Changes for page Cupertino Kumar Aff

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Summary

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1 -Topicality
2 -Interpretation: The affirmative must defend (resolution). You can discuss non-topical issues under the world of my interp, you just cannot claim that your advocacy is to fight them and that you should win for that.
3 -
4 -1. Ground-
5 -
6 -A. Resolvability-
7 -B. Probability-
8 -C. Internal link-
9 -D. Dialogue- Galloway 07
10 -Ryan, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007
11 -Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).
12 -2. Limits-
13 -Only limited topics protect participants from research overload which materially affects our lives outside of round. Harris 13
14 -Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655
15 -The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against Topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.
16 -Controls the internal link to the aff- I can’t engage in the 1AC’s critical issues in round AND you cause research overload so I cannot be politically active for your cause outside of round because I am too busy researching. Limits are key to fairness because they ensure that I have the prep to engage.
17 -
18 -Vote Neg:
19 -A) Key to endorsing good methodologies—1AR severance prevents effective dialogue on the role of the ballot and having a methods debate sets a norm for other rounds. It’s too late to have a constructive debate about public policy since there are only three speeches left.
20 -B) If I win their advocacy is not topical and that topicality comes first then they have no advocacy and thus cannot have offense.
21 -Evaluate the T debate under competing interpretations – it's key to generate clear models of debate and ground because otherwise the aff's interpretation can be a moving target. Reasonability is arbitrarily defined and causes a race to the bottom for the "most reasonable" position.
22 -
23 -Rights K
24 -Their advocacy for rights rectifies the division between the human and the political - Rights talk ties the population to the sovereign by defining life only in terms of what can be defended by the state—this turns the citizen-subject into bare life by allowing arbitrary exclusion
25 -Hoover 13 Hoover, Joe. Dr Hoover has a BA in Philosophy from the University of Colorado and an MSc in Philosophy, now at University of London "Towards a politics for human rights: Ambiguous humanity and democratizing rights." Philosophy and Social Criticism 2013 (IM)
26 -Agamben pushes this critique even further by focusing on the way in which rights depend upon the distinction between those who have rights as members of the political community and those that are excluded – between bios and zoē. Human rights attempt to privilege the bare life of human beings without a place in the political world, which is why Agamben sees the displaced or stateless individual as the exemplary subject of human rights. However, it is the sovereign that has the power to make this distinction, the exclusion of some life from the political community, the creation of “bare life”. As rights are supposed to attach to human beings as such, rather than as members of a particular nation, it seems that the law achieves justification beyond convention, beyond the shared sense of justice that makes a People, but in fact it reveals that the law depends upon the power of the sovereign who ultimately decides which human beings have their rights protected and which find themselves excluded totally, most tellingly in the camp. This critique of human rights depends upon Agamben’s understanding of the sovereign as ‘the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.’54 The pure bio-politics we find in the relationship between Homo Sacer and the sovereign, who decides whether bare human life is extinguished or preserved, reveals that the effort to remove rights from a given order (to transform civil right into human rights) renders those rights precarious, dependent on exceptional power of the sovereign rather than a universal law. On this reading, human rights cannot constrain authority because they are dependent upon it, nor do they enable transformations of the legal and political order because they confirm rather than claim power. Agamben suggests that rights are not ambiguous in their support of authority and control, but rather central to it at the most fundamental level.
27 -
28 -Bare life is the ultimate devaluation of life – life that can be killed, but not sacrificed.
29 -Reinert 2007 (‘The Pertinence of Sacrifice - Some Notes on Larry the Luckiest Lamb’ Hugo Reinert, PhD from Cambridge University of Cambridge, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol6no3_2007/reinert_larry.htm) IM
30 -14. For a few years now, in his Homo Sacer project, Agamben has been tracing the political predicament of the present using the enigmatic figure of the bare life nuda vita (1998). Throughout his work, this bare life appears in many guises: from werewolves, outlaws and Roman priestesses to overcomatose patients and concentration camp victims. Perhaps its principal exemplar however - the figure that Agamben uses to illustrate its basic dynamic most succinctly - is the homo sacer or 'sacred man': 'an obscure figure from archaic Roman Law' who, for his crimes, has been expelled from both the ius humanum and the ius divinum, from both secular and sacred law. As a consequence of this, it is declared that he 'may be killed but not sacrificed' (Agamben 1998: 8). Killing this sacred man therefore invokes no sanction, but his life is also 'unsacrificeable' (82). His existence is constituted through a 'double exclusion' that expresses the basic operation of sovereign power itself - the process by which 'the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule' (18). This is the 'relation of exception': 'the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion' (18). Through this extreme relation, sovereign power maintains itself in a permanent relationship to the excluded: the outlaw for example, as another figure of the bare life, 'is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death' (183). 15. The sacred man and the outlaw are only two figures in a gallery of priests, bandits, kings, werewolves and concentration camp victims, all connected by the thread of the bare life and its shifting parameters. King or camp victim, this bare life is always a figure of the extreme margin: life stripped of its everyday humanity, reduced and excluded to the blurred threshold that surrounds the 'city of men' and defines its limits. In a sense, it is the human zoon politikon stripped of the very quality that makes it human: its social being, its character of sociality. Seen this way, the bare life is defined by the fact that it is not - or that it is no longer - a social person . This is the sense in which the term has come of age recently: particularly to describe Muslims held at Guantanamo, but also - with variable relevance - to describe social phenomena ranging from premature infant births (Wynn 2002) and homeless people (Feldman 2006), to the geopolitics of post-colonial violence (Sylvester 2006) and, somewhat bizarrely, European tourists in Ibiza (Diken and Laustsen 2004). In the present context, the more relevant of these applications focus on the question of violence - on the intersection between the sovereign exercise and justification of violence, on the one hand, and the bare life's quality of constant, permanent exposure to the threat of violence on the other. 16. As Agamben argues, the exercise of lethal violence against the bare life is twice circumscribed by the structure of the sovereign ban. Suspended in the grasp of sovereign power, the bare life becomes simultaneously vulnerable to certain kinds of violence and ineligible for others. On the one hand, it can be freely killed - the exercise of violence against the bare life is routine, insignificant and unmarked. It requires no expiation or atonement and invites no sanctions: it is banal, without consequence to the law and anything but 'intrinsically mysterious, mystifying, convoluting, plain scary, mythical and arcane' (Taussig 1992: 116). Simultaneously, with this subjection to unregulated and freely exercised forms of violence, the bare life also becomes ineligible for sacrifice - which is to say, in the general sense in which Agamben interprets the term, that the bare life is excluded from all forms of ritually marked, institutionalized, exalted or sacralizing violence, such as are 'prescribed by the rite of the law' (1998: 102): it can not, for example, be 'submitted to sanctioned forms of execution' (103). Between them, these two exclusions operate to desacralize the death of the bare life, stripping it of any significance. Its killing and death become trivial, casual, mundane and devoid of higher meaning: to Agamben the observer, the horror of the concentration camp is that as embodiments of the bare life, the men and women there died, to their executors, 'like lice' (114). In one sense, the bare life stands as cypher for a de-personalization, or dis-individuation, that transforms subjects into objects: subjecting them to the free exercise of unregulated violence while simultaneously, through the trope of denied sacrifice, disqualifying them from subjection to ritual or sacralizing forms of violence - insofar as they are 'not worthy of this gesture of honour' (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 17).
31 -
32 -
33 -The alternative is to reject the aff’s portrayal of rights—only fighting oppressive discourse like theirs can solve.
34 - McKenzie, M. (2014, February 3). 4 Ways to Push Back Against Your Privilege. Retrieved from https://www.bgdblog.org/2014/02/4-ways-push-back-privilege/ (writer, activist, founder of Black Girls Danger)
35 -I’ve often said that it’s not enough to acknowledge your privilege. And, in fact, that acknowledging it is often little more than a chance to pat yourself on the back for being so “aware.” What I find is that most of the time when people acknowledge their privilege, they feel really special about it, really important, really glad that something so significant just happened, and then they just go ahead and do whatever they wanted to do anyway, privilege firmly in place. The truth is that acknowledging your privilege means a whole lot of nothing much if you don’t do anything to actively push back against it. I understand, of course, that the vast majority of people don’t even acknowledge their privilege in the first place. I’m not talking to them. I’m talking to those of us who do. If we do, then we need to understand that acknowledgement all by itself isn’t enough. No matter how cathartic it feels. So, what does pushing back against your privilege look like? Well, here are just a few ways it can look (note: none of these is easy; that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t try): If you are in a position of power and you are able to recognize and acknowledge that at least part of the reason you are there is your (white, male, cisgendered, able-bodied, class, etc.) privilege, then pushing back against that privilege means sharing that power with, or sometimes relinquishing it to, the folks around you who have less privilege and therefore less power. I had a conversation recently with my friend about her terrible white woman boss who, when the women of color she supervises have strong feelings about the way things are being run, including the hiring of more white people over POC, pulls rank on them. Her “I understand your feelings but I am, you know, the boss and it’s my job to…” nonsense is exactly what not pushing back against your privilege looks like. On the other hand, “I was hired to supervise y’all, but I don’t want to perpetuate this type of effed-up power dynamic and also I recognize that y’all have a better understanding about why we should not hire another white man, so I’m going to go ahead and defer to y’all” is exactly what pushing back against your privilege does look like. If you have access to something and you recognize that you have it partly because of privilege, opt out of it. If you’re an able-bodied person and that retreat you really, really want to go on isn’t wheelchair accessible, and the organizers of said retreat have been asked and supported in making a change and done nothing, and you realize how fucked up that is, don’t go. It works the same for women-only events that exclude trans women. Don’t go. Even if you really, really want to go because your, like, fave artist ever is gonna be there. Especially then. Pushing back against your privilege often requires sacrifice. Sacrifice is hard sometimes, homies. If not being a dick were easy, everybody would do it! Acknowledging that something is messed up doesn’t mean anything if you still participate just because, dang, you really want to and stuff. This one is so, so important. If you are a person with a lot of privilege (i.e. a white, straight, able-bodied, class-privileged, cisgender male or any combination of two or more of those) and you call yourself being against oppression, then it should be part of your regular routine to sit the hell down and shut the eff up. If you can recognize that part of the reason your opinion, your voice, carries so much weight and importance is because you are a white man (or whatever combination is working for you), then pushing back against your privilege often looks like shutting your face. Now, of course, using your privilege to speak out against oppression is very important. But I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about chiming in, taking up space, adding your two cents, playing devil’s advocate, etc. when 1) no one asked you, 2) the subject matter is outside your realm of experience (why do you even think you get to have an opinion about the lives of black women??), 3) anything you say is just going to cause more harm because your voice, in and of itself, is a reminder that you always get to have a voice and that voice usually drowns out the voices of others.
