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	1	+European conceptions of reason/body dualism posit non-white people – especially women – as irrational and closer to nature, and therefore dominable and exploitable
	2	+Quijano 2000 (Anibal, Professor of sociology at Binghamton University, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” http://www.unc.edu/~aescobar/wan/wanquijano.pdf, 2000)
	3	+With Descartes the mutation of the ancient dualist approach to¶ the bodyand the nonbodytook place.23 What was a permanent copresence¶ of both elements in each stage of the human being, with Descartes came a¶ radical separation between reason/subject and body. Reason was not only a¶ secularization of the idea of the soul in the theological sense, but a mutation¶ into a new entity, the reason/subject, the only entity capable of rational¶ knowledge. The body was and could be nothing but an object of knowledge.¶ From this point of view the human being is, par excellence, a being¶ gifted with reason, and this gift was conceived as localized exclusively in the¶ soul. Thus the body, by definition incapable of reason, does not have anything¶ that meets reason/subject. The radical separation produced between¶ reason/subject and body and their relations should be seen only as relations¶ between the human subject/reason and the human body/nature, or between¶ spirit and nature. In this way, in Eurocentric rationality the body was fixed¶ as object of knowledge, outside of the environment of subject/reason.¶ Without this objectification of the body as nature, its expulsion¶ from the sphere of the spirit (and this is mystrong thesis), the “scientific”¶ theorization of the problem of race (as in the case of the comte de Gobineau¶ 1853–57 during the nineteenth century) would have hardly been¶ possible. From the Eurocentric perspective, certain races are condemned¶ as inferior for not being rational subjects. They are objects of study, consequently bodies closer to nature. In a sense, they became dominable and¶ exploitable. According to the myth of the state of nature and the chain of¶ the civilizing process that culminates in European civilization, some races—¶ blacks, American Indians, or yellows—are closer to nature than whites.24¶ It was only within this peculiar perspective that non-European peoples¶ were considered as an object of knowledge and domination/exploitation by¶ Europeans virtually to the end of World War II.¶ This new and radical dualism affected not only the racial relations¶ of domination, but the older sexual relations of domination as well. Women,¶ especially the women of inferior races (“women of color”), remained stereotyped¶ together with the rest of the bodies, and their place was all the more inferior for their race, so that they were considered much closer to nature or¶ (as was the case with black slaves) directly within nature. It is probable (although¶ the question remains to be investigated) that the new idea of gender¶ has been elaborated after the new and radical dualism of the Eurocentric¶ cognitive perspective in the articulation of the colonialityof power.¶ Furthermore, the new radical dualism was amalgamated in the¶ eighteenth century with the new mystified ideas of “progress” and of the¶ state of nature in the human trajectory: the foundational myths of the Eurocentric¶ version of modernity. The peculiar dualist/evolutionist historical¶ perspective was linked to the foundational myths. Thus, all non-Europeans¶ could be considered as pre-European and at the same time displaced on a¶ certain historical chain from the primitive to the civilized, from the rational¶ to the irrational, from the traditional to the modern, from the magic-mythic¶ to the scientific. In other words, from the non-European/pre-European to¶ something that in time will be Europeanized or modernized.Without considering¶ the entire experience of colonialism and coloniality,this intellectual¶ trademark, as well as the long-lasting global hegemonyof Eurocentrism,¶ would hardlyb e explicable. The necessities of capital as such alone do not¶ exhaust, could not exhaust, the explanation of the character and trajectory¶ of this perspective of knowledge.
