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1 -XWiki.kumarharithas@gmailcom
1 +XWiki.parkerwhitfill@gmailcom_1
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1 -Framework
2 -The role of the ballot is to evaluate the simulated consequences of the affirmative policy vs a competing neg policy option to reduce material oppression.
3 -1. The aff deploys the state to learn scenario planning- even if politics is bad, scenario analysis of politics is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills
4 -Barma et al 16 May 2016, Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15, Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19,
5 -What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.
6 -2. Ideal theory strips away particularities making ethics inaccessible and epistemically skewed
7 -Mills 05, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory” as Ideology,
8 -“The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.” (175)
9 -3. No act omission distinction for states means means based theories collapse to consequentialism.
10 -Sunstein and Vermule 05Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. The University of Chicago Law School. “Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs.” JOHN M. OLIN LAW and ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 239. The Chicago Working Paper Series. March 2005
11 -In our view, both the argument from causation and the argument from intention go wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. Whatever the general status of the act-omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,38 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government.39 The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything, or refusing to act.40 Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private actionfor example, private killing—becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action, but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it.
1 +1NC Shell
2 +A. Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a specific form of constitutionally protected speech that they defend not restricting.
3 +“Any” when used in a negative sentence is a weak determiner referring to an indefinite number of things AND cannot be used for a singular countable thing
4 +Cambridge Dictionary writes Cambridge English Dictionary, “Any,” Cambridge University Press, Accessed 12-4-2016, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/grammar/british-grammar/quantifiers/any JW
5 +Any as a determiner We use any before nouns to refer to indefinite or unknown quantities or an unlimited entity: Did you bring any bread? Mr Jacobson refused to answer any questions. If I were able to travel back to any place and time in history, I would go to ancient China. Any as a determiner has two forms: a strong form and a weak form. The forms have different meanings. Weak form any: indefinite quantities We use any for indefinite quantities in questions and negative sentences. We use some in affirmative sentences: Have you got any eggs? I haven’t got any eggs. I’ve got some eggs. Not: I’ve got any eggs. We use weak form any only with uncountable nouns or with plural nouns: talking about fuel for the car Do I need to get any petrol? (+ uncountable noun) There aren’t any clean knives. They’re all in the dishwasher. (+ plural noun) Warning: We don’t use any with this meaning with singular countable nouns: Have you got any Italian cookery books? (or … an Italian cookery book?) Not: Have you got any Italian cookery book?
6 +B. Violation: They only defend speech of journalists
7 +C. Standards
8 +1. Grammar:
12 12  
13 -Plan
14 -Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech that criticizes the State of Israel.
15 -Volokh 16 Eugene Volokh, teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation, “University of California Board of Regents is wrong about ‘anti-Zionism’ on campus,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/16/university-of-california-board-of-regents-is-wrong-about-anti-zionism-on-campus/?utm_term=.cfab0cd93ad6 JW
16 -The University of California Board of Regents has just released its Final Report of the Regents Working Group on Principles Against Intolerance, which includes a proposed set of such principles. I hope to blog some more about the actual proposal in the coming days, but what has made the news is the passage in the introduction to the report’s “Contextual Statement” that says: Fundamentally, commenters noted that historic manifestations of anti-Semitism have changed and that expressions of anti-Semitism are more coded and difficult to identify. In particular, opposition to Zionism1 often is expressed in ways that are not simply statements of disagreement over politics and policy, but also assertions of prejudice and intolerance toward Jewish people and culture. Anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism and other forms of discrimination have no place at the University of California…. Footnote 1: Merriam Webster defines Zionism as follows: an international movement originally for the establishment of a Jewish national or religious community in Palestine and later for the support of modern Israel…. The Oxford American Dictionary defines Zionism as follows: A movement for (originally) the reestablishment and (now) the development and protection of a Jewish nation in what is now Israel. I’m ethnically Jewish (I say “ethnically” because I’m not religious), and I support Israel. It’s the one democracy among its neighbors, and for all its flaws it’s doing a pretty good job faced with very difficult circumstances. Whatever one might say about whether Israel should have been created in 1948, it’s there, and undoing that decision would be a disaster in many ways. And I do think that a good deal of anti-Zionism is indeed anti-Semitic. But I think the regents are flat wrong to say that “anti-Zionism” has “no place at the University of California.” Even though they’re not outright banning anti-Zionist speech, but rather trying to sharply condemn it, I think such statements by the regents chill debate, especially by university employees and students who (unlike me) lack tenure. (For more on that, see here.) And this debate must remain free, regardless of what the regents or I think is the right position in the debate. Whether the Jewish people should have an independent state in Israel is a perfectly legitimate question to discuss — just as it’s perfectly legitimate to discuss whether Basques, Kurds, Taiwanese, Tibetans, Northern Cypriots, Flemish Belgians, Walloon Belgians, Faroese, Northern Italians, Kosovars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians, Transnistrians, Chechens, Catalonians, Eastern Ukranians and so on should have a right to have independent states. Sometimes the answer might be “yes.” Sometimes it might be “no.” Sometimes the answer might be “it depends.” But there’s no uncontroversial principle on which these questions can be decided. They have to be constantly up for inquiry and debate, especially in places that are set up for inquiry and debate: universities. Whether Israel is entitled to exist as an independent Jewish state is just as fitting a subject for discussion as whether Kosovo or Northern Cyprus or Kurdistan or Tawain or Tibet or a Basque nation should exist as an independent state for those ethnic groups. Of course, Israel is different from the other countries in that it has already been internationally recognized as an independent state. But while that’s an important practical argument, and an important argument under international law, it can’t determine what should be talked about at universities. International recognition can be granted, and it can be taken away. Certainly international recognition doesn’t conclusively resolve either moral or pragmatic questions about whether an ethnic group is entitled to a state of their own. The United Nations of 1947, or the great majority of the governments of today, may have been right or they may have been wrong. We can’t decide even for ourselves whether they’re right or wrong without hearing a lively debate about the subject. And certainly the University of California Board of Regents ought not prejudge this debate. I entirely agree that, to give an example given by the regents, “vandalism targeting property associated with Jewish people or Judaism” should be condemned and punished. I think that UCLA student government should not be allowed to discriminate against Jewish candidates for student government positions. And I agree, as I said, that some anti-Zionist speech and speakers are indeed hostile to Jews as an ethnic group, rather than just opposing a particular government or nation-state. But the regents should not be telling professors and students that “there is no place” at the University of California for a political viewpoint on the existence of Israel as a nation-state — a statement that is likely to and intended to deter debate on that subject. Indeed, universities are the very places where such matters should indeed be discussed.
17 -Defining anti-Zionism as anti-Semitic chills on-campus discourse that attempts to criticize Israel or support Palestine
18 -Emmons 16 Alex Emmons, Senate Responds to Trump-Inspired Anti-Semitism By Targeting Students Who Criticize Israel, The Intercept, December 2 2016
19 -A draft of the bill obtained by The Intercept encourages the Department of Education to use the State Department’s broad, widely criticized definition of anti-Semitism when investigating schools. That definition, from a 2010 memo, includes as examples of anti-Semitism “delegitimizing” Israel, “demonizing” Israel, “applying double standards” to Israel, and “focusing on Israel only for peace or human rights investigations.” Critics have pointed out that those are political — not racist — positions, shared by a significant number of Jews, and qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution. According to the draft, the bill does not adopt the definition as a formal legal standard, it only directs the State Department to “take into consideration” the definition when investigating schools for anti-Semitic discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The memo’s definition — which is widely supported by Israeli advocacy groups — was intended for identifying anti-Semitic groups overseas. Even then, it came with caveats. Criticisms of Israel are only examples of possible anti-Semitism “taking into account the overall context,” and the memo concludes: “However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as anti-Semitic.” Attempts to adopt the definition as a standard for campus censorship have drawn criticism from civil rights groups, free speech advocates, newspapers, hundreds of academics, and even one of the definition’s crafters, who wrote a column last year arguing it should not be applied to campuses. The bill approved by the Senate on Thursday was supported by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Jewish Federations of North America, and the Anti-Defamation League. “The definition will have a severe chilling effect on campuses, and that is the explicit goal of the Israel advocacy organizations who promote it,” said Liz Jackson, an attorney with the group Palestine Legal. “Student activists for Palestinian rights already operate in a repressive environment. If this bill passes, they will face the specter of federal investigation simply for engaging in criticism of the Israeli government’s abusive policies.” Campus activists are being subject to an increasingly broad censorship effort by Israeli-allied groups. Each year, Palestine Legal documents hundreds of instances of obstruction, censorship, or punishment of pro-Palestinian activism at colleges and universities. In December 2015, for example, one student at George Washington University was ordered by campus police to remove a Palestinian flag from her window, and threatened with further disciplinary action. At other campuses, students have been suspended or threatened with expulsion for demonstrating against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The University of Illinois in 2014 fired a tenure-track professor for tweeting about Israel’s bombardment of Gaza. Filing complaints with the Department of Education has been a favored tactic of groups including the Zionist Organization of America and the Brandeis Center, which have written letters to the department alleging that events like demonstrations and film screenings amount to “harassment” or “intimidation,” and create a “hostile environment on the basis of national origin” for Jewish students on campus.
20 20  
21 -Advantages
22 -Advantage 1: Islamophobia
23 -I’ll isolate two impacts
24 -a) Suppression of pro-Palestine movements on campus denies Palestinian students the ability to form solidarity
25 -Nadeau and Sears 11 Mary-Jo Nadeau and Alan Sears, Mary-Jo Nadeau teaches at the Department of Sociology, University of Toronto-Mississauga. Alan Sears teaches at the Department of Sociology, Ryerson University, Toronto. “This Is What Complicity Looks Like: Palestine and the Silencing Campaign on Campus,” The Bullet, March 5, 2011, http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/475.php JW
26 -The silencing campaign is particularly dangerous given the overall political climate, which facilitates the neoliberalization of education. The goal of neoliberalism in post-secondary education is to make the universities serve exclusively economic goals, preparing students for the corporate workplace and creating know-how that can be commercialized. This requires a serious culture shift on campuses. One of the core political projects of neoliberalism on campus has been to roll back the spaces for campus activism and freedom of expression originally won by student militancy in the 1960s and 1970s. The campus silencing campaign against Palestine solidarity aligns in important ways with this neoliberal agenda, shutting down political spaces in the interest of a narrow vocational conception of education. Campus equity movements are particular targets in this broader effort, as they have won a certain limited space for themselves, and often critique the limits of the dominant forms of academic knowledge. The silencing campaign around Palestine solidarity organizing has played a leading role in the attack on freedom of expression on campuses. There are in fact two ideas of academic freedom and campus freedom of expression at stake. The first is the narrow and professional conception of academic freedom, which stresses the right of the professor to conduct free inquiry within his or her own specific realm of expertise and to disseminate the results of that inquiry through publication or teaching. This sense of academic freedom informs the influential “Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure” developed in the U.S. in 1915. The second, and more recent, conception of campus freedom of expression and academic freedom was won through struggles from below by the radical student movement of the 1960s. The freedom struggles of African-Americans galvanized activists, including students who fought for the right to build solidarity campaigns on campuses. This was strongly opposed by university administrations, who sought to keep activist politics safely off campus. Nowhere was this struggle sharper than at the Berkeley campus of University of California. There, the Free Speech Movement fought for political rights on campus, challenging the administration of Clark Kerr who was perhaps the most prominent advocate of the technocratic university serving the needs of corporations and the state. Clark Kerr was, in many ways, the forerunner of the current neoliberal strategy of reorganizing universities to focus more clearly on the service of business and the lean state. In the 1960s, Kerr was actually defeated by a mass, militant student movement. But the technocratic vision that the radical student movement of the 1960s successfully defended against has returned in new and aggressive forms under neoliberalism. And part of this agenda is to politically cleanse campuses, stripping away the political rights students won through militancy in the 1960s. The attack on Palestine solidarity is a leading thrust in the current campaign to roll back campus political expression and to define academic freedom in narrow professional terms. The Iacobucci report at York, discussed below, is an important example of this logic. The gains of campus equity movements since the 1960s pose an important obstacle to the narrow definition of academic freedom. Serious struggles against racism, sexism and heterosexism necessarily raise questions about the nature of knowledge and its supposed objectivity. These movements show the ways fundamental inequalities distort knowledge, often in unrecognized ways. Equity movements therefore challenge the conception of expertise that underlies the narrow definition of academic freedom, arguing that the person who experiences systemic inequality often sees it more clearly than someone in a privileged position. As the case for Israeli policy has become harder to make after five years of the highly effective Palestinian-led global Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, pro-Israel advocacy organizations have sought to shut down their opponents through silencing. In doing so, they are not only attempting yet again to shut down any expression of Palestinian experience, but also to weaken protections for freedom of expression and narrow the conception of academic freedom. This is a serious attack, and one that resonates with the neoliberal restructuring of the universities.