36 -
37 -
38 -White People CP
39 -
40 -Counterplan Text: Resolved: Public Colleges and Universities shall restrict the constitutionally protected speech of Caucasian people.
41 -White conservatives use free speech as a way to combat their fear of multiculturalism. The counterplan is key to fighting back against white privelige.
42 -Stroup 16CNN host: Pro-speech conservatives just afraid of multiculturalism. Victoria Stroup. Missouri Campus Correspondent. September 16th 2016. http://www.campusreform.org/?ID=8140. //DC
43 -
44 -At a University of Missouri free speech symposium, CNN commentator Sally Kohn said conservatives fighting for free speech on college campuses are afraid of multiculturalism. Kohn made the statement during a sparsely-attended keynote debate Friday with fellow CNN commentator Kirsten Powers on the issue of the fight for free speech on campus, declaring, “Where this whole debate comes from now is a critique of multiculturalism.”“Feelings are valid...I’m never going to argue with people’s feelings.” Kohn added that because conservatives can no longer criticize multiculturalism while remaining socially acceptable, they have taken on the campus speech fight because it is a way to “attack diverse principles.” She then critiqued the “broad conservative agenda” to “protect conservative issues” and repeatedly spoke against “the Koch-funded Foundation for Individual Rights in Education.” Powers countered by citing examples of liberal bias on college campuses, such as the uproar that is often encountered by both liberal and conservative students who diverge from the liberal orthodoxy, and specifically mentioned Christina Hoff Sommers, an American Enterprise Institute scholar whose speech at Oberlin College was disrupted by numerous protesters, some of whom set up a makeshift “safe space.” Powers also cited the case of a feminist professor at the University of California-Santa Barbara attacking a pro-life demonstrator because she felt threatened by the display, as well as that of a libertarian Muslim student at the University of Michigan whose satirical newspaper article led to demands for his firing because people felt “unsafe.” “Speech is not in itself dangerous,” Powers declared emphatically. Kohn retorted that both her and Powers’ white, upper-middle-class upbringings cloud their vision on the issue, claiming that speech that may not be threatening to them may nonetheless be threatening to someone else.“Feelings are valid,” she mused. “I’m never going to argue with people’s feelings.” Powers next spoke of the chilling effect that occurs when unpopular viewpoints are silent, arguing that people do not learn when everybody is like them. Kohn, however, believes this is largely a good thing, especially in the case of conservatives who do not hold progressive social views, saying, “If they feel like they can no longer speak against positive social change, good.” Once again, Powers insisted that diversity of thought and diversity of ideas are just as important as any other type of diversity, but Kohn refused to concede the point, arguing that some ideas are less deserving of protection than others.“They think diversity is dumbing down humanity, or the greatness and exceptionalism of America,” Kohn said. “I’m happy that’s under assault.”
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1 -Dan Armitage
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1 -Cupertino Kumar Aff
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1 -1NC R1 Harvard Westlake
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1 -Harvard Westlake
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1 -1AC Colonialism K aff
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1 -Karen Qi
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1 -1AC Journalism
2 -NC must have standard Text T plan flaw hate speech PIC
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1 -1NC R4 CPS
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1 +1NC Shell
2 +A. Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a specific form of constitutionally protected speech that they defend not restricting.
3 +“Any” when used in a negative sentence is a weak determiner referring to an indefinite number of things AND cannot be used for a singular countable thing
4 +Cambridge Dictionary writes Cambridge English Dictionary, “Any,” Cambridge University Press, Accessed 12-4-2016, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/grammar/british-grammar/quantifiers/any JW
5 +Any as a determiner We use any before nouns to refer to indefinite or unknown quantities or an unlimited entity: Did you bring any bread? Mr Jacobson refused to answer any questions. If I were able to travel back to any place and time in history, I would go to ancient China. Any as a determiner has two forms: a strong form and a weak form. The forms have different meanings. Weak form any: indefinite quantities We use any for indefinite quantities in questions and negative sentences. We use some in affirmative sentences: Have you got any eggs? I haven’t got any eggs. I’ve got some eggs. Not: I’ve got any eggs. We use weak form any only with uncountable nouns or with plural nouns: talking about fuel for the car Do I need to get any petrol? (+ uncountable noun) There aren’t any clean knives. They’re all in the dishwasher. (+ plural noun) Warning: We don’t use any with this meaning with singular countable nouns: Have you got any Italian cookery books? (or … an Italian cookery book?) Not: Have you got any Italian cookery book?
6 +B. Violation: They only defend speech of journalists
7 +C. Standards
8 +1. Grammar:
9 +
10 +
11 +
12 +2. Limits:
13 +
14 +3. Topical version of the aff solves: you can read your specific rights as advantages under a whole res aff. Solves 100 of your offense and solves the T violation.
15 +D. Voters
16 +1. Fairness is a voter since the ballot asks who the better debater is and you can’t make that decision accurately if the round is unfair.
17 +2. Fairness outweighs education
18 +Education loss is a reversible harm - I can always read up more on topic lit later, or do rebuttal redos to increase clash and critical thinking skills. But an unfair decision is permanent.
19 +
20 +3. Drop the debater
21 +
22 +
23 +4. Competing Interps
24 +
25 +
26 +2-off
27 +
28 +Hate speech is permissible under the first amendment despite the exceptions
29 +Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh, Law Professor at UCLA, “No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.9e1ed85e9262 JW
30 +I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend. The Supreme Court did, in Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), uphold a “group libel” law that outlawed statements that expose racial or religious groups to contempt or hatred, unless the speaker could show that the statements were true, and were said with “good motives” and for “justifiable ends.” But this too was treated by the Court as just a special case of a broader First Amendment exception — the one for libel generally. And Beauharnais is widely understood to no longer be good law, given the Court’s restrictions on the libel exception. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) (rejecting the view that libel is categorically unprotected, and holding that the libel exception requires a showing that the libelous accusations be “of and concerning” a particular person); Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) (generally rejecting the view that a defense of truth can be limited to speech that is said for “good motives” and for “justifiable ends”); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) (generally rejecting the view that the burden of proving truth can be placed on the defendant); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) (holding that singling bigoted speech is unconstitutional, even when that speech fits within a First Amendment exception); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Beauharnais is no longer good law); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (likewise); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (likewise); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (likewise); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973) (likewise); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1043-45 (4th ed. 2011); Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Law, §12-17, at 926; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 211, 219 (1991); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 330-31 (1988). Finally, “hostile environment harassment law” has sometimes been read as applying civil liability — or administrative discipline by universities — to allegedly bigoted speech in workplaces, universities, and places of public accommodation. There is a hot debate on whether those restrictions are indeed constitutional; they have generally been held unconstitutional when applied to universities, but decisions are mixed as to civil liability based on speech that creates hostile environments in workplaces (see the pages linked to at this site for more information on the subject). But even when those restrictions have been upheld, they have been justified precisely on the rationale that they do not criminalize speech (or otherwise punish it) in society at large, but only apply to particular contexts, such as workplaces. None of them represent a “hate speech” exception, nor have they been defined in terms of “hate speech.” For this very reason, “hate speech” also doesn’t have any fixed legal meaning under U.S. law. U.S. law has just never had occasion to define “hate speech” — any more than it has had occasion to define rudeness, evil ideas, unpatriotic speech, or any other kind of speech that people might condemn but that does not constitute a legally relevant category.
31 +Free speech used as a cover to justify hate speech like anti-semitic speech
32 +Marcus 08 Kenneth L. Marcus, Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College School of Public Affairs, “Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism,” 16 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 1025 (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol16/iss4/5 JW
33 +During recent years, American college campuses have seen numerous alarming examples8° of the striking resurgence of anti-Semitic activity which is taking place worldwide.8 There appear to be six sources for this resurgence: traditional European, Christian Jew-hatred; aggressive anti-Israelism that crosses the line into antiSemitism; traditional Muslim anti-Semitism; anti-Americanism and anti-globalism that spill over into anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism; black anti-Semitism; and fundamentalist intolerance.82 Generally speaking, the most significant recent episodes of American campus anti-Semitism have been associated with anti-Israelism or antiZionism. 83 In addition to the University of California at Irvine, a few other campuses have become particularly notorious for alleged incidents of anti-Semitism over the last few years." San Francisco State: During one notorious 2002 rally, a large number of proPalestinian students surrounded approximately fifty Jewish students, screaming "Get out or we will kill you," and "Hitler did not finish the job."85 When one Jewish professor began to sing peace songs, the crowd yelled, "Go back to Russia, Jew. 86 At about the same time, students distributed a flyer advertising a pro-Palestinian rally which featured a picture of a dead baby with the words, "Canned Palestinian Children Meat-Slaughtered According to Jewish Rites Under American License."87 More recently, a Jewish supporter of Israel alleged that he was, in separate incidents, spat on and assaulted.88 Columbia University: Columbia faculty, especially in the Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures program, have been accused of intimidating and silencing Jewish pro-Israel students.89 In one example, a professor allegedly privately told a pro-Israel Jewish student, "You have no voice in this debate." 9 When she insisted that she be allowed to express her opinion he disagreed, approaching very close to her and saying, "See, you have green eyes... You're not a Semite .... I'm a Semite. I have brown eyes. You have no claim to the land of Israel."9' These incidents are quite distinct from legitimate criticizing of Israeli politics.92 To the extent that there might be any question, the distinguishing features of antiSemitic anti-Zionism are rapidly becoming conventional: employment of "classic anti-Semitic stereotypes," use of double standards, "drawing comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany," and "holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeli actions" regardless of actual complicity.93 For example, American college students and faculty have recently used the medieval phrase "blood libel" to describe Israeli military practices, 94 ascribed traditional Jewish cultural stereotypes to contemporary Israeli society,95 and attributed demonic characteristics to Israeli leaders and Zionists as those characteristics have historically been related to Jews.96 This spillover of anti-Israelism into anti-Semitism has historical resonance in that it represents the second significant mutation that anti-Semitism experienced in the space of a century.97 Some of this activity, globally and domestically, takes the form of basic hate and bias activity. Much recent anti-Semitism, however, is postracialist or even anti-racist in appearance. 98 While early nineteenth-century antiSemitism was predominantly religious in animus and mid-twentieth-century antiSemitism predominantly racial, twenty-first-century anti-Semitism is predominantly political in character and often purports to address the Jewish state. 99 The nineteenth-century shift from religious to racialist anti-Semitism, attributed largely to German journalist Wilhelm Marr and his colleagues, was essentially a deliberate effort to justify continued adherence to anti-Jewish attitudes in the face of changing social attitudes towards religion and religious discrimination." Significantly, the religious-racialist mutation served an evolutionary function: the anti-Semitism virus evolved to adapt to changing environmental conditions. The racialist-political mutation, in which racialist anti-Semitism evolved into political anti-Semitism, represented a similar example of adaptive behavior in the twentieth century: Jew-hatred adapted to a post-Holocaust environment in which explicit race-hatred was socially unacceptable unless repackaged to appear political in nature.'0' In many cases, age-old anti-Semitic stereotypes and defamations are recast in contemporary political terms, castigating Israel and Zionism in terms historically used to denigrate Jews and Judaism. 10 2 In this formulation, Israel-mordantly characterized as "the 'Jew' of the nations'' a is made the repository of age-old stereotypes and defamations classically equated with Jews: as "a pariah;" as "supernaturally powerful and crafty;" as conspiratorial; and as a malignant force responsible for the world's evils.' 4 This political turn in anti-Semitism has had another consequence however. Where political speech has social and legal protection, such as on the American college campus, politically inflected hate and bias incidents are more difficult to police without implicating constitutional protections and academic freedom concerns. 05 Indeed, virtually any form of abuse may be considered protected-and its opposition deemed censorious-when the context is an academic campus and the perpetrator is careful to adopt the tropes of political discourse."° This has been an enormous challenge for civil rights enforcement in this area.