	4	+
	5	+ANY philosophical project that relies on rationality as a universal ethical principle justifies colonialism by treating their narrow vision of reason as an absolute strategy to judge others against
	6	+Minnich 1900 Elizabeth Kamarck, Senior Scholar, the Association of American Colleges and Universities. Transforming Knowledge. 1900. Pg. 115-16
	7	+The responses to such questions that are suggested by these books may and may not be adequate, of course. It has frequently been suggested that the effort to say what women are like risks perpetuating the old errors resulting from faulty universalization (or essentialism). All women are by no means alike, after all, not only across but within cultures, and subcultures. That is one problem. Another is that the ways of reasoning, of knowing, of judging, depicted in these books, precisely insofar as they may be general (if no; universal), may derive from the general oppression of women. That is, what we find by studying "the woman's voice" now may not only not be the woman's voice, but may specifically not be the, or a, voice that we would hear had women not been oppressed so systematically for so long. The debate around these works is complex and important, but I wish here only to note that their popularity tells us that many of us are deeply hungry for public recognition of ways of thought different from the few that have been in the ascendancy for so long. I would also note that, as Sara Ruddick demonstrates in Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace,14 we may indeed need to find the suppressed voices not just to make ourselves feel better, or to change education, or even to enrich our understanding of 'rationality/ but to make the peace we must have if we are to survive on this earth. For that essential effort, nonexclusive universals may indeed be helpful~-~-again, not as things we can know, but as ideas we can think, as we can think but never know the idea of justice, as justice is approached but never realized in any particular set of laws, institutions, or practices.15 It is the circular, self-referential and sell-justifying meaning of reason that needs to be particularized if we are to think more freely about thinking, about knowing. Bui many respond to the effort to particularize as if reason-itself were under attack. It is only under attack as long as one persists in claiming for a particular version of it the totality of human reason rather than a particular share or mode of expression of that infinitely rich gift, which can always overleap itself and so cannot catch itself in any of its particular constructions. By including reason in this discussion of mystified concepts, I am suggesting that the narrow view of reason we can find functioning in (rather than consciously held by) many academics (among others) has served some purposes. Among other things, it has worked quite effectively to allow the dominant few in the Western tradition to brand others "irrational.” And that, in a tradition that has taken rationality to be the characteristic of the truly and fully human, has had very serious consequences. As Aristotle said, slaves and in different ways 'free' women, being less rational than free men, need to be ruled~-~-and, the tradition added, "the Dark Continent" needs to have enlightenment brought to it. Conquest, rule, mastery, are all served well by a notion of reason that is both narrow and absolutized. When one has said, "That's an irrational idea,” one has not only exempted oneself from asking whether it is true, but also from considering whether or not it is expressive of some real experience or is indicative of someone's good-faith effort to remedy a situation~-~-from asking whether that which presently seems "irrational" is, perhaps, born of an "intuition" of a "new world/'16 The irrational, judged as such against a narrow (or even an adequate) definition of "rational," is not the same as the anti-rational.
	8	+Rationality has historically been a tool used by Western thinkers to invent fundamental differences between Europe and the rest of humanity in order to justify the inferiority of non-white peoples.
	9	+Eze 97 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze African philosophy: an anthology. “Modern Western Philosophy and African Colonialism.”1997
	10	+When Western philosophy speaks of "reason." It is not just speaking of "science" and "knowledge" and "method," and "critique," or even "thought." In and through these codes it is more fundamentally the question of the "anthropos," of the human, that is at stake, for questions of knowledge and identity, logos and anthropos, always hang together. It is within this background of anthropos as logikos the interlacing of human understanding and the understanding of the human, that Europeans originally introduced the notion of a difference in kind between themselves and Africans as a way of justifying unspeakable exploitation and denigration of Africans.
	11	+
	12	+Link 2: Kant
	13	+Kantianism is tainted by racist assumptions. To Kant only Europeans count as fully human, all others must be forced to conform.
	14	+Eze 97 Emmanuel Chukwudi, Prof. Philosophy DePaul University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Color of Reason.” Pg. 130-31 “It should be…of human nature.”
	15	+It should be obvious that what is at stake in our critique of Kant is, as Lucius Outlaw pointedly stales, the "struggle over the meaning of man,"140 or the project of defining what it means to be(come) human. In 1765 Kant wrote: “If there is any science man really needs, ii is the one 1 teach, of how to fulfill properly that position in creation which is assigned to man, and from which he is able to learn what one must be m order to be a man.” It is clear that what Kant settled upon as the "essence" of humanity, that which one ought to become in order to deserve human dignity, sounds very much like Kant himself: "white," European, and male.'4* More broadly speaking, Kant's philosophical anthropology reveals itself as the guardian of Europe's self-image of itself as superior and the rest of the world as barbaric. Behind Kant's anthropology is what Tsenay Serequeberhan characterizes as "the singular and grounding metaphysical belief that European humanity is properly speaking isomorphic with the humanity of the human as such. This universalist conjunction of metaphysics and anthropology is made possible by a philosophy which understands itself as the lieu of logos so that philosophical anthropology becomes the logocentric articulation of an ahisiorical, universal, and unchanging essence of "man." The so-called primitives surely ought to be wary of such Kantian universalist-humanoid abstraction, which colonizes humanity by grounding the particularity of the European self as center even as it denies the humanity of others. And lest it be forgotten, nothing that I have said here is particularly new. Friedrich Gentz, who studied with Kant at Konigsberg In between 1783 and 1786, pointed out that, if the goal of Kant's anthropological theories were realized, it would "compact the whole species into one and the same form," a dangerous situation which would destroy diversity and the "free movement of the spirit" for anyone who disagreed with Kant's compact would be treated as a rebel against fundamental principles of human nature.