27 -b) Attempts to conflate anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism leads to campaigns by pro-Israel groups that demean and marginalize Muslim-American students
28 -Solomon 16 Daniel J. Solomon, “Inflammatory Pro-Israel Posters Pop Up on Campus — Are They Islamophobic?,” Forward, October 26, 2016, http://forward.com/news/national/352698/inflammatory-pro-israel-posters-pop-up-on-campus-are-they-islamophobic/ JW
29 -A row over Israel on campus is as predictable as the fall of autumn leaves, and it’s no different this season. Fliers accusing pro-Palestinian students of being anti-Semitic have cropped at numerous colleges in October — including the University of Chicago, Tufts University, Brooklyn College and Berkeley — and have been claimed by the David Horowitz Freedom Center, a rightwing organization labeled a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center. “Do you want to show your support for Hamas terrorists whose stated goal whose stated goal is the elimination of the Jewish people and the Jewish state? Join us! Students for Justice in Palestine at Tufts University.” read one flier procured by the Tufts Daily. It also featured a Palestinian militant wrapped in a keffiyeh, or traditional headscarf and toting a machine gun. Other posters included specific callouts to individual faculty and students, accusing them of collaboration with jihadists. According to the anti-Zionist site Electronic Intifada, a flier at San Francisco State University labeled one professor “a leader of the Hamas BDS campaign,” while one at Berkeley said that a professor was a “supporter of Hamas terrorists” and an “Islamophobia alarmist.” Most of the posters featured the slogan #Jewhatred and directed people to the Freedom Center’s Web site. Horowitz’s organization has been termed a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which has described Horowitz as “a driving force of the anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, and anti-black movements.” According to Electronic Intifada, the current poster campaign was preceded by a smaller episode last spring at the University of California–Los Angeles, where the group circulated similar fliers. Critics of the posters — both campus administrators and others — have said they create an atmosphere of fear. “This is not an issue of free speech; this is bullying behavior that is unacceptable and will not be tolerated on our campus,” Leslie Wong, the president of San Francisco State, said in a comment run by Electronic Intifada. Joanne Barker, a professor at the university, told the Web site that her school “should be contacting federal and state authorities to investigate this incident as a hate crime.” Recently, some rightwing Israel advocates have adopted more hard-nosed tactics intended to publicly shame and sanction their perceived enemies. Created last year, one such effort, the Canary Mission, has compiled dossiers on hundreds of students and faculty that it sees as anti-Israel or anti-Semitic – often conflating the two. Another new organization, the Amcha Initiative, has an “anti-Semitism tracker” on its Web site that puts calls for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against the Jewish state (BDS) in the same category as Jew-hatred. This also comes on the heels of a controversy at Berkeley, where students and faculty clashed with one another over a course that presented Zionism as a “settler colonialist” movement.
30 -Islamophobia empirically leads to hate crimes, fractures communities, and increases national security threats.
31 -Foran 16 Clare Foran, Donald Trump and the Rise of Anti-Muslim Violence, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-muslims-islamophobia-hate-crime/500840/
32 -A new report from California State University-San Bernardino’s Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism suggests that political rhetoric may play a role in mitigating or fueling hate crimes. The report shows that anti-Muslim hate crimes in the U.S. rose sharply in 2015 to the highest levels since the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. It also suggests that Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric could have contributed to this backlash against American Muslims. “There’s very compelling evidence that political rhetoric may well play a role in directing behavior in the aftermath of a terrorist attack,” Brian Levin, the author of the report said in an interview. “I don’t think we can dismiss contentions that rhetoric is one of the significant variables that can contribute to hate crimes.” The report from the non-partisan center examined the incidence of hate crimes in the aftermath of two reactions to terrorism from political leaders. First, George W. Bush’s speech following the 9/11 attacks declaring: “Islam is peace” and “the face of terror is not the true faith of Islam,” and the second, Trump calling for a ban on Muslims entering the U.S. after the San Bernardino terror attack. The report found a steep rise in hate crimes following Trump’s remarks and a significant drop in hate crimes after Bush’s speech, relative to the number of hate crimes immediately following the initial terror attacks. A wide array of factors contribute to the incidence of hate crimes. Ignorance and isolation may play a role; most Americans say they do not personally know any Muslims, although those who do report positive views of Muslims in general. The nature of the threat groups of people are perceived to pose can also be a factor; prejudice catalyzed by a terrorist attack, for example, may be particularly likely to inspire hate crimes. Political rhetoric is only one ingredient in that mix, and the many messages in circulation after an attack can make it harder to determine the impact of any one particular reaction from a political leader. Before Trump’s call for a ban on Muslims entering the country, President Obama delivered a speech to the nation on the San Bernardino attack stressing tolerance. Still, the report looked at daily data following terrorist attacks, and found that “a tolerant statement about Muslims by a political leader was accompanied by a sharp decline in hate crime, while a less tolerant announcement was followed by a precipitous increase in both the severity and number of anti-Muslim hate crimes.” It notes that “there have been very few incidents of actual hate crime where Mr. Trump’s name was uttered since his candidacy,” but adds that “the increase of 87.5 in anti-Muslim hate crime in the days directly following his announcement is a troubling development and worthy of concern.” Aside from calling for a ban on Muslims entering the the United States, Trump has said that “Islam hates us,” and accused American Muslims of protecting terrorists. The research does not demonstrate a direct causal link, nor can it rule out the role of other factors. It’s possible that the documented increase reflects an increase in hate-crime reporting due to heightened awareness of Islamophobia, which has become a topic of discussion during the presidential race. Nevertheless, the research does raise the possibility that Islamophobic political rhetoric may have devastating consequences. A Georgetown University report released in May similarly found that threats, intimidation and violence against Muslim Americans have surged over the course of the presidential election. Engy Abdelkader, the author of the report, believes that trend is linked to Trump’s political rise. “Trump has seized on people’s fears and anxieties,” Abdelkader said. “I think that has translated in a number of instances not just to hostility, but acts of violence.”
33 -Advantage 2: Civic Engagement
34 -Public universities are threatening cuts to funding in response to pro-Palestine divestment strategies. Empirically proven on University of California campuses where organizations that don’t associate with pro-Palestine get funding while others don’t
35 -Friedman 15 Nora Barrows-Friedman, staff writer and associate editor at The Electronic Intifada, “UCLA student groups face funding cuts over Israel divestment,” The Electronic Intifada, Dec 7, 2015, https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/nora-barrows-friedman/ucla-student-groups-face-funding-cuts-over-israel-divestment JW
36 -The Graduate Students Association at UCLA in California has put stipulations on funding for student groups based on affiliation with Palestinian rights activism. Students and civil rights organizations are concerned that such conditions are the result of overt willingness by University of California’s top officials to exceptionalize free speech rights and threaten punishment against student activists. In mid-October, the president of UCLA’s Graduate Students Association sent an email to a student group that was seeking funding for a diversity caucus event. The association represents thousands of UCLA’s graduate students and provides resources, including funding, to graduate students and organizations. Members pay mandatory fees each academic quarter. The association’s president informed the group that “GSA leadership has a zero engagement/endorsement policy towards Divest from Israel or any related movement/organization” (emphasis in original) and awarded the group $2,000 in funding based on their “zero connection” to a “Divest from Israel” group. UCLA does not have an organization or movement specifically called “Divest from Israel,” but the president was most likely referring to the graduate student workers’ union across the University of California system, UAW Local 2865, which passed a historic divestment resolution one year ago. This condition could also apply to Students for Justice in Palestine as well as graduate student organizations that support the Palestinian-led boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement. In addition to UAW 2865’s successful divestment vote, student governments at seven out of nine University of California undergraduate campuses — including at UCLA in 2014 — have passed resolutions calling for the administration to pull investments from US and international companies profiting from Israel’s violations of Palestinians’ rights. Despite an expensive public relations campaign waged by anti-Palestinian groups, UCLA’s divestment resolution passed by a landslide vote and was supported by more than 30 student organizations.
37 -Impacts
38 -A) Encouraging discourse about foreign policy toward Israel-Palestine is uniquely good because it builds coalitions across all racial groups to inspire new dialogues. The aff spills over to other reform movements
39 -Hallward and Shaver 12 Maia Carter Hallward and Patrick Shaver, Associate Professor of Middle East Politics at American university, “‘‘WAR by other Means’’ or Nonviolent Resistance? Examining the Discourses Surrounding Berkeley’s Divestment Bill,” Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research, July 2012 JW
40 -Finally, proponents and opponents differed in their approaches to power. Opponents of the bill in the Jewish community on and off campus focused their efforts on the power hierarchy, targeting the president of the student government, president of the university, and parents of upcoming high school seniors who may be considering the university in the future. In contrast, supporters of the divestment bill were more focused on the grassroots, on the campus community, on networks within the broader Bay Area, such as the dock workers who later refused to unload an Israeli ship. Supporters of the bill repeatedly emphasized that BDS was one of the small steps they could take owing to their lack of power in the conventional sense, and they reached out to those with positional power or influence (such Nobel Prize Laureate Desmond Tutu) to try to strengthen their cause. By reaching out to a broad coalition of minority groups on campus, seeking to engage Muslims and Jews, Latinos and African-Americans, the supporters of divestment sought to build a force for change in the name of justice. This coalition building across ethnic and other lines of division parallels the strategies used by Berkeley students during the antiapartheid era.93 Other Jewish groups on campus, like Tikvah Students for Israel, joined forces with Evangelical Christians, orthodox Jewish students, and the Berkeley College Republicans in a call for ending divisive debates and ensuring that Jewish students feel safe and not marginalized on campus. These two rival coalitions of students used very different language to discuss the issues at hand and to frame the debate, with supporters emphasizing the human rights abuses of the occupation and the U.S. corporations supplying weapons and opponents focusing on dialogue and ‘‘peace.’’ Regardless, the power of BDS was clearly indicated in the size of the crowds attending and their willingness to endure all night sessions, as well as the extent of involvement of the Israeli consul for the Northwest. On a broader level, the case illustrates the challenges of democratic decision making in terms of the question of representation and authority. What was originally a relatively unremarkable student government decision became the subject of national, even international, attention after the president’s veto and ensuing debates that were opened to the public. While some saw this as an excellent example of democracy in action by expanding the space for discourse and providing in-depth dialogue conducted in a generally civil manner (with a few exceptions), others questioned whether the bill went beyond the scope of the student government’s role, and others wondered about the role of external forces in decision making. Looking at the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and questions of democratic accountability, the case raises questions regarding how difficult political decisions are made and the role of elected leaders in soliciting (or not) external opinion and the role of that external process on the final decision-making process. A second, related point, involves the extent to which the outcome itself, or the educational process leading to that final decision, has more of an impact on community relations and potential for socio-political change. Although opponents of the divestment bill ultimately ‘‘won’’ since the veto was not overturned, the public discourse and attention received in the process contributed to a momentum that spilled over onto other campuses and other California BDS initiatives.
41 -B) Israeli companies abuse West Bank occupation for their own profit while exploiting and suppressing local Palestinians. Every dollar that the divestment strategy gains translates into increased welfare in Palestine
42 -Press 16 Eyal Press, author of “Beautiful Souls: The Courage and Conscience of Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times, “When ‘Made in Israel’ Is a Human Rights Abuse,” New York Times, January 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/opinion/when-made-in-israel-is-a-human-rights-abuse.html?_r=0 JW
43 -From a biblical perspective, this view may be tenable. From a legal and moral perspective, it is not. As documented in a new report by Human Rights Watch, Israel’s occupation has grown into a lucrative business, exploited by companies as part of a system that is unlawful and abusive. Like the settlers, these enterprises receive benefits from the Israeli government — preferential access to land and water, low rents — that make the occupied territories an alluring destination. It is another story for Palestinians, who are routinely denied permits to open their own businesses, cut off from their land and hemmed in by restrictions that, according to the World Bank, cost the Palestinian economy $3.4 billion a year. All of these businesses are operating on illegally occupied land. A significant amount of land, it turns out. There are roughly 1,000 factories in the chain of Israeli-administered “industrial zones” strung across the West Bank. The geographic footprint of these commercial enterprises, together with shopping centers and agricultural projects, exceeds the built-up areas of settler housing. Continue reading the main story Some Israeli officials have argued that Palestinians benefit by working in settlement businesses, producing what one factory owner calls “goods of peace.” But many work in settlements only because Israel’s stifling of the Palestinian economy has deprived them of alternatives. Because the government rarely conducts labor inspections, Palestinian workers often earn less than the Israeli minimum wage. If workers complain, employers sometimes retaliate by fabricating a “security incident” that will deprive Palestinians of their work permits, according to the H.R.W. report. To view goods made under these conditions as no different than products made within Israel requires going blind to such indignities. Unfortunately, that is exactly what new legislation that will soon land on President Obama’s desk would require the United States government to do. Under a provision of a larger piece of legislation, popularly known as the Customs Bill, that has been approved by the House and is expected to soon pass the Senate, American officials will be obligated to treat the settlements as part of Israel in future trade negotiations.
