| ... |
... |
@@ -1,0
+1,55 @@ |
|
1 |
+Universal rules fail. Any application of rules can never be verified because rules are indeterminate, as they require prior knowledge to understand them, which can never be the basis for truth. |
|
2 |
+ |
|
3 |
+KRIPKE: |
|
4 |
+“Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” by Saul A. Kripke Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982 DD |
|
5 |
+“Normally, when we conside |
|
6 |
+AND |
|
7 |
+have the same schmolor if . . .” (17-20) |
|
8 |
+ |
|
9 |
+And, this means ethics cannot be apriori, but rather established through community norms. Virtues are inter-subjectively normative. We disagree in specific instances, but this does not deny that these norms are binding of our communities. Virtue ethics recognizes that complexity is required, and shifts the ethical question to one of character. The context informs what it means to be virtuous. |
|
10 |
+ |
|
11 |
+LEIBOWITZ: |
|
12 |
+PARTICULARISM IN ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS * Uri D. Leibowitz University of Nottingham (Forthcoming in The Journal of Moral Philosophy) DD |
|
13 |
+“Following Burnyeat (1980), I understand |
|
14 |
+AND |
|
15 |
+resolve the conflict.” (7-14) |
|
16 |
+ |
|
17 |
+Thus the standard is appealing to virtuous character clarified by the moral complexities of specific situations. |
|
18 |
+ |
|
19 |
+Prefer additionally- |
|
20 |
+ |
|
21 |
+ |
|
22 |
+States must promote virtuous decision-making. The alternative cannot guide action in all cases. |
|
23 |
+ |
|
24 |
+SILVIA: |
|
25 |
+“VIRTUE ETHICS AND COMMUNITARIANISM” by Rui Silva, University of the Azores DD |
|
26 |
+“The second distinctive trait |
|
27 |
+AND |
|
28 |
+of virtue ethics:” (3-4) |
|
29 |
+ |
|
30 |
+Virtues are constitutive of action. Our passions provide a necessary orientation towards the good. |
|
31 |
+ |
|
32 |
+KORSGAARD: |
|
33 |
+“How to be an Aristotelian Kantian Constitutivist” Christine M. Korsgaard DD |
|
34 |
+“On this interpretation, |
|
35 |
+AND |
|
36 |
+constitutive of her will.” (26-27) |
|
37 |
+ |
|
38 |
+Finally, the standard is not ends based: |
|
39 |
+A. Analytic |
|
40 |
+B. Analytic |
|
41 |
+C. Analytic |
|
42 |
+D. Analytic |
|
43 |
+ |
|
44 |
+Offense |
|
45 |
+First, any negates even within their specific instance. When an agent wills any of an instance, they assume a sufficient reason for the action, but no single reason can account for the legitimacy of the ban because reasons cannot be extended universally, as per the framework. Any would undermine the moral complexities that necessitate certain individuals to own handguns, which is necessary for virtuous decision making in the first place. |
|
46 |
+ |
|
47 |
+Second, The structure of reason is holistic. A reason to take an action in one case need not be a reason in another. This means reasons for actions must be in reference to the particular action. |
|
48 |
+ |
|
49 |
+Dancy |
|
50 |
+“Ethics Without Principles” by Jonathan Dancy 2004 DD |
|
51 |
+“But there are forms of holism |
|
52 |
+AND |
|
53 |
+of the combination.” (7-9) |
|
54 |
+ |
|
55 |
+Even if the aff has a particular scenario, there is always particularities within their instance. |