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+The standard is consistency with universal freedom. |
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+First, an agent's will acts on a law that it gives to itself. If pleasure were a law to you, then you would straight-away do the pleasurable act, but since you're autonomous, you can reason about taking the action. Thus a condition of action is that the will is self-determined. |
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+KORSGAARD: |
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+ |
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+"Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant" by Christine M. Korsgaard LW-DD |
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+"Now I'm going to argue that that sort of willing is impossible. The |
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+AND |
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+identification with the principle of choice on which you act." (123) |
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+ |
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+And, a rational will must set ends within a system of reciprocal constraints. Anything else justifies that someone could impede your ability to achieve your end in the first place, which also means reason constrains end-based frameworks. |
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+SIYAR: |
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+ |
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+Jamsheed Aiam Siyar: Kant's Conception of Practical Reason. Tufts University, 1999 LW-DD |
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+"Recall that insofar as I represent a rationally determined end, I represent it |
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+AND |
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+as I represent it as constraining my actions." (80-81) |
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+ |
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+Second, Analytic |
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+ |
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+Third, Analytic |
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+ |
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+Impact Calc: Analytic |
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+ |
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+ |
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+Contention: |
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+ |
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+Freedom implies an innate right to determine the course of your actions. In the state of nature, might rather than right governs these judgements. Absent of a public authority, rights violations are inevitable. |
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+VARDEN: |
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+ |
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+"A Kantian Conception of Free Speech" by Helga Varden Chapter from: "Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World" edited by Deirdre Golash 2010 LM-DD |
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+"The first important distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal thought issues from Kant's |
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+AND |
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+rather than as subject to anyone's arbitrary choices." (46-47) |
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+ |
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+And, the Brandenburg v. Ohio U.S. Supreme Court decision maintains that seditious speech is protected by the First Amendment so long as it does not indicate an "imminent" threat. But, seditious speech is never compatible with an omnilateral will and must be restricted. The intent requires the right to destroy the state, which justifies the annihilation of all rights. |
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+VARDEN 2: |
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+ |
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+"A Kantian Conception of Free Speech" by Helga Varden Chapter from: "Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World" edited by Deirdre Golash 2010 LM-DD |
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+"To understand Kant's condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned |
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+AND |
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+, it is a public crime (6: 331)." (52) |