11 +
12 +2. Limits:
13 +
14 +3. Topical version of the aff solves: you can read your specific rights as advantages under a whole res aff. Solves 100 of your offense and solves the T violation.
15 +D. Voters
16 +1. Fairness is a voter since the ballot asks who the better debater is and you can’t make that decision accurately if the round is unfair.
17 +2. Fairness outweighs education
18 +Education loss is a reversible harm - I can always read up more on topic lit later, or do rebuttal redos to increase clash and critical thinking skills. But an unfair decision is permanent.
19 +
20 +3. Drop the debater
21 +
22 +
23 +4. Competing Interps
24 +
25 +
26 +2-off
27 +
28 +Hate speech is permissible under the first amendment despite the exceptions
29 +Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh, Law Professor at UCLA, “No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.9e1ed85e9262 JW
30 +I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend. The Supreme Court did, in Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), uphold a “group libel” law that outlawed statements that expose racial or religious groups to contempt or hatred, unless the speaker could show that the statements were true, and were said with “good motives” and for “justifiable ends.” But this too was treated by the Court as just a special case of a broader First Amendment exception — the one for libel generally. And Beauharnais is widely understood to no longer be good law, given the Court’s restrictions on the libel exception. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) (rejecting the view that libel is categorically unprotected, and holding that the libel exception requires a showing that the libelous accusations be “of and concerning” a particular person); Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) (generally rejecting the view that a defense of truth can be limited to speech that is said for “good motives” and for “justifiable ends”); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) (generally rejecting the view that the burden of proving truth can be placed on the defendant); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) (holding that singling bigoted speech is unconstitutional, even when that speech fits within a First Amendment exception); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Beauharnais is no longer good law); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (likewise); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (likewise); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (likewise); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973) (likewise); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1043-45 (4th ed. 2011); Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Law, §12-17, at 926; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 211, 219 (1991); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 330-31 (1988). Finally, “hostile environment harassment law” has sometimes been read as applying civil liability — or administrative discipline by universities — to allegedly bigoted speech in workplaces, universities, and places of public accommodation. There is a hot debate on whether those restrictions are indeed constitutional; they have generally been held unconstitutional when applied to universities, but decisions are mixed as to civil liability based on speech that creates hostile environments in workplaces (see the pages linked to at this site for more information on the subject). But even when those restrictions have been upheld, they have been justified precisely on the rationale that they do not criminalize speech (or otherwise punish it) in society at large, but only apply to particular contexts, such as workplaces. None of them represent a “hate speech” exception, nor have they been defined in terms of “hate speech.” For this very reason, “hate speech” also doesn’t have any fixed legal meaning under U.S. law. U.S. law has just never had occasion to define “hate speech” — any more than it has had occasion to define rudeness, evil ideas, unpatriotic speech, or any other kind of speech that people might condemn but that does not constitute a legally relevant category.
31 +Free speech used as a cover to justify hate speech like anti-semitic speech
32 +Marcus 08 Kenneth L. Marcus, Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College School of Public Affairs, “Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism,” 16 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 1025 (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol16/iss4/5 JW
33 +During recent years, American college campuses have seen numerous alarming examples8° of the striking resurgence of anti-Semitic activity which is taking place worldwide.8 There appear to be six sources for this resurgence: traditional European, Christian Jew-hatred; aggressive anti-Israelism that crosses the line into antiSemitism; traditional Muslim anti-Semitism; anti-Americanism and anti-globalism that spill over into anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism; black anti-Semitism; and fundamentalist intolerance.82 Generally speaking, the most significant recent episodes of American campus anti-Semitism have been associated with anti-Israelism or antiZionism. 83 In addition to the University of California at Irvine, a few other campuses have become particularly notorious for alleged incidents of anti-Semitism over the last few years." San Francisco State: During one notorious 2002 rally, a large number of proPalestinian students surrounded approximately fifty Jewish students, screaming "Get out or we will kill you," and "Hitler did not finish the job."85 When one Jewish professor began to sing peace songs, the crowd yelled, "Go back to Russia, Jew. 86 At about the same time, students distributed a flyer advertising a pro-Palestinian rally which featured a picture of a dead baby with the words, "Canned Palestinian Children Meat-Slaughtered According to Jewish Rites Under American License."87 More recently, a Jewish supporter of Israel alleged that he was, in separate incidents, spat on and assaulted.88 Columbia University: Columbia faculty, especially in the Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures program, have been accused of intimidating and silencing Jewish pro-Israel students.89 In one example, a professor allegedly privately told a pro-Israel Jewish student, "You have no voice in this debate." 9 When she insisted that she be allowed to express her opinion he disagreed, approaching very close to her and saying, "See, you have green eyes... You're not a Semite .... I'm a Semite. I have brown eyes. You have no claim to the land of Israel."9' These incidents are quite distinct from legitimate criticizing of Israeli politics.92 To the extent that there might be any question, the distinguishing features of antiSemitic anti-Zionism are rapidly becoming conventional: employment of "classic anti-Semitic stereotypes," use of double standards, "drawing comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany," and "holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeli actions" regardless of actual complicity.93 For example, American college students and faculty have recently used the medieval phrase "blood libel" to describe Israeli military practices, 94 ascribed traditional Jewish cultural stereotypes to contemporary Israeli society,95 and attributed demonic characteristics to Israeli leaders and Zionists as those characteristics have historically been related to Jews.96 This spillover of anti-Israelism into anti-Semitism has historical resonance in that it represents the second significant mutation that anti-Semitism experienced in the space of a century.97 Some of this activity, globally and domestically, takes the form of basic hate and bias activity. Much recent anti-Semitism, however, is postracialist or even anti-racist in appearance. 98 While early nineteenth-century antiSemitism was predominantly religious in animus and mid-twentieth-century antiSemitism predominantly racial, twenty-first-century anti-Semitism is predominantly political in character and often purports to address the Jewish state. 99 The nineteenth-century shift from religious to racialist anti-Semitism, attributed largely to German journalist Wilhelm Marr and his colleagues, was essentially a deliberate effort to justify continued adherence to anti-Jewish attitudes in the face of changing social attitudes towards religion and religious discrimination." Significantly, the religious-racialist mutation served an evolutionary function: the anti-Semitism virus evolved to adapt to changing environmental conditions. The racialist-political mutation, in which racialist anti-Semitism evolved into political anti-Semitism, represented a similar example of adaptive behavior in the twentieth century: Jew-hatred adapted to a post-Holocaust environment in which explicit race-hatred was socially unacceptable unless repackaged to appear political in nature.'0' In many cases, age-old anti-Semitic stereotypes and defamations are recast in contemporary political terms, castigating Israel and Zionism in terms historically used to denigrate Jews and Judaism. 10 2 In this formulation, Israel-mordantly characterized as "the 'Jew' of the nations'' a is made the repository of age-old stereotypes and defamations classically equated with Jews: as "a pariah;" as "supernaturally powerful and crafty;" as conspiratorial; and as a malignant force responsible for the world's evils.' 4 This political turn in anti-Semitism has had another consequence however. Where political speech has social and legal protection, such as on the American college campus, politically inflected hate and bias incidents are more difficult to police without implicating constitutional protections and academic freedom concerns. 05 Indeed, virtually any form of abuse may be considered protected-and its opposition deemed censorious-when the context is an academic campus and the perpetrator is careful to adopt the tropes of political discourse."° This has been an enormous challenge for civil rights enforcement in this area.
34 +Empirics prove that hate speech leads to hate crimes
35 +Singh 12 Hansdeep Singh, Co-Founder and Director of Legal Programs for the International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination, Simran Jeet Singh, a scholar and activist who writes primarily on culture and religion “The Rise of Hate Crimes Can Be Tied Directly to Hateful Speech,” The Daily Beast, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/06/the-rise-of-hate-crimes-can-be-tied-directly-to-hateful-speech.html JW
36 +Although there are flaws in the FBI’s method of tracking and monitoring hate crimes, their statistics provide a consistent framework to analyze trends. For example, from 2005 to 2010, hate crimes motivated by religious bias show a consistent upward trajectory—whereas hate crimes against religious communities constituted 17.1 percent of all bias-based crimes in 2005, that number has reached 20 percent in the most recent report published in 2010. This is the highest rate of hate crimes motivated by religious bias in the 18 years since the FBI started tracking hate crimes nationwide in 1992. Furthermore, while one might assume that the pattern of anti-Muslim violence would have decreased a decade after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, official statistics show that hate crimes against Muslims are at their highest levels since 2001. The most recent FBI data indicates that in a one-year period, from 2009 to 2010, there was a staggering 42 percent increase in hate crimes against Muslims in this country. The recent shooting rampage at a Sikh Gurdwara (house of worship) in Oak Creek, Wisc., emphasizes the importance of allocating adequate resources to prevent domestic terrorist attacks. The shooter, Wade Michael Page, was a member of the Hammerskin Nation, one of the most violent white supremacist groups in the country. We are deluding ourselves if we do not see the parallel between intolerant or hateful rhetoric and its inevitable consequence. Key issues in our national discourse in 2010 correlate to the rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes. For example, the controversy surrounding the Park 51 Muslim community center in lower Manhattan, the building of “mega-mosques” around the country, and the threat by a Florida pastor to burn the Quran on the anniversary of 9/11—all of these instances contributed to a rising anti-Muslim sentiment in America. The vitriolic discourse can also be linked to bias-based violence against other communities. For instance, hate crime against the LGBT community has risen 36 percent from 2005 to 2010. This is in part because of the extreme rhetoric of opponents of the marriage equality movement. Such targeted violence is one symptom of a deeper and more widespread illness plaguing this great nation—the discrimination and “othering” of minority communities.
37 +
38 +3-off
39 +
40 +CP Text: AFF actors should remove all restrictions on constitutionally protected free speech, and ban the usage of all hate speech, including hate speech not protected by the First Amendment. Hate speech poses a direct threat to the oppressed. Banning it is necessary to promote inclusiveness.
41 +Jared Taylor summarizes Waldron, 12, Why We Should Ban “Hate Speech”, American Renaissance, summarizing Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, Harvard University Press, 2012, 292 pp., 26.95. 8/24/12, http://www.amren.com/features/2012/08/why-we-should-ban-hate-speech/ **Note – Taylor does not agree with but is summarizing Waldron’s position //LADI
42 +First-Amendment guarantees of free speech are a cherished part of the American tradition and set us apart from virtually every other country. They are not without critics, however, and the free speech guarantees under sharpest attack are those that protect so-called “hate speech.” Jeremy Waldron, an academic originally from New Zealand, has written a whole book explaining why “hate speech” does not deserve protection—and Harvard University Press has published it. Prof. Waldron teaches law and philosophy at New York University Law School, is a professor of social and political theory at Oxford, and is an adjunct professor at Victoria University in New Zealand. Perhaps his foreign origins influence his view of the First Amendment. In this book, Professor Waldron makes just one argument for banning “hate speech.” It is not a good argument, and if this is the best the opponents of free speech can do, the First Amendment should be secure. However, in the current atmosphere of “anti-racism,” any argument against “hate speech” could influence policy, so let us understand his argument as best we can. First, Professor Waldron declares that “we are diverse in our ethnicity, our race, our appearance, and our religions, and we are embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together despite these sorts of differences.” Western societies are determined to let in every sort of person imaginable and make them feel respected and equal in every way. “Inclusiveness” is something “that our society sponsors and that it is committed to.” Therefore, what would we make of a “hate speech” billboard that said: “Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in”? Or one with a picture of Muslim children that said “They are all called Osama”? Or posters that say such things as “Muslims out,” “No blacks allowed,” or “All blacks should be sent back to Africa”? Professor Waldron writes that it is all very well for law professors and white people to say that this is the price we pay for free expression, but we must imagine what it must be like for the Muslim or black who must explain these messages to his children. “Can their lives be led, can their children be brought up, can their hopes be maintained and their worst fears dispelled, in a social environment polluted by these materials?” Professor Waldron insists that a “sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good,” like pretty beaches or clean air, and is so precious that the law should require everyone to maintain it: Hate speech undermines this public good . . . . It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like . . . . It creates something like an environmental threat to social peace, a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word, so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining this public good. Professor Waldron tells us that the purpose of “hate speech” is to try to set up a “rival public good” in which it is considered fine to beat up and drive out minorities.
43 +4-off
44 +
45 +Debate should deal with the real-world consequences of oppression.
46 +Curry 14, Tommy, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century, Victory Briefs, 2014,
47 +Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, there is a conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to we must reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the oppressed worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.