	16	+
	17	+Kant’s central premise that some races, namely white people, are inherently superior to the “uncivilized savages” of Africa, Asia, and the Americas is the driving force behind the ideology of colonialism – that civilization must be imposed on the savage for their own good.
	18	+Eze 97 Emmanuel Chukwudi, Prof. Philosophy DePaul University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Color of Reason.” Pg. 130-31 “It should be…of human nature.”
	19	+To be sure, the answer to the question of whose humanity is at stake in Kant’s conception of the Enlightenment is rather simple. Two decades prior to “What is Enlightenment?” (1784), Kant had given his categorical response to this question in his precritical work, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. In this work, Kant unequivocally affirms that The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praise-worthy quality, even though among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color. Much could be written on the “enlightened” and “enlightening” remarks. Kant, who never left the security and cultural ambiance of his country and native city of Konigsberg, makes light of being “transported elsewhere.” Kant, who, as Hannah Arendt has noted, valued highly “one’s community sense, one’s sensus communis” and saw it as the source of one’s humanity and critical capacity to judge and communicate, makes light of being uprooted (i.e., the experience of enslavement) when this catastrophe befalls the “Negroes of Africa. But to return to our main point: Kant recognizes a “fundamental” “difference” and correlates “mental capacities” to the “color” of “these two races.” For him the distance between the “mental capacities” of “these two races” is as radically and quantitatively different (in the spectrum of colors) as between white (the absence of color) and black (the complete absorption of the same). It should be noted, furthermore, that it is not only the “Negroes of Africa” that are castigated in this manner. The passage is too long to quote; it includeinges all of the non-European peoples that Kant could have known about —the Arabs, the Persians, the Japanese, the Indians, the Chinese, an the “savages” of North America. The differing non-european peoples listed are described in an extremely pejorative manner, and a few are “complimented” by being compared with Europeans. The Arabs and the Persians are the Spaniards and the French of the Orient respectively, and the Japanese are the Englishmen of this exotic place! The “Negroes of Africa,” on the other hand, stand at the highest point of this negative pinnacle, precisely because they are assuredly “quite black from head to foot.” From all of this, the, it follows that, insofar as the project of the Enlightenment is concerned with “the totality of men united socially on earth into peoples” and is aimed at establishing the “humanity of human beings” in terms of and by reference to the use of a free and autonomous self-reflexive reason, the “Negroes of Africa” and the differing shades of the rest of humanity are and must be beyond the pale of such a project. In as much as enlightenment is see as “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” and is thus self-reflexive and self-reflective project of critical and rational emancipation, it cannot – on its terms – be inclusive of non-European peoples and most distinctly of Negro Africans. This is so precisely because, according to Kant, reason and rationality are not indigenous to these, and in particular black African, peoples. Indeed, Kant says as much in his “Idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view,” published in the same year (1784) as “What is Enlightenment?” If one starts with Greek history…if one follows the influence of Greek history on the…Roman state…then the Roman influence on the barbarians…if one adds episodes from the national histories of other peoples insofar as they are known from the history of the enlightened European nations, one will discover a regular progress in constitution of states on our continent (which will probably give law, eventually, to all others). The “other” (non-Europeans) will receive the Law of Reason from Europe or, in Kant’s words, “our continent…will probably give law, eventually, to all the others.” Those who cannot reason – and, as Foucault points out, the word for “reason” that Kant uses is rasonieren (i.e. “to reason for reasoning’s sake”) – cannot be expected to affect “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage.” Since they lack the faculty for this human possibility. Thus, Europe has to give the “law” to “all the others.” Indeed, de facto, we of the present – Europeans and non-Europeans alike – exist in a world in which Europe has bestowed the “law” by means of conquest and violent hegemony. This is the case even if this act of “bestowing” abrogates in the very act of giving – the Enlightenment’s own notion of the self-liberating capacity of human reason. What we need to examine next is how Kant legitimizes this de facto (i.e. historical and thus contingent) globalization of Europe and makes of the de jure actualization of the Idea.
