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... ... @@ -1,27 +1,0 @@ 1 -1NC 2 -CP Text: The United States federal government shall repeal the Patriot Act. 3 -That’s key to increase free speech and foster progressive criticism of the status quo on campuses. 4 -Macdonald 03 Morgan MacDonald, Patriot Act stifles dissent on campus, Baltimore Sun, 11/24/03, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-11-24/news/0311240117_1_student-groups-student-information-college-campuses //LADI 5 -AS A COLLEGE student, I am acutely aware of both the legal and social effects of the USA Patriot Act on my life and on the lives of my peers. Passed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Patriot Act has led to a broadening of governmental power to define protest as terrorism and to intrude on our fundamental rights as citizens. I am concerned by the Patriot Act's impact on the lives of all citizens, but especially on my peers in colleges across the country. No matter what provision of the Patriot Act we examine, its effects are tenfold on a college campus. A college campus is highly interconnected in every imaginable way, and in that sense differs from the typical small American city. Students are plugged into one central Internet server, student records are compiled in one database, students live in centralized college housing, student groups meet on campus, and so on. To monitor for "subversive" activity or to track a specific e-mail account is made exponentially easier when all the information is centralized and in the control of school administrations. Students on college campuses have far less privacy than the average person. When this problem is compounded by the expansion of government oversight, students' rights are placed in the most precarious of positions. Under the Patriot Act, student groups can be labeled "terrorist" organizations if they engage in certain types of protest or civil disobedience. In Minnesota, student groups such as Anti-Racist Action and Students Against War were labeled as potential terrorist threats. The government can demand that schools hand over student information without presenting probable cause that a crime has been committed. According to the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, more than 200 colleges and universities have turned over student information to the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service and other law enforcement agencies. Some college police are reporting directly to federal law enforcement agencies, thus allowing the government to monitor the actions of student groups and individual students without notification to the students or even college administrators. Beyond violating constitutionally guaranteed rights, the effect of the Patriot Act on college campuses is to create a suffocating educational and social atmosphere. The result of this legislation is the slow deterioration of student involvement and full intellectual participation on college campuses. If students are not allowed to express themselves in college - to question authority and to team with other students for positive social change - America's future is bleak. I am infuriated when I sit in a student anti-war strategy meeting and one of my peers says she cannot participate in our protest because she is not from the United States and fears the consequences of her actions. That is not the American way. That is not how universities contribute to progress in this country. Those who drafted the Patriot Act failed to create legislation that protects both the safety and the rights of each American. That lack of attention to our country's fundamental values is striking college campuses like a hidden illness. America is a country that advocates free speech and free expression because of the belief that a marketplace of contradictory opinions is beneficial to the progress of society. When students are deterred from participating in free discussion and demonstrations of individuality, the marketplace of ideas loses one of its biggest and most essential contributors. We are not afraid to oppose the Patriot Act because we know the consequences of its implementation. The destruction of our educational freedom must not be allowed. 6 - 7 -Rights K 8 -Their advocacy for rights rectifies the division between the human and the political - Rights talk ties the population to the sovereign by defining life only in terms of what can be defended by the state—this turns the citizen-subject into bare life by allowing arbitrary exclusion 9 -Hoover 13 Hoover, Joe. Dr Hoover has a BA in Philosophy from the University of Colorado and an MSc in Philosophy, now at University of London "Towards a politics for human rights: Ambiguous humanity and democratizing rights." Philosophy and Social Criticism 2013 (IM) 10 -Agamben pushes this critique even further by focusing on the way in which rights depend upon the distinction between those who have rights as members of the political community and those that are excluded – between bios and zoē. Human rights attempt to privilege the bare life of human beings without a place in the political world, which is why Agamben sees the displaced or stateless individual as the exemplary subject of human rights. However, it is the sovereign that has the power to make this distinction, the exclusion of some life from the political community, the creation of “bare life”. As rights are supposed to attach to human beings as such, rather than as members of a particular nation, it seems that the law achieves justification beyond convention, beyond the shared sense of justice that makes a People, but in fact it reveals that the law depends upon the power of the sovereign who ultimately decides which human beings have their rights protected and which find themselves excluded totally, most tellingly in the camp. This critique of human rights depends upon Agamben’s understanding of the sovereign as ‘the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.’54 The pure bio-politics we find in the relationship between Homo Sacer and the sovereign, who decides whether bare human life is extinguished or preserved, reveals that the effort to remove rights from a given order (to transform civil right into human rights) renders those rights precarious, dependent on exceptional power of the sovereign rather than a universal law. On this reading, human rights cannot constrain authority because they are dependent upon it, nor do they enable transformations of the legal and political order because they confirm rather than claim power. Agamben suggests that rights are not ambiguous in their support of authority and control, but rather central to it at the most fundamental level. 11 - 12 -Bare life is the ultimate devaluation of life – life that can be killed, but not sacrificed. 13 -Reinert 2007 (‘The Pertinence of Sacrifice - Some Notes on Larry the Luckiest Lamb’ Hugo Reinert, PhD from Cambridge University of Cambridge, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol6no3_2007/reinert_larry.htm) IM 14 -14. For a few years now, in his Homo Sacer project, Agamben has been tracing the political predicament of the present using the enigmatic figure of the bare life nuda vita (1998). Throughout his work, this bare life appears in many guises: from werewolves, outlaws and Roman priestesses to overcomatose patients and concentration camp victims. Perhaps its principal exemplar however - the figure that Agamben uses to illustrate its basic dynamic most succinctly - is the homo sacer or 'sacred man': 'an obscure figure from archaic Roman Law' who, for his crimes, has been expelled from both the ius humanum and the ius divinum, from both secular and sacred law. As a consequence of this, it is declared that he 'may be killed but not sacrificed' (Agamben 1998: 8). Killing this sacred man therefore invokes no sanction, but his life is also 'unsacrificeable' (82). His existence is constituted through a 'double exclusion' that expresses the basic operation of sovereign power itself - the process by which 'the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule' (18). This is the 'relation of exception': 'the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion' (18). Through this extreme relation, sovereign power maintains itself in a permanent relationship to the excluded: the outlaw for example, as another figure of the bare life, 'is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death' (183). 15. The sacred man and the outlaw are only two figures in a gallery of priests, bandits, kings, werewolves and concentration camp victims, all connected by the thread of the bare life and its shifting parameters. King or camp victim, this bare life is always a figure of the extreme margin: life stripped of its everyday humanity, reduced and excluded to the blurred threshold that surrounds the 'city of men' and defines its limits. In a sense, it is the human zoon politikon stripped of the very quality that makes it human: its social being, its character of sociality. Seen this way, the bare life is defined by the fact that it is not - or that it is no longer - a social person . This is the sense in which the term has come of age recently: particularly to describe Muslims held at Guantanamo, but also - with variable relevance - to describe social phenomena ranging from premature infant births (Wynn 2002) and homeless people (Feldman 2006), to the geopolitics of post-colonial violence (Sylvester 2006) and, somewhat bizarrely, European tourists in Ibiza (Diken and Laustsen 2004). In the present context, the more relevant of these applications focus on the question of violence - on the intersection between the sovereign exercise and justification of violence, on the one hand, and the bare life's quality of constant, permanent exposure to the threat of violence on the other. 16. As Agamben argues, the exercise of lethal violence against the bare life is twice circumscribed by the structure of the sovereign ban. Suspended in the grasp of sovereign power, the bare life becomes simultaneously vulnerable to certain kinds of violence and ineligible for others. On the one hand, it can be freely killed - the exercise of violence against the bare life is routine, insignificant and unmarked. It requires no expiation or atonement and invites no sanctions: it is banal, without consequence to the law and anything but 'intrinsically mysterious, mystifying, convoluting, plain scary, mythical and arcane' (Taussig 1992: 116). Simultaneously, with this subjection to unregulated and freely exercised forms of violence, the bare life also becomes ineligible for sacrifice - which is to say, in the general sense in which Agamben interprets the term, that the bare life is excluded from all forms of ritually marked, institutionalized, exalted or sacralizing violence, such as are 'prescribed by the rite of the law' (1998: 102): it can not, for example, be 'submitted to sanctioned forms of execution' (103). Between them, these two exclusions operate to desacralize the death of the bare life, stripping it of any significance. Its killing and death become trivial, casual, mundane and devoid of higher meaning: to Agamben the observer, the horror of the concentration camp is that as embodiments of the bare life, the men and women there died, to their executors, 'like lice' (114). In one sense, the bare life stands as cypher for a de-personalization, or dis-individuation, that transforms subjects into objects: subjecting them to the free exercise of unregulated violence while simultaneously, through the trope of denied sacrifice, disqualifying them from subjection to ritual or sacralizing forms of violence - insofar as they are 'not worthy of this gesture of honour' (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 17). 15 - 16 - 17 -The alternative is to reject the aff’s portrayal of rights—only fighting oppressive discourse like theirs can solve. 18 - McKenzie, M. (2014, February 3). 4 Ways to Push Back Against Your Privilege. Retrieved from https://www.bgdblog.org/2014/02/4-ways-push-back-privilege/ (writer, activist, founder of Black Girls Danger) 19 -I’ve often said that it’s not enough to acknowledge your privilege. And, in fact, that acknowledging it is often little more than a chance to pat yourself on the back for being so “aware.” What I find is that most of the time when people acknowledge their privilege, they feel really special about it, really important, really glad that something so significant just happened, and then they just go ahead and do whatever they wanted to do anyway, privilege firmly in place. The truth is that acknowledging your privilege means a whole lot of nothing much if you don’t do anything to actively push back against it. I understand, of course, that the vast majority of people don’t even acknowledge their privilege in the first place. I’m not talking to them. I’m talking to those of us who do. If we do, then we need to understand that acknowledgement all by itself isn’t enough. No matter how cathartic it feels. So, what does pushing back against your privilege look like? Well, here are just a few ways it can look (note: none of these is easy; that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t try): If you are in a position of power and you are able to recognize and acknowledge that at least part of the reason you are there is your (white, male, cisgendered, able-bodied, class, etc.) privilege, then pushing back against that privilege means sharing that power with, or sometimes relinquishing it to, the folks around you who have less privilege and therefore less power. I had a conversation recently with my friend about her terrible white woman boss who, when the women of color she supervises have strong feelings about the way things are being run, including the hiring of more white people over POC, pulls rank on them. Her “I understand your feelings but I am, you know, the boss and it’s my job to…” nonsense is exactly what not pushing back against your privilege looks like. On the other hand, “I was hired to supervise y’all, but I don’t want to perpetuate this type of effed-up power dynamic and also I recognize that y’all have a better understanding about why we should not hire another white man, so I’m going to go ahead and defer to y’all” is exactly what pushing back against your privilege does look like. If you have access to something and you recognize that you have it partly because of privilege, opt out of it. If you’re an able-bodied person and that retreat you really, really want to go on isn’t wheelchair accessible, and the organizers of said retreat have been asked and supported in making a change and done nothing, and you realize how fucked up that is, don’t go. It works the same for women-only events that exclude trans women. Don’t go. Even if you really, really want to go because your, like, fave artist ever is gonna be there. Especially then. Pushing back against your privilege often requires sacrifice. Sacrifice is hard sometimes, homies. If not being a dick were easy, everybody would do it! Acknowledging that something is messed up doesn’t mean anything if you still participate just because, dang, you really want to and stuff. This one is so, so important. If you are a person with a lot of privilege (i.e. a white, straight, able-bodied, class-privileged, cisgender male or any combination of two or more of those) and you call yourself being against oppression, then it should be part of your regular routine to sit the hell down and shut the eff up. If you can recognize that part of the reason your opinion, your voice, carries so much weight and importance is because you are a white man (or whatever combination is working for you), then pushing back against your privilege often looks like shutting your face. Now, of course, using your privilege to speak out against oppression is very important. But I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about chiming in, taking up space, adding your two cents, playing devil’s advocate, etc. when 1) no one asked you, 2) the subject matter is outside your realm of experience (why do you even think you get to have an opinion about the lives of black women??), 3) anything you say is just going to cause more harm because your voice, in and of itself, is a reminder that you always get to have a voice and that voice usually drowns out the voices of others. 20 - 21 -Term Papers DA 22 -The sale of term papers is blatant plagiarism—but it’s protected under the First Amendment nonetheless. 23 -Duke Law Journal 73, Term Paper Companies and the Constitution, 1973, 1275-1317 (1974) Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol22/iss6/3 24 -TERM PAPERS AS PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT The preparation and sale of term papers involves not only written communication but also "pure speech," an exchange of ideas arguably protectable under the first amendment . 2 The Supreme Court has indicated that this protection extends to even the most marginal "exchanges of ideas." Justice Frankfurter conceded in his dissent to Winters v. New York17 that "wiholly neutral futilities, of course, come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons." The majority in Winters stated, with more enthusiasm, that even though the magazines in question contained "nothing of any possible value," they were "as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature." ' A term paper, arguably, is somewhat more than a "wiholly neutral futility" and is clearly entitled to as much constitutional protection as magazines which contain "nothing of any possible value to society." 25 -Plagiarism harms the academic environment in universities 26 -Colantuono Florence Colantuono, “Academic Plagiarism.” Explorable. 27 -The written word is used to gauge a persons experience and achievement, when something is plagiarized it does not afford the reader a true opportunity to understand the writer, to gauge progress in academia. Clearly this act impacts the writers learning. If when presented with a paper an unknowing instructor provides constructive criticism that is meant for the writer to help improve, it is wasted. The author can never know the status of their work if it is not their own. Academic plagiarism affects many people along the way. It obviously affects the person whose work has been plagiarized by not affording the author credit for hard work. It affects the person who commits' the plagiarism by not affording the person an opportunity to receive constructive feedback. By not sharing ones own ideas important milestones are missed. It affects the efforts of the instructor to gauge the material being taught as useful of not. Generally academic plagiarism affects the academic community as a whole. Academic success is based on the ability of the institution to affect both public and corporate policy, with a high plagiarism rate the institution will lose standing and creditability. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,62 +1,0 @@ 1 -Title IX DA 2 -Title IX investigations are increasing. Kingiade 16. 3 -Tyler Kingkade. “There Are Far More Title IX Investigations Of Colleges Than Most People Know”. Huffington Post. June 16, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d AGM 4 -The growing backlog of federal Title IX investigations into colleges and universities has now topped 300, but many people, including students at the schools under scrutiny, aren’t aware of those reviews. As of Wednesday, there were 246 ongoing investigations by the U.S. Department of Education into how 195 colleges and universities handle sexual assault reports under the gender equity law. A Freedom of Information Act request by The Huffington Post revealed another 68 Title IX investigations into how 61 colleges handle sexual harassment cases. This puts the total number of Title IX investigations officially dealing with sexual harassment at 315. (Under civil rights statutes, sexual assault is defined as an extreme form of sexual harassment.) But dozens of those Title IX reviews receive no publicity because they don’t specifically deal with sexual assault. If a school is being investigated for allegedly mishandling harassment cases, but not reports of assault, it doesn’t appear on the list regularly given to reporters by the Education Department. Major educational institutions — including New York University, the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, Georgia State University, Florida AandM University, Rutgers University, Howard University, the University of Oklahoma, Kent State University and the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse — have escaped public scrutiny because Title IX investigations into their actions haven’t been highlighted by the government or the schools themselves.SUNY Broome Community College is under three investigations that haven’t been previously disclosed. The Education Department has no plans to regularly issue a list of cases involving sexual harassment only, an official told HuffPost. 5 -And, increased investigations are a crucial way to hold schools accountable. Bricker 12. 6 -Nora Caplan Bricker. “How Title IX Became Our Best Tool Against Sexual Harassment”. The New Republic. June 21, 2012. https://newrepublic.com/article/104237/how-title-ix-became-our-best-tool-against-sexual-harassment. AGM 7 -Title IX remains a call to action and a crucial tool for those who believe schools need to take a harsher line on rape and sexual violence. When Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan issued updated guidelines for Title IX in 2010, they focused on grievance procedures for sexual assault, urging schools to crack down. The past few years have seen a slew of Title IX complaints seeking the reform of sexual grievance procedures—at, among others, Princeton, Duke, the University of Virginia, Harvard Law School, and, once again, Yale. The most recent investigation of Yale closed this month with “no findings of noncompliance,” according to Yale President Richard Levin—though, as one of the complainants pointed out in Slate, the university had to sign an agreement to maintain the new policies it implemented this year, and to keep a close eye on the campus climate and report regularly to OCR. This complaint at Yale was, in many ways, depressingly similar to the case that preceded it by over thirty years: It asked the university to take public displays of misogyny seriously, and to create better recourse for victims of sexual violence and harsher punishments for perpetrators. The echoes of Alexander v. Yale are a reminder of sexism’s insidious hold, and of the progress our society has yet to make. When I told Bayh about Title IX’s foundational role in sexual harassment law, he told me he doesn’t think “discrimination” is a strong enough term for sexual misconduct and violence. “That’s flat-out criminal activity,” he said. But because universities handle so many harassment and assault cases that occur between students in-house, classifying these crimes as discrimination has turned out to be an effective way to hold institutions accountable. 