34 +Empirics prove that hate speech leads to hate crimes
35 +Singh 12 Hansdeep Singh, Co-Founder and Director of Legal Programs for the International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination, Simran Jeet Singh, a scholar and activist who writes primarily on culture and religion “The Rise of Hate Crimes Can Be Tied Directly to Hateful Speech,” The Daily Beast, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/06/the-rise-of-hate-crimes-can-be-tied-directly-to-hateful-speech.html JW
36 +Although there are flaws in the FBI’s method of tracking and monitoring hate crimes, their statistics provide a consistent framework to analyze trends. For example, from 2005 to 2010, hate crimes motivated by religious bias show a consistent upward trajectory—whereas hate crimes against religious communities constituted 17.1 percent of all bias-based crimes in 2005, that number has reached 20 percent in the most recent report published in 2010. This is the highest rate of hate crimes motivated by religious bias in the 18 years since the FBI started tracking hate crimes nationwide in 1992. Furthermore, while one might assume that the pattern of anti-Muslim violence would have decreased a decade after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, official statistics show that hate crimes against Muslims are at their highest levels since 2001. The most recent FBI data indicates that in a one-year period, from 2009 to 2010, there was a staggering 42 percent increase in hate crimes against Muslims in this country. The recent shooting rampage at a Sikh Gurdwara (house of worship) in Oak Creek, Wisc., emphasizes the importance of allocating adequate resources to prevent domestic terrorist attacks. The shooter, Wade Michael Page, was a member of the Hammerskin Nation, one of the most violent white supremacist groups in the country. We are deluding ourselves if we do not see the parallel between intolerant or hateful rhetoric and its inevitable consequence. Key issues in our national discourse in 2010 correlate to the rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes. For example, the controversy surrounding the Park 51 Muslim community center in lower Manhattan, the building of “mega-mosques” around the country, and the threat by a Florida pastor to burn the Quran on the anniversary of 9/11—all of these instances contributed to a rising anti-Muslim sentiment in America. The vitriolic discourse can also be linked to bias-based violence against other communities. For instance, hate crime against the LGBT community has risen 36 percent from 2005 to 2010. This is in part because of the extreme rhetoric of opponents of the marriage equality movement. Such targeted violence is one symptom of a deeper and more widespread illness plaguing this great nation—the discrimination and “othering” of minority communities.
37 +
38 +3-off
39 +
40 +CP Text: AFF actors should remove all restrictions on constitutionally protected free speech, and ban the usage of all hate speech, including hate speech not protected by the First Amendment. Hate speech poses a direct threat to the oppressed. Banning it is necessary to promote inclusiveness.
41 +Jared Taylor summarizes Waldron, 12, Why We Should Ban “Hate Speech”, American Renaissance, summarizing Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, Harvard University Press, 2012, 292 pp., 26.95. 8/24/12, http://www.amren.com/features/2012/08/why-we-should-ban-hate-speech/ **Note – Taylor does not agree with but is summarizing Waldron’s position //LADI
42 +First-Amendment guarantees of free speech are a cherished part of the American tradition and set us apart from virtually every other country. They are not without critics, however, and the free speech guarantees under sharpest attack are those that protect so-called “hate speech.” Jeremy Waldron, an academic originally from New Zealand, has written a whole book explaining why “hate speech” does not deserve protection—and Harvard University Press has published it. Prof. Waldron teaches law and philosophy at New York University Law School, is a professor of social and political theory at Oxford, and is an adjunct professor at Victoria University in New Zealand. Perhaps his foreign origins influence his view of the First Amendment. In this book, Professor Waldron makes just one argument for banning “hate speech.” It is not a good argument, and if this is the best the opponents of free speech can do, the First Amendment should be secure. However, in the current atmosphere of “anti-racism,” any argument against “hate speech” could influence policy, so let us understand his argument as best we can. First, Professor Waldron declares that “we are diverse in our ethnicity, our race, our appearance, and our religions, and we are embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together despite these sorts of differences.” Western societies are determined to let in every sort of person imaginable and make them feel respected and equal in every way. “Inclusiveness” is something “that our society sponsors and that it is committed to.” Therefore, what would we make of a “hate speech” billboard that said: “Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in”? Or one with a picture of Muslim children that said “They are all called Osama”? Or posters that say such things as “Muslims out,” “No blacks allowed,” or “All blacks should be sent back to Africa”? Professor Waldron writes that it is all very well for law professors and white people to say that this is the price we pay for free expression, but we must imagine what it must be like for the Muslim or black who must explain these messages to his children. “Can their lives be led, can their children be brought up, can their hopes be maintained and their worst fears dispelled, in a social environment polluted by these materials?” Professor Waldron insists that a “sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good,” like pretty beaches or clean air, and is so precious that the law should require everyone to maintain it: Hate speech undermines this public good . . . . It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like . . . . It creates something like an environmental threat to social peace, a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word, so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining this public good. Professor Waldron tells us that the purpose of “hate speech” is to try to set up a “rival public good” in which it is considered fine to beat up and drive out minorities.
43 +4-off
44 +
45 +Debate should deal with the real-world consequences of oppression.
46 +Curry 14, Tommy, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century, Victory Briefs, 2014,
47 +Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, there is a conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to we must reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the oppressed worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.
48 +Ethics is divided between ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal theory ask what justice demands in a perfect world while non-ideal theory ask what justice demands in a world that is already unjust. Prefer non-ideal theory as a meta-ethical starting point:
49 +1. Motivation: Ideal theory cannot guide action since its starting point has diverged from the descriptive model of the real world. Non-ideal theory is key for ethical motivation. MILLS: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
50 +“A first possible argument might be the simple denial that moral theory should have any concern with making realistic assumptions about human beings, their capacities, and their behavior. Ethics is concerned with the ideal, so it doesn’t have to worry about the actual. But even for mainstream ethics this wouldn’t work, since, of course, ought is supposed to implies can the ideal has to be achievable by humans. Nor could it seriously be cal imed that moral theory is concerned only with mapping beautiful ideals, not their actual implementation. If any ethicist actually said this, it would be an astonishing abdication of the classic goal of ethics, and its link with practical reason. The normative here would then be weirdly detached from the prescriptive: this is the good and the right—but we are not concerned with their actual realization. Even for Plato, a classic example in at least one sense of an ideal theorist, this was not the case: the Form of the Good was supposed to motivate us, and help philosophers transform society. Nor could anyone seriously say that ideal theory is a good way to approach ethics because as a matter of fact (not as a conceptual necessity following from what “model” or “ideal” means), the normative here has come is close to converging with the descriptive: ideal- as-descriptive-model has approximated to ideal-as-idealized-model. Obviously, the dreadful and dismaying course of human history has not remotely been a record of close-to-ideal behavior, but rather of behavior that has usually been quite the polar opposite of the ideal, with oppression and inequitable treatment of the majority of humanity (whether on grounds of gender, or nationality, or class, or religion, or race) being the norm. So the argument cannot be that as a matter of definitional truth, or factual irrelevance, or factual convergence, ideal theory is required. The argument has to be, as in the quote from Rawls above, that this is the best way of doing normative theory, better than all the other contenders. But why on earth should anyone think this? Why should anyone think that abstaining from theorizing about oppression and its consequences is the best way to bring about an end to oppression? Isn’t this, on the face of it, just completely implausible?”
51 +
52 +2. Descriptive Ideality: ideal theory ignores social realities, which in turn contradicts ideals. Normative ideals aren’t created separately from the social norms that govern us because those influence what we can count as an ideal in the first place. MILLS 2: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005
53 + “I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved.” (170)
54 +
55 +Thus, the standard is resisting material inequalities. Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field, we take steps to correct the material injustice.
56 +
57 +Case
58 +
59 +(Plan Flaws) case
60 +1.Plan flaw~-~--there’s no such thing as constitutional restricted journalist speech.
61 +http://www.dictionary.com/browse/journalist
62 +a person who practices the occupation or profession of journalism
63 +To restrict constitutionally protected journalist speech means to restrict constitutionally protected a person who practices journalism speech—it’s obviously logically incoherent.
64 +http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-20-typo-problems_x.htm
65 +2. Plan flaw—ought defends a moral statement, not the passage of a plan.
66 +http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought
67 +(used to express duty or moral obligation):
68 +
69 +And plan flaws leave to devastating legislative consequences.
