection of his desire that gives that body and all of its actions its meaning and future possibilities. Empowered by the feeling of his freedom, Douglass is enabled to imagine innumerable ways in which it might be further realized, which is not to be free of the demands of others.11 The kind of freedom exercised in the imaginary domain is called "freedom of personality" by Cornell, which "is valuable because it is what lets us make a life we embrace as our own."12 This, I take it, is what Douglass means when he claims "Now I AM A MAN," not that the fight has made him manly or summoned from him manly qualities, or that previously he was somehow deficient in human being, but rather that he had a palpable experience of the felt quality of himself as an agent full of possibility—to exercise restraint, to resist, to vie for determining the terms of his struggle and what its end should be—and that this was a life he could embrace as his own. It does not represent a discovery of a pre-fabricated autonomous, metaphysical self, and it is not just the building of himself as a "self-made man" who achieves his freedom by ruling himself.13 The struggle that marks Douglass's freedom represents a conquest over the anesthetized,mutilated aesthetic issuing from the lived,enslaved body. Why this would be vital emerging from the experience of slavery should be easily understood: the institution of slavery aims to exercise its control, force compliance, and justify itself on the basis of the idea that the slave is merely a thing, his or her body an object of commerce, property of another.The aisthesis of freedom deploys creative resources that enliven and enable the power of human agency.This is what Douglass achieves in his momentous struggle. He becomes, in the words of Simone de Beauvoir,"apprenticed in freedom"and hence enabled and empowered to revolt against the values that reduce his existence to useful property and exclude him from legitimizing human community.14 Slavery cements its hold by effecting transmogrified desire and impairment of any sense of the erotic that would enable one to see oneself as a maker of pleasure and beauty, one who shares and introduces meaningful value in the world.What Douglass acquires in the fight with Covey is a kind of visibility (both a kind of seeing and being seen) activated by what has been called by others "loving perception," a way of seeing the world such that one seizes upon and finds one's ecstasies in the possibilities of what one perceives.1
	70	+
	71	+
	72	+====Cultivation of the self means we have no reason to use violence speech or acts anymore- means 1AC solves- Acampora 2
	73	+Christa Davis Acampora ~~Associate professor of philosophy at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.~~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 8:Unlikely Illuminations: Nietzsche and Frederick Douglass on Power, Struggle, and the Aisthesis of Freedom. ====
	74	+Thus far my account of how Nietzsche thinks about the use and abuse of power in relation to struggle and its transformative possibilities, leaves unaddressed several serious ways in which Nietzsche diverges from Douglass on these matters, and these concerns have a bearing on the charge of racism mentioned in the introduction. It should be clear that although I do not think Nietzsche is an advocate of cruelty and violence—the evidence for which is his condemnation of antiagonistic views on the grounds that they actually constitute a celebration of cruelty and torture as they shut down opportunities for creative expressions of force as discussed above—Nietzsche is clearly no pacifist, and he acknowledges that there is no ultimate constraint against abusive expressions of power. Nonetheless, Nietzsche thinks we will be less interested, less in need of pursuing a sense of ourselves as agents through violent force if and when we have the opportunity to cultivate a sense of ourselves as powerful in ways that actually enhance the significance of our possibilities generally. Nietzsche's genealogies of slavish moralities highlight well this very concern and render more intelligible his discussion of suffering.29
	75	+
	76	+
	77	+====Sub-point D: Banning words give words power which traps oppression in place and makes agency impossible.
	78	+Butler **Judith (Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California-Berkeley), Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, Routledge, 1997.====**
	79	+Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserv~~es~~ their power to injure, and arrest~~s~~ the possibility of a reworking that might shift~~ing~~ their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition. It may be that trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of ~~a~~ originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.
	80	+Impacts:
	81	+1. Words are used to hurt people because they are given power via
	82	+2. AND
	83	+3. words as opposed to mindsets that allowed words to happen which does nothing.
	84	+
	85	+
	86	+====Line drawing problem- speech codes become useless. ====
	87	+Gates
	88	+Henry Louis Gates, Professor and Director of the Hutchins Center for African and African American Research at Harvard University. Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. New York University Press. 1994.
	89	+At the very least, this approach would promise a quick solution to the abuse
	90	+AND
	91	+group in Chicago will be in plentiful supply; the policeman's grandmother will offer

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-02-04 02:27:57.570

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	1	+asd

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	1	+asda

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	1	+11

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	1	+2

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	1	+Dulles Kurian Aff

Title

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	1	+JF- 1AC Universal Aistheisis

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	1	+Colleyville