48 +Ethics is divided between ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal theory ask what justice demands in a perfect world while non-ideal theory ask what justice demands in a world that is already unjust. Prefer non-ideal theory as a meta-ethical starting point:
49 +1. Motivation: Ideal theory cannot guide action since its starting point has diverged from the descriptive model of the real world. Non-ideal theory is key for ethical motivation. MILLS: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
50 +“A first possible argument might be the simple denial that moral theory should have any concern with making realistic assumptions about human beings, their capacities, and their behavior. Ethics is concerned with the ideal, so it doesn’t have to worry about the actual. But even for mainstream ethics this wouldn’t work, since, of course, ought is supposed to implies can the ideal has to be achievable by humans. Nor could it seriously be cal imed that moral theory is concerned only with mapping beautiful ideals, not their actual implementation. If any ethicist actually said this, it would be an astonishing abdication of the classic goal of ethics, and its link with practical reason. The normative here would then be weirdly detached from the prescriptive: this is the good and the right—but we are not concerned with their actual realization. Even for Plato, a classic example in at least one sense of an ideal theorist, this was not the case: the Form of the Good was supposed to motivate us, and help philosophers transform society. Nor could anyone seriously say that ideal theory is a good way to approach ethics because as a matter of fact (not as a conceptual necessity following from what “model” or “ideal” means), the normative here has come is close to converging with the descriptive: ideal- as-descriptive-model has approximated to ideal-as-idealized-model. Obviously, the dreadful and dismaying course of human history has not remotely been a record of close-to-ideal behavior, but rather of behavior that has usually been quite the polar opposite of the ideal, with oppression and inequitable treatment of the majority of humanity (whether on grounds of gender, or nationality, or class, or religion, or race) being the norm. So the argument cannot be that as a matter of definitional truth, or factual irrelevance, or factual convergence, ideal theory is required. The argument has to be, as in the quote from Rawls above, that this is the best way of doing normative theory, better than all the other contenders. But why on earth should anyone think this? Why should anyone think that abstaining from theorizing about oppression and its consequences is the best way to bring about an end to oppression? Isn’t this, on the face of it, just completely implausible?”
51 +
52 +2. Descriptive Ideality: ideal theory ignores social realities, which in turn contradicts ideals. Normative ideals aren’t created separately from the social norms that govern us because those influence what we can count as an ideal in the first place. MILLS 2: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
53 + “I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.” (170)
54 +
55 +Thus, the standard is resisting material inequalities. Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field, we take steps to correct the material injustice.
56 +
57 +Case
58 +
59 +(Plan Flaws) case
60 +1.Plan flaw~-~--there’s no such thing as constitutional restricted journalist speech.
61 +http://www.dictionary.com/browse/journalist
62 +a person who practices the occupation or profession of journalism
63 +To restrict constitutionally protected journalist speech means to restrict constitutionally protected a person who practices journalism speech—it’s obviously logically incoherent.
64 +http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-20-typo-problems_x.htm
65 +2. Plan flaw—ought defends a moral statement, not the passage of a plan.
66 +http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought
67 +(used to express duty or moral obligation):
68 +
69 +And plan flaws leave to devastating legislative consequences.
70 +Heath 06 Heath, Brad. "Small Mistakes Cause Big Problems." USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, 20 Nov. 2006. Web. 09 Dec. 2016. HSLA//SC
71 +If you're reading this in New York, you're probably too drunk to drive. That's because lawmakers accidentally got too tough with a get-tough drunken-driving law, inserting an error that set the standard for "aggravated driving while intoxicated" below the amount of alcohol that can occur naturally. The one-word mistake makes the new law unenforceable, says Lt. Glenn Miner, a New York State Police spokesman. However, drivers with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 or higher can still be prosecuted under other state laws. In the legislative world, such small errors, while uncommon, can carry expensive consequences. In a few cases around the nation this year, typos and other blunders have redirected millions of tax dollars or threatened to invalidate new laws. In Hawaii, for instance, lawmakers approved a cigarette-tax increase to raise money for medical care and research. Cancer researchers, however, will get only an extra 1.5 cents next year — instead of the more than $8 million lawmakers intended. That's because legislators failed to specify that they should get 1.5 cents from each cigarette sold, says Linda Smith, an adviser to Gov. Linda Lingle. When such mistakes happen, they often come during the last-minute rush of legislative sessions, says Bruce Feustel, a senior fellow at the National Conference of State Legislatures. What's important, he says, is that lawmakers can fix them before they cause any harm. Courts generally intercede only in the most obvious cases, says University of Notre Dame law professor John Nagle. If judges tried to change every legislative error, Nagle says, "you get the courts trying to figure out what they think is a mistake that might not be a mistake at all." New York's mistake came in a bill meant to set tougher penalties and curb plea bargains for drivers well above the legal intoxication standard. Instead of specifying blood alcohol as a percentage, as most drunken-driving laws do, New York set its threshold as 0.18 grams — "so low you can't even measure it," Miner says. Lawmakers plan to fix the mistake the next time they convene, says Mark Hansen, a spokesman for the state Senate's Republican majority. He says it's not clear how the mistake happened, or why nobody caught it before legislators voted.
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1 +2017-01-14 18:10:05.30
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1 -Kamiran Dadah, Matt Conrad, John Overing
1 +Karen Qi
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1 +Harvard Westlake SK
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1 -Anti-Zionism AC
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1 +Karen Qi
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1 +Harvard Westlake SK
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1 +1AC Journalism
2 +NC must have standard Text T plan flaw hate speech PIC
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1 +Topicality
2 +Interpretation: The affirmative must defend (resolution). You can discuss non-topical issues under the world of my interp, you just cannot claim that your advocacy is to fight them and that you should win for that.
3 +
4 +1. Ground-
5 +
6 +A. Resolvability-
7 +B. Probability-
8 +C. Internal link-
9 +D. Dialogue- Galloway 07
10 +Ryan, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007
11 +Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).
12 +2. Limits-
13 +Only limited topics protect participants from research overload which materially affects our lives outside of round. Harris 13
14 +Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655
15 +The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against Topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.
16 +Controls the internal link to the aff- I can’t engage in the 1AC’s critical issues in round AND you cause research overload so I cannot be politically active for your cause outside of round because I am too busy researching. Limits are key to fairness because they ensure that I have the prep to engage.
17 +
18 +Vote Neg:
19 +A) Key to endorsing good methodologies—1AR severance prevents effective dialogue on the role of the ballot and having a methods debate sets a norm for other rounds. It’s too late to have a constructive debate about public policy since there are only three speeches left.
20 +B) If I win their advocacy is not topical and that topicality comes first then they have no advocacy and thus cannot have offense.
21 +Evaluate the T debate under competing interpretations – it's key to generate clear models of debate and ground because otherwise the aff's interpretation can be a moving target. Reasonability is arbitrarily defined and causes a race to the bottom for the "most reasonable" position.
22 +
23 +Rights K
24 +Their advocacy for rights rectifies the division between the human and the political - Rights talk ties the population to the sovereign by defining life only in terms of what can be defended by the state—this turns the citizen-subject into bare life by allowing arbitrary exclusion
25 +Hoover 13 Hoover, Joe. Dr Hoover has a BA in Philosophy from the University of Colorado and an MSc in Philosophy, now at University of London "Towards a politics for human rights: Ambiguous humanity and democratizing rights." Philosophy and Social Criticism 2013 (IM)
26 +Agamben pushes this critique even further by focusing on the way in which rights depend upon the distinction between those who have rights as members of the political community and those that are excluded – between bios and zoē. Human rights attempt to privilege the bare life of human beings without a place in the political world, which is why Agamben sees the displaced or stateless individual as the exemplary subject of human rights. However, it is the sovereign that has the power to make this distinction, the exclusion of some life from the political community, the creation of “bare life”. As rights are supposed to attach to human beings as such, rather than as members of a particular nation, it seems that the law achieves justification beyond convention, beyond the shared sense of justice that makes a People, but in fact it reveals that the law depends upon the power of the sovereign who ultimately decides which human beings have their rights protected and which find themselves excluded totally, most tellingly in the camp. This critique of human rights depends upon Agamben’s understanding of the sovereign as ‘the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.’54 The pure bio-politics we find in the relationship between Homo Sacer and the sovereign, who decides whether bare human life is extinguished or preserved, reveals that the effort to remove rights from a given order (to transform civil right into human rights) renders those rights precarious, dependent on exceptional power of the sovereign rather than a universal law. On this reading, human rights cannot constrain authority because they are dependent upon it, nor do they enable transformations of the legal and political order because they confirm rather than claim power. Agamben suggests that rights are not ambiguous in their support of authority and control, but rather central to it at the most fundamental level.
27 +
28 +Bare life is the ultimate devaluation of life – life that can be killed, but not sacrificed.
29 +Reinert 2007 (‘The Pertinence of Sacrifice - Some Notes on Larry the Luckiest Lamb’ Hugo Reinert, PhD from Cambridge University of Cambridge, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol6no3_2007/reinert_larry.htm) IM
30 +14. For a few years now, in his Homo Sacer project, Agamben has been tracing the political predicament of the present using the enigmatic figure of the bare life nuda vita (1998). Throughout his work, this bare life appears in many guises: from werewolves, outlaws and Roman priestesses to overcomatose patients and concentration camp victims. Perhaps its principal exemplar however - the figure that Agamben uses to illustrate its basic dynamic most succinctly - is the homo sacer or 'sacred man': 'an obscure figure from archaic Roman Law' who, for his crimes, has been expelled from both the ius humanum and the ius divinum, from both secular and sacred law. As a consequence of this, it is declared that he 'may be killed but not sacrificed' (Agamben 1998: 8). Killing this sacred man therefore invokes no sanction, but his life is also 'unsacrificeable' (82). His existence is constituted through a 'double exclusion' that expresses the basic operation of sovereign power itself - the process by which 'the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule' (18). This is the 'relation of exception': 'the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion' (18). Through this extreme relation, sovereign power maintains itself in a permanent relationship to the excluded: the outlaw for example, as another figure of the bare life, 'is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death' (183). 15. The sacred man and the outlaw are only two figures in a gallery of priests, bandits, kings, werewolves and concentration camp victims, all connected by the thread of the bare life and its shifting parameters. King or camp victim, this bare life is always a figure of the extreme margin: life stripped of its everyday humanity, reduced and excluded to the blurred threshold that surrounds the 'city of men' and defines its limits. In a sense, it is the human zoon politikon stripped of the very quality that makes it human: its social being, its character of sociality. Seen this way, the bare life is defined by the fact that it is not - or that it is no longer - a social person . This is the sense in which the term has come of age recently: particularly to describe Muslims held at Guantanamo, but also - with variable relevance - to describe social phenomena ranging from premature infant births (Wynn 2002) and homeless people (Feldman 2006), to the geopolitics of post-colonial violence (Sylvester 2006) and, somewhat bizarrely, European tourists in Ibiza (Diken and Laustsen 2004). In the present context, the more relevant of these applications focus on the question of violence - on the intersection between the sovereign exercise and justification of violence, on the one hand, and the bare life's quality of constant, permanent exposure to the threat of violence on the other. 16. As Agamben argues, the exercise of lethal violence against the bare life is twice circumscribed by the structure of the sovereign ban. Suspended in the grasp of sovereign power, the bare life becomes simultaneously vulnerable to certain kinds of violence and ineligible for others. On the one hand, it can be freely killed - the exercise of violence against the bare life is routine, insignificant and unmarked. It requires no expiation or atonement and invites no sanctions: it is banal, without consequence to the law and anything but 'intrinsically mysterious, mystifying, convoluting, plain scary, mythical and arcane' (Taussig 1992: 116). Simultaneously, with this subjection to unregulated and freely exercised forms of violence, the bare life also becomes ineligible for sacrifice - which is to say, in the general sense in which Agamben interprets the term, that the bare life is excluded from all forms of ritually marked, institutionalized, exalted or sacralizing violence, such as are 'prescribed by the rite of the law' (1998: 102): it can not, for example, be 'submitted to sanctioned forms of execution' (103). Between them, these two exclusions operate to desacralize the death of the bare life, stripping it of any significance. Its killing and death become trivial, casual, mundane and devoid of higher meaning: to Agamben the observer, the horror of the concentration camp is that as embodiments of the bare life, the men and women there died, to their executors, 'like lice' (114). In one sense, the bare life stands as cypher for a de-personalization, or dis-individuation, that transforms subjects into objects: subjecting them to the free exercise of unregulated violence while simultaneously, through the trope of denied sacrifice, disqualifying them from subjection to ritual or sacralizing forms of violence - insofar as they are 'not worthy of this gesture of honour' (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 17).
31 +
32 +
33 +The alternative is to reject the aff’s portrayal of rights—only fighting oppressive discourse like theirs can solve.