8 -AFF guts effectiveness of Title IX – it causes first amendment opportunism. Schauer 04 9 -Schauer, Frederick David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law. "The boundaries of the First Amendment: A preliminary exploration of constitutional salience." Harvard Law Review (2004): 1765-1809. 10 -In addition to the properties of First Amendment claims that may¶ make them less likely to appear legally frivolous, the First Amend-¶ ment's magnetism may assist in ensuring that those claims will not¶ arise in isolation. There will often be multiple lawyers, multiple liti-¶ gants, and multiple public actors who perceive the virtues of the same¶ opportunistic strategy at roughly the same time, or who even may be¶ in active coordination with each other - as with the multiple chal-¶ lenges to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the proliferation of First¶ Amendment rhetoric surrounding legal arguments regarding computer¶ source code, and the panoply of parallel claims about First Amend-¶ ment limitations on copyright. When this is the case, the multiplicity¶ of individually tenuous claims may produce a cascade effect160 such¶ that the claims no longer appear tenuous. The combination of, say,¶ four scarcely plausible but simultaneous court challenges and twenty¶ scarcely plausible public claims of a First Amendment problem could make all these individually implausible claims seem more credible¶ than they actually are.161 From the standpoint of an interest group¶ seeking to achieve change and to mobilize public support or the sup-¶ port of other interest groups,162 winning is better than losing publicly,¶ but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being ignored.¶ Once the claim or argument achieves a critical mass of plausibility,¶ the game may be over. Even if individual courts reject the claim, the¶ multiplicity of now-plausible claims may give the issue what is re-¶ ferred to in inside-the-Beltway political jargon as "traction" and in¶ newsroom jargon as "legs." Interestingly, this phenomenon sometimes¶ survives even authoritative rejection of the claim. With respect to the¶ argument that hostile-environment sexual harassment enforcement has¶ serious First Amendment implications, for example, neither the Su-¶ preme Court's rejection of this argument in dicta in R.A. V v. City of¶ St. Paul163 nor the Court's silent dismissal of the same claim in Harris¶ v. Forklift Systems, Inc.164 has slowed the momentum of those who¶ would wage serious First Amendment battle against hostile-¶ environment sexual harassment law.'65 Similarly, decades of judicial¶ rejection of the argument that copyright law must be substantially re-¶ stricted by the commands of the First Amendment have scarcely dis-¶ couraged those who urge otherwise; and in some respects the Supreme¶ Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroftl66 can be considered not a¶ defeat, but rather one further step toward the entry of copyright into¶ the domain of the First Amendment: the Supreme Court did grant cer-¶ tiorari, in part to determine "whether ... the extension of existing and¶ future copyrights violates the First Amendment;"'67 and the seven-¶ Justice majority, as well as Justice Breyer in dissent,'68 acknowledged¶ that the First Amendment was not totally irrelevant. 11 -Sexual harassment represents an oppressive use of power and kills the participation and success of the harassed. Benson and Thomson 82 12 - 13 -Benson, Donna J., and Gregg E. Thomson. "Sexual harassment on a university campus: The confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender stratification." Social problems 29.3 (1982): 236-251. 14 - 15 -It is precisely this widespread confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender¶ stratification which defines the problem of sexual harassment. There is, in other words, a nexus¶ of power and sexualprerogative often enjoyed by men with formal authority over women. Men¶ in such positions can engage in (or "get away with") overt sexual behaviors that would be rebuffed¶ or avoided were the relationship not one of superior and subordinate. They can also discharge selectively the power and rewards of their positions as a means to obligate women sexualy (Blau,¶ 1964).¶ As well as reward and punish women directly, men can manipulate and obscure their sexual in-¶ tentions toward female subordinates. Women learn that the "official" attention of a male¶ superior is often but a vehicle through which he can "press his pursuits" (Goffman, 1977). In¶ turn, what is often mistakenly perceived by men as an unfounded distrust or suspicion of motives¶ has its basis in previous experience with male "helpfulness." Therefore, as Thorne5 suggests, there¶ is an intrinsic ambiguity between the formal definition of the male superior/female subordinate¶ relationship and a sexual one, in which the gender of the woman can be made salient at the in-¶ itiative of the man.¶ Male Authority and Sexual Interest on the University Campus¶ At major universities, student access to individual instructors can be a scarce resource. Faculty¶ members serve as gatekeepers to the professions, yet an institutional priority on research severely¶ constrains the time and energy that they devote to instruction and interaction with under-¶ graduates (Blau, 1973). Moreover, though students are supposedly evaluated according to merit,¶ the teacher's role permits a wide latitude in the degree of interaction and helpfulness granted to¶ individual students. An instructor enjoys considerable discretionary power to provide or¶ withhold academic rewards (grades, recommendations) and related resources (help, psychological¶ support).6¶ As in the workplace, it is usually men who exercise this discretionary power over female univer-¶ sity students. While women now comprise more than half of all college students,¶ faculty-especially within higher ranks and at major universities-are overwhelmingly male.¶ About 95 percent of university full professors are men (Patterson and Engelberg, 1978). Nor-¶ mative requirements for career advancement at competitive universities are based on traditional,¶ male life-cycle patterns and work schedules that are not convenient to many women (Hochschild,¶ 1975).¶ In the past, it has been difficult for women to successfully enter any prestigious and male-¶ dominated - hence, "non-traditional" - field (Epstein, 1970). Social psychological analyses (Med-¶ nick et. al., 1975) have identified some of the barriers still faced by college women seeking such¶ careers. Yet a recent compendium of student responses to a University of California ad-¶ ministrative query about sex discrimination on campus is replete with testimony from male¶ students that female students' sexuality now gives them an unfair advantage in this competition¶ (University of California, Berkeley, 1977). While women allude to numerous sexist remarks and¶ behaviors by faculty which derogate the abilities of women as a group, the male respondents¶ claim that individual women profit from their sexual attributes because male instructors go out of¶ their way to be "extra friendly" and helpful to them. According to the male perception, then, the¶ latitude permitted in the faculty-student relationship works - at the initiative of either instructor¶ or student - to the advantage of attractive women.¶ Some sociologists of higher education view faculty-student sexual exchanges only as women at-¶ tempting to use their sexuality to compensate for a lack of academic accomplishment:¶ Innumerable girls have found that a pretty face and a tight sweater were an adequate substitute for diligence and cleverness when dealing with a male teacher. Some, having been frustrated in efforts to get¶ by on this basis, have pushed matters further and ended up in bed-though not necessarily with an A¶ (Jencks and Riesman, 1968:427n).¶ Similarly, Singer's (1964:148) empirical study of the relationship between personal attrac-¶ tiveness and university grades relies on unsupported conjecture about female manipulativeness to¶ conclude that ". . . the poor college professor is . . . enticed by the female students ... as he goes¶ about his academic and personal responsibilities." In both studies we find the unquestioned¶ assumption that women (unfairly) capitalize on their sexuality in an otherwise meritocratic and¶ asexual relationship.7¶ Our analysis of sexual harassment as the nexus of power and sexual prerogative implies that,¶ from the woman's perspective, the situation is more complex and decidedly less sanguine. Rather¶ than having a unilateral "sex advantage," female students face the possibility that male instruc-¶ tors may manipulate sexual interest and authority in ways which ultimately undermine the posi-¶ tion of women in academia. Because women can no longer be openly denied access to educational¶ and professional training legally, sexual harassment may remain an especially critical factor of¶ more covert discrimination. 16 - 17 -Empirically proven with graduation rates – Aff kills diversity. Bricker 12. 18 -Nora Caplan Bricker. “How Title IX Became Our Best Tool Against Sexual Harassment”. The New Republic. June 21, 2012. https://newrepublic.com/article/104237/how-title-ix-became-our-best-tool-against-sexual-harassment. AGM 19 -When former Indiana Senator Birch Bayh* wrote Title IX forty years ago, his goal was very simple: to make sure women could get a good education. He wanted to force schools to accept women as students, let them into classes, and hire them as professors. And he wanted to make professions that require higher education accessible to women. As the law, which prohibits educational programs that take federal money from discriminating on the basis of sex, celebrates its fortieth birthday on Saturday, the changes Bayh was after have, to a stunning degree, happened—women have been earning more undergraduate degrees than men since 1996 and in 2009 overtook them in the attainment of doctoral degrees; 47 percent of legal degrees and 48 percent of medical degrees were conferred on women in 2010, compared to 7 percent and 9 percent, respectively, in 1972. Title IX has become most famous for ushering female athletes onto the playing field—an application of Bayh’s law that he told me didn’t cross his mind when he was defending it in the Senate. 20 -Term Papers DA 21 -The sale of term papers is blatant plagiarism—but it’s protected under the First Amendment nonetheless. 22 -Duke Law Journal 73, Term Paper Companies and the Constitution, 1973, 1275-1317 (1974) Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol22/iss6/3 23 -TERM PAPERS AS PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT The preparation and sale of term papers involves not only written communication but also "pure speech," an exchange of ideas arguably protectable under the first amendment . 2 The Supreme Court has indicated that this protection extends to even the most marginal "exchanges of ideas." Justice Frankfurter conceded in his dissent to Winters v. New York17 that "wiholly neutral futilities, of course, come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons." The majority in Winters stated, with more enthusiasm, that even though the magazines in question contained "nothing of any possible value," they were "as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature." ' A term paper, arguably, is somewhat more than a "wiholly neutral futility" and is clearly entitled to as much constitutional protection as magazines which contain "nothing of any possible value to society." 24 -Plagiarism harms the academic environment in universities 25 -Colantuono Florence Colantuono, “Academic Plagiarism.” Explorable. 26 -The written word is used to gauge a persons experience and achievement, when something is plagiarized it does not afford the reader a true opportunity to understand the writer, to gauge progress in academia. Clearly this act impacts the writers learning. If when presented with a paper an unknowing instructor provides constructive criticism that is meant for the writer to help improve, it is wasted. The author can never know the status of their work if it is not their own. Academic plagiarism affects many people along the way. It obviously affects the person whose work has been plagiarized by not affording the author credit for hard work. It affects the person who commits' the plagiarism by not affording the person an opportunity to receive constructive feedback. By not sharing ones own ideas important milestones are missed. It affects the efforts of the instructor to gauge the material being taught as useful of not. Generally academic plagiarism affects the academic community as a whole. Academic success is based on the ability of the institution to affect both public and corporate policy, with a high plagiarism rate the institution will lose standing and creditability. 27 -Turns the aff and outweighs: 28 -1. Precludes the link to other reforms—Colantuono says credibility is key to shaping public policy, that means if on-campus discourse is good, plagiarism prevents it from causing real change 29 -2. Scope—selling term papers is already fairly common when the punishment is expulsion, if universities have no punishment for doing so literally every student will buy a term paper 30 -3. Creates educational inequities because students with more financial resources will be able to get better grades, making education based more on wealth and resources than quality of writing 31 -4. Most speech on campuses is outside the classroom, so it has a lesser comparative effect, but work produced from course assignments is implicitly endorsed by the institution, so plagiarism is much worse there 32 - 33 - 34 -Hate Speech DA 35 - 36 -Uniqueness 37 -On campus hate speech and crimes is decreasing in the squo—that means current restrictions are working and the aff is unnecessary at best 38 -Sutton 16 Halley Sutton, Report shows crime on campus down across the country, Campus Security Report 13.4 (2016), 9/9/16 39 -A recent report released by the National Center for Education Statistics found an overall decrease in crimes at educational institutions across the country since 2001. The overall number of crimes reported by postsecondary institutions has dropped by 34 percent, from 41,600 per year in 2001 to 27,600 per year in 2013. The report, titled Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2015, covers higher education campuses as well as K–12 schools and includes such topics as victimization, teacher injury, bullying and cyberbullying, use of drugs and alcohol, and criminal incidents at postsecondary institutions. The report found significant decreases in instances of bullying, harassment due to sexual orientation, and violent crime at all levels of education. The number of on-campus crimes reported at postsecondary institutions in 2013 was lower than in 2001 for every category except forcible sex offenses and murder. 40 -Link 41 -Hate speech is constitutionally protected 42 -Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh, Law Professor at UCLA, “No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2015, JW 43 -I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” and in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) 44 -Impact 45 -Empirics prove that hate speech leads to hate crimes 46 -Singh 12 Hansdeep Singh, Co-Founder and Director of Legal Programs for the International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination, Simran Jeet Singh, a scholar and activist who writes primarily on culture and religion “The Rise of Hate Crimes Can Be Tied Directly to Hateful Speech,” The Daily Beast, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/06/the-rise-of-hate-crimes-can-be-tied-directly-to-hateful-speech.html JW 47 -Although there are flaws in the FBI’s method of tracking and monitoring hate crimes, their statistics provide a consistent framework to analyze trends. For example, from 2005 to 2010, hate crimes motivated by religious bias show a consistent upward trajectory—whereas hate crimes against religious communities constituted 17.1 percent of all bias-based crimes in 2005, that number has reached 20 percent in the most recent report published in 2010. This is the highest rate of hate crimes motivated by religious bias in the 18 years since the FBI started tracking hate crimes nationwide in 1992. Furthermore, while one might assume that the pattern of anti-Muslim violence would have decreased a decade after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, official statistics show that hate crimes against Muslims are at their highest levels since 2001. The most recent FBI data indicates that in a one-year period, from 2009 to 2010, there was a staggering 42 percent increase in hate crimes against Muslims in this country. The recent shooting rampage at a Sikh Gurdwara (house of worship) in Oak Creek, Wisc., emphasizes the importance of allocating adequate resources to prevent domestic terrorist attacks. The shooter, Wade Michael Page, was a member of the Hammerskin Nation, one of the most violent white supremacist groups in the country. We are deluding ourselves if we do not see the parallel between intolerant or hateful rhetoric and its inevitable consequence. Key issues in our national discourse in 2010 correlate to the rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes. For example, the controversy surrounding the Park 51 Muslim community center in lower Manhattan, the building of “mega-mosques” around the country, and the threat by a Florida pastor to burn the Quran on the anniversary of 9/11—all of these instances contributed to a rising anti-Muslim sentiment in America. The vitriolic discourse can also be linked to bias-based violence against other communities. For instance, hate crime against the LGBT community has risen 36 percent from 2005 to 2010. This is in part because of the extreme rhetoric of opponents of the marriage equality movement. Such targeted violence is one symptom of a deeper and more widespread illness plaguing this great nation—the discrimination and “othering” of minority communities. 48 - 49 -Expenditures DA 50 -Campaign expenditures are deemed constitutionally protected speech under Citizens United 51 -Levy 15 Gabrielle Levy, “How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5 Years,” US News and World Report, January 21, 2015 52 -Five years ago Wednesday, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that dramatically reshaped the business of politics in the U.S. In its Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision, the court opened the campaign spending floodgates. The justices' ruling said political spending is protected under the First Amendment, meaning corporations and unions could spend unlimited amounts of money on political activities 53 -Limits on campaign expenditures are key to provide equal access to student government, especially for underprivileged students. 54 -New University 16 New University. "Spending Caps Stop The Arms Race.". May 04, 2009. Web. December 07, 2016 55 -On April 20, the New University published an editorial entitled, “Paying to Play: Buying the ASUCI Presidency,” in which the Editorial Board argued for spending caps in ASUCI elections. We stand behind that editorial. Without spending caps, election campaigns have become caught in an arms race, with each candidate forced to spend ridiculous amounts of money in order to remain competitive. This leaves students who don’t have large amounts of funding behind. ASUCI campaigns should be fueled by thoughtful proposals and ideas, not by money. The fact is that universities have legitimate reasons for enacting spending limits. That is why many other schools, including UC Berkeley, already have them. Limiting the influence of money in a student election means that, as Judge Carlos T. Bea said, “Students are forced to campaign personally, wearing out their shoe-leather rather than wearing out a parent’s – or an activist organization’s – pocketbook.” 