70 +Heath 06 Heath, Brad. "Small Mistakes Cause Big Problems." USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, 20 Nov. 2006. Web. 09 Dec. 2016. HSLA//SC
71 +If you're reading this in New York, you're probably too drunk to drive. That's because lawmakers accidentally got too tough with a get-tough drunken-driving law, inserting an error that set the standard for "aggravated driving while intoxicated" below the amount of alcohol that can occur naturally. The one-word mistake makes the new law unenforceable, says Lt. Glenn Miner, a New York State Police spokesman. However, drivers with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 or higher can still be prosecuted under other state laws. In the legislative world, such small errors, while uncommon, can carry expensive consequences. In a few cases around the nation this year, typos and other blunders have redirected millions of tax dollars or threatened to invalidate new laws. In Hawaii, for instance, lawmakers approved a cigarette-tax increase to raise money for medical care and research. Cancer researchers, however, will get only an extra 1.5 cents next year — instead of the more than $8 million lawmakers intended. That's because legislators failed to specify that they should get 1.5 cents from each cigarette sold, says Linda Smith, an adviser to Gov. Linda Lingle. When such mistakes happen, they often come during the last-minute rush of legislative sessions, says Bruce Feustel, a senior fellow at the National Conference of State Legislatures. What's important, he says, is that lawmakers can fix them before they cause any harm. Courts generally intercede only in the most obvious cases, says University of Notre Dame law professor John Nagle. If judges tried to change every legislative error, Nagle says, "you get the courts trying to figure out what they think is a mistake that might not be a mistake at all." New York's mistake came in a bill meant to set tougher penalties and curb plea bargains for drivers well above the legal intoxication standard. Instead of specifying blood alcohol as a percentage, as most drunken-driving laws do, New York set its threshold as 0.18 grams — "so low you can't even measure it," Miner says. Lawmakers plan to fix the mistake the next time they convene, says Mark Hansen, a spokesman for the state Senate's Republican majority. He says it's not clear how the mistake happened, or why nobody caught it before legislators voted.
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1 +Cupertino Kumar Aff
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1 +1NC Round 4 CPS
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2 +1NC
3 +Free Speech Link: Free speech protections are not neutral. They’re what conservatives and large corporations use to cover their actions
4 +Balkin 90 J.M. BALKIN, Professor of Law and Graves, Dougherty, Hearon, and Moody Centennial Faculty Fellow, University of Texas, “SOME REALISM ABOUT PLURALISM: LEGAL REALIST APPROACHES TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT,” Duke Law Journal, June 1990 JW
5 +A similar transformation, I suspect, is overtaking the principle of free speech today. Business interests and other conservative groups are finding that arguments for property rights and the social status quo can more and more easily be rephrased in the language of the first amendment by using the very same absolutist forms of argument offered by the left in previous generations. Here's a quick quiz: What do the Klan, conservative PACs, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, and the conglomerate that owns the holding company that owns the manufacturer of your favorite brand of toothpaste all have in common? They can all justify their activities in the name of the first amendment. What was sauce for the liberal goose increasingly has become sauce for the more conservative gander.26 This social transformation is not yet complete, and indeed, I suspect, it probably never will be as complete as the transformation of political views regarding laissez-faire between 1830 and 1890. For example, I can't imagine a social context that would change so radically that the left would find it in its best interests to abandon completely its commitment to protecting the speech of unpopular groups. What I do expect will happen, however, is that gradually the left no longer will find the first amendment its most effective tool for promoting a progressive agenda. That job will fall to other fundamental rights and interests, which occasionally will conflict with the absolutist interpretation of the first amendment that the left traditionally has favored.
6 +The First Amendment is seen as a neutral mechanism to produce a free marketplace of ideas when in actuality it favors a status quo that maintains oppressive power structures
7 +Delgado 94 Delgado, Richard. Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado, "First Amendment formalism is giving way to First Amendment legal realism." Harv CR-CLL Rev. 29 (1994): 169
8 +First, the paradigm includes an awareness of the First Amendment's limitations. Early in our history, we made grandiose claims for what the system of free expression could do. 15 But recently, scholars have shown that our much-vaunted marketplace of ideas works best in connection with questions that are narrowly limited in scope. 16 Is this parking space safer to leave the car in than another? Does a heavy object fall faster than a light one in a vacuum? Would a voucher school-finance scheme adversely affect the poor? With such clearly bounded disputes, First Amendment free speech can often help us avoid error and arrive at a consensus. But with systemic social ills like racism and sexism, the marketplace of ideas is much less effective. These broadscale ills are embedded in the reigning paradigm, the set of meanings and conventions by which we construct and interpret reality. Someone who speaks out against the racism of his or her day is seen as extreme, political, or incoherent. Speech is least effective where we need it most.17 A second theme of First Amendment legal realism is the understanding of the free expression paradigm as a tool for legitimating the status quo." If, as a starting point, we posit a perfect marketplace of ideas, then, according to the old paradigm, the current distribution of social power and resources must be roughly what fairness and justice would dictate. Our more energetic, European ideas, for example, competed with others and won in a fair fight. But, of course, it was not fair: communication is expensive, so the poor are often excluded; the dominant paradigm renders certain ideas unsayable or incomprehensible; and our system of ideas and images constructs certain people so that they have little credibility in the eyes of listeners.' 9
9 +Protests at the University of Missouri prove this true. Unhindered exercise of the First Amendment structurally antagonizes black students
10 +Tyler Kingkade Lilly Workneh Ryan Grenoble Nov 16th, 2015 Campus Racism Protests Didn't Come Out Of Nowhere, And They Aren't Going Away Quickly Mizzou seems to have catalyzed years of tension over inequality and race. Senior Editor/Reporter, The Huffington Post, Senior Black Voices Editor, The Huffington Post News Editor, The Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/campus-racism-protests-didnt-come-out-of-nowhere_us_56464a87e4b08cda3488bfb
11 +If there's one thing University of Missouri senior Alanna Diggs thinks people are getting wrong about campus racism protests, it's the assumption that they're something new. The demonstrations at Mizzou this month resulting in the ouster of two top university leaders, partly over how they handled various racist incidents on campus, Diggs said, "were not a result of spontaneous combustion." "It was not an overdramatic reaction by a couple of angry black students, but a moment built up over time," Diggs continued. "Many of us behind the scenes have been suffering and struggling with administration and students while trying to deal with class and work. The movement is not over. This is the beginning." The demonstrations at Mizzou's campus in Columbia came on the heels of unrestat Yale University, and have been copied ~-~- complete with demands for resignations ~-~-at dozens of other colleges, including Ithaca College in New York, the University of Kansas and Claremont McKenna College near Los Angeles. Protests staged on college campuses last week are the culmination of years of activism around inequality and everyday racism, and incidents pushing racial divisions to the surface. The demands activists are making are reminiscent of similar protests decades earlier. And scholars caution there's no single switch colleges can flip to fix things ~-~- improving racial tensions on campuses will likely take years. "What we are seeing is the beginning of a movement where students and student groups across campuses are finding the courage to speak up about what they have been experiencing," said Yolanda Sealey-Ruiz, a scholar of Latino and black male students, at Columbia University. "I think Mizzou is a catalyst, an inspiration perhaps, but not a one-off event. I think we are also witnessing a reprise to history ~-~- college campuses have historically been places where protest to inequality has taken place." Students are arriving on campus believing racism remains persistent in America today. According to an annual survey of more than 150,000 incoming freshmen by UCLA, the percentage of students who believe racism is no longer an issue has risen slowly over 25 years, from 19 percent in 1990 to 24 percent in 2015. Students of color who've spoken with HuffPost say that does not surprise them, given that students are growing up witnessing high-profile deaths of unarmed black men and teens, like Trayvon Martin, Tamir Rice and Eric Garner. Those experiences are coupled multiple examples of fraternity and sorority parties featuring black face and caricatures of various ethnic groups, while Muslim students at some campuses have been subjected to spying by law enforcement. "We're not that much that different than the people being killed," said Taylor Lemmons, a junior at Claremont McKenna College. "Just because we're going to get a degree from these shiny institutions doesn't mean we're that much different." In some cases, students who say racism is still a prevalent issue have been proven right. The University of Alabama's sororities didn't begin accepting black women as members until 2013. In March, fraternity brothers in Oklahoma were caught on video singing and laughing about lynching black men ~-~- racial slurs included. "We're living in a time where issues that haven't been appropriately attended to for a number of years are getting much more attention," said Benjamin Reese Jr., Duke University's chief diversity officer. "I don't think students suddenly woke up to things. I think they're reacting not only to the events on campus and incidents around the country." Brown University senior Armani Madison said part of his discontent with his school is fueled by demands made by black students in 1968, 1975 and 1985 that "have yet to be fulfilled, despite university promises." Activists at Occidental College noted their demand for a black studies major has existed since 1968. Students of color have organized campaigns at Colgate University, the University of Michigan, UCLA, and Harvard, among other schools, to highlight inequities. Some of these demands at Brown, Mizzou and elsewhere are for an increase in the percentage of minority students and faculty. More selective colleges are still disproportionately white compared with the general population, data from the Georgetown University's Center on Education and the Workforce shows. College presidents, football coaches and professors all are much more likely to be white, too. Black students are less likely to graduate within six years compared with their classmates. But even increasing the percentage of students of color on campus is not enough, insisted Deborah Bial, founder of the Posse Foundation, which partners with colleges to place minority students.“It's the responsibility of every institution to be transparent to have as many ongoing conversations as possible, to create forums, to use every resource they have from the president to the students themselves," Bial said. "And the conversation shouldn't just be happening one time." Activists also are demanding changes to curriculum to address diversity and an administrative acknowledgement of barriers that students of color face. Students of color say they're constantly reminded that they are "different." Reine Ibala, a senior at Yale, described either feeling "invisible" on campus, or like she was an intruder and couldn't rely on bystanders to help if something happened. "The thing about being black on a college campus in an urban area is that your color ~-~- in my case, my blackness ~-~- at times puts my status as a student in question," Ibala said. "Here in New Haven, the assumption is first that I am a 'townie.'" Students protesting on campuses told HuffPost their demonstrations were not simply about offensive Halloween costumes, misguided emails from administrators or one person shouting the N-word. The emotional response ,which sometimes receives backlash, comes from dealing with years of feeling like administrators aren't trying to make things better for them. "It shouldn't take days of our tears and anger to move an administration to listen," Ibala said. Transparency during the next steps will be critical, said Reese, president of National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education. Reese recommended including students in assessing what steps a college will take to address racial issues ~-~- something activists are demanding at Mizzou and Claremont McKenna, among other campuses. But in the near term, both Reese and Bial emphasized that colleges will have to be quicker to respond to individual incidents of racism. "It's important to say this happened and we're not okay with it, and it's important for students to say it as well ~-~- I can't emphasize that enough," Bial said. "Students can't give up the power they have to voice opinions about what's okay and what's not okay." Vernā Myers, a diversity consultant and author, said now that Mizzou has served as a spark, protests against campus racism won't go away. "This generation didn't think they'd have to go through something like this," Myers said. But now, they are empowered to do so, and "they're going to help our country live up to what we say we believe."