	20	+By basing moral worth on a narrow and exclusionary notion of rationality Kantianism demands the conquering of those who do not conform. Kantianism is the moral justification for colonialism
	21	+Serequeberhan 97 Tsenay, Prof. Philosophy. Morgan State University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Critique of Eurocentrism.” Pg. 150-52
	22	+The same Kant, however, does express the view that "if the happy inhabitant of Tahiti, never visited by more civilized nations, were destined to live in their quiet indolence for thousands of centuries/* one could not give a satisfactory answer to the question "why they bothered to exist at all, and whether it would not have been just as well that this island should have been occupied by happy sheep and cattle as by happy men engaged in mere pleasure?"44 The force of Kant’s rhetorical question is directed at stressing what he calls "the value of existence itself,**45 which is not, in his view, manifested in the placid, sedate or idle pursuit of "mere pleasure." As we shall see, for Kant, "the value of existence itself," which is ontologically and/or metaphysically proper to human life, is manifested in the rational control of nature, both in the human being and in nature as such,4*1 It is interesting and 1 think significant to note further that Kant sees a similarity between the Tahitians (and the rest of non-Europeans humanity by extension) and sheep because - if one is to judge by the illustrations he uses - sheep, for him, typify the paradigmatic example of a passive resource to be exploited. In his "Conjectural beginning of human history" (1786), Kant, freely utilizing the story of Genesis, lists the four likely steps by which reason extracts man from instinct and his original abode in the garden of paradise. The fourth "and final step which reason took," he writes, to raise man "altogether above community with animals," occurred when man realized that he himself was the "true end of nature.1147 As Kant depicts it: “The first time he ever said to the sheep, "nature has given you the skin you wear for my use, not yours"; the first lime he ever took that skin and put it upon himself . . .that time he became aware of the way in which his nature privileged and raised him above all animals. And from then on he looked upon them, no longer as fellow creatures, hut as mere means and tools lo whatever ends he pleased.” In the following page in his remarks on the above -leaving allegory and sheepish examples aside - Kant states bluntly that reason separates man from instinct/nature by establishing total dominion over the natural realm “Man’s departure from that paradise which his reason represents as the first abode of his species was nothing but the transition from an uncivilized merely animal condition to the state of humanity, from bondage to to instinct to rational control in a word, from the tutelage of nature to the state of freedom.” In other words, those whose humanness - by its lack of differentiation from and dominion over nature - resembles the placid and carefree existence of sheep, cattle, and animals in general, are still within the realm of instinct and have not yet ascended to "the state of freedom" which reason makes possible. Thus, if “what is good for the goose is good for the gander," then those who have made the "transitioned" from "merely an animal condition" can treat those who have not the animalistic "gander" of non-European humanity - "no longer as fellow creatures i.e. human beings worthy of respect, but as mere means and tools to whatever ends" they - Europeans – see fit. Indeed, as we saw earlier, this is precisely how Said describes the project and practice of European imperialism and colonialism, which is undertaken in "an air of normality.” This too is what Kant finds reprehensible in the European contact with and conduct towards non-European peoples.52 And yet, as we have seen thus far, he himself is one of the most important constructors of the Idea or "general philosophy1* behind this brutish practice: that is, the “pre-text" that ensures the confident and self-possessed "normality" of European conquest. It is important at this point to emphasize that by "reason” Kant means exclusively the instrumental and calculative control {i.e., "rational control") of the natural environment and of the human person as a being of nature with the possibility for rational freedom, or the "state of humanity" beyond the "lawless freedom" of non-European "savages."'1 Now, within the context of European history this "rational control" is established by the proper utilization/control of reason in its public and private domains* For as Kant confidently puts it, in "What is Enlightenment?": "Men work themselves gradually out of barbarity if only intentional artifices arc not made to hold them in it."54 This is the play of the unsocial sociability" of human nature within the confines of European history, which Kant wants to assist in its unhampered unfolding,'1 even if it means establishing "a sort of contract - what might be called the contract of rational despotism with free reason."1*' This, to be sure, is the core concern of “What is Enlightenment?" which clearly has Europe and Kant's own “contemporary reality alone"5" as its direct object of reflection. This is what Kant refers to and designates as the "age of enlightenment" What then of non-European humanity? How is it to achieve "progress" and 'enlightenment"? it is here that the idea of "unsocial sociability" comes into its own and, beyond the formal niceties and distinctions that Kant makes, presents itself in all of its awesome ferocity. As already noted, for Kant, the non-European world is incapable of engaging in the self-reflexive and self-reflective project of enlightenment on its own terms, since it is beyond the pale of reason; just as the Tahitians, had they not been "benefited" by European contact/conquest would be little different than sheep or cattle in their existence. Thus, the non-European has to be civilized or enlightened from the outside And for this purpose, nature utilizes man's "unsocial sociability," just as Heraclitus tells us that u(c very beast is driven to pasture by a blow. In other words, Kant cannot he candid in his critique of the imperialistic practices of European states (i.e., "the inhospitable actions of civilized ... states," see note 43 for the full citation), since he himself thinks that the Tahitians are "nothing, but mere sheep. He is hard pressed, "to give a satisfactory answer to the question why they bothered to exist at all" except for the fact that they were "visited by more civilized European nations.” As noted earlier, Kant's historicopolitical texts metaphysically substantiate the very attitude he finds reprehensible in Europe's contact with the rest of us.