56 -Precludes the aff and outweighs: 57 -1. Involvement in student government shapes the decisions that colleges make, so spending caps are a prerequisite to an equal starting point for discourse over campus policies 58 -2. Student government models real-world government and student leaders become leaders in the real world—that means changing the culture on campuses will spill over into real-world campaign finance reform 59 -3. Absent spending caps, outside organizations can influence on-campus speech—your offense presumes that universities are insulated spaces for discourse, which isn’t true if political organizations are allowed to meddle in the process 60 -4. Large campaign contributions breed corruption and disproportionate representation and preclude other reforms 61 -Kennedy 13 Liz Kennedy, “Campaign Spending Limits Protect Our Democracy from Corruption,” US News and World Report, October 7 2013 62 -Americans are outraged over the power of money on our government. In Citizens United the Supreme Court already increased the dominance of the wealthy and special interests on politics and policy. Now, in McCutcheon v FEC, the court is being asked to strike down one of the few remaining campaign finance laws that we have to fight corruption of our democratic government. After all, in a democracy the size of your wallet shouldn't determine the impact of your voice or your right to representation. Coal executive Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee are asking the court to declare unconstitutional a law that says that no one person can contribute over $123,000 per cycle directly to candidates, parties, and committees. That's more than twice the average American household's income. If the court makes the radical choice to overturn its own precedent and strike down this common sense limit, a single wealthy donor could contribute more than $3.5 million to one party's candidates and committees. That's why Demos and organizations representing almost 9.5 million Americans, including the NAACP, Communications Workers of America, Sierra Club, and Greenpeace, came together to tell the court: not another Citizens United. Americans already think their government is corrupt because their elected representatives are more responsive to financial supporters than to constituents or even the public interest. And they're right. Research shows that government really is more responsive to the policy preferences of the donor class than to average Americans. This is true even when the policy preferences of the wealthy differ greatly from the majority of Americans, which often they do – particularly on economic issues. No wonder almost 80 percent of Americans believe that large political contributions are preventing government from solving the important issues facing America today. When big money dictates what's possible in public policy the current and long-term needs of American families are put in jeopardy. When corporations and wealthy Americans bankroll political campaigns, there's little hope that they'll be made to pay their fair share of taxes or prevented from receiving a disproportionate share of tax breaks. Progress on upward mobility issues such as the minimum wage, paid sick leave and family friendly workforce policies is stalled despite widespread support because they are opposed by (or not a priority of) the donor class. That's not how a representative democracy is supposed to work. We need a political system that is responsive to citizens to advocate effectively for policies that reflect the priorities Americans share. But elections are increasingly financed by those who personally profit from the continuation of harmful business and environmental practices. They can use their wealth to build political power, then use their political power to strengthen their economic positions. No wonder so many Americans think the deck is stacked against them. Funding for our elections is already dominated by a tiny elite donor class. According to the Sunlight Foundation, 84 percent of the members of Congress elected in 2012 received more money from the 1 percent of the 1 percent than from all of their small donors combined. Removing aggregate contribution limits would make a bad situation worse, allowing more than $1 billion dollars of new "McCutcheon Money" into our elections over the next two presidential cycles, according to Demos and U.S. PIRG projections. It's no wonder research shows that, in contrast to the affluent, low-income Americans have little influence over public policy outcomes – in other words, our government's decisions. But the donor class doesn't have the same public policy preferences and priorities as the rest of America, and it don't look like the rest of America either. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,42 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 2 -K – Black Safe Spaces (2:50) 3 -Imagine being stuck in a sort of vertigo that seems as if you have no where to go, no where to hide, no where to just be with people who understand your struggle – this is the analysis the 1AC fundamentally misses and affirms for more free speech – safe spaces on college campuses are necessary and needed to help black students deal with being black. 4 -Tyler Kingkade Lilly Workneh Ryan Grenoble Nov 16th, 2015 Campus Racism Protests Didn't Come Out Of Nowhere, And They Aren't Going Away Quickly Mizzou seems to have catalyzed years of tension over inequality and race. Senior Editor/Reporter, The Huffington Post, Senior Black Voices Editor, The Huffington Post News Editor, The Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/campus-racism-protests-didnt-come-out-of-nowhere_us_56464a87e4b08cda3488bfb 5 -If there's one thing University of Missouri senior Alanna Diggs thinks people are getting wrong about campus racism protests, it's the assumption that they're something new. The demonstrations at Mizzou this month resulting in the ouster of two top university leaders, partly over how they handled various racist incidents on campus, Diggs said, "were not a result of spontaneous combustion." "It was not an overdramatic reaction by a couple of angry black students, but a moment built up over time," Diggs continued. "Many of us behind the scenes have been suffering and struggling with administration and students while trying to deal with class and work. The movement is not over. This is the beginning." The demonstrations at Mizzou's campus in Columbia came on the heels of unrestat Yale University, and have been copied ~-~- complete with demands for resignations ~-~-at dozens of other colleges, including Ithaca College in New York, the University of Kansas and Claremont McKenna College near Los Angeles. Protests staged on college campuses last week are the culmination of years of activism around inequality and everyday racism, and incidents pushing racial divisions to the surface. The demands activists are making are reminiscent of similar protests decades earlier. And scholars caution there's no single switch colleges can flip to fix things ~-~- improving racial tensions on campuses will likely take years. "What we are seeing is the beginning of a movement where students and student groups across campuses are finding the courage to speak up about what they have been experiencing," said Yolanda Sealey-Ruiz, a scholar of Latino and black male students, at Columbia University. "I think Mizzou is a catalyst, an inspiration perhaps, but not a one-off event. I think we are also witnessing a reprise to history ~-~- college campuses have historically been places where protest to inequality has taken place." Students are arriving on campus believing racism remains persistent in America today. According to an annual survey of more than 150,000 incoming freshmen by UCLA, the percentage of students who believe racism is no longer an issue has risen slowly over 25 years, from 19 percent in 1990 to 24 percent in 2015. Students of color who've spoken with HuffPost say that does not surprise them, given that students are growing up witnessing high-profile deaths of unarmed black men and teens, like Trayvon Martin, Tamir Rice and Eric Garner. Those experiences are coupled multiple examples of fraternity and sorority parties featuring black face and caricatures of various ethnic groups, while Muslim students at some campuses have been subjected to spying by law enforcement. "We're not that much that different than the people being killed," said Taylor Lemmons, a junior at Claremont McKenna College. "Just because we're going to get a degree from these shiny institutions doesn't mean we're that much different." In some cases, students who say racism is still a prevalent issue have been proven right. The University of Alabama's sororities didn't begin accepting black women as members until 2013. In March, fraternity brothers in Oklahoma were caught on video singing and laughing about lynching black men ~-~- racial slurs included. "We're living in a time where issues that haven't been appropriately attended to for a number of years are getting much more attention," said Benjamin Reese Jr., Duke University's chief diversity officer. "I don't think students suddenly woke up to things. I think they're reacting not only to the events on campus and incidents around the country." Brown University senior Armani Madison said part of his discontent with his school is fueled by demands made by black students in 1968, 1975 and 1985 that "have yet to be fulfilled, despite university promises." Activists at Occidental College noted their demand for a black studies major has existed since 1968. Students of color have organized campaigns at Colgate University, the University of Michigan, UCLA, and Harvard, among other schools, to highlight inequities. Some of these demands at Brown, Mizzou and elsewhere are for an increase in the percentage of minority students and faculty. More selective colleges are still disproportionately white compared with the general population, data from the Georgetown University's Center on Education and the Workforce shows. College presidents, football coaches and professors all are much more likely to be white, too. Black students are less likely to graduate within six years compared with their classmates. But even increasing the percentage of students of color on campus is not enough, insisted Deborah Bial, founder of the Posse Foundation, which partners with colleges to place minority students.“It's the responsibility of every institution to be transparent to have as many ongoing conversations as possible, to create forums, to use every resource they have from the president to the students themselves," Bial said. "And the conversation shouldn't just be happening one time." Activists also are demanding changes to curriculum to address diversity and an administrative acknowledgement of barriers that students of color face. Students of color say they're constantly reminded that they are "different." Reine Ibala, a senior at Yale, described either feeling "invisible" on campus, or like she was an intruder and couldn't rely on bystanders to help if something happened. "The thing about being black on a college campus in an urban area is that your color ~-~- in my case, my blackness ~-~- at times puts my status as a student in question," Ibala said. "Here in New Haven, the assumption is first that I am a 'townie.'" Students protesting on campuses told HuffPost their demonstrations were not simply about offensive Halloween costumes, misguided emails from administrators or one person shouting the N-word. The emotional response ,which sometimes receives backlash, comes from dealing with years of feeling like administrators aren't trying to make things better for them. "It shouldn't take days of our tears and anger to move an administration to listen," Ibala said. Transparency during the next steps will be critical, said Reese, president of National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education. Reese recommended including students in assessing what steps a college will take to address racial issues ~-~- something activists are demanding at Mizzou and Claremont McKenna, among other campuses. But in the near term, both Reese and Bial emphasized that colleges will have to be quicker to respond to individual incidents of racism. "It's important to say this happened and we're not okay with it, and it's important for students to say it as well ~-~- I can't emphasize that enough," Bial said. "Students can't give up the power they have to voice opinions about what's okay and what's not okay." Vernā Myers, a diversity consultant and author, said now that Mizzou has served as a spark, protests against campus racism won't go away. "This generation didn't think they'd have to go through something like this," Myers said. But now, they are empowered to do so, and "they're going to help our country live up to what we say we believe." 6 -Forcing minorities to confront racial microaggressions without any other form of recourse or retreat induces racial “battle fatigue” that translates into actual material harms 7 -Smith et al 07 William A. Smith University of Utah Walter R. Allen University of California, Los Angeles Lynette L. Danley University of Utah, ““Assume the Position . . . You Fit the Description” Psychosocial Experiences and Racial Battle Fatigue Among African American Male College Students,” American Behavioral Scientist, 2007 JW 8 -Racial Microaggressions in Historically White Environments The concern about greater distress and academic attrition among Black males attending historically White universities should not be misunderstood as individual failure to cope with stress or as being academically underprepared (Prillerman, Myers, and Smedley 1989). Pierce (1974) has argued that in analyzing racial discrimination, we “must not look for the gross and obvious. The subtle, cumulative miniassault is the substance of today’s racism” (p. 516). He defined these mini-assaults as microaggressions and explained that these racialized insults “may seem harmless, but the cumulative burden of a lifetime of microaggressions can theoretically contribute to diminished mortality, augmented morbidity, and flattened confidence” (Pierce, 1995, p. 281). African American males not only experience mini-assaults or racial microaggressions, they also experience macrostressors or racial macroaggressions (Williams, Neighbors, and Jackson, 2003). Racial macroaggressions are largescale, systems-related stressors that are widespread, sometimes becoming highly publicized, race-related, traumatic events. For example, the 1963 Birmingham church bombing or “driving-while-Black” restrictions would classify as racial macroaggressions (Feagin, 2006). Landrine and Klonoff (1996) maintain that whether at the micro- or macrolevel, perceived racial discrimination is a nearly universal stressor for Blacks. According to the authors, these universal race-related stressors are linked with poor mental and physical health outcomes. Based on a sample of African Americans ages 15 to 70 years, Landrine and Klonoff reported that 98.1 of Blacks said they experienced racial discrimination during the past year and 100 reported that they had experienced racial discrimination at some point during their lifetime. Moreover, 99.4 of the sample indicated that these race-related experiences were stressful. Thus, racism has a systemic, powerful, and far-reaching effect in the lives of Black people (Feagin, 2006). The impact of racial microaggressions on individual Black targets become communicable as the psychological and emotional pain of the incidents is passed on to family, friends, and the larger social group and across generations (Feagin and McKinney, 2003; Smith, 2005b). According to Smith (2005b), racial microaggressions can range from racial slights, recurrent indignities and irritations, unfair treatment, stigmatization, hypersurveillance, and contentious classrooms to personal threats or attacks on one’s wellbeing (also see Bobo and Smith, 1998; Clark, Anderson, Clark, and Williams, 1999; Essed and Stanfield, 1991; Williams, Yu, Jackson, and Anderson, 1997; Wilson, 1990). As a result of chronic racial microaggressions, many African Americans perceive their environment as extremely stressful, exhausting, and diminishing to their sense of control, comfort, and meaning while eliciting feelings of loss, ambiguity, strain, frustration, and injustice (Brown et al., 1999). When racially oppressed groups are in situations where they experience environmental stressors as mundane events, the ramifications are as much a psychological and emotional burden as they are a physiological response (Carroll, 1998; Pierce, 1974). Racial Battle Fatigue in Historically White Environments Racial battle fatigue addresses the physiological and psychological strain exacted on racially marginalized groups and the amount of energy lost dedicated to coping with racial microaggressions and racism. The concept of racial battle fatigue synthesizes and builds on the extensive discipline-specific research literature and studies of stress responses to racism and its impact on health and coping (e.g., Brown, Parker-Dominguez, and Sorey, 2000; Brown, Wallace, and Williams, 2000; Carroll, 1998; Clark et al., 1999; Feagin and McKinney, 2003; Feagin and Sikes, 1994; Gougis, 1986; James, 1994; Pierce, 1974, 1975a, 1975b, 1995; Prillerman et al., 1989; Sapolsky, 1998; Scaer, 2001; Shay, 2002; Shay and Munroe, 1999; Smith, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Steele, 1997; Steele and Aronson, 1995; Stevenson, 1994a, 1994b, 1997, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). Racial battle fatigue also uses the literature on combat stress syndrome (also known as combat stress fatigue, combat trauma, combat injury, or posttraumatic stress disorder or injury) for understanding the effects of hostile environments (Pierce, 1975a, 1995; Shay, 2002; Shay and Munroe, 1999; Smith, 2004; U.S. Department of the Army, 1994; Willie and Sanford, 1995). Combat stress syndrome is diagnosed when military personnel suffer from mental, emotional, and physiological injuries in response to persistent, extreme stress or risk. Unlike typical occupational stress, combat stress syndrome and racial battle fatigue are natural responses to living and working under mundane conditions of heightened distress, especially when facing potential perils or dangers because of tough, violent conditions or the perception that one’s life, personal dignity, or character is being threatened (Pierce, 1974, 1975a, 1975b, 1995; Shay, 2002; Shay and Munroe, 1999; U.S. Department of the Army, 1994). For the military soldier, combat stress is the result of being placed in a foreign environment and having to be constantly on guard for imminent danger in less-than-ideal and life-threatening conditions. For African Americans, racial battle fatigue is the result of constant physiological, psychological, cultural, and emotional coping with racial microaggressions in less-than-ideal and racially hostile or unsupportive environments (campus or otherwise). African Americans experience mundane environmental stressors as physiological, psychological, and emotional burdens (Feagin, Vera, and Imani, 2001). In the aftermath of a racially traumatic event, it is normal to have feelings of detachment or emotional numbness or a feeling of distorted or altered reality (e.g., wondering, “Did I hear what I thought I just heard?”). Surprise, shock, and frustration are oftentimes followed by the attempt to force the event from memory, denying that it occurred, or reliving the event in dreams or in conversations with others. Unfortunately, for most people of color, these negative feelings or the associated collective memories seldom fade; instead, they become a part of a person’s life history. For African Americans and other people of color, the mental, emotional, and physiological symptoms of racial battle fatigue can develop from exposure to chronically stressful race-related conditions. These conditions can range from chronic exposure to and experiences with racial slights, recurrent indignities and irritations, unfair treatment, and contentious classrooms to personal threats to one’s well-being (Clark et al., 1999; Essed and Stanfield, 1991; Prillerman et al., 1989; Smith, 2004, 2005a; Williams et al., 1997). College and university campuses and their surrounding communities are often located in historically White environments where racial discrimination exists in both subtle and overt forms (Devine, 1989; Dinwiddie and Allen, 2003; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, and Howard, 1997; Lewis, Chesler, and Forman, 2000). African Americans are trying to transition into these historically White spaces and succeed, despite never knowing if or when they might be the targets of racial discrimination. The cumulative symptoms of racial battle fatigue are both physiological and psychological (Smith, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). Examples of physiological symptoms include, but are not limited to, (a) tension headaches and backaches, (b) elevated heart beat, (c) rapid breathing in anticipation of racial conflict, (d) an upset stomach or “butterflies,” (e) extreme fatigue, (f) ulcers, (g) loss of appetite, and (h) elevated blood pressure. The psychological symptoms of racial battle fatigue include (a) constant anxiety and worrying; (b) increased swearing and complaining; (c) inability to sleep; (d) sleep broken by haunting, conflict-specific dreams; (e) intrusive thoughts and images; (f) loss of self-confidence; (g) difficulty in thinking coherently or being able to articulate (confirming stereotype); (h) hypervigilance; (i) frustration; (j) denial; (k) John Henryism, or prolonged, high-effort coping with difficult psychological stressors; (1) emotional and social withdrawal; (m) anger, anger suppression, and verbal or nonverbal expressions of anger; (n) denial; (o) keeping quiet; and (p) resentment (for more information on the effects of racial stressors, see Clark et al., 1999; Feagin and McKinney, 2003; Feagin and Sikes, 1994; James, 1994; Pierce 1974, 1975a, 1995; Prillerman et al., 1989; Turner and Myers, 2000; Williams et al., 1997). As a result of mundane racial microaggressions, social feelings of cohesion and moral trust are often retarded or broken between students of color and the HWI community (Smith, 2004) 9 -Racial battle fatigue turns the case: minorities are shut out of conversations and are never treated as an equal participant in the discussion 10 -Smith et al 07 William A. Smith University of Utah Walter R. Allen University of California, Los Angeles Lynette L. Danley University of Utah, ““Assume the Position . . . You Fit the Description” Psychosocial Experiences and Racial Battle Fatigue Among African American Male College Students,” American Behavioral Scientist, 2007 JW 11 -Responding in emotional self-defense to traumatic events, Black students might slowly or suddenly distance themselves from stressful conflicts and deny or avoid recalling the impact of such experiences. In fact, African American males bear a social cost when they attribute blocked opportunities for success to discrimination. Kaiser