12 +
13 +Ignoring the rule of law’s hidden violence fuels euro-centric imperialism
14 +Dossa 99 Shiraz, Department of Political Science, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, “Liberal Legalism: Law, Culture and Identity,” The European Legacy, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 73-87,1
15 +Law's imperial reach, it massive authority, in liberal politics is a brute, recurring fact. In Law's Empire, Dworkin attests to its scope and power with candour: "We live in and by the law. It makes us what we are" (vii). But he fails to appreciate that law equally traduces others, it systematically unmakes them. For Dworkin, a militant liberal legalist, law is the insiders' domain: legal argument has to be understood internally from the "judge's point of view"; sociological or historical readings are irrelevant and "perverse".2 Praising the decencies of liberal law is necessary in this world: rule of law, judicial integrity, fairness, justice are integral facets of tolerable human life. Lawfulness is and ought to be part of any decent regime of politics. But law's rhetoric on its own behalf systematically scants law's violent, dark underside, it skillfully masks law's commerce with destruction and death. None of this is visible from the internalist standpoint, and Dworkin's liberal apologia serves to mystify the gross reality of law's empire. In liberal political science, law's presumed, Olympian impartiality, is thus not a contested notion. Liberals still presuppose as a matter of course the juristic community's impartiality and neutrality, despite empirical evidence to the contrary.3 One consequence of the assumed sanctity of the judicial torso within the body politic, has been that law's genealogy, law's chronological disposition towards political and cultural questions, have simply not been of interest or concern to most liberal scholars. A further result of this attitude is the political science community's nearly total ignorance of liberal law's complicity in western imperialism, and in shaping western attitudes to the lands and cultures of the conquered natives. Liberal jurisprudence's subterranean life, its invidious consciousness is, however, not an archaic, intermittent annoyance as sensitive liberals are inclined to think: indeed law is as potent now as it has been in last two centuries in articulating a dismissive image of the native Other.
16 +The alternative is to embrace the indeterminacy of the law. The rule of law only has power when people believe in its objective power
17 +Hasnas 95 John Hasnas, Associate Professor McDonough School of Business Georgetown University, “The Myth of the Rule of Law,” Wisconsin Law Review 199 (1995) http://faculty.msb.edu/hasnasj/GTWebSite/MythWeb.htm JW
18 +Let us assume that I have failed to convince you of the impossibility of reforming the law into a body of definite, consistent rules that produces determinate results. Even if the law could be reformed in this way, it clearly should not be. There is nothing perverse in the fact that the law is indeterminate. Society is not the victim of some nefarious conspiracy to undermine legal certainty to further ulterior motives. As long as law remains a state monopoly, as long as it is created and enforced exclusively through governmental bodies, it must remain indeterminate if it is to serve its purpose. Its indeterminacy gives the law its flexibility. And since, as a monopoly product, the law must apply to all members of society in a one-size-fits-all manner, flexibility is its most essential feature. It is certainly true that one of the purposes of law is to ensure a stable social environment, to provide order. But not just any order will suffice. Another purpose of the law must be to do justice. The goal of the law is to provide a social environment which is both orderly and just. Unfortunately, these two purposes are always in tension. For the more definite and rigidly- determined the rules of law become, the less the legal system is able to do justice to the individual. Thus, if the law were fully determinate, it would have no ability to consider the equities of the particular case. This is why even if we could reform the law to make it wholly definite and consistent, we should not.
19 +The Role of the Judge is to be a critical legal educator that tests the underlying assumptions of the aff. Engaging in critical examination of the law enables us to challenge its imperialistic violence. Omitting this analysis is to be complicit with the violence the law creates
20 +Valdes 03 Francisco Valdes, Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Hispanic and Caribbean Legal Studies, University of Miami, “Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedogogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education,” Asian American Law Journal Vol 10 Issue 1, January 2003 JW
21 +Critical educational theorists have shown how all forms of education eventually become institutions that tend to operate either as instruments of colonization or of emancipation. 9 In the context of the United States, uncritical mainstream education teaches each generation to genuflect and maintain, the cultural, economic, and social skews constructed by the elites that dominate society and control its institutions of education.' 0 The principal aim (or effect) of such education has been, and still is, to assimilate and domesticate in the name of progress and prosperity, and even in the name of equality and liberty. This effect is achieved both by what is left out, as well as what is put into, the content or substance of "education" - by leaving out, for instance, the systematic imposition of supremacist politics to motivate conquest and rationalize subordination, a key part of the story that explains so much of the injustice embedded in students' social inheritance, and which every new generation struggles to understand. This act of omission - and other acts like it - enables the sanitized "history" of the status quo to be spoon-fed to students day in and day out across the country (and globe), keeping each succeeding generation socially tranquilized, culturally subjugated, and politically subordinated. Under this view, mainstream education, in its dominant, uncritical form, formalizes and systematizes the inculcation of cultural politics to ratify the world "as is" - as inherited by each generation of humans." Mainstream legal education, then, perpetuates conquest. 12 As OutCrit scholars have long explained - and these syllabi confirm - legal education is a site for the production both of knowledge and power;'3 knowledge is power, especially in the current "Information Age." As with other social institutions constructed in the service of supremacist political arrangements, legal education historically was structured to privilege white-identified groups, persons, and values; conversely, legal education was structured to exclude feared or "different" Others. 14 Indeed, the documented history of formal legal education in this country illustrates clearly that, like all forms of education, it was conceived and since then has been operated mostly as an instrument of social hierarchy. 5 In design and purpose, formal legal education was, and perhaps still is effectively, a means of ensuring the continued consolidation of legal knowledge, and of power over Law and policy, in the hands of social groups and institutions identified with the "original" immigrants from Europe to the lands now known as the United States.' 6 Awareness or wariness of this power and knowledge is precisely why critical theory is still absent or marginal in formal law school curricula from coast to coast, effectively withholding from most law students any structured opportunity to acquire self-liberating knowledge in the general course of a typical legal education. 7 Thus, the insights of OutCrit legal theorists on legal education are congruent with the insights of critical education theorists more generally - a congruence that calls for engagement and emphasis as part of the effort to develop a critical approach or pedagogy within the confines of formal legal education in the United States today.
22 +The role of the ballot is to reject unequal power structures – this is the only way to make educational spaces truly fair
23 +Trifonas 03 PETER PERICLES TRIFONAS. PEDAGOGIES OF DIFFERENCE: RETHINKING EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE/ RoutledgeFalmer. New York, London. 2003. Questia
24 +. Thus, paying attention to how power operates along axes of gender, race, class, and ability (that is, recognizing that social differences are not given, but are accomplished in and through educational settings) is a step toward educational equity. What does the above discussion mean in the educational context? It means that in the interactions of teachers with students in the classroom, or in other contexts, attention needs to be directed toward how dominant and subordinate relations (be they based on race, gender, class, or ability) permeate these contexts and intersect in complicated ways to produce inequality and marginalization. The frequently used and well-meaning phrase, “I treat everyone the same, ” often used by teachers and administrators to indicate their lack of bias in a diverse educational setting, in fact masks unequal power relations. Similarly, educational policies that assume that people are the same or equal may serve to entrench existing inequality precisely because people enter into the educational process with different and unequal experiences. These attempts, well meaning though they may be, tend to render inequality invisible, and thus work against equity in education. In her exploration of white privilege in higher education in the United States, Frances Rains (1998), an aboriginal-Japanese American woman, states emphatically that these benign acts are disempowering for the minority person because they erase his or her racial identity. The denial of racism in this case is in fact a form of racism. Thus, in moving toward equity in education that allows us to address multiple and intersecting axes of difference and inequality, I recommend that we try to think and act “against the grain” in developing educational policies and handling various kinds of pedagogical situations. 5 To work against the grain is to recognize that education is not neutral; it is contested. Mohanty puts it as such: … Education represents both a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power relations. It is a central terrain where power and politics operate out of the lived culture of individuals and groups situated in asymmetrical social and political positions. (Mohanty 1990:184) We need to develop a critical awareness of the power dynamics operative in institutional relations-and of the fact that people participate in institutions as unequal subjects. Working against the grain is to take a proactive approach to understanding and acting upon institutional relations, whether in the classroom, in other interactions with students, or in policy development. Rather than overlooking the embeddedness of gender, race, class, ability, and other forms of inequality that shape our interactions, working against the grain makes explicit the political nature of education and how power operates to privilege, silence, and marginalize individuals who are differently located in the educational process. In her exploration of feminist pedagogy, Linda Briskin (1990) makes a clear distinction between nonsexist and antisexist education critical to our understanding here. She asserts that nonsexism is an approach that attempts to neutralize sexual inequality by pretending that gender can be made irrelevant in the classroom. Thus, for instance, merely asserting that male and female students should have equal time to speak-and indeed giving them equal time-cannot adequately rectify the endemic problem of sexism in the classroom. One of Briskin's students reported that in her political science tutorials that when the male students spoke, everyone paid attention. When a female student spoke, however, the class acted as if no one was speaking (13). Neutrality is an attempt to conceal the unequal distribution of power. An against the grain approach would acknowledge explicitly that we are all gendered, racialized, and differently constructed subjects who do not participate in interactional relations as equals. This goes beyond formulating sexism, racism, abilism, and class privilege in individualist terms and treating them as if they were personal attitudes. Terry Wolverton (1983) discovered the difference between nonracism and antiracism in her consciousness-raising attempt: I had confused the act of trying to appear not to be racist with actively working to eliminate racism. Trying to appear not racist had made me deny my racism, and therefore exclude the possibility of change. (191) Being against the grain means seeing inequality as systemic and interpersonal (rather than individual), and combatting oppression as a collective responsibility, not just as a personal attribute (so that somehow a person can cleanse herself or himself of sexism, racism, abilism, or class bias). It is to pay attention to oppression as an interactional property that can be altered (see Manners 1998). Roger Simon (1993) suggests, in his development of a philosophical basis for teaching against the grain, which shares many commonalities in how I think about an integrative approach to equity in education, that teaching against the grain is fundamentally a moral practice. By this he does not mean that teachers simply fulfill the mandate and guidelines of school authorities. He believes that teachers must expose the partial and imperfect nature of existing knowledge, which is constructed on the basis of asymmetrical power relations (for instance, who has the power to speak and whose voices are suppressed?). It is the responsibility of the teacher or educator to show how dominant forms of knowledge and ways of knowing constrict human capacities. In exposing the power relations integral to the knowledge construction process, the educator, by extension, must treat teaching and learning as a mutual and collaborative act between teachers and students.