	23	+
	24	+Link 3: Color-blindness
	25	+Theories must take into account their historical and social conditions – anything else fails since it assumes the wrong starting point for a moral theory. Theories that are colorblind don’t take into account the social background that all theories are embedded in – a social background of racism – this makes their theories a tool of racism
	26	+Walsh 4 (Kenneth, Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal) “COLOR-BLIND RACISM IN GRUTTER AND GRATZ” Boston College Third World Law Journal, Volume 24 No 2, 2004. Review of RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 2003. Pp. 213. AT
	27	+In his book, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva alerts readers to the danger that a color-blind ideology will soon pervade discussions of race in the United States.157 The mechanisms of color-blind racism allow whites to advance positions that assure the perpetuation of white privilege.158 Under this color-blind guise, the arguments opposing affirmative action sound reasonable and moral.159 Yet individuals employ the frames, style, and story lines of color-blind racism to mask the fact that blacks still hold a second-class status and in America.160 Thus, color-blind racism facilitates the perpetuation of racial inequality by obscuring the fact that there is even a problem to fix.161
	28	+More generally, colorblind theories ignore the way their claims are always understood within a context of racial inequality. Sustained historical critique—revealing the ways universal claims are invoked to justify racism—is necessary to reclaim abstract theories
	29	+McCarthy 1 (Thomas, Distinguished Professor of the Humanities at Northwestern Univ) “Political Philosophy and Racial Injustice: From Normative to Critical Theory” AT
	30	+In interpreting the languages of political thought, normative theorists too often take abstract formulations at their word, as if what were left out of the saying were left out of the meaning; they neglect to attend to how key terms actually function in the multiplicity of contexts in which authors and their audiences put them to use, or to what in practice are regarded as conditions of satisfaction and acceptability for claims employing them. They tend also to disregard that general norms are always understood and justified with an eye to some range of standard situations and typical cases assumed to be appropriate, and that if that range shifts, then so too do the understandings and justifications of those norms, the conceptual interconnections and warranting reasons considered relevant to them. On the other hand, recognizing that ideals and principles of justice, however abstract their form, always come with contentful preunderstandings that derive from their locations not only in systems of thought but also in forms of life, does not in itself commit us to sheer localism. In the case in point of liberalism’s complicity with racial slavery, for instance, many of the ideas implicated in the justifications of slavery were also given more inclusive interpretations in the same cultural contexts as the dominant exclusionary versions highlighted in section I above. That is to say, those contexts also provided resources for arguments against slavery on religious or philosophical grounds, including arguments to the effect that the basic rights possessed by all human beings as such forbade it. One could say, then, that there were competing meanings ~-~- networks of inferential connections, ranges of standard situations and typical cases ~-~- which partly overlapped and partly diverged, but which were sufficiently interlinked to make disagreements real disagreements and not just incommensurable mutterings. And one might then understand the work of critics ~-~- and critical theorists ~-~- as an ongoing effort to reweave those connections and redefine those ranges so as to promote more genuinely inclusive versions. In doing so, they adopt the internal perspective of reflective participants and invoke the context-transcending validity claims of putatively universal ideals to argue that they have been betrayed, that existing formulations, though expressed in formally universal terms, are actually exclusionary.27 On this view, the search for a genuinely inclusive theory of justice is a never ending, constantly renewed effort to rethink supposedly universal basic norms and reshape their practical and institutional embodiments to include what, in their limited historical forms, they unjustly exclude. What generally drives this effort are struggles for recognition by those whom the norms in their established versions fail to recognize.28 And the intellectual form it takes is the ongoing contestation of essentially contestable articulations of the universal demands of justice. Judith Butler puts the point this way: “the provisional and parochial versions of universality” encoded in law at any given time never exhaust “the possibilities of what might be meant by the universal.”29 Contestation by subjects excluded under existing definitions and conventions are crucial to “the continuing elaboration of the universal itself,” for “they seize the language of the universal and set into motion a ‘performative contradiction,’ claiming to be covered by it and thereby exposing the contradictory character” of conventional formulations.30 Butler here captures the important idea that the possibility of challenging putatively universal representations is inherent in those representations themselves, or more precisely, in their context-transcending claims, and that historically that possibility has been exploited to greatest effect by groups who, though not entitled under existing formulations of the universal, nevertheless appeal to it in formulating more inclusive conceptions of justice. Viewed in this light, as a part ~-~-albeit a reflective part ~-~- of historical processes of emancipation, normative theory is clearly not “freestanding” in any fundamental sense. And, as the shock-effects of Foucault’s genealogies have made clear, the familiar enlightenment metanarratives of universal principles discovered at the birth of modernity fail to acknowledge the impurity of the demands that have historically been made in the name of pure reason. Accordingly, there is a need for critical “histories of the present,” the aim of which is to alter our self-understandings by examining the actual genealogies of accepted ideas and principles of practical reason.31 This distinguishes critical approaches to moral and political theory from approaches like Rawls’s that seek to construct fundamental norms of justice from the “settled convictions” of our “public political culture” by way of “reflective equilibrium.” Critical histories make evident that the political values from which political liberalism seeks to construct a political conception of justice have always been and still are deeply contested, often fiercely, and usually in connection with matters of power, desire, and interest. And they make us aware that the quite varied, often conflicting ideas, principles, values, and norms that have been taken to express the demands of justice cannot adequately be comprehended or assessed without understanding that and how elements of the contexts and situations in which they were propounded entered into them.32 It is not only this “context of origins” that contemporary normative theory leaves largely unexamined, but the “context of applications” as well. The distinction that Rawls and others draw between ideal and nonideal theory insulates political theorizing, at least initially, from the messiness of political reality. Subsequent forays into nonideal theory are all too often of limited value because of their loose, post hoc connection to empirical work. Specifically, discussions of race following this strategy usually end up as discussions of affirmative action in the broadest sense: since equal citizenship rights are now largely in place, the “unfavorable conditions” at issue are the substantive inequalities that are the enduring legacy of centuries of legalized oppression and discrimination.33 Of course, one then has to judge any proposed remedial measures, policies, and programs from a pragmatic as well as a moral point of view, for they are put forward as practical means to the desired end of eliminating or reducing those inequities. Hence the case for any concrete compensatory measures has to be made not just “in principle” but “all things considered,” that is, it has to take into account empirically likely consequences and side-effects, costs and benefits, comparative advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis possible alternatives, political viability, long-term efficacy, and so on. Thus nonideal theorizing of this sort turns normative political theory back in the direction of the empirical social reality it began by abstracting and idealizing away from. But ~-~- and this is my main point here ~-~- there are no theoretical means at hand for bridging the gap between a color-blind ideal theory and a color-coded political reality, for the approach of ideal theory provides no theoretical mediation between the ideal and the real ~-~- or rather, what mediation it does provide is usually only tacit and always drastically restricted.
	31	+Colonialism allows for dehumanization and degradation of the colonized.
	32	+Hayes 96 Floyd W. Hayes III Fanon: a critical reader Ed. Lewis Ricardo Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting. “Fanon, Oppression and Resentment: The Black Experience In the United States.” 1996.
	33	+Fanon points out that in the colonial situation the primary thrust of the Master in relation to the Slave is not for the sake of recognition but for work. The colonized are dehumanized, their humanity effaced, not simply for the sake of the colonizer's ego satisfaction but for the purpose of the colonized's exploitation (Pn 179 / BS 220). What colonialism seeks to hide from view, to render invisible about itself, is the grounding fact of its possibility: that colonialism is predicated only on force and fraud. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all exemplify their states of nature in terms of non-European states of being. The fact that force and fraud are the only virtues necessary in the Hobbesian state of nature (the state of "warre') reveals rather that a readier representation of the contractualists' "natural state" is not "the savage peoples of the Americas" and the like (Hobbes: ch. 13) but the colonial condition imposed by Europeans (geographically or racially) upon those deemed non-European. Colonialism is operationalized at both the material and the representational levels. Materially colonialism seeks to strengthen domination for the sake of human and economic exploitation. Representationally, it seeks to sustains the identity of the ideological or discursive image it has created of the colonized and of the depreciated image the colonized have of themselves. Colonialism thus undertakes at the latter level to extend and maintain a veiling, to affect a strategic invisibility on the pan of the colonized: to maintain invisibility socially and politically so as to minimize the costs of economic reproduction. and labor enforcement. Through normalization, colonialism is able to hides from view its constitutive forms of domination. and exploitation. By making the relations and practices of dominance seem standard, normal, and given, colonialism creates as "acceptable" its central social expressions of degradation and dehumanization, rendering unseen the fact that it makes people what they are not. Colonialism is quite literally untruth, an untruth which to sustain itself must be hidden from view. Fanon speaks of this as "the lie of the colonial situation" (Sr 115 / ADC 128), a lie that infects the colonized who to survive find that they are "hardly ever truthful before the colonizer" (114 /127). Thus, like modernity more generally, colonialism is a condition of extreme ambivalence, imposing a structure, an order of things, it inevitably is incapable of sustaining. Drawn to an order, a scheme of classification, it at once cannot sustain because it is both mis- and unrepresentative of a people the very being of whom it negates, the colonial condition faces (off) its impending disorder with differentiation and division, separation and subordination, manipulation and mystification - in short, with fraud and force (sec ch. 4 of Black Skin; see also Bauman). It is in this sense that Fanon sees himself as engaged analytically, critically, in a form of unveiling.