and Miller (2001) found that no matter how much discrimination an African American male faces, he is viewed as hypersensitive, emotional, argumentative, irritating, troublesome, and complaining when he suggested that discrimination was the cause of a failing grade. As a result, according to these authors, African American males are more likely to minimize acts of racial discrimination. In a supporting study, Swim et al. (2003) found African American gender differences in behavioral responses to racist incidents. African American male students (36) were less likely than African American female students (81) to respond directly or indirectly to racist incidents. Moreover, these gender differences were not because of differential types of incidents experienced by Black women and men. These researchers maintain that African American males suffer greater consequences for assertively confronting perpetrators. The social condition that produces racial battle fatigue for African Americans is enveloped in societal ideologies and beliefs about Blacks as a group. In this social milieu, where institutional and individual racist practices are present (whether overtly, covertly, subtly, or as color-blind acts), African Americans are constantly dedicating time and energy to determining if there was a stressor, whether that stressor was motivated by a racist purpose, and how or if they should respond. With a history of more than several centuries of racial struggle in the United States, African Americans are socialized to employ many forms of coping strategies for combating racial microaggressions (Bowman and Howard, 1985; Clark et al., 1999; Prillerman et al., 1989; Stevenson, 1994a, 1994b, 1997, 1998). Research suggests that this socialization process has prepared them more effectively for dealing with racial macroaggressions than with microaggressions (Prillerman et al., 1989; Stevenson, 1994a, 1994b, 1997). Depending on the coping responses, adaptive or maladaptive, African Americans will experience racial battle fatigue in varying frequencies and degrees that directly affects psychological and physiological stress response and related health outcomes. Despite various coping strategies, Black male college students express high levels of repressed frustration, greater dropout or “slow-out” rates, and lower grades because of the mundane, extreme, environmental stressors faced in public, academic, and social spaces on and off campus (Carroll, 1998; Feagin, 2002; Feagin, Vera, and Imani, 2001; Solórzano, Allen, and Carroll, 2002). More research is beginning to examine African American male collegians’ success and struggles (Kaiser and Miller, 2001; Stevenson, 1998; Swim et al., 2003). However, more often than not, the outcomes are not pleasant for Black males. Trend data indicate that Black males are more likely than Black females to drop out of high school and college, and consequently more Black men will abuse drugs, become incarcerated, and have higher rates of psychological disturbances (Duncan, 2003). For African American males, hopes of achieving the “American Dream,” of being employed with a college degree, are too often thwarted. A raced–gendered analysis of national enrollment data found a disproportionately low representation of Black males to Black females. For every Black male enrolled in college, there were two Black females enrolled; similar disparities exist with respect to earned degrees (Harvey and Anderson, 2005). 12 -Lack of safe spaces means that minorities must be routinely exposed to gratuitous psychological violence that transcends generations 13 -Delgado and Stefacic ’09, Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf, 14 -II. OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO: THE EVALUATION OF HARMS HAS BEEN INCOMPLETE One way, of course, to end the current standoff is for one of the parties to defer to the other’s point of view. Indeed, by pursuing an aggressive campaign of litigation, the free-speech camp has been implicitly urging that the other side do just that.58 One could also argue that a host of campus administrators, by enacting successive versions of hate-speech codes, are attempting to do the same thing, namely, wear the other side down.59 Ordinarily, though, it is the free-speech faction, with a string of lower-court victories to its credit, who urge the other side to “get over it” and toughen its collective hide.60 Yet, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of speech regulation suggests that the case for it is closer than the ACLU and some courts seem ready to acknowledge. Before addressing the costs of hate-speech regulation versus the opposite, it is advisable to arrive at an understanding of what hate speech is. A Types of Hate Speech Hate speech, including the campus variety, can take a number of forms—direct (sometimes called “specific”) or indirect; veiled or overt; single or repeated; backed by power, authority, or threat, or not.61 One can also distinguish it in terms of the characteristic— such as race, religion, sexual orientation, immigration status, or gender—of the person or group it targets.62 It can isolate a single individual (“Jones, you goddamned X.”) or group (“The goddamned Xs are destroying this country.”). It can be delivered orally, in writing, on the Internet, or in the form of a tangible thing, such as a Confederate flag, football mascot, or monument.63 It can be anonymous, as with graffiti or a leaflet surreptitiously placed on a bulletin board or under a dormitory door, or its author can be plainly identified.64 The object of the speech may be free to leave, or trapped, as in a classroom or workplace.65 B. The Harms of Hate Speech The various forms of hate speech present different kinds and degrees of harm. The face-to-face kind is the most immediately problematic, especially if the target is not in a position to leave and the one delivering it possesses the power to harm. 1. Direct or Face-to-Face Hate Speech Although some courts and commentators describe the injury of hate speech as mere offense,66 the harm associated with the face-toface kind, at least, is often far greater than that and includes flinching, tightening of muscles, adrenaline rushes, and inability to sleep.67 Some victims may suffer psychosocial harms, including depression, repressed anger, diminished self-concept, and impairment of work or school performance.68 Some may take refuge in drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addiction, compounding their misery.69 2. Hate Speech and Children With children, the harms of hate speech may be even more worrisome. A child victimized by racial taunts or browbeating may respond aggressively, with the result that he or she is labeled as assaultive.70 Or, the child can respond by internalizing the harm and pretending to ignore it. Robbed of self-confidence and a sense of ease, such a child can easily become introspective and morose.71 If the child’s parents suffer the same fate at work, they may bring these problems home so that the parents retain even less energy for their families than before.72 Recent scholarship points out how the pathologies associated with social subordination may be transgenerational, lasting for centuries, if not millennia, and include pain, fear, shame, anger, and despair.73 3. General Hate Speech With general hate speech, such as anonymously circulated flyers or speeches to a crowd, the harms, while diffuse, may be just as serious.74 Recent scholarship shows how practically every instance of genocide came on the heels of a wave of hate speech depicting the victims in belittling terms.75 For example, before launching their wave of deadly attacks on the Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutus in government and the media disseminated a drumbeat of messages casting their ethnic rivals as despicable.76 The Third Reich did much the same with the Jews during the period leading up to the Holocaust.77 When the United States enslaved African Americans and killed or removed the Indians, it rationalized that these were simple folk who needed discipline and tutelage, or else bloodthirsty savages who resisted the blessings of civilization.78 When, a little later, the nation marched westward in pursuit of manifest destiny, it justified taking over the rich lands of California and the Southwest on the ground that the indolent Mexicans living on them did not deserve their good fortune.79 Before interning the Japanese during World War II, propagandists depicted the group as sneaky, suspicious, and despotic.80 It is possible that the connection between general hate speech and instances of mass oppression may not be merely statistical and contingent, but conceptual and necessary.81 Concerted action requires an intelligible intention or rationale capable of being understood by others. One cannot mistreat another group without first articulating a reason why one is doing it—otherwise, no one but a sadist would join in.82 Without a softening-up period, early steps toward genocide, such as removing Jews to a ghetto, would strike others as gratuitous and command little support. Discriminatory action of any kind presupposes a group that labors under a stigma of some kind.83 The prime mechanism for the creation of such stigma is hate speech.84 Without it, genocide, imperialism, Indian removal, and Jim Crow could gain little purchase.85 C. The Harms of Speech Regulation If the harms of hate speech are sobering, what lies on the other side? What happens to the hate speaker forced to hold things in? Will he or she suffer psychological injury, depression, nightmares, drug addiction, and a blunted self image?86 Diminished pecuniary and personal prospects?87 Will hate-speech regulation set up the speaker’s group for extermination, seizure of ancestral lands, or anything comparable?88 The very possibility seems far-fetched. And, indeed, regimes, such as Europe’s and Canada’s, that criminalize hate speech exhibit none of these ills.89 Speech and inquiry there seem as free and uninhibited as in the United States, and their press just as feisty as our own.90 What about harm to the hate speaker? The individual who holds his or her tongue for fear of official sanction may be momentarily irritated. But “bottling it up” seems not to inflict serious psychological or emotional damage.91 Early in the debate about hate speech, some posited that a prejudiced individual forced to keep his impulses in check might become more dangerous as a result.92 By analogy to a pressure valve, he or she might explode in a more serious form of hate speech or even a physical attack on a member of the target group.93 But studies examining this possibility discount it.94 Indeed, the bigot who expresses his sentiment aloud is apt to be more dangerous, not less, as a result. The incident “revs him up” for the next one, while giving onlookers the impression that baiting minorities is socially acceptable, so that they may follow suit.95 A recently developed social science instrument, the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), shows that many Americans harbor measurable animus toward racial minorities.96 Might it be that hearing hate speech, in person or on the radio, contributes to that result?97 III. OBSERVATION NUMBER THREE: INTEREST BALANCING MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF RELEVANT FEATURES OF HATE SPEECH If all types of hate speech are apt to impose costs,98 large or small, how should courts and policymakers weigh them? Not every victim of hate speech will respond in one of the ways described above. Some will shrug it off or lash back at the aggressor, giving as good as they got.99 The harm of hate speech is variable, changing from victim to victim and setting to setting.100 By the same token, it is impossible to say with assurance that the cost of hate-speech regulation will always be negligible. Some speakers who might wish to address sensitive topics, such as affirmative action or racial differences in response to medical treatments, might shy away from them.101 The interplay of voices that society relies on to regulate itself may deteriorate. In balancing hate speech versus regulation, two benchmarks may be helpful: a review of current freespeech “exceptions” and attention to the role of incessancy. A. Current Free-Speech Exceptions Not all speech is free. The current legal landscape contains many exceptions and special doctrines corresponding to speech that society has decided it may legitimately punish. Some of these are: words of conspiracy; libel and defamation; copyright violation; words of threat; misleading advertising; disrespectful words uttered to a judge, police officer, or other authority figure; obscenity; and words that create a risk of imminent violence.102 If speech is not a seamless web, the issue is whether the case for prohibiting hate speech is as compelling as that underlying existing exceptions. First Amendment defenders often assert that coining a new exception raises the specter of additional ones, culminating, potentially, in official censorship and Big Brother.103 But our tolerance for a wide array of special doctrines suggests that this fear may be exaggerated and that a case-by-case approach may be quite feasible. How important is it to protect a black undergraduate walking home late at night from the campus library?104 As important as a truthful label on a can of dog food or safeguarding the dignity of a minor state official?105 Neither free-speech advocates nor courts have addressed matters like these, but a rational approach to the issue of hate-speech regulation suggests that they should.106 B. Incessancy and Compounding Two final aspects of hate speech are incessancy—the tendency to recur repeatedly in the life of a victim—and compounding.107 A victim of a racist or similar insult is likely to have heard it more than once. In this respect, a racial epithet differs from an insult such as “You damn idiot driver” or “Watch where you’re going, you klutz” that the listener is apt to hear only occasionally. Like water dripping on stone, racist speech impinges on one who has heard similar remarks many times before.108 Each episode builds on the last, reopening a wound likely still to be raw. The legal system, in a number of settings, recognizes the harm of an act known to inflict a cumulative harm. Ranging from eggshell plaintiffs to the physician who fails to secure fully informed consent, we commonly judge the blameworthiness of an action in light of the victim’s vulnerability.109 When free-speech absolutists trivialize the injury of hate speech as simple offense, they ignore how it targets the victim because of a condition he or she cannot change and that is part of the victim’s very identity. Hate speakers “pile on,” injuring in a way in which the victim has been injured several times before. The would-be hate speaker forced to keep his thoughts to himself suffers no comparable harm. A comparison of the harms to the speaker and the victim of hate speech, then, suggests that a regime of unregulated hate speech is costly, both individually and socially. Yet, even if the harms on both sides were similar, one of the parties is more disadvantaged than the other, so that Rawls’s difference principle suggests that, as a moral matter, we break the tie in the victim’s favor.110 Moreover, the magnitude of error can easily be greater, even in First Amendment terms, on the side of nonregulation. Hate speech warps the dialogic community by depriving its victims of credibility. Who would listen to one who appears, in a thousand scripts, cartoons, stories, and narratives as a buffoon, lazy desperado, or wanton criminal? Because one consequence of hate speech is to diminish the status of one group vis-à-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of credibility and an audience, a result surely at odds with the underlying rationales of a system of free expression.111 15 - 16 -The politics of the 1AC removes safe spaces on college campuses – this impact turns and outweighs the case – safe spaces are uniquely key for marginalized communities to come together and actually engage in conversations about identity 17 -Pickett 16 RaeAnn Pickett. August 31st 2016. Pickett is senior director of communications and public Affairs at the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health and a Ms. Foundation Public Voices Fellows. Trigger Warnings and Safe Spaces Are Necessary. Published by TIME. 18 -After the birth of my first son, I had postpartum depression. I was a mess emotionally, and I was in desperate need of feeling safe. I had no idea what “trigger warnings” or “safe spaces” were, but I had been using them internally for days—avoiding the mommy movies and choosing not to go to the breastfeeding support group where I felt like a failure. Being able to know beforehand what experiences I should avoid and create an environment where I felt safe made it easier for me to share my struggles and move past them. Everyone deserves that opportunity. The University of Chicago recently decided to put an end to trigger warnings—advance notice of subject material that might upset students—and safe spaces—places where students can avoid those subjects. The university’s reasoning for ending these voluntary practices was a “commitment to academic freedom.” In reality, this policy puts many students in the uncomfortable position of entering spaces that may or may not be safe for them to learn, interact and share in—and puts the onus on them to leave or to endure the situation. The decision doesn’t take students wants or needs into account. As the National Coalition Against Censorship notes: “In many cases, the request for trigger warnings comes from students themselves.” And safe spaces can have powerful therapeutic purposes for those who enter them. In fact, the university’s new policy does the exact opposite of what it is purported to do: instead of fostering academic freedom, it could foster mistrust and negatively affect survivors of trauma, including people of color. If students cannot trust that spaces they enter are going to keep them safe, they are less able to feel secure enough to learn. Safe spaces and trigger warnings can help support victims of assault, PTSD and violence. Organizations like Slut Walk and Take Back The Night have made great strides in ending stigma for sexual assault survivors and have called for increasing trigger warnings for sensitive content. A lack of safe spaces can also compound the mental toll of racism, even subtle racism. Past experience with bullying plays a role here: Of the 160,000 children bullied every day, 31 are multiracial, according to Clemson University’s “Status of Bullying in School” 2013 report. Racial bullying often goes unnoticed or unreported due to how teachers perceive interethnic relationships. Psychologist Morris Rosenberg found that African-Americans showed surprisingly high rates of self-esteem when they compared themselves with other African-Americans, but when they compared themselves to white peers, self-esteem levels dropped. Safe spaces can help minorities feel empowered to speak up. Some may say a commitment to free speech, by any means necessary, does more to foster a positive academic setting than safe spaces and trigger warnings. But the bigger question is: whose speech is being protected by these policies? They certainly don’t always foster a healthy relationship with students of color or survivors of trauma or those who live at the intersection of both. Sitting in the dark holding my newborn and struggling with undiagnosed postpartum depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder were some of the darkest days of my life. But because of ratings systems on movies and descriptions on the TV guide, I was able to take small steps every day to commit to keeping myself mentally healthy. The pressure of living up to the stereotype of a proud, wise, confident Latina mother kept me from seeking help for a long time. But when my first postpartum depression support group facilitator said in a hushed, happy voice that this was a safe space, I felt the weight slowly start to lift from my chest. All the pent-up anxiety I had felt was dissapating—just by knowing that the physical place I chose to be in was filled with people who understood me and could help me find the tools to get well. Being able to make informed decisions about which spaces students chose to enter and not enter is critical in helping them stay well and take control over the information they decide to receive and how to receive it. A critical phase of healing involves reclaiming power and control in positive ways. Our universities should be at the vanguard of modeling the way forward—not backward. 19 -The roll of the ballot is to endorse the debater with the best methodology to liberate the oppressed 20 -The roll of the judge is to be a critical educator 21 - 22 -Thus, the alternative – safe spaces that are currently in the status quo should remain where they are. The negative cannot fiat more safe spaces will occur – but our method in the kritik is affirming the tangibility and productivity that safe spaces provide to black students on colleges campuses. 