25 +
26 +2-off
27 +
28 +Hate speech is permissible under the first amendment despite the exceptions
29 +Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh, Law Professor at UCLA, “No, there’s no “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.9e1ed85e9262 JW
30 +I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend. The Supreme Court did, in Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), uphold a “group libel” law that outlawed statements that expose racial or religious groups to contempt or hatred, unless the speaker could show that the statements were true, and were said with “good motives” and for “justifiable ends.” But this too was treated by the Court as just a special case of a broader First Amendment exception — the one for libel generally. And Beauharnais is widely understood to no longer be good law, given the Court’s restrictions on the libel exception. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) (rejecting the view that libel is categorically unprotected, and holding that the libel exception requires a showing that the libelous accusations be “of and concerning” a particular person); Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) (generally rejecting the view that a defense of truth can be limited to speech that is said for “good motives” and for “justifiable ends”); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) (generally rejecting the view that the burden of proving truth can be placed on the defendant); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) (holding that singling bigoted speech is unconstitutional, even when that speech fits within a First Amendment exception); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Beauharnais is no longer good law); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (likewise); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (likewise); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (likewise); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973) (likewise); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1043-45 (4th ed. 2011); Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Law, §12-17, at 926; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 211, 219 (1991); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 330-31 (1988). Finally, “hostile environment harassment law” has sometimes been read as applying civil liability — or administrative discipline by universities — to allegedly bigoted speech in workplaces, universities, and places of public accommodation. There is a hot debate on whether those restrictions are indeed constitutional; they have generally been held unconstitutional when applied to universities, but decisions are mixed as to civil liability based on speech that creates hostile environments in workplaces (see the pages linked to at this site for more information on the subject). But even when those restrictions have been upheld, they have been justified precisely on the rationale that they do not criminalize speech (or otherwise punish it) in society at large, but only apply to particular contexts, such as workplaces. None of them represent a “hate speech” exception, nor have they been defined in terms of “hate speech.” For this very reason, “hate speech” also doesn’t have any fixed legal meaning under U.S. law. U.S. law has just never had occasion to define “hate speech” — any more than it has had occasion to define rudeness, evil ideas, unpatriotic speech, or any other kind of speech that people might condemn but that does not constitute a legally relevant category.
31 +Free speech used as a cover to justify hate speech like anti-semitic speech
32 +Marcus 08 Kenneth L. Marcus, Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College School of Public Affairs, “Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism,” 16 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 1025 (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol16/iss4/5 JW
33 +During recent years, American college campuses have seen numerous alarming examples8° of the striking resurgence of anti-Semitic activity which is taking place worldwide.8 There appear to be six sources for this resurgence: traditional European, Christian Jew-hatred; aggressive anti-Israelism that crosses the line into antiSemitism; traditional Muslim anti-Semitism; anti-Americanism and anti-globalism that spill over into anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism; black anti-Semitism; and fundamentalist intolerance.82 Generally speaking, the most significant recent episodes of American campus anti-Semitism have been associated with anti-Israelism or antiZionism. 83 In addition to the University of California at Irvine, a few other campuses have become particularly notorious for alleged incidents of anti-Semitism over the last few years." San Francisco State: During one notorious 2002 rally, a large number of proPalestinian students surrounded approximately fifty Jewish students, screaming "Get out or we will kill you," and "Hitler did not finish the job."85 When one Jewish professor began to sing peace songs, the crowd yelled, "Go back to Russia, Jew. 86 At about the same time, students distributed a flyer advertising a pro-Palestinian rally which featured a picture of a dead baby with the words, "Canned Palestinian Children Meat-Slaughtered According to Jewish Rites Under American License."87 More recently, a Jewish supporter of Israel alleged that he was, in separate incidents, spat on and assaulted.88 Columbia University: Columbia faculty, especially in the Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures program, have been accused of intimidating and silencing Jewish pro-Israel students.89 In one example, a professor allegedly privately told a pro-Israel Jewish student, "You have no voice in this debate." 9 When she insisted that she be allowed to express her opinion he disagreed, approaching very close to her and saying, "See, you have green eyes... You're not a Semite .... I'm a Semite. I have brown eyes. You have no claim to the land of Israel."9' These incidents are quite distinct from legitimate criticizing of Israeli politics.92 To the extent that there might be any question, the distinguishing features of antiSemitic anti-Zionism are rapidly becoming conventional: employment of "classic anti-Semitic stereotypes," use of double standards, "drawing comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany," and "holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeli actions" regardless of actual complicity.93 For example, American college students and faculty have recently used the medieval phrase "blood libel" to describe Israeli military practices, 94 ascribed traditional Jewish cultural stereotypes to contemporary Israeli society,95 and attributed demonic characteristics to Israeli leaders and Zionists as those characteristics have historically been related to Jews.96 This spillover of anti-Israelism into anti-Semitism has historical resonance in that it represents the second significant mutation that anti-Semitism experienced in the space of a century.97 Some of this activity, globally and domestically, takes the form of basic hate and bias activity. Much recent anti-Semitism, however, is postracialist or even anti-racist in appearance. 98 While early nineteenth-century antiSemitism was predominantly religious in animus and mid-twentieth-century antiSemitism predominantly racial, twenty-first-century anti-Semitism is predominantly political in character and often purports to address the Jewish state. 99 The nineteenth-century shift from religious to racialist anti-Semitism, attributed largely to German journalist Wilhelm Marr and his colleagues, was essentially a deliberate effort to justify continued adherence to anti-Jewish attitudes in the face of changing social attitudes towards religion and religious discrimination." Significantly, the religious-racialist mutation served an evolutionary function: the anti-Semitism virus evolved to adapt to changing environmental conditions. The racialist-political mutation, in which racialist anti-Semitism evolved into political anti-Semitism, represented a similar example of adaptive behavior in the twentieth century: Jew-hatred adapted to a post-Holocaust environment in which explicit race-hatred was socially unacceptable unless repackaged to appear political in nature.'0' In many cases, age-old anti-Semitic stereotypes and defamations are recast in contemporary political terms, castigating Israel and Zionism in terms historically used to denigrate Jews and Judaism. 10 2 In this formulation, Israel-mordantly characterized as "the 'Jew' of the nations'' a is made the repository of age-old stereotypes and defamations classically equated with Jews: as "a pariah;" as "supernaturally powerful and crafty;" as conspiratorial; and as a malignant force responsible for the world's evils.' 4 This political turn in anti-Semitism has had another consequence however. Where political speech has social and legal protection, such as on the American college campus, politically inflected hate and bias incidents are more difficult to police without implicating constitutional protections and academic freedom concerns. 05 Indeed, virtually any form of abuse may be considered protected-and its opposition deemed censorious-when the context is an academic campus and the perpetrator is careful to adopt the tropes of political discourse."° This has been an enormous challenge for civil rights enforcement in this area.
34 +Empirics prove that hate speech leads to hate crimes
35 +Singh 12 Hansdeep Singh, Co-Founder and Director of Legal Programs for the International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination, Simran Jeet Singh, a scholar and activist who writes primarily on culture and religion “The Rise of Hate Crimes Can Be Tied Directly to Hateful Speech,” The Daily Beast, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/06/the-rise-of-hate-crimes-can-be-tied-directly-to-hateful-speech.html JW
36 +Although there are flaws in the FBI’s method of tracking and monitoring hate crimes, their statistics provide a consistent framework to analyze trends. For example, from 2005 to 2010, hate crimes motivated by religious bias show a consistent upward trajectory—whereas hate crimes against religious communities constituted 17.1 percent of all bias-based crimes in 2005, that number has reached 20 percent in the most recent report published in 2010. This is the highest rate of hate crimes motivated by religious bias in the 18 years since the FBI started tracking hate crimes nationwide in 1992. Furthermore, while one might assume that the pattern of anti-Muslim violence would have decreased a decade after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, official statistics show that hate crimes against Muslims are at their highest levels since 2001. The most recent FBI data indicates that in a one-year period, from 2009 to 2010, there was a staggering 42 percent increase in hate crimes against Muslims in this country. The recent shooting rampage at a Sikh Gurdwara (house of worship) in Oak Creek, Wisc., emphasizes the importance of allocating adequate resources to prevent domestic terrorist attacks. The shooter, Wade Michael Page, was a member of the Hammerskin Nation, one of the most violent white supremacist groups in the country. We are deluding ourselves if we do not see the parallel between intolerant or hateful rhetoric and its inevitable consequence. Key issues in our national discourse in 2010 correlate to the rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes. For example, the controversy surrounding the Park 51 Muslim community center in lower Manhattan, the building of “mega-mosques” around the country, and the threat by a Florida pastor to burn the Quran on the anniversary of 9/11—all of these instances contributed to a rising anti-Muslim sentiment in America. The vitriolic discourse can also be linked to bias-based violence against other communities. For instance, hate crime against the LGBT community has risen 36 percent from 2005 to 2010. This is in part because of the extreme rhetoric of opponents of the marriage equality movement. Such targeted violence is one symptom of a deeper and more widespread illness plaguing this great nation—the discrimination and “othering” of minority communities.
37 +Turn: silencing people is inevitable but harassment creates an even greater chilling effect in both students and faculty
38 +Marcus 2 Kenneth L. Marcus, Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College School of Public Affairs, “Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism,” 16 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 1025 (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol16/iss4/5 JW
39 +Unavoidably, antidiscrimination law will have the effect of silencing some discriminators, just as tort law silences some defrauders and conspiracy law silences some conspirators. This will be true as long as lawbreakers use words to further their malfeasance. The serious First Amendment question here is not whether any speech is silenced, but whether legitimate, protected speech is chilled in a manner that unacceptably hampers speech." 0 In fact, it may be argued that the failure to enforce antidiscrimination law may have a more chilling effect on campus free expression than the exercise of this power. Specifically, some commentators have observed that anti-Semitic incidents have had the affect of silencing some Jewish students and faculty on college campuses who were intimidated from expressing their viewpoint publicly.'5' In reference to this problem, Natan Sharansky has dubbed American Jewish college students the "new Jews of silence," a phrase resonant with the experience of Russian Jews in the old Soviet Union. 5 2 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has suggested that "perhaps the most powerful arguments of all for the regulation of hate speech come from those who maintain that such regulation will really enhance the diversity and range of public discourse."' 153 The gist of this argument, as applied either to hate speech or harassment, is that these activities tend to have a silencing effect on the minorities at whom they are targeted. Indeed, the danger now is not only that students and some faculty will be silenced by the harassment itself; it is also that they will be silenced by other faculty members who denounce efforts to eliminate anti-Semitism as a threat to academic freedom and "the core mission of institutions of higher education in a democratic society."'" As I have traveled to college campuses to describe the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' public education campaign on campus anti-Semitism, students and faculty have expressed precisely this concern to me. That is, they are reluctant to speak out against hate and bias incidents for fear that they will be accused of trying to silence debate or suppress academic freedom.