	34	+Thus, the (counter) role of the ballot is to evaluate and reject epistemological positions through the context of colonialism. To clarify, scrutinize the way each side presents their arguments, ethics, and epistemology, and choose to reject the position that enhances the strength of colonialism.
	35	+
	36	+This modern global order of domination is justified by philosophical tradition – from our privileged standpoint we have a choice to sustain and replicate this evil or fight it. Vote neg to choose resistance.
	37	+Serequeberhan Tsenay, Prof. Philosophy. Morgan State University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Critique of Eurocentrism.” Pg. 154-57
	38	+From all of the above, then, Kant's historicopolitical texts - and, as I have argued elsewhere, the historical thinking of Hegel and Marx 77 and, by extension, the European philosophic tradition as a whole - is grosso modo grounded, minus its "dark horses," on a Eurocentric "pre-text”of the humanity/historicity of human existence as a whole, But why is it necessary to de-structively engage this "pre-text” or Idee? Why is this critical-negative project an indispensable aspect of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy? To begin with, as Kwame Anthony Appiah has correctly noted, we contemporary African philosophers/ and Westernized Africans in general, share by our training and educational formation, in the intellectual heritage of Europe. Consequently, we "see" ourselves and our contemporary situation, at least partially, through the lenses conferral to us in the transmissions of this heritage. Thus, to explore this shared heritage in regards to how it sees and conceptualizes our lived humanity is a necessary precondition to critically appropriating it. For as Frantz Fanon reminds us - lest we forget! - our sharing in this heritage it rather problematic, since it is transmitted to us through a dour stepmother who "restrains her fundamentally perverse offspring from … giving free rein to its evil instincts" - a harsh "colonial mother11 who "protects her child from itself"7* Today, that part of our heritage which is African - or its residual -is no longer (at least in principle) considered "evil." In order to begin appropriating to ourselves that from which we were thus far protected, it is first necessary to clear the metaphysical grounding of all the evil that was said of us and done to us. It is not enough to say with Kwasi Wiredu that: “Indeed an African needs a certain level headedness to deal with some of these hinkers at all. Neither 1 Hume, nor Marx, displayed much respect for the black man, so whatever partiality the African philosopher may develop for these thinkers must rest mostly on considerations of the truth of their philosophical thought.” Indeed, to give proper consideration and appreciation to the "philosophical thought" expressed by these and other thinkers in the European tradition presupposes the critical destructive labor of seeing how "the truth" is skewed and skewered by the partiality it justifies and in which it is enmeshed. The necessity for this undertaking, furthermore, is grounded in the fact that today Eurocentrism is the general consciousness of our age. It is not something that merely affects Europeans. As Marx noted in the German ideology, the dominant ideas of the ruling strata in a society are always, at any particular point in time, the dominating ideas of an age or historical period. Today in our global society the dominant ideas are the ideas through which Europe dominates the world. As Jose Rabasa has appropriately noted: “I must emphasize again that by Eurocentrism I do not simply mean a Tradition that places Europe as a universal cultural ideal embodied in what is called The West, but rather a pervasive |metaphysical | condition of thought* It is universal because it affects both Europeans and non-Europeans, despite the specific questions and situations each may address.” To critically engage in a destructive reading of the texts of the Occidental tradition as regards their views on non-European cultures is thus to critically appropriate that part of our own heritage which was violently "bestowed" on us by Europe. Not to do so would be to continue to inhabit a defunct intellectual horizon, whose material embodiments that is, overt imperialism and colonialism- have already been destroyed by the formerly colonized peoples of the world. Today, in our post colonial present, we face a more covert hegemony which functions and implements global Euro-American domination through the Westernized segments of formerly colonized peoples. For better or for worse, we who belong to the Westernized segments of formerly colonized societies occupy positions of relative power which can be utilized either to replicate Europe or to try and unleash the concrete and suppressed possibilities of our respective histories.10 For example, as 1 Lyotard has correctly observed: "The spread of struggles for independence since the Second World War and the recognition of new national names seem to imply a consolidation of local legitimacies” But this "spread of struggles for independence" only "seems to imply" the "consolidation of local legitimacies;" it is only a semblance, an appearance that hides the actuality that "new 'independent’ governments either fall in line with the market of world capitalism or adopt a Stalinist-style political apparatus.” In a similar vein, Castoriadis tells us that the West asserts "not that it … has. . . discovered the trick of producing more cheaply and more quickly more commodities, but that