34 + McKenzie, M. (2014, February 3). 4 Ways to Push Back Against Your Privilege. Retrieved from https://www.bgdblog.org/2014/02/4-ways-push-back-privilege/ (writer, activist, founder of Black Girls Danger)
35 +I’ve often said that it’s not enough to acknowledge your privilege. And, in fact, that acknowledging it is often little more than a chance to pat yourself on the back for being so “aware.” What I find is that most of the time when people acknowledge their privilege, they feel really special about it, really important, really glad that something so significant just happened, and then they just go ahead and do whatever they wanted to do anyway, privilege firmly in place. The truth is that acknowledging your privilege means a whole lot of nothing much if you don’t do anything to actively push back against it. I understand, of course, that the vast majority of people don’t even acknowledge their privilege in the first place. I’m not talking to them. I’m talking to those of us who do. If we do, then we need to understand that acknowledgement all by itself isn’t enough. No matter how cathartic it feels. So, what does pushing back against your privilege look like? Well, here are just a few ways it can look (note: none of these is easy; that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t try): If you are in a position of power and you are able to recognize and acknowledge that at least part of the reason you are there is your (white, male, cisgendered, able-bodied, class, etc.) privilege, then pushing back against that privilege means sharing that power with, or sometimes relinquishing it to, the folks around you who have less privilege and therefore less power. I had a conversation recently with my friend about her terrible white woman boss who, when the women of color she supervises have strong feelings about the way things are being run, including the hiring of more white people over POC, pulls rank on them. Her “I understand your feelings but I am, you know, the boss and it’s my job to…” nonsense is exactly what not pushing back against your privilege looks like. On the other hand, “I was hired to supervise y’all, but I don’t want to perpetuate this type of effed-up power dynamic and also I recognize that y’all have a better understanding about why we should not hire another white man, so I’m going to go ahead and defer to y’all” is exactly what pushing back against your privilege does look like. If you have access to something and you recognize that you have it partly because of privilege, opt out of it. If you’re an able-bodied person and that retreat you really, really want to go on isn’t wheelchair accessible, and the organizers of said retreat have been asked and supported in making a change and done nothing, and you realize how fucked up that is, don’t go. It works the same for women-only events that exclude trans women. Don’t go. Even if you really, really want to go because your, like, fave artist ever is gonna be there. Especially then. Pushing back against your privilege often requires sacrifice. Sacrifice is hard sometimes, homies. If not being a dick were easy, everybody would do it! Acknowledging that something is messed up doesn’t mean anything if you still participate just because, dang, you really want to and stuff. This one is so, so important. If you are a person with a lot of privilege (i.e. a white, straight, able-bodied, class-privileged, cisgender male or any combination of two or more of those) and you call yourself being against oppression, then it should be part of your regular routine to sit the hell down and shut the eff up. If you can recognize that part of the reason your opinion, your voice, carries so much weight and importance is because you are a white man (or whatever combination is working for you), then pushing back against your privilege often looks like shutting your face. Now, of course, using your privilege to speak out against oppression is very important. But I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about chiming in, taking up space, adding your two cents, playing devil’s advocate, etc. when 1) no one asked you, 2) the subject matter is outside your realm of experience (why do you even think you get to have an opinion about the lives of black women??), 3) anything you say is just going to cause more harm because your voice, in and of itself, is a reminder that you always get to have a voice and that voice usually drowns out the voices of others.
36 +
37 +
38 +White People CP
39 +
40 +Counterplan Text: Resolved: Public Colleges and Universities shall restrict the constitutionally protected speech of Caucasian people.
41 +White conservatives use free speech as a way to combat their fear of multiculturalism. The counterplan is key to fighting back against white privelige.
42 +Stroup 16CNN host: Pro-speech conservatives just afraid of multiculturalism. Victoria Stroup. Missouri Campus Correspondent. September 16th 2016. http://www.campusreform.org/?ID=8140. //DC
43 +
44 +At a University of Missouri free speech symposium, CNN commentator Sally Kohn said conservatives fighting for free speech on college campuses are afraid of multiculturalism. Kohn made the statement during a sparsely-attended keynote debate Friday with fellow CNN commentator Kirsten Powers on the issue of the fight for free speech on campus, declaring, “Where this whole debate comes from now is a critique of multiculturalism.”“Feelings are valid...I’m never going to argue with people’s feelings.” Kohn added that because conservatives can no longer criticize multiculturalism while remaining socially acceptable, they have taken on the campus speech fight because it is a way to “attack diverse principles.” She then critiqued the “broad conservative agenda” to “protect conservative issues” and repeatedly spoke against “the Koch-funded Foundation for Individual Rights in Education.” Powers countered by citing examples of liberal bias on college campuses, such as the uproar that is often encountered by both liberal and conservative students who diverge from the liberal orthodoxy, and specifically mentioned Christina Hoff Sommers, an American Enterprise Institute scholar whose speech at Oberlin College was disrupted by numerous protesters, some of whom set up a makeshift “safe space.” Powers also cited the case of a feminist professor at the University of California-Santa Barbara attacking a pro-life demonstrator because she felt threatened by the display, as well as that of a libertarian Muslim student at the University of Michigan whose satirical newspaper article led to demands for his firing because people felt “unsafe.” “Speech is not in itself dangerous,” Powers declared emphatically. Kohn retorted that both her and Powers’ white, upper-middle-class upbringings cloud their vision on the issue, claiming that speech that may not be threatening to them may nonetheless be threatening to someone else.“Feelings are valid,” she mused. “I’m never going to argue with people’s feelings.” Powers next spoke of the chilling effect that occurs when unpopular viewpoints are silent, arguing that people do not learn when everybody is like them. Kohn, however, believes this is largely a good thing, especially in the case of conservatives who do not hold progressive social views, saying, “If they feel like they can no longer speak against positive social change, good.” Once again, Powers insisted that diversity of thought and diversity of ideas are just as important as any other type of diversity, but Kohn refused to concede the point, arguing that some ideas are less deserving of protection than others.“They think diversity is dumbing down humanity, or the greatness and exceptionalism of America,” Kohn said. “I’m happy that’s under assault.”
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1 +2017-01-14 17:55:53.0
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1 +Dan Armitage
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1 +Cupertino Kumar Aff
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1 +1NC R1 Harvard Westlake
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1 +Harvard Westlake
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1 +1AC – CPS
2 +Part 1: Framework
3 +Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics as pure will inevitably fail:
4 +1. There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing.
5 +Butler 92 (Judith Butler. 1992. “Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism” Feminists Theorize the Political)
6 +“In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede and condition the formation of the subject. As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms it situation. The subject is constructed through acts of exclusion and differentiation that distinguished the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject which is then placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject’s production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that “agency” has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization that are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation at can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own possibility of being reworked. The subject is an accomplishment regulate and produced in advance. And is as such fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself.”
7 +2. Discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in violence.
8 +Hagglund ““THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
9 +“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence does is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence it stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the “ethico-theoretical decision” of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of “alienation,” and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any “positive” term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its “other.” Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls “undecidability.” With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking “undecidable,” since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, or political decision, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a is constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary “spec- trality.” A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general “hauntology” (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional “ontology” that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an “economy of violence” where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are is implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and here can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better.” (46-48)
10 +Impacts:
11 +A. Controls the internal link to every other framework because any theory requires us to choose a conception of morality otherwise they are baseless and cannot prescribe an obligation. So, other theories would have to concede exclusion of beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place.
12 +B. Precedes idealized frameworks. The belief in absolute peace is self-contradictory and justifies absolute violence.
13 +Hagglund 2“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND
14 +“A possible objection here is that we must strivinge toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an “ontological” the thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be “out of joint,” not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.” (49)
15 +
16 +And, democratic agonism is the only thing that can overcome ontological violence~-~--Aiming toward consensus is a false goal because consensus is impossible, difference in inevitable. Contestation is key. Dividing people up and treating them as enemies is also a false goal because it denies that the existence of their opposing identity is what constructs yours.
17 +
18 +Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, it’s a question of creating procedural elements that allow discussion, not specific ends. Prefer additionally:
19 +1. Educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism.
20 +Rickert 01 Thomas, “"Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World”, JacOnline Journal
21 +“This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students aren’t are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives. Pedagogy could reflect this concern in its practices by attending to the idea that each student's life is its own telos, meaning that the individual struggles of each student cannot and should not necessarily mirror our own. Or, to put it another way, students must sooner or later overcome us, even though we may legitimate our sense of service with the idea that we have their best interests in mind. However, we should be suspicious of this presumptive ethic, for, as Mann astutely observes, "nothing is more aggressive than the desire to serve the other” (48)
22 +2. Double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict.
23 +3. Agonism outweighs regardless of the role of the ballot. To make claims about the structure and shape of the activity relies on the assumption that debaters have the ability to contest the structure our activity. This entails that higher-level deliberation and contestation about what judges should do or how the ballot should function relies on the initial AC premise.
24 +4. Agonism controls the ability for us to engage in activism to solve oppression.
25 +Harrigan 08 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.43-45
26 +The Relevance Of Argumentation For Advancing Tolerant Politics Cannot Be Underestimated. The willingness to be open to alternative views has a material impact on difference in at least two primary ways. First, the rendering of a certain belief as “off limits” from debate and the prohibition of ideas from the realm of contestation is conceptually indistinct from the physical exclusion of people from societal practices. Unlike racial or gendered concerns, certain groups of people (the religious, minority political parties, etc.) are defined almost exclusively by the arguments that they adhere to. To deem these views unspeakable or irrelevant is to functionally deny whole groups of people access to public deliberation. Second, argument, as individual advocacy, is an expression of belief. It has the potential to persuade members of the public to either support or oppose progressive politics. Belief itself is an accurate indicator of the way individuals will chose to act—with very real implications for openness, diversity and accommodation. Thus, as a precursor to action, argument is an essential starting point for campaigns of tolerance. Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975, p. 694). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself that these beliefs may hold true. Referring back to the opening examples, a pluralist would respect the right for the KKK to hold certain beliefs, even if he or she may find the group offensive. In the argumentative context, pluralism requires that participants to a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable they may be. The key here is expression: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, each should have equal access (at least initially) to forums of deliberation. It is important to distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused, but only loosely connected, counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It pluralism implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for the Klan to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism itself, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs contrary to the dominant forces of economic, political, and social exclusion. Pluralism requires that individuals acknowledge opposing beliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding that personal convictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki 2004, p. 10). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a falsely assumed universality (which, history has shown, frequently become justifications for scape-goating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments that attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism. Personal convictions are supplemented by conviction in the process of debate. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths. Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. Setting aside their own “ego-identification,” students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates (Muir 1993, p. 289). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods 2007, p. 224). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most robust checks against violence in contemporary society.
27 +Impact Calc: The framework is not consequentialist, rather, it cares about creating the structures that allow for agonistic deliberation. Mouffe 3
28 +"Following that line of thought we can realize that what is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that make possible the creation of democratic citizens. This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity. By privileging rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values. This cannot be ignored, and it entails envisaging the question of democratic citizenship in a very different way. The failure of current democratic theory to tackle the question of citizenship is the consequence of their operating with a conception of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and either utility maximizing agents or rational subjects. In all cases they are abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible. What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very question of what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject. The view that I want to put forward is that it is not by providing arguments about the rationality embodied in liberal democratic institutions that one can contribute to the creation of democratic citizens. Democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, and the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values. This is why, although agreeing with deliberative democrats about the need for a different understanding of democracy, I see their proposals as counterproductive. To be sure, we need to formulate an alternative to the aggregative model and to the instrumentalist conception of politics that it fosters. It has become clear that by discouraging the active involvement of citizens in the running of the polity and by encouraging the privatization of life, they have not secured the stability that they were announcing. Extreme forms of individualism have become widespread which threaten the very social fabric. On the other side, deprived of the possibility of identifying with valuable conceptions of citizenship, many people are increasingly searching for other forms of collective identification, which can very often put into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a democratic political association. The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is, in my view, the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which characterizes most liberal-democratic societies. To seriously tackle those problems, the only way to envisage democratic citizenship from a different perspective, is one that puts the emphasis on the types of practices and not the forms of argumentation." (95)
29 +
30 +Part 2: Advocacy
31 +I defend the resolution, resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. I grant links to all disads.
32 +
33 +Part 3: Contention
34 +Censorship on college campuses is being used to stifle democratic thought itself. Sevcenko 16 Catherine Sevcenko, Email Congress about Campus Censorship Today, March 3, 2016, https://www.thefire.org/email-congress-about-campus-censorship-today/
35 +Nevertheless, colleges and universities have stifled political debate on campus on numerous occasions, especially advocacy for a particular candidate, on the mistaken ground that if Students for Insert Candidate’s Name Here is allowed to advocate on campus, the school will lose its tax-exempt status and likely be put out of business.