23 -Okeke 16 24 -Okeke ,Cameron .I’m a black UChicago graduate. Safe spaces got me through college. Cameron Okeke is currently earning a master's in bioethics at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and Berman Institute of Bioethics in Baltimore, Maryland. His views are his own and do not represent those of the institution he currently attends. Aug 29, 2016 http://www.vox.com/2016/8/29/12692376/university-chicago-safe-spaces-defense 25 -The University of Chicago sent a dizzying letter to its freshman class last week, pledging its allegiance to two principles: academic freedom and freedom of expression. The letter expressed this commitment by denouncing "so-called trigger warnings" and "intellectual ‘safe spaces.’" To those unfamiliar with the UChicago’s abysmal campus climate, a strong stance against echo chambers may seem reasonable. But marginalized students know that this declaration ignores the real problems on campus: sexual assault, racial profiling, and other troubling issues. I would know. During my four years as an undergraduate at UChicago from 2011 to 2015, I grew increasingly dissatisfied with the university’s willful ignorance of students’ concerns, especially students of color. As a first-generation black student, I needed safe spaces like the Office of Multicultural Student Affairs — not to "hide from ideas and perspectives at odds with my own," but to heal from relentless hate and ignorance, to hear and be heard. My ideas were always challenged, concebut never my humanity. I mattered. Full of robust dialogue, safe spaces are not a bubbled-wrapped echo chamber, but a places where "civility and mutual respect" actually matter. Though spacious, the multicultural student affairs office was always full of students sharing their struggles and grappling with oppression. Underfunded and understaffed, it was a house-turned-sanctuary for students and student groups alike. I even slept there during a particularly brutal finals week. I, like many other students, wouldn’t have survived UChicago without this place to call my home. Alas, UChicago does not seem to get it. The university claims that it values diversity, boasting about its history of championing black, LGBTQ, poor, and femme-identified students. But you do not get our "diversity" without safe spaces, trigger warnings, or some institutionalized form of respect for people with different experiences. You want the perspective of someone with PTSD, then you better be prepared to do the work to make them comfortable enough to speak up in class, and that means giving them a heads up when discussing potentially triggering topics. Classrooms should not be a form of exposure therapy. The Office of Multicultural Student Affairs always started its dialogs with trigger warnings and had people on staff trained to handle PTSD flashbacks. You want the greatness femme-identified folks have to offer, then you have to support them in their endeavors and take sexual assault and harassment seriously. While the university continually failed to take rape and rape threat seriously, the Phoenix Survivor Alliance held solidarity circles to support survivors at Hull Gate. You want low-income and first-generation students to focus in class and thrive in your elitist institution, then you better fund the Student Support Services (for undocumented and low-income students) and address the classist onslaught inherent in UChicago culture. When the dining halls closed on Saturday nights, low-income students (myself included) went hungry. Where did we go? The Office of Multicultural Student Affairs. You want trans and LGBTQ students to show up to class and elevate the conversation with their brilliance, then you need to create a culture where misgendering and deadnaming are taboo. Fully staff the Office of LGBTQ Student Life and make more places where these students can speak freely about their struggles. You want me to elevate mediocre conversations about race with my personal experience and critical lens, then you better do something about the students muttering about affirmative action every time I speak, or the campus police who stop me on the street for not looking "UChicago enough." During my time on campus, I met more than couple people who believed in the genetic inferiority of black people. I was never afraid of their thinly veiled bigotry, just bored and disappointed. I needed a space where I, a biology major, was not expected to give free race theory classes. You want black women and other women of color to do anything at all for your gentrifying, police-protected institution, then you better just do better. If you want a university with people who have experienced "real life," then you need to listen to them, address their problems, and create places where they can heal. One house is not enough. Do not disparage the tools we have created as a show of intellectual bravado, then claim our success as your own. If, on the other hand, you only want the boring babblings of rich, white, cis, straight men whose worst experience was burying their fourth family pet, then keep doing what you have been doing since your inception. Keep pandering to the politically incorrect and the privileged if you want, but do not expect the depth and nuance that experience brings. Don’t expect us to show up. UChicago should know that trigger warnings and safe spaces exist to give those with firsthand experience a way to engage without sacrificing their well-being or safety. This accessibility is the key to a truly open marketplace of ideas and an essential pillar of academic freedom. Recklessly painting trigger warnings and safe spaces as enemies to academic freedom will only make UChicago a more hostile environment for marginalized first-years. Being diverse isn't easy and our diversity ain’t free. Don’t let us in if you can’t make room for us. 26 -Part 1 is Framework 27 -Debate should deal with questions of real-world consequences—ideal theories ignore the concrete nature of the world and legitimize oppression 28 -Curry 14 Tommy J. Curry, Professor of Philosophy @ Texas AandM, “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century,” 2014 29 -Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, it is set against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—this is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. 30 - 31 -Thus the standard is mitigating structural violence. Prefer: 32 -1. Exclusion based on perceived differences makes ethical theories illegitimate. 33 -Winter and Leighton 99 |Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter|Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and justice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” Pg 4-5 34 -She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social justice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace. 35 - 36 -2. Universal ethical obligations fail to account for status quo ante inequalities—acknowledging these is a prerequisite to any form of morality 37 -Llorente 03 Renzo Llorente. “Maurice Cornforth’s Contribution to Marxist Metaethics.” NATURE, SOCIETY, AND THOUGHT Vol. 16, No. 3 (2003) 38 -The problem, argues Cornforth, concerns the contradiction between a demand for, and injunction to, universalizability as the guarantee of fairness and impartiality, on the one hand, and the inherent injustice and unfairness of seeking to universalize moral norms and precepts in class-divided societies. For the insistence on universalizability, save in a situation of rough equality of condition, imposes very different burdens on the agents subject to this demand, and thus proves inherently unfair, a violation of the fundamental moral precept, already formulated by Aristotle, of equality of treatment for equals.10 As Cornforth puts it, “How, in a class-divided society in which the profits of one class are derived from the labour of another, can public policies and social aims be judged by a criterion of universal acceptability?” (228). Or again, putting the same point a bit differently (i.e., in terms of interests): “Until all exploitation of man by man is ended, morality cannot be based on a generalised human standpoint, expressing a common human point of view and interest” (357). We shall return to Cornforth’s remarks on interests shortly. Before doing so, let us first consider Cornforth’s discussion of the consequences attending the attempt to comply with the imperative of universalizability in class-divided societies. As Cornforth shows, two outcomes are possible. On the one hand, insofar as determinate moral principles are established as universally valid and used to regulate social life, the result is the enshrinement of a system of moral rules that is intrinsically unfair and inevitably class-biased. As Cornforth observes, “Where there are class divisions and one class interest is dominant within the given form of association, the corresponding obligations and rights express the dominant class interest, and the corresponding moral code becomes class-biased, not a code of universal but of class-biased morality” (1965, 354).11 In other words, if class divisions preclude the rough equality of condition necessary for the principle of universalizability to function properly (i.e., impartially), then the prevailing moral code will normally comprise duties, obligations, and so on that favor the dominant classes,12 since their interests are sure to take precedence in a situation in which there exist divergent, mutually exclusive interests and they alone possess the economic and political resources to ensure that their interests prevail.13 39 -4:30 40 -3. Education must prioritize equity—this requires minimizing structural antagonism to facilitate open discourse 41 -Trifonas 03 PETER PERICLES TRIFONAS. PEDAGOGIES OF DIFFERENCE: RETHINKING EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE/ RoutledgeFalmer. New York, London. 2003. Questia 42 -. Thus, paying attention to how power operates along axes of gender, race, class, and ability (that is, recognizing that social differences are not given, but are accomplished in and through educational settings) is a step toward educational equity. What does the above discussion mean in the educational context? It means that in the interactions of teachers with students in the classroom, or in other contexts, attention needs to be directed toward how dominant and subordinate relations (be they based on race, gender, class, or ability) permeate these contexts and intersect in complicated ways to produce inequality and marginalization. The frequently used and well-meaning phrase, “I treat everyone the same, ” often used by teachers and administrators to indicate their lack of bias in a diverse educational setting, in fact masks unequal power relations. Similarly, educational policies that assume that people are the same or equal may serve to entrench existing inequality precisely because people enter into the educational process with different and unequal experiences. These attempts, well meaning though they may be, tend to render inequality invisible, and thus work against equity in education. In her exploration of white privilege in higher education in the United States, Frances Rains (1998), an aboriginal-Japanese American woman, states emphatically that these benign acts are disempowering for the minority person because they erase his or her racial identity. The denial of racism in this case is in fact a form of racism. Thus, in moving toward equity in education that allows us to address multiple and intersecting axes of difference and inequality, I recommend that we try to think and act “against the grain” in developing educational policies and handling various kinds of pedagogical situations. 5 To work against the grain is to recognize that education is not neutral; it is contested. Mohanty puts it as such: … Education represents both a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power relations. It is a central terrain where power and politics operate out of the lived culture of individuals and groups situated in asymmetrical social and political positions. (Mohanty 1990:184) We need to develop a critical awareness of the power dynamics operative in institutional relations-and of the fact that people participate in institutions as unequal subjects. Working against the grain is to take a proactive approach to understanding and acting upon institutional relations, whether in the classroom, in other interactions with students, or in policy development. Rather than overlooking the embeddedness of gender, race, class, ability, and other forms of inequality that shape our interactions, working against the grain makes explicit the political nature of education and how power operates to privilege, silence, and marginalize individuals who are differently located in the educational process. In her exploration of feminist pedagogy, Linda Briskin (1990) makes a clear distinction between nonsexist and antisexist education critical to our understanding here. She asserts that nonsexism is an approach that attempts to neutralize sexual inequality by pretending that gender can be made irrelevant in the classroom. Thus, for instance, merely asserting that male and female students should have equal time to speak-and indeed giving them equal time-cannot adequately rectify the endemic problem of sexism in the classroom. One of Briskin's students reported that in her political science tutorials that when the male students spoke, everyone paid attention. When a female student spoke, however, the class acted as if no one was speaking (13). Neutrality is an attempt to conceal the unequal distribution of power. An against the grain approach would acknowledge explicitly that we are all gendered, racialized, and differently constructed subjects who do not participate in interactional relations as equals. This goes beyond formulating sexism, racism, abilism, and class privilege in individualist terms and treating them as if they were personal attitudes. Terry Wolverton (1983) discovered the difference between nonracism and antiracism in her consciousness-raising attempt: I had confused the act of trying to appear not to be racist with actively working to eliminate racism. Trying to appear not racist had made me deny my racism, and therefore exclude the possibility of change. (191) Being against the grain means seeing inequality as systemic and interpersonal (rather than individual), and combatting oppression as a collective responsibility, not just as a personal attribute (so that somehow a person can cleanse herself or himself of sexism, racism, abilism, or class bias). It is to pay attention to oppression as an interactional property that can be altered (see Manners 1998). Roger Simon (1993) suggests, in his development of a philosophical basis for teaching against the grain, which shares many commonalities in how I think about an integrative approach to equity in education, that teaching against the grain is fundamentally a moral practice. By this he does not mean that teachers simply fulfill the mandate and guidelines of school authorities. He believes that teachers must expose the partial and imperfect nature of existing knowledge, which is constructed on the basis of asymmetrical power relations (for instance, who has the power to speak and whose voices are suppressed?). It is the responsibility of the teacher or educator to show how dominant forms of knowledge and ways of knowing constrict human capacities. In exposing the power relations integral to the knowledge construction process, the educator, by extension, must treat teaching and learning as a mutual and collaborative act between teachers and students. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,55 @@ 1 +The standard is util. My framework defines ought as util – two warrants: 2 + 3 +The free dictionary defines ought as used to indicate desirability 4 +http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ought 5 +2. Ought implies an ends based calculus. Harris : 6 +But this notion of “ought” is an artificial and needlessly confusing way to think about moral choice. In fact, it seems to be another dismal product of Abrahamic religion—which, strangely enough, now constrains the thinking of even atheists. If this notion of “ought” means anything we can possibly care about, it must translate into a concern about the actual or potential experience of conscious beings (either in this life or in some other). For instance, to say that we ought to treat children with kindness seems identical to saying that everyone will tend to be better off if we do. The person who claims that he does not want to be better off is either wrong about what he does, in fact, want (i.e., he doesn’t know what he’s missing), or he is lying, or he is not making sense. The person who insists that he is committed to treating children with kindness for the reasons that have nothing to do with anyone’s well-being is also not making sense. It is worth noting in this context that the God of Abraham never told us to treat children with kindness, but He did tell us to kill them for talking back to us (Exodus 21:15, Leviticus 20:9, Deuteronomy 21:18–21, Mark 7:9–13, and Matthew 15:4–7). And yet everyone finds this “moral” imperative perfectly insane. Which is to say that no one—not even fundamentalists Christians and orthodox Jews—can so fully ignore the link between morality and human well-being. 7 +Prefer: 8 +Turn ground: ends based frameworks give us the best turn ground because you can link and impact turn my offense. Other frameworks like deont make link turns to the contention pointless as simply proving you don’t violate doesn’t meet your burden, while simply proving your opponent violates too just generates permissibility. Saying that I can turn these theories through permissibility misses the point because that just gives me impact turn ground but not true link turns, making them always comparatively less fair than my framework. denying one side link or impact turn ground that ethical theories creates unequal burdens for each side making the debate intrinsically skewed. 9 +2. Weighing ground: Util lets us weigh the probability a scenario, its risk, scope, severity, etc. and we can even weigh between these standards. We can still run side constraints but they are compared to other impacts while other frameworks prevent weighing by making them absolute. Weighing ground is key to fairness because otherwise I lose the ability to win under their standard since if their standard evaluates black and white burdens then I have to win 100 terminal defense on any of their offense before I can even begin to start linking under their standard. 10 +3. Topic lit - most articles are written through the lens of util since they’re crafted for policymakers and the general public to understand who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Topic lit is key to fairness and education because it’s where we get our arguments and determines how we engage in the res. 11 +Also, util is substantively true: 12 + 13 +Psychological evidence proves we don’t identify with our future selves. Continuous personal identity doesn’t exist. 14 +Alisa Opar (articles editor at Audubon magazine; cites Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business; and Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton) “Why We Procrastinate” Nautilus January 2014 15 +“The British philosopher Derek Parfit espoused a severely reductionist view of personal identity in his seminal book, Reasons and Persons: It does not exist, at least not in the way we usually consider it. We humans, Parfit argued, are not a consistent identity moving through time, but a chain of successive selves, each tangentially linked to, and yet distinct from, the previous and subsequent ones. The boy who begins to smoke despite knowing that he may suffer from the habit decades later should not be judged harshly: “This boy does not identify with his future self,” Parfit wrote. “His attitude towards this future self is in some ways like his attitude to other people.” Parfit’s view was controversial even among philosophers. But psychologists are beginning to understand that it may accurately describe our attitudes towards our own decision-making: It turns out that we see our future selves as strangers. Though we will inevitably share their fates, the people we will become in a decade, quarter century, or more, are unknown to us. This impedes our ability to make good choices on their—which of course is our own—behalf. That bright, shiny New Year’s resolution? If you feel perfectly justified in breaking it, it may be because it feels like it was a promise someone else made. “It’s kind of a weird notion,” says Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. “On a psychological and emotional level we really consider that future self as if it’s another person.” Using MRI, Hershfield and colleagues studied brain activity changes when people imagine their future and consider their present. They homed in on two areas of the brain called the medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, which are more active when a subject thinks about themselves himself than when they he thinks of someone else. They found these same areas were more strongly activated when subjects thought of themselves today, than of themselves in the future. Their future self “felt” like somebody else. In fact, their neural activity when they described themselves in a decade was similar to that when they described Matt Damon or Natalie Portman. And subjects whose brain activity changed the most when they spoke about their future selves were the least likely to favor large long-term financial gains over small immediate ones. Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton, has come to similar conclusions in her research. In a 2008 study, Pronin and her team told college students that they were taking part in an experiment on disgust that required drinking a concoction made of ketchup and soy sauce. The more they, their future selves, or other students consumed, they were told, the greater the benefit to science. Students who were told they’d have to down the distasteful quaff that day committed to consuming two tablespoons. But those that were committing their future selves (the following semester) or other students to participate agreed to guzzle an average of half a cup. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person. The disconnect between our present and time-shifted selves has real implications for how we make decisions. We might choose to procrastinate, and let some other version of our self deal with problems or chores. Or, as in the case of Parfit’s smoking boy, we can focus on that version of our self that derives pleasure, and ignore the one that pays the price. But if procrastination or irresponsibility can derive from a poor connection to your future self, strengthening this connection may prove to be an effective remedy. This is exactly the tactic that some researchers are taking. Anne Wilson, a psychologist at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada, has manipulated people’s perception of time by presenting participants with timelines scaled to make an upcoming event, such as a paper due date, seem either very close or far off. “Using a longer timeline makes people feel more connected to their future selves,” says Wilson. That, in turn, spurred students to finish their assignment earlier, saving their end-of-semester self the stress of banging it out at the last minute. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person. Hershfield has taken a more high-tech approach. Inspired by the use of images to spur charitable donations, he and colleagues took subjects into a virtual reality room and asked them to look into a mirror. The subjects saw either their current self, or a digitally aged image of themselves (see the figure, Digital Old Age). When they exited the room, they were asked how they’d spend $1,000. Those exposed to the aged photo said they’d put twice as much into a retirement account as those who saw themselves unaged. This might be important news for parts of the finance industry. Insurance giant Allianz is funding a pilot project in the midwest in which Hershfield’s team will show state employees their aged faces when they make pension allocations. Merrill Edge, the online discount unit of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, has taken this approach online, with a service called Face Retirement. Each decade-jumping image is accompanied by startling cost-of-living projections and suggestions to invest in your golden years. Hershfield is currently investigating whether morphed images can help people lose weight. Of course, the way we treat our future self is not necessarily negative: Since we think of our future self as someone else, our own decision making reflects how we treat other people. Where Parfit’s smoking boy endangers the health of his future self with nary a thought, others might act differently. “The thing is, we make sacrifices for people all the time,” says Hershfield. “In relationships, in marriages.” The silver lining of our dissociation from our future self, then, is that it is another reason to practice being good to others. One of them might be you.” 16 +This means util is the only coherent moral theory. 17 +A. Since a there is not continuous persons, distribution of goods among people is irrelevant, so we just maximize benefits among people. 18 +B. It is impossible to violate a constraint since identity is in constant flux. Anything such as a promise a made a year ago is no long my promise, etc. 19 +2. Public policy necessitates tradeoffs—that means util. 20 +Gary Woller BYU Prof., “An Overview by Gary Woller”, A Forum on the Role of Environmental Ethics, June 1997, pg. 10 21 +“Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such but justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty is to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their polices are somehow to the overall advantage of society. At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, Also, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse.” 22 +A. Takes out util indicts—governments already use it in the squo, so calc indicts are empirically denied. 23 +B. Any theory based in constraints is useless. Government action inevitably violates some principle, so util is most plausible. 24 +C. Util is comparatively better to any other ethical theory—non-consequentialist theories paralyze government action which is always worse than a risk of not being able to use util. 25 +1-off 26 +Challenges to revenge porn laws indicate that un-hindering free speech would be detrimental for reducing the incidence of revenge porn 27 +Harrison 15 Anne Harrison, Student Writer for The Journal of Gender, Race and Justice, “Revenge Porn: Protected by the Constitution?” University of Iowa: The Journal of Gender, Race and Justice, Volume 18, 2015, https://jgrj.law.uiowa.edu/article/revenge-porn-protected-constitution JW 28 +Legal scholars differ in how to handle revenge porn. Some find that criminalization is not necessary given that victims can already pursue civil suits. Others find that criminalization will serve as a better deterrence than civil action. As advocates push for laws prohibiting the distribution of nude photographs, a legal gray area has emerged based on the dueling freedom of expression contained in the first amendment and the substantive right to privacy. Several states have passed laws criminalizing the nonconsensual posting of nude photographs, including New Jersey penalizing the act as a felony and California making it a misdemeanor to distribute images taken with the understanding that they would remain private. Some of these laws have been challenged on the ground that they unconstitutionally restrict freedom of speech. For example, ACLU filed a federal lawsuit against Arizona’s law, which made it illegal “to intentionally disclose, display, distribute, publish, advertise or offer a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording of another person in a state of nudity or engaged in specific sexual activities if the person knows or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure.” Because the anti-revenge-porn criminal statutes at issue are content-based speech restrictions, the State has the burden of showing they meet strict scrutiny. While content-based speech restrictions are presumptively invalid, legal scholars argue that the Supreme Court has held “where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are less rigorous.” One scholar on the subject posited that such laws are likely to be upheld because the specific nude pictures involved “have nothing to do with public commentary about society.” There is some support for the notion that the laws will be upheld as cyber-stalking laws have not been found to violate the First Amendment. Other scholars believe that anti-revenge porn statutes are criminalizing protected expression. They maintain that the “First Amendment is not a guardian of taste.” In its lawsuit against the state of Arizona, the ACLU argues that the Constitution protects speech even when that speech is offense or emotionally distressing. The ACLU goes on to state that the Arizona law is overbroad in that it applies equally to private photographs and images that are “truly newsworthy, artistic, and historical images.” 29 +First Amendment protections extend to revenge porn 30 +Larkin 14 Paul J. Larkin Jr., Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, “Revenge Porn, State Law, and Free Speech,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Oct. 1, 2014 JW 31 +The Internet serves as a forum for publication or exchange of ideas, expression, or images. Parties who post images on the Internet will claim an entitlement to the same First Amendment protection that the owner of a bookstore or a movie theater receives.152 They will argue that the government cannot criminalize as legally “obscene” simple depictions of nudity,153 nor can the government prohibit the publication of “indecent” photographs on the Internet.154 State tort law permitting recovery for the online posting of nude photographs raises the same First Amendment issues because an award of damages also can have the same censorious or deterrent effect.155 The result, a defendant will argue, is that revenge porn is constitutionally protected speech despite its offensive character.156 The Free Speech Clause has proved to be a formidable barrier to attempts to use the tort or criminal laws to prevent disclosure of offensive communications, on the Internet or elsewhere.157 A victim or a prosecutor would face a well-fortified barricade. As explained below, however, they can break through that barricade in some instances.158 A. First Amendment Precedent Defendants likely would rely heavily on several Supreme Court rulings that the government cannot hold someone liable for the publication of true information. For example, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Court held that the First Amendment protects a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim that the paper lawfully acquired from a police report placed in the department’s pressroom.159 In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the right of a newspaper to publish the transcript of a wiretap in which the newspaper had played no role even though the wiretap itself was illegal.160 Defendants in revenge porn cases would maintain that cases such as Florida Star and Bartnicki disallow a state from imposing civil or criminal liability on the publication of truthful information regardless of the nature or strength of the privacy interest that the state seeks to protect. Defendants also would rely on Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 161 which involved the publication of offensive material depicting the plaintiff as part of a parody. Falwell, a well-known minister and public figure, sued Hustler magazine over a liquor advertisement that parodied him. The ad, which “clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of ‘first times,’” referred to the first time that Falwell allegedly sampled a particular liquor, but also implied that Falwell had engaged in a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse.162 Falwell sued, claiming that he was the victim of defamation, an invasion of his privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the way in which he was portrayed in the ad. At the end of trial, the district court granted Hustler a directed verdict on Falwell’s privacy claim, and the jury rejected his claim of defamation but returned a verdict in his favor on his emotional distress claim.163 After the district court and court of appeals upheld the verdict on that ground, Hustler sought review in the Supreme Court. As the Court saw it, the case presented “a novel question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State’s authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional distress.”164 The question was “whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most.”165 The Court answered, “No.” 32 +The chance for revenge porn is extraordinarily high given the amount of sexting on campus 33 +Reid 14 Samantha Reid, reporter at USA Today, “Study says 70 of students have sexted, so how do they feel about revenge porn?” USA Today, May 15, 2014, http://college.usatoday.com/2014/05/15/study-says-70-of-students-have-sexted-so-how-do-they-feel-about-revenge-porn/ JW 34 +College students are a key demographic affected by these laws –– according to a study published by the Electronic Journal of Human Sexuality, nearly 70 of college students admit to having sent or received sexually suggestive text messages. Apps like Snapchat, make it easier than ever for students to share nude or partially nude images. While students are willing to admit to sexting in anonymous studies, very few are willing to speak on the topic openly for fear of embarrassment or hurting potential career prospects –– the same results as when photos are leaked. “Revenge porn is not talked about openly,” says Nickie Hackenbrack, a senior at University of Tennessee. “Because of the anonymity of the Internet and students’ trust of those around us we have the impression that it could never happen to us.” Several schools have held events this past semester to attempt to bolster student awareness. Dowling College in Oakdale, N.Y., Colorado College in Colorado Springs, Colo. and Beloit College in Beloit, Wis. all held events that focused on revenge porn. Hackenbrack is part of “Sexual Empowerment and Awareness at Tennessee,” better known on campus as SEAT. The group puts on “Sex Week” at UT, and the organizers hope to focus on revenge porn at this year’s event. “We hope the event brings to light the pervasiveness of technology, even when it comes to sexuality,” Hackenbrack says. “To address this issue head on, we hope to put together a panel from legal and ethical perspectives to talk about the current state of revenge porn legislation.” Events like “Sex Week” strive to open up a greater dialogue about intimacy and respect among college students. Sending nude photos is a pervasive practice, but conversation about it is often taboo. “For college students this is part of contemporary sexual expression and relationships,” says Danielle Citron, a law professor at University of Maryland who specializes in cybercrime. “We want to encourage private sexual expression… but there’s got to be a sense of confidentiality.” Julie Bogen, a senior at Wheaton College in Norton, Mass., agrees that sexual expression is hindered without laws in place to protect individual privacy. “The existence of revenge porn creates a twisted paranoia surrounding experimentation and trusting your partner,” Bogen says. “Who would trust anyone or try anything new… when if the relationship ends poorly, their private moments could end up as public domain?” Without laws that pertain specifically to this type of crime, victims are left with few options for recourse when that privacy is violated–– civil suits are one route, but for the young people that this issue most commonly affects that too can be problematic. 35 +Revenge porn is the manifestation of a violent patriarchy 36 +Dermody 14 Meagan Dermody, Managing Editor at CT, “Jennifer Lawrence, privacy and the patriarchy,” The independent student press at Virginia Commonwealth University, September 7, 2014, http://www.commonwealthtimes.org/2014/09/07/jennifer-lawrence-privacy-and-the-patriarchy/ JW 37 +The leak falls somewhere between degradation and physical violence; though the violation those involved have experienced was not physical in nature, losing control over sexual images can mean losing control of a piece of your personhood. Woman becomes passive body, cut to discrete and consumable pieces without consent — the photo no longer represents a person sharing an intimate part of a complex and valuable self, but an object to be fantasized about, criticized, and consumed. It doesn’t stop there. Users of the website 4chan attempted to manipulate female users into sharing nude photographs of themselves — in solidarity, they claimed. By painting it as a movement for solidarity, they belied (however ineffectively) their true intentions. The attempt to access sexually explicit images of other women is in fact a manifestation of the will to objectify, an act of patriarchal punishment with a beguiling false attitude. It follows that the leak of these photographs and the demand for more represent a greater initiative to consume the female body as passive sex object — a large-scale manifestation of patriarchal violence, meant to reify women on a grand scale and degrade their consent by stripping them of their control over their image and intimate selves. 38 +2-off 39 +International law banned hate speech 40 +Matsuda 89 Mari J. Matsuda (Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, the William S. Richardson School of Law), "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," Michigan Law Review, 1989 41 +The international community has chosen to outlaw racist hate propaganda. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimi- nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states: Article 4 States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of per- sons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or pro- mote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incite- ment to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimi- nation, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organ- ized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organization or activities as an offence punishable by law; and (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.105 Under this treaty, states are required to criminalize racial hate messages. Prohibiting dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or hatred is not easily reconciled with American concepts of free speech. The Convention recognizes this conflict. Article 4 acknowledges the need for "due regard" for rights protected by the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights and by article 5 of the Convention - including the rights of freedom of speech, association, and conscience. Recognizing these conflicting values, and nonetheless concluding that the right to freedom from racist hate propaganda deserves affirm- ative recognition, represents the evolving international view. An American lawyer, trained in a tradition of liberal thought, would read article 4 and conclude immediately that it is unworkable. Acts of vio- lence, and perhaps imminent incitement to violence are properly pro- hibited, but the control of ideas is doomed to failure. This position was voiced continually in the debates'06 preceding adoption of the Convention, leading to the view that article 4 is both controversial and troublesome. 107 To those who struggled through early international attempts'08 to deal with racist propaganda, the competing values had a sense of ur- gency. 09 The imagery of both book burnings and swastikas was clear in their minds. 10 Hitler had banned ideas. He had also murdered six million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a major theme the idea of racial superiority. While the causes of fascism are complex,11 the knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the rise of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred. In 1959 and 1960, the United Nations faced an "outburst of anti- Semitic incidents in several parts of the world.""'2 The movement to implement the human rights goals of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration gained momentum as member states sought effective means of eliminating discrimination. 42 +Hate speech is permissible under the first amendment despite the exceptions 43 +Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh, Law Professor at UCLA, “No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.9e1ed85e9262 JW 44 +I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. 45 + 46 +Compliance with ILaw is key to preventing global disaster- US compliance with ILaw shapes global ILaw compliance 47 +IEER 02 Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties. May 2002. http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf 48 +The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system offered by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments by the United States that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. If the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance. 49 + 50 +US adherence to international law concerning hate speech is key to credibility in international human rights 51 +Cohen 15 Tanya Cohen, "It’s Time To Bring The Hammer Down On Hate Speech In The U.S." Thought Catalog, 52 +Recent scandals involving right-wing hatemongers like Phil Robertson, Donald Sterling, Bill Maher, and the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity have brought to light one of America’s biggest embarrassments: the fact that America remains the only country in the world without any legal protections against hate speech. In any other country, people like Phil Robertson and Donald Sterling would have been taken before a Human Rights Commission and subsequently fined and/or imprisoned and/or stripped of their right to public comment for making comments that incite hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities. But, in the US, such people are allowed to freely incite hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities with impunity, as the US lacks any legal protections against any forms of hate speech – even the most vile and extreme forms of hate speech remain completely legal in the so-called “land of the free”. Not only is this a violation of the most basic and fundamental human rights principles, but it’s also an explicit violation of legally-binding international human rights conventions. For many decades, human rights groups around the world – from Amnesty International to Human Rights First to the United Nations Human Rights Council – have told the United States that it needs to pass and enforce strong legal protections against hate speech in accordance with its international human rights obligations. As of 2015, the US is the only country in the world where hate speech remains completely legal. This is, in fact, a flagrant violation of international human rights law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) both mandate that all countries outlaw hate speech, including “propaganda for war” and the dissemination of any “ideas based on racial superiority or hatred”. The ICCPR and ICERD are both legally-binding international human rights conventions, and all nations are required to uphold them in the fullest. By failing to prosecute hate speech, the US is explicitly and flippantly violating international human rights law. No other country would be allowed to get away with this, so why would the US? The United Nations has stated many times that international law has absolute authority. This is quite simply not optional. The US is required to outlaw hate speech. No other country would be able to get away with blatantly ignoring international human rights standards, so why should the US be able to? The US is every bit as required to follow international human rights law as the rest of the world is. 53 +Improving human rights and preventing violations helps billions materially facing oppression across the globe. 