it. . . has| . . . discovered the way life appropriate to all human society." In making such a grandiose metaphysical assertion, the "unease”1 that "Western ideologues" might have fell is "allayed by the haste with which the 'developing' nations" or, more accurately* the Westernized elites of these nations greedily "adopt the Western 'model’ of society." What both Lyotard and Castoriadis are pointing to is the fact that the hegemonic replication of Europe, in our shared postcolonial present, is carried on by and incarnated in the human residue that is^ the Westernized elites left behind by the retreating colonial empires of Europe. In other words, the "fact that, in some particular domain, and to some particular end i.e., the scientific/technological control of nature,"" the West has achieved considerable success is taken, by the Westernized elites and their metropolitan mentors, as a sign of Europe's absolute metaphysical superiority to the rest of humanity). It is, grosso modo, this domineering theme that constitutes the Eurocentric consciousness of our postcolonial globe and, as we have seen in our reading of Kant, finds its speculative foundation in the Western tradition of philosophy. More than through physical force, Euro-America today rules through its hegemony of ideas, "through its ‘models’ of growth and development, through the statist and other structures which … are today adopted everywhere.” other structures which … are today adopted everywhere.” This is why Fanon concludes Le dames de la terre with a simultaneous call to leave "old" Europe behind and engage in the concrete inventing and creating of our own lived historicity. But to heed, or even hear, Fanon’s call requires that we first recognize and de-structure the speculative metaphysical underpinnings of the Eurocentric constraints that have held us and still hold us – in bondage. This, in my view, is one of the most important and basic tasks of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy; its critical-negative project –the critique of Eurocentrism.
	39	+Thus the alternative is to reject their mode of thinking, and engage with radical subjectivity. This involves a recognition that peoples have different lived experiences and ways of understanding the world that are not the white, Eurocentric thinking of the aff.
	40	+All Neo-Kantians link because they have failed to expose the traditional thoughts that have echoed through contemporary moral philosophy.
	41	+ENYIMBA (MADUKA, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR) RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY: AN EXAMINATION OF HUMAN AND KANTIAN RACIAL THOUGHTS
	42	+*OUR refers to Africans/African thought
	43	+It is indeed, a racial prejudice to describe some set of human being as incapable of reasoning, as primitive, and (or) as savages because of their descent, or simply because they are of different race or origin from one. There is indeed no moral, rational or logical justification for such far-reaching conclusion or thinking. Infact, in our opinion, it is the one who is prone to such racial delusion that should be referred to as primitive, inhuman and therefore must not be taken very seriously. This is so because, when human persons refuse to recognize the authentic humanity of their neighbours and fellow human beings, they cease or fail to be human persons themselves. We Africans should desist from worshipping these scholars and from accepting hook line and sinker their ideas and thoughts as canons and apodictic. This must however, not be done as a matter of prejudice, but as a matter of fact, because it is the truth; otherwise we will be falling into the same racial bigotry with them. As Wiredu rightly pointed out, the Africans indeed posses a high degree of coherent thought. For instance, the west has a lot to learn from our moral thoughts, which are free from superstition. Similarly, Desmond Tutu asserts that “In Africa we say a person is a person through other persons. We can be human only in fellowship. The law of our being is that we have been created for togetherness, for communion; Western philosophy has much to learn from this statement”. (Qtd in Nicholas 52). It is therefore the task of contemporary African philosophers to expose these aspects of traditional thoughts and thereby correct these misconceptions of African thought.
	44	+I know what you’re thinking, “Who said Kant? And surely Korsgaard can’t be a racist! She is a cat lover and is friends with me on the Facebook!”
	45	+But she’s still a neo-Kantian. Pihlstrom:
	46	+Sami Pihlstrom, Pragmatic Moral Realism, New York: Rodopi, 2005.
	47	+The extent to which both pragmatist and Wittgenstenian forms of moral realism are fundamentally Kantian (transcendental) conceptions of morality, or have one of their key sources in Kant’s thought (although they might prima facie appear to e quite different from Kant’s alleged rationalistic ‘rigorism’), may be further appreciated through a brief comparison with the more explicitly transcendental reflections on the sources of ethical normativity offered by one of the leading contemporary champions of Kantian ethics, Christine Korsgaard.

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	1	+2016-12-17 20:20:06.821

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	1	+Shania Hunt

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	1	+Albany

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	1	+Dougherty Valley Kumaravel Neg

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	1	+1-K Omni

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	1	+College Prep