36 +Educational institutions are, understandably, extremely careful not to do anything that might jeopardize their tax-exempt status. The IRS is equally zealous in making sure that institutions who have this benefit adhere to the rules needed to maintain it. So the incentive for schools to take a “better safe than sorry” approach to the regulations is high—even if it means censoring student speech.
37 +Thus, affirm:
38 +Subpoint A is intelligibility:
39 +Agonism forces everyone to acknowledge each other’s beliefs as structurally legitimate to have engagement.
40 +Mouffe 2 Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”
41 +I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that there cannot be one single best, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.
42 +This means censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced.
43 +Pohlhaus and Wright. Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus and John R. Wright
44 + Insofar as a plurality of positions can be accommodated within the 'we' through which individuals can lay claim to an intelligible voice, the 'we' and the language games we play are affirmed in their legitimacy. On the other hand, insofar as what 'we say' forecloses in advance the acknowledgment of certain individuals as competent speakers of our language, then 'we' put into question our intelligibility to ourselves. This situation parallels the claim to a private language insofar as our answerability to others would be artificially delimited and our intelligibility to ourselves would be made to seem, in this regard, effortless. Like the individual entertaining the idea of a private lan¬guage, 'we' ignore the grounds of our collective intelligibility to others and to ourselves when we deny our dependence, in raising any sort of claim, on an open-ended public language. We will call this the 'extended private language argument'. Taking the skeptical 'threat' seriously, by this argument, is part of maintaining a commitment to a genuinely open-ended 'we' as a ground to mutual intelligibility, because not doing so would be to set limits, in advance, on who we will regard as a competent speaker. For example, say a group's use of 'justice' involves claiming without irony that "justice was served" in situations involving racial minorities whenever they have been punished more harshly than nonminorities would be for an equivalent crime. Confronted with this group, one might want to say to these people that they are twisting the term to suit their purposes of maintaining a racist social order; yet perhaps when this is pointed out, they persist in claim¬ing that they really are 'doing justice'. If we claim, then, that "they evidently don't know what justice means," one possible response open to them is sim¬ply to say, "perhaps you don't know what it means, but this is what we say . . . " Any demands put to the racist group to use the term consistently can easily be deflected by an obstinate appeal to the 'real meaning' of the term. As invoked in this situation, those who object that "that's not what justice means" can be branded as incompetent speakers with a shrug from a member of the racist group. We are then at a stalemate, at least about our language. The force of the extended private language argument is to show us that in refusing answerability, both non-racists and the racist group are alienated from their intelligibility to themselves through the language in which they try to express themselves. In other words, by saying that they do not have to answer m
45 +Subpoint B is Discussion
46 +Silencing bigots only re-entrenches their position and galvanizes their opposition to social justice movements
47 +Levinovitz 16 Alan Levinovitz, assistant professor of religion at James Madison University, “How Trigger Warnings Silence Religious Students,” The Atlantic, August 30, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/silencing-religious-students-on-campus/497951/ JW
48 + There is no doubt that in America, the perspective of white, heterosexual Christian males has enjoyed disproportionate emphasis, particularly in higher education. Trigger warnings, safe spaces, diversity initiatives, and attention to social justice: all of these are essential for pushing back against this lopsided power dynamic. But there is a very real danger that these efforts will become overzealous and render opposing opinions taboo. Instead of dialogues in which everyone is fairly represented, campus conversations about race, gender, and religion will devolve into monologues about the virtues of tolerance and diversity. I have seen it happen, not only at the University of Chicago, my alma mater, but also at the school where I currently teach, James Madison University, where the majority of students are white and Christian. The problem, I’d wager, is fairly widespread, at least at secular universities. Silencing these voices is not a good thing for anyone, especially the advocates of marginalized groups who hope to sway public opinion. Take for example the idea that God opposes homosexuality, a belief that some students still hold. On an ideal campus, these students would feel free to voice their belief. They would then be confronted by opposing arguments, spoken, perhaps, by the very people whose sexual orientation they have asserted is sinful. At least in this kind of environment, these students would have an opportunity to see the weaknesses in their position and potentially change their minds. But if students do not feel free to voice their opinions, they will remain silent, retreating from the classroom to discuss their position on homosexuality with family, friends, and other like-minded individuals. They will believe, correctly in some cases, that advocates of gay rights see them as hateful, intolerant bigots who deserve to be silenced, and which may persuade them to cling with even greater intensity to their convictions. A more charitable interpretation of the University of Chicago letter is that it is meant to inoculate students against allergy to argument. Modern, secular, liberal education is supposed to combine a Socratic ideal of the examined life with a Millian marketplace of ideas. It is boot camp, not a hotel. In theory, this will produce individuals who have cultivated their intellect and embraced new ideas via communal debate—the kind of individuals who make good neighbors and citizens. The communal aspect of the debate is important. It demands patience, open-mindedness, empathy, the courage to question others and be questioned, and above all, attempting to see things as others do. But even though academic debate takes place in a community, it is also combat. Combat can hurt. It is literally offensive. Without offense there is no antagonistic dialogue, no competitive marketplace, and no chance to change your mind. Impious, disrespectful Socrates was executed in Athens for having the temerity to challenge people’s most deeply held beliefs. It would be a shame to execute him again.
49 +Allowing for freedom of discussion solves better for issues of hate speech.
50 +ACLU Hate Speech On Campus, https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus
51 +Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more speech ~-~- not less ~-~- is the best revenge. This is particularly true at universities, whose mission is to facilitate learning through open debate and study, and to enlighten. Speech codes are not the way to go on campuses, where all views are entitled to be heard, explored, supported or refuted. Besides, when hate is out in the open, people can see the problem. Then they can organize effectively to counter bad attitudes, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance.
52 +Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns any criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.
53 +Ward 90 ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 and 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87)
54 +Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.
55 +Part 4: Underview
56 +1. Aff gets RVI’s on theory
57 +a) It’s key to reciprocity since neg will kick theory if I answer it
58 +b) Checks frivolous theory by punishing bad theory
59 +c) It’s logical: you should lose for needlessly calling me a cheater
60 +d) RVI’s key to agonism because we need to have a discussion on an equal level
61 +2. Drop the Debater on theory
62 +a) Deters future abuse because they know they can lose off of theory
63 +b)I’ve already invested time in theory—dropping the argument exacerbates 1AR time skew which means the neg has a much larger chance of winning the round.
64 +3. Prefer competing interps over reasonability
65 +a) Reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention. Even if you set a brightline, it’s arbitrary, meaning that you get away with abuse.
66 +b) Competing interps means we compare two different theory shells and vote for the debater who sets better norms, meaning that it’s key to better debate in the long term.
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1 +2017-01-14 18:00:51.0
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1 +Abbey Chapman
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1 +Dougherty Valley AY
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1 +Cupertino Kumar Aff
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1 +Agonism AC CPS
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1 +CPS
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1 +The standard is util. My framework defines ought as util – two warrants:
2 +1. The free dictionary defines ought as used to indicate desirability
3 +http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ought
4 +2. Ought implies an ends based calculus. Harris :
5 +But this notion of “ought” is an artificial and needlessly confusing way to think about moral choice. In fact, it seems to be another dismal product of Abrahamic religion—which, strangely enough, now constrains the thinking of even atheists. If this notion of “ought” means anything we can possibly care about, it must translate into a concern about the actual or potential experience of conscious beings (either in this life or in some other). For instance, to say that we ought to treat children with kindness seems identical to saying that everyone will tend to be better off if we do. The person who claims that he does not want to be better off is either wrong about what he does, in fact, want (i.e., he doesn’t know what he’s missing), or he is lying, or he is not making sense. The person who insists that he is committed to treating children with kindness for the reasons that have nothing to do with anyone’s well-being is also not making sense. It is worth noting in this context that the God of Abraham never told us to treat children with kindness, but He did tell us to kill them for talking back to us (Exodus 21:15, Leviticus 20:9, Deuteronomy 21:18–21, Mark 7:9–13, and Matthew 15:4–7). And yet everyone finds this “moral” imperative perfectly insane. Which is to say that no one—not even fundamentalists Christians and orthodox Jews—can so fully ignore the link between morality and human well-being.
6 +Prefer:
7 +1. Turn ground: ends based frameworks give us the best turn ground because you can link and impact turn my offense. Other frameworks like deont make link turns to the contention pointless as simply proving you don’t violate doesn’t meet your burden, while simply proving your opponent violates too just generates permissibility. Saying that I can turn these theories through permissibility misses the point because that just gives me impact turn ground but not true link turns, making them always comparatively less fair than my framework. denying one side link or impact turn ground that ethical theories creates unequal burdens for each side making the debate intrinsically skewed.
8 +2. Weighing ground: Util lets us weigh the probability a scenario, its risk, scope, severity, etc. and we can even weigh between these standards. We can still run side constraints but they are compared to other impacts while other frameworks prevent weighing by making them absolute. Weighing ground is key to fairness because otherwise I lose the ability to win under their standard since if their standard evaluates black and white burdens then I have to win 100 terminal defense on any of their offense before I can even begin to start linking under their standard.
9 +3. Topic lit - most articles are written through the lens of util since they’re crafted for policymakers and the general public to understand who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Topic lit is key to fairness and education because it’s where we get our arguments and determines how we engage in the res.
10 +
11 +Also, util is substantively true:
12 +1. Psychological evidence proves we don’t identify with our future selves. Continuous personal identity doesn’t exist.
13 +Alisa Opar (articles editor at Audubon magazine; cites Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business; and Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton) “Why We Procrastinate” Nautilus January 2014
14 +“The British philosopher Derek Parfit espoused a severely reductionist view of personal identity in his seminal book, Reasons and Persons: It does not exist, at least not in the way we usually consider it. We humans, Parfit argued, are not a consistent identity moving through time, but a chain of successive selves, each tangentially linked to, and yet distinct from, the previous and subsequent ones. The boy who begins to smoke despite knowing that he may suffer from the habit decades later should not be judged harshly: “This boy does not identify with his future self,” Parfit wrote. “His attitude towards this future self is in some ways like his attitude to other people.” Parfit’s view was controversial even among philosophers. But psychologists are beginning to understand that it may accurately describe our attitudes towards our own decision-making: It turns out that we see our future selves as strangers. Though we will inevitably share their fates, the people we will become in a decade, quarter century, or more, are unknown to us. This impedes our ability to make good choices on their—which of course is our own—behalf. That bright, shiny New Year’s resolution? If you feel perfectly justified in breaking it, it may be because it feels like it was a promise someone else made. “It’s kind of a weird notion,” says Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. “On a psychological and emotional level we really consider that future self as if it’s another person.” Using MRI, Hershfield and colleagues studied brain activity changes when people imagine their future and consider their present. They homed in on two areas of the brain called the medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, which are more active when a subject thinks about themselves himself than when they he thinks of someone else. They found these same areas were more strongly activated when subjects thought of themselves today, than of themselves in the future. Their future self “felt” like somebody else. In fact, their neural activity when they described themselves in a decade was similar to that when they described Matt Damon or Natalie Portman. And subjects whose brain activity changed the most when they spoke about their future selves were the least likely to favor large long-term financial gains over small immediate ones. Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton, has come to similar conclusions in her research. In a 2008 study, Pronin and her team told college students that they were taking part in an experiment on disgust that required drinking a concoction made of ketchup and soy sauce. The more they, their future selves, or other students consumed, they were told, the greater the benefit to science. Students who were told they’d have to down the distasteful quaff that day committed to consuming two tablespoons. But those that were committing their future selves (the following semester) or other students to participate agreed to guzzle an average of half a cup. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person. The disconnect between our present and time-shifted selves has real implications for how we make decisions. We might choose to procrastinate, and let some other version of our self deal with problems or chores. Or, as in the case of Parfit’s smoking boy, we can focus on that version of our self that derives pleasure, and ignore the one that pays the price. But if procrastination or irresponsibility can derive from a poor connection to your future self, strengthening this connection may prove to be an effective remedy. This is exactly the tactic that some researchers are taking. Anne Wilson, a psychologist at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada, has manipulated people’s perception of time by presenting participants with timelines scaled to make an upcoming event, such as a paper due date, seem either very close or far off. “Using a longer timeline makes people feel more connected to their future selves,” says Wilson. That, in turn, spurred students to finish their assignment earlier, saving their end-of-semester self the stress of banging it out at the last minute. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person. Hershfield has taken a more high-tech approach. Inspired by the use of images to spur charitable donations, he and colleagues took subjects into a virtual reality room and asked them to look into a mirror. The subjects saw either their current self, or a digitally aged image of themselves (see the figure, Digital Old Age). When they exited the room, they were asked how they’d spend $1,000. Those exposed to the aged photo said they’d put twice as much into a retirement account as those who saw themselves unaged. This might be important news for parts of the finance industry. Insurance giant Allianz is funding a pilot project in the midwest in which Hershfield’s team will show state employees their aged faces when they make pension allocations. Merrill Edge, the online discount unit of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, has taken this approach online, with a service called Face Retirement. Each decade-jumping image is accompanied by startling cost-of-living projections and suggestions to invest in your golden years. Hershfield is currently investigating whether morphed images can help people lose weight. Of course, the way we treat our future self is not necessarily negative: Since we think of our future self as someone else, our own decision making reflects how we treat other people. Where Parfit’s smoking boy endangers the health of his future self with nary a thought, others might act differently. “The thing is, we make sacrifices for people all the time,” says Hershfield. “In relationships, in marriages.” The silver lining of our dissociation from our future self, then, is that it is another reason to practice being good to others. One of them might be you.”