40 +Case
41 +The marketplace of ideas is terrible – government influence creates a chilling effect, it acts as a palliative for broader reform, and shuts dissent into endless debate instead of action – the aff opens a procedural can of worms that makes change impossible. Inbger 84
42 +Stanley Ingber, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: A LEGITIMIZING MYTH, Duke Law Review, February 1984
43 +The clear and present danger test presupposes that market imperfections sometimes give speakers an unacceptable level of advantage in influencing others. Because information opposing the speaker's viewpoint cannot be transmitted instantaneously to all market participants, the real market substantially departs from the theoretical one.80 Therefore, emergency situations are exempted from first amendment coverage. As long as sufficient time remains for the marketplace's process of deliberation to persist, however, and as long as lawless action is not imminent, no emergency exists and all speech must be protected. Yet the goal of free speech is not merely to have citizens enjoy participating in an effete truth-seeking process. Instead, citizens seek truth through free speech precisely to influence choice and behavior. Recognizing that beliefs are important primarily because those who hold them are likely to act accordingly, Holmes conceded that "every idea is an incitement. '81 Ironically, however, Holmes's "clear and present danger" formula allows government officials to prohibit expression precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.82 An interpretation of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off expression as soon as it comes close to being effective essentially limits the amendment's protection to encompass only abstract or innocuous communication. 83 Consequently, speech is constitutionally protected under the clear and present danger test as long as it is either ineffective84 or insignificant. 85 In either instance the test creates an establishment bias. Other factors peculiar to the clear and present danger test accentuate this bias. The test is both ad hoc and vague. Speakers receive no warning whether their contemplated speech extends beyond the parameters of constitutional protection. The test is totally contextual, giving little guidance to either the speaker or the official censor who must predict the impact of the expression. 6 For the speaker, this lack of notice fosters continuous uncertainty and thus may chill a risk-averse speaker who desires to minimize his personal legal peril.87 Such a person may censor himself by intentionally avoiding those messages he perceives as approaching the fringe of official acceptability. The official, in turn, must decide when the expression is clearly dangerous and when insufficient time exists for a full and fair hearing of responsive expression that would allow good counsel to defeat bad.88 The censor's evaluation involves a two-tiered decision. First, the official must evaluate the speech ideologically to determine whether it is good or evil, because if the speech is good the lack of sufficient time for response is irrelevant. 89 But under the market model, only the marketplace can accurately separate good from evil; therefore, no criteria can exist to determine whether speech is sufficiently evil to warrant exclusion from the market. Second, the official must calculate the seriousness of the speech's evil, because the market requires greater response time for more serious evils. This requirement forces the official to differentiate without any guidelines between evil counsel that is about to lead an insufficiently educated public astray, and good counsel that merely has convinced an adequately informed public of its "rightness." Under a test with such elasticity, speakers who proclaim any radical political doctrine may expect to receive little or no protection because they will always appear as a threat to the nation and, thus, embody the most serious of all possible evils. 90 The establishment bias is again obvious. The clear and present danger test also encourages prolonging debate indefinitely. According to Brandeis, expression may not be prohibited so long as debate remains ongoing. 91 Thus, only the process of truth-seeking is fully protected; decisions and actions predicated upon truths once discovered are protected not at all.92 Brandeis's approach to the marketplace of ideas accordingly encourages prolonged discussion and, therefore, the delay of decisions that might lead to actions contrary to society's generally accepted "truths." There is, however, little value in the discovery of truth that cannot be used as a basis of choice and behavior. Brandeis's focus on procedural aspects of the market rather than on the substantive actions it triggers also fosters delay in implementing any ideas that challenge the status quo perspective. Disputes over the best solutions for societal problems are converted into disputes over proper marketplace processes. For example, rather than focusing on whether the military draft should be reinstated, the debate may well center on whether antidraft groups should be allowed to stage a massive demonstration in a business district. Such procedural concerns divert attention from the substantive issue so that the status quo is more easily preserved. Through this process of transforming substantive conflicts into procedural debates, challengers to the status quo may be placated with a procedural victory while their overt threat is defused.93 This shift in focus helps to insulate society from the trauma of having to reconsider its accepted values while at the same time it allows the protesting individual and his supporters to believe that they have a fair opportunity to win popular support for their position.94 If freedom of expression only gives protection as long as decisions are not yet made, actions are not yet taken, and debate is still in progress, then there is little threat to established norms
44 +Revolution
45 +The Aff’s defense of free speech allows the state to marginalize those who would oppose the system and traps us in the capitalist system.
46 +Anonymous 10 Retrieved on 7 July 2015 from http://www.mediafire.com/view/h4qv25h825sajcj/The_Divorce_of_Thought_from_Deed_(imposed).pdf
47 +In fact, in nations in which free speech is not legally protected, radicals are not always more isolated—on the contrary, the average person is sometimes more sympathetic to those in conflict with the state, as it is more difficult for the state to legitimize itself as the defender of liberty. Laws do not tie the hands of the state nearly so much as public opposition can; given the choice between legal rights and popular support, radicals are much better off with the latter. One dictionary defines civil liberty as “the state of being subject only to laws established for the good of the community.” This sounds ideal to those who believe that laws enforced by hierarchical power can serve the “good of the community”—but who defines “the community” and what is good for it, if not those in power? In practice, the discourse of civil liberties enables the state to marginalize its foes: if there is a legitimate channel for every kind of expression, then those who refuse to play by the rules are clearly illegitimate. Thus we may read this definition the other way around: under “civil liberty,” all laws are for the good of the community, and any who challenge them must be against it.
48 +
49 +Reaction Rhetoric
50 +This right wing defense of free speech on college campuses allows for reactionary rhetoric and oppression of many groups. Anonymous 10
51 +“Divorce of Thought from Deed,” North Carolina Piece Corps, Retrieved on 7 July 2015 from http://www.mediafire.com/view/h4qv25h825sajcj/The_Divorce_of_Thought_from_Deed_(imposed).pdf
52 +But anti-authoritarians aren’t the only ones who have taken up the banner of free speech. More recently, the right wing in the US has begun to argue that the failure to give conservative views an equal footing with liberal views constitutes a suppression of their free speech. By accusing “liberal” universities and media of suppressing conservative views—a laughable assertion, given the massive structures of power and funding advancing these—they use First Amendment discourse to promote reactionary agendas. Supposedly progressive campuses reveal their true colors as they mobilize institutional power to defend right-wing territory in the marketplace of ideas, going so far as to censor and intimidate opposition. Extreme right and fascist organizations have jumped onto the free speech bandwagon as well. In the US, Anti-Racist Action and similar groups have been largely effective in disrupting their events and organizing efforts. Consequently, fascists now increasingly rely on the state to protect them, claiming that racist, anti-immigrant, and anti-gay organizing constitutes a form of legally protected speech—and within the framework of the ACLU, it does. Fascist groups that are prevented from publishing their material in most other industrialized democracies by laws restricting hate speech frequently publish it in the United States, where no such laws exist, and distribute it worldwide from here. So in practice, state protection of the right to free expression aids fascist organizing.
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1 +2017-01-14 18:16:10.0
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1 +Shania Hunt
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1 +Brentwood JD
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1 +4
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1 +6
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1 +Cupertino Kumar Aff
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1 +1NC Round 6 CPS
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1 +CPS
Caselist.CitesClass[5]
Cites
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1 +Topicality
2 +Interpretation: The affirmative must defend (resolution). You can discuss non-topical issues under the world of my interp, you just cannot claim that your advocacy is to fight them and that you should win for that.
3 +
4 +1. Ground-
5 +
6 +A. Resolvability-
7 +B. Probability-
8 +C. Internal link-
9 +D. Dialogue- Galloway 07
10 +Ryan, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007
11 +Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).
12 +2. Limits-
13 +Only limited topics protect participants from research overload which materially affects our lives outside of round. Harris 13
14 +Scott Harris (Director of Debate at U Kansas, 2006 National Debate Coach of the Year, Vice President of the American Forensic Association, 2nd speaker at the NDT in 1981). “This ballot.” 5 April 2013. CEDA Forums. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4762.0;attach=1655
15 +The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against Topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.
16 +Controls the internal link to the aff- I can’t engage in the 1AC’s critical issues in round AND you cause research overload so I cannot be politically active for your cause outside of round because I am too busy researching. Limits are key to fairness because they ensure that I have the prep to engage.
17 +
18 +Vote Neg:
19 +A) Key to endorsing good methodologies—1AR severance prevents effective dialogue on the role of the ballot and having a methods debate sets a norm for other rounds. It’s too late to have a constructive debate about public policy since there are only three speeches left.
20 +B) If I win their advocacy is not topical and that topicality comes first then they have no advocacy and thus cannot have offense.
21 +Evaluate the T debate under competing interpretations – it's key to generate clear models of debate and ground because otherwise the aff's interpretation can be a moving target. Reasonability is arbitrarily defined and causes a race to the bottom for the "most reasonable" position.