54 +CFR 13 - Council on Foreign Relations: June 19, 2013 (“The Global Human Rights Regime” From the multimedia Global Governance Monitor of the International Institutions and Global Governance program Available at http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/global-human-rights-regime/p27450#p1 55 +Although the concept of human rights is abstract, how it is applied has a direct and enormous impact on daily life worldwide. Millions have suffered crimes against humanity. Millions more toil in bonded labor. In the last decade alone, authoritarian rule has denied civil and political liberties to billions. The idea of human rights has a long history, but only in the past century has the international community sought to galvanize a regime to promote and guard them. Particularly, since the United Nations (UN) was established in 1945, world leaders have cooperated to codify human rights in a universally recognized regime of treaties, institutions, and norms. An elaborate global system is being developed. Governments are striving to promote human rights domestically and abroad, and are partnering with multilateral institutions to do so. A particularly dynamic and decentralized network of civil-society actors is also involved in the effort. Together, these players have achieved marked success, though the institutionalization and implementation of different rights is progressing at varying rates. Response to mass atrocities has seen the greatest progress, even if enforcement remains inconsistent. The imperative to provide people with adequate public health care is strongly embedded across the globe, and substantial resources have been devoted to the challenge. The right to freedom from slavery and forced labor has also been integrated into international and national institutions, and has benefited from high-profile pressure to combat forced labor. Finally, the steady accumulation of human-rights-related conventions has encouraged most states to do more to implement binding legislation in their constitutions and statutes. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,41 @@ 1 +Topicality 2 +Interpretation: The affirmative must defend (resolution). You can discuss non-topical issues under the world of my interp, you just cannot claim that your advocacy is to fight them and that you should win for that. 3 + 4 +Ground- 5 +A. Resolvability- 6 +B. Probability- 7 +C. Internal link- 8 +D. Dialogue- Galloway 07 9 +Ryan, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007 10 +Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). 11 +2. Limits- 12 +Only limited topics protect participants from research overload which materially affects our lives outside of round. Harris 13 13 +Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655 14 +The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against Topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence. 15 +Controls the internal link to the aff- I can’t engage in the 1AC’s critical issues in round AND you cause research overload so I cannot be politically active for your cause outside of round because I am too busy researching. Limits are key to fairness because they ensure that I have the prep to engage. 16 + 17 +Vote Neg: 18 +A) Key to endorsing good methodologies—1AR severance prevents effective dialogue on the role of the ballot and having a methods debate sets a norm for other rounds. It’s too late to have a constructive debate about public policy since there are only three speeches left. 19 +B) If I win their advocacy is not topical and that topicality comes first then they have no advocacy and thus cannot have offense. 20 +Evaluate the T debate under competing interpretations – it's key to generate clear models of debate and ground because otherwise the aff's interpretation can be a moving target. Reasonability is arbitrarily defined and causes a race to the bottom for the "most reasonable" position. 21 + 22 +Rights K 23 +Their advocacy for rights rectifies the division between the human and the political - Rights talk ties the population to the sovereign by defining life only in terms of what can be defended by the state—this turns the citizen-subject into bare life by allowing arbitrary exclusion 24 +Hoover 13 Hoover, Joe. Dr Hoover has a BA in Philosophy from the University of Colorado and an MSc in Philosophy, now at University of London "Towards a politics for human rights: Ambiguous humanity and democratizing rights." Philosophy and Social Criticism 2013 (IM) 25 +Agamben pushes this critique even further by focusing on the way in which rights depend upon the distinction between those who have rights as members of the political community and those that are excluded – between bios and zoē. Human rights attempt to privilege the bare life of human beings without a place in the political world, which is why Agamben sees the displaced or stateless individual as the exemplary subject of human rights. However, it is the sovereign that has the power to make this distinction, the exclusion of some life from the political community, the creation of “bare life”. As rights are supposed to attach to human beings as such, rather than as members of a particular nation, it seems that the law achieves justification beyond convention, beyond the shared sense of justice that makes a People, but in fact it reveals that the law depends upon the power of the sovereign who ultimately decides which human beings have their rights protected and which find themselves excluded totally, most tellingly in the camp. This critique of human rights depends upon Agamben’s understanding of the sovereign as ‘the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.’54 The pure bio-politics we find in the relationship between Homo Sacer and the sovereign, who decides whether bare human life is extinguished or preserved, reveals that the effort to remove rights from a given order (to transform civil right into human rights) renders those rights precarious, dependent on exceptional power of the sovereign rather than a universal law. On this reading, human rights cannot constrain authority because they are dependent upon it, nor do they enable transformations of the legal and political order because they confirm rather than claim power. Agamben suggests that rights are not ambiguous in their support of authority and control, but rather central to it at the most fundamental level. 26 + 27 +Bare life is the ultimate devaluation of life – life that can be killed, but not sacrificed. 28 +Reinert 2007 (‘The Pertinence of Sacrifice - Some Notes on Larry the Luckiest Lamb’ Hugo Reinert, PhD from Cambridge University of Cambridge, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol6no3_2007/reinert_larry.htm) IM 29 +14. For a few years now, in his Homo Sacer project, Agamben has been tracing the political predicament of the present using the enigmatic figure of the bare life nuda vita (1998). Throughout his work, this bare life appears in many guises: from werewolves, outlaws and Roman priestesses to overcomatose patients and concentration camp victims. Perhaps its principal exemplar however - the figure that Agamben uses to illustrate its basic dynamic most succinctly - is the homo sacer or 'sacred man': 'an obscure figure from archaic Roman Law' who, for his crimes, has been expelled from both the ius humanum and the ius divinum, from both secular and sacred law. As a consequence of this, it is declared that he 'may be killed but not sacrificed' (Agamben 1998: 8). Killing this sacred man therefore invokes no sanction, but his life is also 'unsacrificeable' (82). His existence is constituted through a 'double exclusion' that expresses the basic operation of sovereign power itself - the process by which 'the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule' (18). This is the 'relation of exception': 'the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion' (18). Through this extreme relation, sovereign power maintains itself in a permanent relationship to the excluded: the outlaw for example, as another figure of the bare life, 'is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death' (183). 15. The sacred man and the outlaw are only two figures in a gallery of priests, bandits, kings, werewolves and concentration camp victims, all connected by the thread of the bare life and its shifting parameters. King or camp victim, this bare life is always a figure of the extreme margin: life stripped of its everyday humanity, reduced and excluded to the blurred threshold that surrounds the 'city of men' and defines its limits. In a sense, it is the human zoon politikon stripped of the very quality that makes it human: its social being, its character of sociality. Seen this way, the bare life is defined by the fact that it is not - or that it is no longer - a social person . This is the sense in which the term has come of age recently: particularly to describe Muslims held at Guantanamo, but also - with variable relevance - to describe social phenomena ranging from premature infant births (Wynn 2002) and homeless people (Feldman 2006), to the geopolitics of post-colonial violence (Sylvester 2006) and, somewhat bizarrely, European tourists in Ibiza (Diken and Laustsen 2004). In the present context, the more relevant of these applications focus on the question of violence - on the intersection between the sovereign exercise and justification of violence, on the one hand, and the bare life's quality of constant, permanent exposure to the threat of violence on the other. 16. As Agamben argues, the exercise of lethal violence against the bare life is twice circumscribed by the structure of the sovereign ban. Suspended in the grasp of sovereign power, the bare life becomes simultaneously vulnerable to certain kinds of violence and ineligible for others. On the one hand, it can be freely killed - the exercise of violence against the bare life is routine, insignificant and unmarked. It requires no expiation or atonement and invites no sanctions: it is banal, without consequence to the law and anything but 'intrinsically mysterious, mystifying, convoluting, plain scary, mythical and arcane' (Taussig 1992: 116). Simultaneously, with this subjection to unregulated and freely exercised forms of violence, the bare life also becomes ineligible for sacrifice - which is to say, in the general sense in which Agamben interprets the term, that the bare life is excluded from all forms of ritually marked, institutionalized, exalted or sacralizing violence, such as are 'prescribed by the rite of the law' (1998: 102): it can not, for example, be 'submitted to sanctioned forms of execution' (103). Between them, these two exclusions operate to desacralize the death of the bare life, stripping it of any significance. Its killing and death become trivial, casual, mundane and devoid of higher meaning: to Agamben the observer, the horror of the concentration camp is that as embodiments of the bare life, the men and women there died, to their executors, 'like lice' (114). In one sense, the bare life stands as cypher for a de-personalization, or dis-individuation, that transforms subjects into objects: subjecting them to the free exercise of unregulated violence while simultaneously, through the trope of denied sacrifice, disqualifying them from subjection to ritual or sacralizing forms of violence - insofar as they are 'not worthy of this gesture of honour' (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 17). 30 + 31 +The alternative is to reject the aff’s portrayal of rights—only fighting oppressive discourse like theirs can solve. 32 + McKenzie, M. (2014, February 3). 4 Ways to Push Back Against Your Privilege. Retrieved from https://www.bgdblog.org/2014/02/4-ways-push-back-privilege/ (writer, activist, founder of Black Girls Danger) 33 +I’ve often said that it’s not enough to acknowledge your privilege. And, in fact, that acknowledging it is often little more than a chance to pat yourself on the back for being so “aware.” What I find is that most of the time when people acknowledge their privilege, they feel really special about it, really important, really glad that something so significant just happened, and then they just go ahead and do whatever they wanted to do anyway, privilege firmly in place. The truth is that acknowledging your privilege means a whole lot of nothing much if you don’t do anything to actively push back against it. I understand, of course, that the vast majority of people don’t even acknowledge their privilege in the first place. I’m not talking to them. I’m talking to those of us who do. If we do, then we need to understand that acknowledgement all by itself isn’t enough. No matter how cathartic it feels. So, what does pushing back against your privilege look like? Well, here are just a few ways it can look (note: none of these is easy; that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t try): If you are in a position of power and you are able to recognize and acknowledge that at least part of the reason you are there is your (white, male, cisgendered, able-bodied, class, etc.) privilege, then pushing back against that privilege means sharing that power with, or sometimes relinquishing it to, the folks around you who have less privilege and therefore less power. I had a conversation recently with my friend about her terrible white woman boss who, when the women of color she supervises have strong feelings about the way things are being run, including the hiring of more white people over POC, pulls rank on them. Her “I understand your feelings but I am, you know, the boss and it’s my job to…” nonsense is exactly what not pushing back against your privilege looks like. On the other hand, “I was hired to supervise y’all, but I don’t want to perpetuate this type of effed-up power dynamic and also I recognize that y’all have a better understanding about why we should not hire another white man, so I’m going to go ahead and defer to y’all” is exactly what pushing back against your privilege does look like. If you have access to something and you recognize that you have it partly because of privilege, opt out of it. If you’re an able-bodied person and that retreat you really, really want to go on isn’t wheelchair accessible, and the organizers of said retreat have been asked and supported in making a change and done nothing, and you realize how fucked up that is, don’t go. It works the same for women-only events that exclude trans women. Don’t go. Even if you really, really want to go because your, like, fave artist ever is gonna be there. Especially then. Pushing back against your privilege often requires sacrifice. Sacrifice is hard sometimes, homies. If not being a dick were easy, everybody would do it! Acknowledging that something is messed up doesn’t mean anything if you still participate just because, dang, you really want to and stuff. This one is so, so important. If you are a person with a lot of privilege (i.e. a white, straight, able-bodied, class-privileged, cisgender male or any combination of two or more of those) and you call yourself being against oppression, then it should be part of your regular routine to sit the hell down and shut the eff up. If you can recognize that part of the reason your opinion, your voice, carries so much weight and importance is because you are a white man (or whatever combination is working for you), then pushing back against your privilege often looks like shutting your face. Now, of course, using your privilege to speak out against oppression is very important. But I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about chiming in, taking up space, adding your two cents, playing devil’s advocate, etc. when 1) no one asked you, 2) the subject matter is outside your realm of experience (why do you even think you get to have an opinion about the lives of black women??), 3) anything you say is just going to cause more harm because your voice, in and of itself, is a reminder that you always get to have a voice and that voice usually drowns out the voices of others. 34 + 35 +White People CP 36 + 37 +Counterplan Text: Resolved: Public Colleges and Universities shall restrict the constitutionally protected speech of Caucasian people. 38 +White conservatives use free speech as a way to combat their fear of multiculturalism. The counterplan is key to fighting back against white privelige. 39 +Stroup 16CNN host: Pro-speech conservatives just afraid of multiculturalism. Victoria Stroup. Missouri Campus Correspondent. September 16th 2016. http://www.campusreform.org/?ID=8140. DC 40 + 41 +At a University of Missouri free speech symposium, CNN commentator Sally Kohn said conservatives fighting for free speech on college campuses are afraid of multiculturalism. Kohn made the statement during a sparsely-attended keynote debate Friday with fellow CNN commentator Kirsten Powers on the issue of the fight for free speech on campus, declaring, “Where this whole debate comes from now is a critique of multiculturalism.”“Feelings are valid...I’m never going to argue with people’s feelings.” Kohn added that because conservatives can no longer criticize multiculturalism while remaining socially acceptable, they have taken on the campus speech fight because it is a way to “attack diverse principles.” She then critiqued the “broad conservative agenda” to “protect conservative issues” and repeatedly spoke against “the Koch-funded Foundation for Individual Rights in Education.” Powers countered by citing examples of liberal bias on college campuses, such as the uproar that is often encountered by both liberal and conservative students who diverge from the liberal orthodoxy, and specifically mentioned Christina Hoff Sommers, an American Enterprise Institute scholar whose speech at Oberlin College was disrupted by numerous protesters, some of whom set up a makeshift “safe space.” Powers also cited the case of a feminist professor at the University of California-Santa Barbara attacking a pro-life demonstrator because she felt threatened by the display, as well as that of a libertarian Muslim student at the University of Michigan whose satirical newspaper article led to demands for his firing because people felt “unsafe.” “Speech is not in itself dangerous,” Powers declared emphatically. Kohn retorted that both her and Powers’ white, upper-middle-class upbringings cloud their vision on the issue, claiming that speech that may not be threatening to them may nonetheless be threatening to someone else.“Feelings are valid,” she mused. “I’m never going to argue with people’s feelings.” Powers next spoke of the chilling effect that occurs when unpopular viewpoints are silent, arguing that people do not learn when everybody is like them. Kohn, however, believes this is largely a good thing, especially in the case of conservatives who do not hold progressive social views, saying, “If they feel like they can no longer speak against positive social change, good.” Once again, Powers insisted that diversity of thought and diversity of ideas are just as important as any other type of diversity, but Kohn refused to concede the point, arguing that some ideas are less deserving of protection than others.“They think diversity is dumbing down humanity, or the greatness and exceptionalism of America,” Kohn said. “I’m happy that’s under assault.” - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,68 @@ 1 +1NC Shell 2 +A. Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a specific form of constitutionally protected speech that they defend not restricting. 3 +“Any” when used in a negative sentence is a weak determiner referring to an indefinite number of things AND cannot be used for a singular countable thing 4 +Cambridge Dictionary writes Cambridge English Dictionary, “Any,” Cambridge University Press, Accessed 12-4-2016, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/grammar/british-grammar/quantifiers/any JW 5 +Any as a determiner We use any before nouns to refer to indefinite or unknown quantities or an unlimited entity: Did you bring any bread? Mr Jacobson refused to answer any questions. If I were able to travel back to any place and time in history, I would go to ancient China. Any as a determiner has two forms: a strong form and a weak form. The forms have different meanings. Weak form any: indefinite quantities We use any for indefinite quantities in questions and negative sentences. We use some in affirmative sentences: Have you got any eggs? I haven’t got any eggs. I’ve got some eggs. Not: I’ve got any eggs. We use weak form any only with uncountable nouns or with plural nouns: talking about fuel for the car Do I need to get any petrol? (+ uncountable noun) There aren’t any clean knives. They’re all in the dishwasher. (+ plural noun) Warning: We don’t use any with this meaning with singular countable nouns: Have you got any Italian cookery books? (or … an Italian cookery book?) Not: Have you got any Italian cookery book? 6 +B. Violation: They only defend speech of journalists 7 +C. Standards 8 + 9 +Grammar: 10 + 11 +2. Limits: 12 + 13 +3. Topical version of the aff solves: you can read your specific rights as advantages under a whole res aff. Solves 100 of your offense and solves the T violation. 14 +D. Voters 15 + 16 +Fairness is a voter since the ballot asks who the better debater is and you can’t make that decision accurately if the round is unfair. 17 +2. Fairness outweighs education 18 +Education loss is a reversible harm - I can always read up more on topic lit later, or do rebuttal redos to increase clash and critical thinking skills. But an unfair decision is permanent. 19 +3. Drop the debater 20 + 21 +4. Competing Interps 22 + 23 +2-off 24 + 25 +Hate speech is permissible under the first amendment despite the exceptions 26 +Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh, Law Professor at UCLA, “No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.9e1ed85e9262 JW 27 +I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend. The Supreme Court did, in Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), uphold a “group libel” law that outlawed statements that expose racial or religious groups to contempt or hatred, unless the speaker could show that the statements were true, and were said with “good motives” and for “justifiable ends.” But this too was treated by the Court as just a special case of a broader First Amendment exception — the one for libel generally. And Beauharnais is widely understood to no longer be good law, given the Court’s restrictions on the libel exception. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) (rejecting the view that libel is categorically unprotected, and holding that the libel exception requires a showing that the libelous accusations be “of and concerning” a particular person); Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) (generally rejecting the view that a defense of truth can be limited to speech that is said for “good motives” and for “justifiable ends”); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) (generally rejecting the view that the burden of proving truth can be placed on the defendant); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) (holding that singling bigoted speech is unconstitutional, even when that speech fits within a First Amendment exception); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Beauharnais is no longer good law); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (likewise); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (likewise); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (likewise); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973) (likewise); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1043-45 (4th ed. 2011); Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Law, §12-17, at 926; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 211, 219 (1991); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 330-31 (1988). Finally, “hostile environment harassment law” has sometimes been read as applying civil liability — or administrative discipline by universities — to allegedly bigoted speech in workplaces, universities, and places of public accommodation. There is a hot debate on whether those restrictions are indeed constitutional; they have generally been held unconstitutional when applied to universities, but decisions are mixed as to civil liability based on speech that creates hostile environments in workplaces (see the pages linked to at this site for more information on the subject). But even when those restrictions have been upheld, they have been justified precisely on the rationale that they do not criminalize speech (or otherwise punish it) in society at large, but only apply to particular contexts, such as workplaces. None of them represent a “hate speech” exception, nor have they been defined in terms of “hate speech.” For this very reason, “hate speech” also doesn’t have any fixed legal meaning under U.S. law. U.S. law has just never had occasion to define “hate speech” — any more than it has had occasion to define rudeness, evil ideas, unpatriotic speech, or any other kind of speech that people might condemn but that does not constitute a legally relevant category. 28 +Free speech used as a cover to justify hate speech like anti-semitic speech 29 +Marcus 08 Kenneth L. Marcus, Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College School of Public Affairs, “Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism,” 16 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 1025 (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol16/iss4/5 JW 30 +During recent years, American college campuses have seen numerous alarming examples8° of the striking resurgence of anti-Semitic activity which is taking place worldwide.8 There appear to be six sources for this resurgence: traditional European, Christian Jew-hatred; aggressive anti-Israelism that crosses the line into antiSemitism; traditional Muslim anti-Semitism; anti-Americanism and anti-globalism that spill over into anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism; black anti-Semitism; and fundamentalist intolerance.82 Generally speaking, the most significant recent episodes of American campus anti-Semitism have been associated with anti-Israelism or antiZionism. 83 In addition to the University of California at Irvine, a few other campuses have become particularly notorious for alleged incidents of anti-Semitism over the last few years." San Francisco State: During one notorious 2002 rally, a large number of proPalestinian students surrounded approximately fifty Jewish students, screaming "Get out or we will kill you," and "Hitler did not finish the job."85 When one Jewish professor began to sing peace songs, the crowd yelled, "Go back to Russia, Jew. 86 At about the same time, students distributed a flyer advertising a pro-Palestinian rally which featured a picture of a dead baby with the words, "Canned Palestinian Children Meat-Slaughtered According to Jewish Rites Under American License."87 More recently, a Jewish supporter of Israel alleged that he was, in separate incidents, spat on and assaulted.88 Columbia University: Columbia faculty, especially in the Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures program, have been accused of intimidating and silencing Jewish pro-Israel students.89 In one example, a professor allegedly privately told a pro-Israel Jewish student, "You have no voice in this debate." 9 When she insisted that she be allowed to express her opinion he disagreed, approaching very close to her and saying, "See, you have green eyes... You're not a Semite .... I'm a Semite. I have brown eyes. You have no claim to the land of Israel."9' These incidents are quite distinct from legitimate criticizing of Israeli politics.92 To the extent that there might be any question, the distinguishing features of antiSemitic anti-Zionism are rapidly becoming conventional: employment of "classic anti-Semitic stereotypes," use of double standards, "drawing comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany," and "holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeli actions" regardless of actual complicity.93 For example, American college students and faculty have recently used the medieval phrase "blood libel" to describe Israeli military practices, 94 ascribed traditional Jewish cultural stereotypes to contemporary Israeli society,95 and attributed demonic characteristics to Israeli leaders and Zionists as those characteristics have historically been related to Jews.96 This spillover of anti-Israelism into anti-Semitism has historical resonance in that it represents the second significant mutation that anti-Semitism experienced in the space of a century.97 Some of this activity, globally and domestically, takes the form of basic hate and bias activity. Much recent anti-Semitism, however, is postracialist or even anti-racist in appearance. 98 While early nineteenth-century antiSemitism was predominantly religious in animus and mid-twentieth-century antiSemitism predominantly racial, twenty-first-century anti-Semitism is predominantly political in character and often purports to address the Jewish state. 99 The nineteenth-century shift from religious to racialist anti-Semitism, attributed largely to German journalist Wilhelm Marr and his colleagues, was essentially a deliberate effort to justify continued adherence to anti-Jewish attitudes in the face of changing social attitudes towards religion and religious discrimination." Significantly, the religious-racialist mutation served an evolutionary function: the anti-Semitism virus evolved to adapt to changing environmental conditions. The racialist-political mutation, in which racialist anti-Semitism evolved into political anti-Semitism, represented a similar example of adaptive behavior in the twentieth century: Jew-hatred adapted to a post-Holocaust environment in which explicit race-hatred was socially unacceptable unless repackaged to appear political in nature.'0' In many cases, age-old anti-Semitic stereotypes and defamations are recast in contemporary political terms, castigating Israel and Zionism in terms historically used to denigrate Jews and Judaism. 10 2 In this formulation, Israel-mordantly characterized as "the 'Jew' of the nations'' a is made the repository of age-old stereotypes and defamations classically equated with Jews: as "a pariah;" as "supernaturally powerful and crafty;" as conspiratorial; and as a malignant force responsible for the world's evils.' 4 This political turn in anti-Semitism has had another consequence however. Where political speech has social and legal protection, such as on the American college campus, politically inflected hate and bias incidents are more difficult to police without implicating constitutional protections and academic freedom concerns. 05 Indeed, virtually any form of abuse may be considered protected-and its opposition deemed censorious-when the context is an academic campus and the perpetrator is careful to adopt the tropes of political discourse."° This has been an enormous challenge for civil rights enforcement in this area. 31 +Empirics prove that hate speech leads to hate crimes 32 +Singh 12 Hansdeep Singh, Co-Founder and Director of Legal Programs for the International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination, Simran Jeet Singh, a scholar and activist who writes primarily on culture and religion “The Rise of Hate Crimes Can Be Tied Directly to Hateful Speech,” The Daily Beast, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/06/the-rise-of-hate-crimes-can-be-tied-directly-to-hateful-speech.html JW 33 +Although there are flaws in the FBI’s method of tracking and monitoring hate crimes, their statistics provide a consistent framework to analyze trends. For example, from 2005 to 2010, hate crimes motivated by religious bias show a consistent upward trajectory—whereas hate crimes against religious communities constituted 17.1 percent of all bias-based crimes in 2005, that number has reached 20 percent in the most recent report published in 2010. This is the highest rate of hate crimes motivated by religious bias in the 18 years since the FBI started tracking hate crimes nationwide in 1992. Furthermore, while one might assume that the pattern of anti-Muslim violence would have decreased a decade after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, official statistics show that hate crimes against Muslims are at their highest levels since 2001. The most recent FBI data indicates that in a one-year period, from 2009 to 2010, there was a staggering 42 percent increase in hate crimes against Muslims in this country. The recent shooting rampage at a Sikh Gurdwara (house of worship) in Oak Creek, Wisc., emphasizes the importance of allocating adequate resources to prevent domestic terrorist attacks. The shooter, Wade Michael Page, was a member of the Hammerskin Nation, one of the most violent white supremacist groups in the country. We are deluding ourselves if we do not see the parallel between intolerant or hateful rhetoric and its inevitable consequence. Key issues in our national discourse in 2010 correlate to the rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes. For example, the controversy surrounding the Park 51 Muslim community center in lower Manhattan, the building of “mega-mosques” around the country, and the threat by a Florida pastor to burn the Quran on the anniversary of 9/11—all of these instances contributed to a rising anti-Muslim sentiment in America. The vitriolic discourse can also be linked to bias-based violence against other communities. For instance, hate crime against the LGBT community has risen 36 percent from 2005 to 2010. This is in part because of the extreme rhetoric of opponents of the marriage equality movement. Such targeted violence is one symptom of a deeper and more widespread illness plaguing this great nation—the discrimination and “othering” of minority communities. 34 + 35 +3-off 36 + 37 +CP Text: AFF actors should remove all restrictions on constitutionally protected free speech, and ban the usage of all hate speech, including hate speech not protected by the First Amendment. Hate speech poses a direct threat to the oppressed. Banning it is necessary to promote inclusiveness. 38 +Jared Taylor summarizes Waldron, 12, Why We Should Ban “Hate Speech”, American Renaissance, summarizing Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, Harvard University Press, 2012, 292 pp., 26.95. 8/24/12, http://www.amren.com/features/2012/08/why-we-should-ban-hate-speech/ Note – Taylor does not agree with but is summarizing Waldron’s position LADI 39 +First-Amendment guarantees of free speech are a cherished part of the American tradition and set us apart from virtually every other country. They are not without critics, however, and the free speech guarantees under sharpest attack are those that protect so-called “hate speech.” Jeremy Waldron, an academic originally from New Zealand, has written a whole book explaining why “hate speech” does not deserve protection—and Harvard University Press has published it. Prof. Waldron teaches law and philosophy at New York University Law School, is a professor of social and political theory at Oxford, and is an adjunct professor at Victoria University in New Zealand. Perhaps his foreign origins influence his view of the First Amendment. In this book, Professor Waldron makes just one argument for banning “hate speech.” It is not a good argument, and if this is the best the opponents of free speech can do, the First Amendment should be secure. However, in the current atmosphere of “anti-racism,” any argument against “hate speech” could influence policy, so let us understand his argument as best we can. First, Professor Waldron declares that “we are diverse in our ethnicity, our race, our appearance, and our religions, and we are embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together despite these sorts of differences.” Western societies are determined to let in every sort of person imaginable and make them feel respected and equal in every way. “Inclusiveness” is something “that our society sponsors and that it is committed to.” Therefore, what would we make of a “hate speech” billboard that said: “Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in”? Or one with a picture of Muslim children that said “They are all called Osama”? Or posters that say such things as “Muslims out,” “No blacks allowed,” or “All blacks should be sent back to Africa”? Professor Waldron writes that it is all very well for law professors and white people to say that this is the price we pay for free expression, but we must imagine what it must be like for the Muslim or black who must explain these messages to his children. “Can their lives be led, can their children be brought up, can their hopes be maintained and their worst fears dispelled, in a social environment polluted by these materials?” Professor Waldron insists that a “sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good,” like pretty beaches or clean air, and is so precious that the law should require everyone to maintain it: Hate speech undermines this public good . . . . It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like . . . . It creates something like an environmental threat to social peace, a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word, so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining this public good. Professor Waldron tells us that the purpose of “hate speech” is to try to set up a “rival public good” in which it is considered fine to beat up and drive out minorities. 40 +4-off 41 + 42 +Debate should deal with the real-world consequences of oppression. 43 +Curry 14, Tommy, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century, Victory Briefs, 2014, 44 +Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, there is a conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to we must reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the oppressed worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters. 45 +Ethics is divided between ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal theory ask what justice demands in a perfect world while non-ideal theory ask what justice demands in a world that is already unjust. Prefer non-ideal theory as a meta-ethical starting point: 46 + 47 +Motivation: Ideal theory cannot guide action since its starting point has diverged from the descriptive model of the real world. Non-ideal theory is key for ethical motivation. MILLS: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005 48 +“A first possible argument might be the simple denial that moral theory should have any concern with making realistic assumptions about human beings, their capacities, and their behavior. Ethics is concerned with the ideal, so it doesn’t have to worry about the actual. But even for mainstream ethics this wouldn’t work, since, of course, ought is supposed to implies can the ideal has to be achievable by humans. Nor could it seriously be cal imed that moral theory is concerned only with mapping beautiful ideals, not their actual implementation. If any ethicist actually said this, it would be an astonishing abdication of the classic goal of ethics, and its link with practical reason. The normative here would then be weirdly detached from the prescriptive: this is the good and the right—but we are not concerned with their actual realization. Even for Plato, a classic example in at least one sense of an ideal theorist, this was not the case: the Form of the Good was supposed to motivate us, and help philosophers transform society. Nor could anyone seriously say that ideal theory is a good way to approach ethics because as a matter of fact (not as a conceptual necessity following from what “model” or “ideal” means), the normative here has come is close to converging with the descriptive: ideal- as-descriptive-model has approximated to ideal-as-idealized-model. Obviously, the dreadful and dismaying course of human history has not remotely been a record of close-to-ideal behavior, but rather of behavior that has usually been quite the polar opposite of the ideal, with oppression and inequitable treatment of the majority of humanity (whether on grounds of gender, or nationality, or class, or religion, or race) being the norm. So the argument cannot be that as a matter of definitional truth, or factual irrelevance, or factual convergence, ideal theory is required. The argument has to be, as in the quote from Rawls above, that this is the best way of doing normative theory, better than all the other contenders. But why on earth should anyone think this? Why should anyone think that abstaining from theorizing about oppression and its consequences is the best way to bring about an end to oppression? Isn’t this, on the face of it, just completely implausible?” 49 +2. Descriptive Ideality: ideal theory ignores social realities, which in turn contradicts ideals. Normative ideals aren’t created separately from the social norms that govern us because those influence what we can count as an ideal in the first place. MILLS 2: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005 50 + “I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.” (170) 51 + 52 +Thus, the standard is resisting material inequalities. Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field, we take steps to correct the material injustice. 53 + 54 +Case 55 + 56 +(Plan Flaws) case 57 +1.Plan flaw-~~-~-there’s no such thing as constitutional restricted journalist speech. 58 +http://www.dictionary.com/browse/journalist 59 +a person who practices the occupation or profession of journalism 60 +To restrict constitutionally protected journalist speech means to restrict constitutionally protected a person who practices journalism speech—it’s obviously logically incoherent. 61 +http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-20-typo-problems_x.htm 62 +2. Plan flaw—ought defends a moral statement, not the passage of a plan. 63 +http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought 64 +(used to express duty or moral obligation): 65 + 66 +And plan flaws leave to devastating legislative consequences. 67 +Heath 06 Heath, Brad. "Small Mistakes Cause Big Problems." USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, 20 Nov. 2006. Web. 09 Dec. 2016. HSLASC 68 +If you're reading this in New York, you're probably too drunk to drive. That's because lawmakers accidentally got too tough with a get-tough drunken-driving law, inserting an error that set the standard for "aggravated driving while intoxicated" below the amount of alcohol that can occur naturally. The one-word mistake makes the new law unenforceable, says Lt. Glenn Miner, a New York State Police spokesman. However, drivers with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 or higher can still be prosecuted under other state laws. In the legislative world, such small errors, while uncommon, can carry expensive consequences. In a few cases around the nation this year, typos and other blunders have redirected millions of tax dollars or threatened to invalidate new laws. In Hawaii, for instance, lawmakers approved a cigarette-tax increase to raise money for medical care and research. Cancer researchers, however, will get only an extra 1.5 cents next year — instead of the more than $8 million lawmakers intended. That's because legislators failed to specify that they should get 1.5 cents from each cigarette sold, says Linda Smith, an adviser to Gov. Linda Lingle. When such mistakes happen, they often come during the last-minute rush of legislative sessions, says Bruce Feustel, a senior fellow at the National Conference of State Legislatures. What's important, he says, is that lawmakers can fix them before they cause any harm. Courts generally intercede only in the most obvious cases, says University of Notre Dame law professor John Nagle. If judges tried to change every legislative error, Nagle says, "you get the courts trying to figure out what they think is a mistake that might not be a mistake at all." New York's mistake came in a bill meant to set tougher penalties and curb plea bargains for drivers well above the legal intoxication standard. Instead of specifying blood alcohol as a percentage, as most drunken-driving laws do, New York set its threshold as 0.18 grams — "so low you can't even measure it," Miner says. Lawmakers plan to fix the mistake the next time they convene, says Mark Hansen, a spokesman for the state Senate's Republican majority. He says it's not clear how the mistake happened, or why nobody caught it before legislators voted. - EntryDate
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