15 +This means util is the only coherent moral theory.
16 +A. Since a there is not continuous persons, distribution of goods among people is irrelevant, so we just maximize benefits among people.
17 +B. It is impossible to violate a constraint since identity is in constant flux. Anything such as a promise a made a year ago is no long my promise, etc.
18 +2. Public policy necessitates tradeoffs—that means util.
19 +Gary Woller BYU Prof., “An Overview by Gary Woller”, A Forum on the Role of Environmental Ethics, June 1997, pg. 10
20 +“Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such but justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty is to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their polices are somehow to the overall advantage of society. At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, Also, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse.”
21 +A. Takes out util indicts—governments already use it in the squo, so calc indicts are empirically denied.
22 +B. Any theory based in constraints is useless. Government action inevitably violates some principle, so util is most plausible.
23 +C. Util is comparatively better to any other ethical theory—non-consequentialist theories paralyze government action which is always worse than a risk of not being able to use util.
24 +1-off
25 +Challenges to revenge porn laws indicate that un-hindering free speech would be detrimental for reducing the incidence of revenge porn
26 +Harrison 15 Anne Harrison, Student Writer for The Journal of Gender, Race and Justice, “Revenge Porn: Protected by the Constitution?” University of Iowa: The Journal of Gender, Race and Justice, Volume 18, 2015, https://jgrj.law.uiowa.edu/article/revenge-porn-protected-constitution JW
27 +Legal scholars differ in how to handle revenge porn. Some find that criminalization is not necessary given that victims can already pursue civil suits. Others find that criminalization will serve as a better deterrence than civil action. As advocates push for laws prohibiting the distribution of nude photographs, a legal gray area has emerged based on the dueling freedom of expression contained in the first amendment and the substantive right to privacy. Several states have passed laws criminalizing the nonconsensual posting of nude photographs, including New Jersey penalizing the act as a felony and California making it a misdemeanor to distribute images taken with the understanding that they would remain private. Some of these laws have been challenged on the ground that they unconstitutionally restrict freedom of speech. For example, ACLU filed a federal lawsuit against Arizona’s law, which made it illegal “to intentionally disclose, display, distribute, publish, advertise or offer a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording of another person in a state of nudity or engaged in specific sexual activities if the person knows or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure.” Because the anti-revenge-porn criminal statutes at issue are content-based speech restrictions, the State has the burden of showing they meet strict scrutiny. While content-based speech restrictions are presumptively invalid, legal scholars argue that the Supreme Court has held “where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are less rigorous.” One scholar on the subject posited that such laws are likely to be upheld because the specific nude pictures involved “have nothing to do with public commentary about society.” There is some support for the notion that the laws will be upheld as cyber-stalking laws have not been found to violate the First Amendment. Other scholars believe that anti-revenge porn statutes are criminalizing protected expression. They maintain that the “First Amendment is not a guardian of taste.” In its lawsuit against the state of Arizona, the ACLU argues that the Constitution protects speech even when that speech is offense or emotionally distressing. The ACLU goes on to state that the Arizona law is overbroad in that it applies equally to private photographs and images that are “truly newsworthy, artistic, and historical images.”
28 +First Amendment protections extend to revenge porn
29 +Larkin 14 Paul J. Larkin Jr., Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, “Revenge Porn, State Law, and Free Speech,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Oct. 1, 2014 JW
30 +The Internet serves as a forum for publication or exchange of ideas, expression, or images. Parties who post images on the Internet will claim an entitlement to the same First Amendment protection that the owner of a bookstore or a movie theater receives.152 They will argue that the government cannot criminalize as legally “obscene” simple depictions of nudity,153 nor can the government prohibit the publication of “indecent” photographs on the Internet.154 State tort law permitting recovery for the online posting of nude photographs raises the same First Amendment issues because an award of damages also can have the same censorious or deterrent effect.155 The result, a defendant will argue, is that revenge porn is constitutionally protected speech despite its offensive character.156 The Free Speech Clause has proved to be a formidable barrier to attempts to use the tort or criminal laws to prevent disclosure of offensive communications, on the Internet or elsewhere.157 A victim or a prosecutor would face a well-fortified barricade. As explained below, however, they can break through that barricade in some instances.158 A. First Amendment Precedent Defendants likely would rely heavily on several Supreme Court rulings that the government cannot hold someone liable for the publication of true information. For example, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Court held that the First Amendment protects a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim that the paper lawfully acquired from a police report placed in the department’s pressroom.159 In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the right of a newspaper to publish the transcript of a wiretap in which the newspaper had played no role even though the wiretap itself was illegal.160 Defendants in revenge porn cases would maintain that cases such as Florida Star and Bartnicki disallow a state from imposing civil or criminal liability on the publication of truthful information regardless of the nature or strength of the privacy interest that the state seeks to protect. Defendants also would rely on Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 161 which involved the publication of offensive material depicting the plaintiff as part of a parody. Falwell, a well-known minister and public figure, sued Hustler magazine over a liquor advertisement that parodied him. The ad, which “clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of ‘first times,’” referred to the first time that Falwell allegedly sampled a particular liquor, but also implied that Falwell had engaged in a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse.162 Falwell sued, claiming that he was the victim of defamation, an invasion of his privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the way in which he was portrayed in the ad. At the end of trial, the district court granted Hustler a directed verdict on Falwell’s privacy claim, and the jury rejected his claim of defamation but returned a verdict in his favor on his emotional distress claim.163 After the district court and court of appeals upheld the verdict on that ground, Hustler sought review in the Supreme Court. As the Court saw it, the case presented “a novel question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State’s authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional distress.”164 The question was “whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most.”165 The Court answered, “No.”
31 +The chance for revenge porn is extraordinarily high given the amount of sexting on campus
32 +Reid 14 Samantha Reid, reporter at USA Today, “Study says 70 of students have sexted, so how do they feel about revenge porn?” USA Today, May 15, 2014, http://college.usatoday.com/2014/05/15/study-says-70-of-students-have-sexted-so-how-do-they-feel-about-revenge-porn/ JW
33 +College students are a key demographic affected by these laws –– according to a study published by the Electronic Journal of Human Sexuality, nearly 70 of college students admit to having sent or received sexually suggestive text messages. Apps like Snapchat, make it easier than ever for students to share nude or partially nude images. While students are willing to admit to sexting in anonymous studies, very few are willing to speak on the topic openly for fear of embarrassment or hurting potential career prospects –– the same results as when photos are leaked. “Revenge porn is not talked about openly,” says Nickie Hackenbrack, a senior at University of Tennessee. “Because of the anonymity of the Internet and students’ trust of those around us we have the impression that it could never happen to us.” Several schools have held events this past semester to attempt to bolster student awareness. Dowling College in Oakdale, N.Y., Colorado College in Colorado Springs, Colo. and Beloit College in Beloit, Wis. all held events that focused on revenge porn. Hackenbrack is part of “Sexual Empowerment and Awareness at Tennessee,” better known on campus as SEAT. The group puts on “Sex Week” at UT, and the organizers hope to focus on revenge porn at this year’s event. “We hope the event brings to light the pervasiveness of technology, even when it comes to sexuality,” Hackenbrack says. “To address this issue head on, we hope to put together a panel from legal and ethical perspectives to talk about the current state of revenge porn legislation.” Events like “Sex Week” strive to open up a greater dialogue about intimacy and respect among college students. Sending nude photos is a pervasive practice, but conversation about it is often taboo. “For college students this is part of contemporary sexual expression and relationships,” says Danielle Citron, a law professor at University of Maryland who specializes in cybercrime. “We want to encourage private sexual expression… but there’s got to be a sense of confidentiality.” Julie Bogen, a senior at Wheaton College in Norton, Mass., agrees that sexual expression is hindered without laws in place to protect individual privacy. “The existence of revenge porn creates a twisted paranoia surrounding experimentation and trusting your partner,” Bogen says. “Who would trust anyone or try anything new… when if the relationship ends poorly, their private moments could end up as public domain?” Without laws that pertain specifically to this type of crime, victims are left with few options for recourse when that privacy is violated–– civil suits are one route, but for the young people that this issue most commonly affects that too can be problematic.
34 +Revenge porn is the manifestation of a violent patriarchy
35 +Dermody 14 Meagan Dermody, Managing Editor at CT, “Jennifer Lawrence, privacy and the patriarchy,” The independent student press at Virginia Commonwealth University, September 7, 2014, http://www.commonwealthtimes.org/2014/09/07/jennifer-lawrence-privacy-and-the-patriarchy/ JW
36 +The leak falls somewhere between degradation and physical violence; though the violation those involved have experienced was not physical in nature, losing control over sexual images can mean losing control of a piece of your personhood. Woman becomes passive body, cut to discrete and consumable pieces without consent — the photo no longer represents a person sharing an intimate part of a complex and valuable self, but an object to be fantasized about, criticized, and consumed. It doesn’t stop there. Users of the website 4chan attempted to manipulate female users into sharing nude photographs of themselves — in solidarity, they claimed. By painting it as a movement for solidarity, they belied (however ineffectively) their true intentions. The attempt to access sexually explicit images of other women is in fact a manifestation of the will to objectify, an act of patriarchal punishment with a beguiling false attitude. It follows that the leak of these photographs and the demand for more represent a greater initiative to consume the female body as passive sex object — a large-scale manifestation of patriarchal violence, meant to reify women on a grand scale and degrade their consent by stripping them of their control over their image and intimate selves.
37 +2-off
38 +
39 +International law banned hate speech
40 +Matsuda 89 Mari J. Matsuda (Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, the William S. Richardson School of Law), "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," Michigan Law Review, 1989
41 +The international community has chosen to outlaw racist hate propaganda. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimi- nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states: Article 4 States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of per- sons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or pro- mote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incite- ment to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimi- nation, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organ- ized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organization or activities as an offence punishable by law; and (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.105 Under this treaty, states are required to criminalize racial hate messages. Prohibiting dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or hatred is not easily reconciled with American concepts of free speech. The Convention recognizes this conflict. Article 4 acknowledges the need for "due regard" for rights protected by the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights and by article 5 of the Convention - including the rights of freedom of speech, association, and conscience. Recognizing these conflicting values, and nonetheless concluding that the right to freedom from racist hate propaganda deserves affirm- ative recognition, represents the evolving international view. An American lawyer, trained in a tradition of liberal thought, would read article 4 and conclude immediately that it is unworkable. Acts of vio- lence, and perhaps imminent incitement to violence are properly pro- hibited, but the control of ideas is doomed to failure. This position was voiced continually in the debates'06 preceding adoption of the Convention, leading to the view that article 4 is both controversial and troublesome. 107 To those who struggled through early international attempts'08 to deal with racist propaganda, the competing values had a sense of ur- gency. 09 The imagery of both book burnings and swastikas was clear in their minds. 10 Hitler had banned ideas. He had also murdered six million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a major theme the idea of racial superiority. While the causes of fascism are complex,11 the knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the rise of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred. In 1959 and 1960, the United Nations faced an "outburst of anti- Semitic incidents in several parts of the world.""'2 The movement to implement the human rights goals of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration gained momentum as member states sought effective means of eliminating discrimination.
42 +Hate speech is permissible under the first amendment despite the exceptions
43 +Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh, Law Professor at UCLA, “No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.9e1ed85e9262 JW
44 +I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible.
45 +
46 +Compliance with ILaw is key to preventing global disaster- US compliance with ILaw shapes global ILaw compliance
47 +IEER 02 Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties. May 2002. http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf
48 +The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system offered by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments by the United States that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. If the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.
49 +
50 +US adherence to international law concerning hate speech is key to credibility in international human rights
51 +Cohen 15 Tanya Cohen, "It’s Time To Bring The Hammer Down On Hate Speech In The U.S." Thought Catalog,
52 +Recent scandals involving right-wing hatemongers like Phil Robertson, Donald Sterling, Bill Maher, and the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity have brought to light one of America’s biggest embarrassments: the fact that America remains the only country in the world without any legal protections against hate speech. In any other country, people like Phil Robertson and Donald Sterling would have been taken before a Human Rights Commission and subsequently fined and/or imprisoned and/or stripped of their right to public comment for making comments that incite hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities. But, in the US, such people are allowed to freely incite hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities with impunity, as the US lacks any legal protections against any forms of hate speech – even the most vile and extreme forms of hate speech remain completely legal in the so-called “land of the free”. Not only is this a violation of the most basic and fundamental human rights principles, but it’s also an explicit violation of legally-binding international human rights conventions. For many decades, human rights groups around the world – from Amnesty International to Human Rights First to the United Nations Human Rights Council – have told the United States that it needs to pass and enforce strong legal protections against hate speech in accordance with its international human rights obligations. As of 2015, the US is the only country in the world where hate speech remains completely legal. This is, in fact, a flagrant violation of international human rights law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) both mandate that all countries outlaw hate speech, including “propaganda for war” and the dissemination of any “ideas based on racial superiority or hatred”. The ICCPR and ICERD are both legally-binding international human rights conventions, and all nations are required to uphold them in the fullest. By failing to prosecute hate speech, the US is explicitly and flippantly violating international human rights law. No other country would be allowed to get away with this, so why would the US? The United Nations has stated many times that international law has absolute authority. This is quite simply not optional. The US is required to outlaw hate speech. No other country would be able to get away with blatantly ignoring international human rights standards, so why should the US be able to? The US is every bit as required to follow international human rights law as the rest of the world is.
53 +Improving human rights and preventing violations helps billions materially facing oppression across the globe.
54 +CFR 13 - Council on Foreign Relations: June 19, 2013 (“The Global Human Rights Regime” From the multimedia Global Governance Monitor of the International Institutions and Global Governance program Available at http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/global-human-rights-regime/p27450#p1
55 +Although the concept of human rights is abstract, how it is applied has a direct and enormous impact on daily life worldwide. Millions have suffered crimes against humanity. Millions more toil in bonded labor. In the last decade alone, authoritarian rule has denied civil and political liberties to billions. The idea of human rights has a long history, but only in the past century has the international community sought to galvanize a regime to promote and guard them. Particularly, since the United Nations (UN) was established in 1945, world leaders have cooperated to codify human rights in a universally recognized regime of treaties, institutions, and norms. An elaborate global system is being developed. Governments are striving to promote human rights domestically and abroad, and are partnering with multilateral institutions to do so. A particularly dynamic and decentralized network of civil-society actors is also involved in the effort. Together, these players have achieved marked success, though the institutionalization and implementation of different rights is progressing at varying rates. Response to mass atrocities has seen the greatest progress, even if enforcement remains inconsistent. The imperative to provide people with adequate public health care is strongly embedded across the globe, and substantial resources have been devoted to the challenge. The right to freedom from slavery and forced labor has also been integrated into international and national institutions, and has benefited from high-profile pressure to combat forced labor. Finally, the steady accumulation of human-rights-related conventions has encouraged most states to do more to implement binding legislation in their constitutions and statutes.
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EntryDate
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1 +2017-01-14 18:03:00.0
Judge
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1 +Michael Harris
Opponent
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1 +Harker SP
Round
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +1
RoundReport
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1 +1AC Deont Aff
2 +Neg Util Fwk and DA's
Tournament
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1 +CPS

Schools

Aberdeen Central (SD)
Acton-Boxborough (MA)
Albany (CA)
Albuquerque Academy (NM)
Alief Taylor (TX)
American Heritage Boca Delray (FL)
American Heritage Plantation (FL)
Anderson (TX)
Annie Wright (WA)
Apple Valley (MN)
Appleton East (WI)
Arbor View (NV)
Arcadia (CA)
Archbishop Mitty (CA)
Ardrey Kell (NC)
Ashland (OR)
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Bainbridge (WA)
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Barrington (IL)
BASIS Mesa (AZ)
BASIS Scottsdale (AZ)
BASIS Silicon (CA)
Beckman (CA)
Bellarmine (CA)
Benjamin Franklin (LA)
Benjamin N Cardozo (NY)
Bentonville (AR)
Bergen County (NJ)
Bettendorf (IA)
Bingham (UT)
Blue Valley Southwest (KS)
Brentwood (CA)
Brentwood Middle (CA)
Bridgewater-Raritan (NJ)
Bronx Science (NY)
Brophy College Prep (AZ)
Brown (KY)
Byram Hills (NY)
Byron Nelson (TX)
Cabot (AR)
Calhoun Homeschool (TX)
Cambridge Rindge (MA)
Canyon Crest (CA)
Canyon Springs (NV)
Cape Fear Academy (NC)
Carmel Valley Independent (CA)
Carpe Diem (NJ)
Cedar Park (TX)
Cedar Ridge (TX)
Centennial (ID)
Centennial (TX)
Center For Talented Youth (MD)
Cerritos (CA)
Chaminade (CA)
Chandler (AZ)
Chandler Prep (AZ)
Chaparral (AZ)
Charles E Smith (MD)
Cherokee (OK)
Christ Episcopal (LA)
Christopher Columbus (FL)
Cinco Ranch (TX)
Citrus Valley (CA)
Claremont (CA)
Clark (NV)
Clark (TX)
Clear Brook (TX)
Clements (TX)
Clovis North (CA)
College Prep (CA)
Collegiate (NY)
Colleyville Heritage (TX)
Concord Carlisle (MA)
Concordia Lutheran (TX)
Connally (TX)
Coral Glades (FL)
Coral Science (NV)
Coral Springs (FL)
Coppell (TX)
Copper Hills (UT)
Corona Del Sol (AZ)
Crandall (TX)
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Cypress Springs (TX)
Cypress Woods (TX)
Dallastown (PA)
Davis (CA)
Delbarton (NJ)
Derby (KS)
Des Moines Roosevelt (IA)
Desert Vista (AZ)
Diamond Bar (CA)
Dobson (AZ)
Dougherty Valley (CA)
Dowling Catholic (IA)
Dripping Springs (TX)
Dulles (TX)
duPont Manual (KY)
Dwyer (FL)
Eagle (ID)
Eastside Catholic (WA)
Edgemont (NY)
Edina (MN)
Edmond North (OK)
Edmond Santa Fe (OK)
El Cerrito (CA)
Elkins (TX)
Enloe (NC)
Episcopal (TX)
Evanston (IL)
Evergreen Valley (CA)
Ferris (TX)
Flintridge Sacred Heart (CA)
Flower Mound (TX)
Fordham Prep (NY)
Fort Lauderdale (FL)
Fort Walton Beach (FL)
Freehold Township (NJ)
Fremont (NE)
Frontier (MO)
Gabrielino (CA)
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George Ranch (TX)
Georgetown Day (DC)
Gig Harbor (WA)
Gilmour (OH)
Glenbrook South (IL)
Gonzaga Prep (WA)
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Greenhill (TX)
Guyer (TX)
Hamilton (AZ)
Hamilton (MT)
Harker (CA)
Harmony (TX)
Harrison (NY)
Harvard Westlake (CA)
Hawken (OH)
Head Royce (CA)
Hebron (TX)
Heights (MD)
Hendrick Hudson (NY)
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Highland (ID)
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Holy Cross (LA)
Homewood Flossmoor (IL)
Hopkins (MN)
Houston Homeschool (TX)
Hunter College (NY)
Hutchinson (KS)
Immaculate Heart (CA)
Independent (All)
Interlake (WA)
Isidore Newman (LA)
Jack C Hays (TX)
James Bowie (TX)
Jefferson City (MO)
Jersey Village (TX)
John Marshall (CA)
Juan Diego (UT)
Jupiter (FL)
Kapaun Mount Carmel (KS)
Kamiak (WA)
Katy Taylor (TX)
Keller (TX)
Kempner (TX)
Kent Denver (CO)
King (FL)
Kingwood (TX)
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Klein (TX)
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Kudos College (CA)
La Canada (CA)
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La Jolla (CA)
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Lake Travis (TX)
Lakeville North (MN)
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Lamar (TX)
LAMP (AL)
Law Magnet (TX)
Langham Creek (TX)
Lansing (KS)
LaSalle College (PA)
Lawrence Free State (KS)
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Leucadia Independent (CA)
Lexington (MA)
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Lincoln (OR)
Lincoln (NE)
Lincoln East (NE)
Lindale (TX)
Livingston (NJ)
Logan (UT)
Lone Peak (UT)
Los Altos (CA)
Los Osos (CA)
Lovejoy (TX)
Loyola (CA)
Loyola Blakefield (MA)
Lynbrook (CA)
Maeser Prep (UT)
Mannford (OK)
Marcus (TX)
Marlborough (CA)
McClintock (AZ)
McDowell (PA)
McNeil (TX)
Meadows (NV)
Memorial (TX)
Millard North (NE)
Millard South (NE)
Millard West (NE)
Millburn (NJ)
Milpitas (CA)
Miramonte (CA)
Mission San Jose (CA)
Monsignor Kelly (TX)
Monta Vista (CA)
Montclair Kimberley (NJ)
Montgomery (TX)
Monticello (NY)
Montville Township (NJ)
Morris Hills (NJ)
Mountain Brook (AL)
Mountain Pointe (AZ)
Mountain View (CA)
Mountain View (AZ)
Murphy Middle (TX)
NCSSM (NC)
New Orleans Jesuit (LA)
New Trier (IL)
Newark Science (NJ)
Newburgh Free Academy (NY)
Newport (WA)
North Allegheny (PA)
North Crowley (TX)
North Hollywood (CA)
Northland Christian (TX)
Northwood (CA)
Notre Dame (CA)
Nueva (CA)
Oak Hall (FL)
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Okoboji (IA)
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Oxford (CA)
Pacific Ridge (CA)
Palm Beach Gardens (FL)
Palo Alto Independent (CA)
Palos Verdes Peninsula (CA)
Park Crossing (AL)
Peak to Peak (CO)
Pembroke Pines (FL)
Pennsbury (PA)
Phillips Academy Andover (MA)
Phoenix Country Day (AZ)
Pine Crest (FL)
Pingry (NJ)
Pittsburgh Central Catholic (PA)
Plano East (TX)
Polytechnic (CA)
Presentation (CA)
Princeton (NJ)
Prosper (TX)
Quarry Lane (CA)
Raisbeck-Aviation (WA)
Rancho Bernardo (CA)
Randolph (NJ)
Reagan (TX)
Richardson (TX)
Ridge (NJ)
Ridge Point (TX)
Riverside (SC)
Robert Vela (TX)
Rosemount (MN)
Roseville (MN)
Round Rock (TX)
Rowland Hall (UT)
Royse City (TX)
Ruston (LA)
Sacred Heart (MA)
Sacred Heart (MS)
Sage Hill (CA)
Sage Ridge (NV)
Salado (TX)
Salpointe Catholic (AZ)
Sammamish (WA)
San Dieguito (CA)
San Marino (CA)
SandHoke (NC)
Santa Monica (CA)
Sarasota (FL)
Saratoga (CA)
Scarsdale (NY)
Servite (CA)
Seven Lakes (TX)
Shawnee Mission East (KS)
Shawnee Mission Northwest (KS)
Shawnee Mission South (KS)
Shawnee Mission West (KS)
Sky View (UT)
Skyline (UT)
Smithson Valley (TX)
Southlake Carroll (TX)
Sprague (OR)
St Agnes (TX)
St Andrews (MS)
St Francis (CA)
St James (AL)
St Johns (TX)
St Louis Park (MN)
St Margarets (CA)
St Marys Hall (TX)
St Thomas (MN)
St Thomas (TX)
Stephen F Austin (TX)
Stoneman Douglas (FL)
Stony Point (TX)
Strake Jesuit (TX)
Stratford (TX)
Stratford Independent (CA)
Stuyvesant (NY)
Success Academy (NY)
Sunnyslope (AZ)
Sunset (OR)
Syosset (NY)
Tahoma (WA)
Talley (AZ)
Texas Academy of Math and Science (TX)
Thomas Jefferson (VA)
Thompkins (TX)
Timber Creek (FL)
Timothy Christian (NJ)
Tom C Clark (TX)
Tompkins (TX)
Torrey Pines (CA)
Travis (TX)
Trinity (KY)
Trinity Prep (FL)
Trinity Valley (TX)
Truman (PA)
Turlock (CA)
Union (OK)
Unionville (PA)
University High (CA)
University School (OH)
University (FL)
Upper Arlington (OH)
Upper Dublin (PA)
Valley (IA)
Valor Christian (CO)
Vashon (WA)
Ventura (CA)
Veritas Prep (AZ)
Vestavia Hills (AL)
Vincentian (PA)
Walla Walla (WA)
Walt Whitman (MD)
Warren (TX)
Wenatchee (WA)
West (UT)
West Ranch (CA)
Westford (MA)
Westlake (TX)
Westview (OR)
Westwood (TX)
Whitefish Bay (WI)
Whitney (CA)
Wilson (DC)
Winston Churchill (TX)
Winter Springs (FL)
Woodlands (TX)
Woodlands College Park (TX)
Wren (SC)
Yucca Valley (CA)