22 +
23 +Rights K
24 +Their advocacy for rights rectifies the division between the human and the political - Rights talk ties the population to the sovereign by defining life only in terms of what can be defended by the state—this turns the citizen-subject into bare life by allowing arbitrary exclusion
25 +Hoover 13 Hoover, Joe. Dr Hoover has a BA in Philosophy from the University of Colorado and an MSc in Philosophy, now at University of London "Towards a politics for human rights: Ambiguous humanity and democratizing rights." Philosophy and Social Criticism 2013 (IM)
26 +Agamben pushes this critique even further by focusing on the way in which rights depend upon the distinction between those who have rights as members of the political community and those that are excluded – between bios and zoē. Human rights attempt to privilege the bare life of human beings without a place in the political world, which is why Agamben sees the displaced or stateless individual as the exemplary subject of human rights. However, it is the sovereign that has the power to make this distinction, the exclusion of some life from the political community, the creation of “bare life”. As rights are supposed to attach to human beings as such, rather than as members of a particular nation, it seems that the law achieves justification beyond convention, beyond the shared sense of justice that makes a People, but in fact it reveals that the law depends upon the power of the sovereign who ultimately decides which human beings have their rights protected and which find themselves excluded totally, most tellingly in the camp. This critique of human rights depends upon Agamben’s understanding of the sovereign as ‘the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.’54 The pure bio-politics we find in the relationship between Homo Sacer and the sovereign, who decides whether bare human life is extinguished or preserved, reveals that the effort to remove rights from a given order (to transform civil right into human rights) renders those rights precarious, dependent on exceptional power of the sovereign rather than a universal law. On this reading, human rights cannot constrain authority because they are dependent upon it, nor do they enable transformations of the legal and political order because they confirm rather than claim power. Agamben suggests that rights are not ambiguous in their support of authority and control, but rather central to it at the most fundamental level.
27 +
28 +Bare life is the ultimate devaluation of life – life that can be killed, but not sacrificed.
29 +Reinert 2007 (‘The Pertinence of Sacrifice - Some Notes on Larry the Luckiest Lamb’ Hugo Reinert, PhD from Cambridge University of Cambridge, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol6no3_2007/reinert_larry.htm) IM
30 +14. For a few years now, in his Homo Sacer project, Agamben has been tracing the political predicament of the present using the enigmatic figure of the bare life nuda vita (1998). Throughout his work, this bare life appears in many guises: from werewolves, outlaws and Roman priestesses to overcomatose patients and concentration camp victims. Perhaps its principal exemplar however - the figure that Agamben uses to illustrate its basic dynamic most succinctly - is the homo sacer or 'sacred man': 'an obscure figure from archaic Roman Law' who, for his crimes, has been expelled from both the ius humanum and the ius divinum, from both secular and sacred law. As a consequence of this, it is declared that he 'may be killed but not sacrificed' (Agamben 1998: 8). Killing this sacred man therefore invokes no sanction, but his life is also 'unsacrificeable' (82). His existence is constituted through a 'double exclusion' that expresses the basic operation of sovereign power itself - the process by which 'the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule' (18). This is the 'relation of exception': 'the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion' (18). Through this extreme relation, sovereign power maintains itself in a permanent relationship to the excluded: the outlaw for example, as another figure of the bare life, 'is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death' (183). 15. The sacred man and the outlaw are only two figures in a gallery of priests, bandits, kings, werewolves and concentration camp victims, all connected by the thread of the bare life and its shifting parameters. King or camp victim, this bare life is always a figure of the extreme margin: life stripped of its everyday humanity, reduced and excluded to the blurred threshold that surrounds the 'city of men' and defines its limits. In a sense, it is the human zoon politikon stripped of the very quality that makes it human: its social being, its character of sociality. Seen this way, the bare life is defined by the fact that it is not - or that it is no longer - a social person . This is the sense in which the term has come of age recently: particularly to describe Muslims held at Guantanamo, but also - with variable relevance - to describe social phenomena ranging from premature infant births (Wynn 2002) and homeless people (Feldman 2006), to the geopolitics of post-colonial violence (Sylvester 2006) and, somewhat bizarrely, European tourists in Ibiza (Diken and Laustsen 2004). In the present context, the more relevant of these applications focus on the question of violence - on the intersection between the sovereign exercise and justification of violence, on the one hand, and the bare life's quality of constant, permanent exposure to the threat of violence on the other. 16. As Agamben argues, the exercise of lethal violence against the bare life is twice circumscribed by the structure of the sovereign ban. Suspended in the grasp of sovereign power, the bare life becomes simultaneously vulnerable to certain kinds of violence and ineligible for others. On the one hand, it can be freely killed - the exercise of violence against the bare life is routine, insignificant and unmarked. It requires no expiation or atonement and invites no sanctions: it is banal, without consequence to the law and anything but 'intrinsically mysterious, mystifying, convoluting, plain scary, mythical and arcane' (Taussig 1992: 116). Simultaneously, with this subjection to unregulated and freely exercised forms of violence, the bare life also becomes ineligible for sacrifice - which is to say, in the general sense in which Agamben interprets the term, that the bare life is excluded from all forms of ritually marked, institutionalized, exalted or sacralizing violence, such as are 'prescribed by the rite of the law' (1998: 102): it can not, for example, be 'submitted to sanctioned forms of execution' (103). Between them, these two exclusions operate to desacralize the death of the bare life, stripping it of any significance. Its killing and death become trivial, casual, mundane and devoid of higher meaning: to Agamben the observer, the horror of the concentration camp is that as embodiments of the bare life, the men and women there died, to their executors, 'like lice' (114). In one sense, the bare life stands as cypher for a de-personalization, or dis-individuation, that transforms subjects into objects: subjecting them to the free exercise of unregulated violence while simultaneously, through the trope of denied sacrifice, disqualifying them from subjection to ritual or sacralizing forms of violence - insofar as they are 'not worthy of this gesture of honour' (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 17).
31 +
32 +
33 +The alternative is to reject the aff’s portrayal of rights—only fighting oppressive discourse like theirs can solve.
34 + McKenzie, M. (2014, February 3). 4 Ways to Push Back Against Your Privilege. Retrieved from https://www.bgdblog.org/2014/02/4-ways-push-back-privilege/ (writer, activist, founder of Black Girls Danger)
35 +I’ve often said that it’s not enough to acknowledge your privilege. And, in fact, that acknowledging it is often little more than a chance to pat yourself on the back for being so “aware.” What I find is that most of the time when people acknowledge their privilege, they feel really special about it, really important, really glad that something so significant just happened, and then they just go ahead and do whatever they wanted to do anyway, privilege firmly in place. The truth is that acknowledging your privilege means a whole lot of nothing much if you don’t do anything to actively push back against it. I understand, of course, that the vast majority of people don’t even acknowledge their privilege in the first place. I’m not talking to them. I’m talking to those of us who do. If we do, then we need to understand that acknowledgement all by itself isn’t enough. No matter how cathartic it feels. So, what does pushing back against your privilege look like? Well, here are just a few ways it can look (note: none of these is easy; that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t try): If you are in a position of power and you are able to recognize and acknowledge that at least part of the reason you are there is your (white, male, cisgendered, able-bodied, class, etc.) privilege, then pushing back against that privilege means sharing that power with, or sometimes relinquishing it to, the folks around you who have less privilege and therefore less power. I had a conversation recently with my friend about her terrible white woman boss who, when the women of color she supervises have strong feelings about the way things are being run, including the hiring of more white people over POC, pulls rank on them. Her “I understand your feelings but I am, you know, the boss and it’s my job to…” nonsense is exactly what not pushing back against your privilege looks like. On the other hand, “I was hired to supervise y’all, but I don’t want to perpetuate this type of effed-up power dynamic and also I recognize that y’all have a better understanding about why we should not hire another white man, so I’m going to go ahead and defer to y’all” is exactly what pushing back against your privilege does look like. If you have access to something and you recognize that you have it partly because of privilege, opt out of it. If you’re an able-bodied person and that retreat you really, really want to go on isn’t wheelchair accessible, and the organizers of said retreat have been asked and supported in making a change and done nothing, and you realize how fucked up that is, don’t go. It works the same for women-only events that exclude trans women. Don’t go. Even if you really, really want to go because your, like, fave artist ever is gonna be there. Especially then. Pushing back against your privilege often requires sacrifice. Sacrifice is hard sometimes, homies. If not being a dick were easy, everybody would do it! Acknowledging that something is messed up doesn’t mean anything if you still participate just because, dang, you really want to and stuff. This one is so, so important. If you are a person with a lot of privilege (i.e. a white, straight, able-bodied, class-privileged, cisgender male or any combination of two or more of those) and you call yourself being against oppression, then it should be part of your regular routine to sit the hell down and shut the eff up. If you can recognize that part of the reason your opinion, your voice, carries so much weight and importance is because you are a white man (or whatever combination is working for you), then pushing back against your privilege often looks like shutting your face. Now, of course, using your privilege to speak out against oppression is very important. But I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about chiming in, taking up space, adding your two cents, playing devil’s advocate, etc. when 1) no one asked you, 2) the subject matter is outside your realm of experience (why do you even think you get to have an opinion about the lives of black women??), 3) anything you say is just going to cause more harm because your voice, in and of itself, is a reminder that you always get to have a voice and that voice usually drowns out the voices of others.
36 +
37 +
38 +White People CP
39 +
40 +Counterplan Text: Resolved: Public Colleges and Universities shall restrict the constitutionally protected speech of Caucasian people.
41 +White conservatives use free speech as a way to combat their fear of multiculturalism. The counterplan is key to fighting back against white privelige.
42 +Stroup 16CNN host: Pro-speech conservatives just afraid of multiculturalism. Victoria Stroup. Missouri Campus Correspondent. September 16th 2016. http://www.campusreform.org/?ID=8140. //DC
43 +
44 +At a University of Missouri free speech symposium, CNN commentator Sally Kohn said conservatives fighting for free speech on college campuses are afraid of multiculturalism. Kohn made the statement during a sparsely-attended keynote debate Friday with fellow CNN commentator Kirsten Powers on the issue of the fight for free speech on campus, declaring, “Where this whole debate comes from now is a critique of multiculturalism.”“Feelings are valid...I’m never going to argue with people’s feelings.” Kohn added that because conservatives can no longer criticize multiculturalism while remaining socially acceptable, they have taken on the campus speech fight because it is a way to “attack diverse principles.” She then critiqued the “broad conservative agenda” to “protect conservative issues” and repeatedly spoke against “the Koch-funded Foundation for Individual Rights in Education.” Powers countered by citing examples of liberal bias on college campuses, such as the uproar that is often encountered by both liberal and conservative students who diverge from the liberal orthodoxy, and specifically mentioned Christina Hoff Sommers, an American Enterprise Institute scholar whose speech at Oberlin College was disrupted by numerous protesters, some of whom set up a makeshift “safe space.” Powers also cited the case of a feminist professor at the University of California-Santa Barbara attacking a pro-life demonstrator because she felt threatened by the display, as well as that of a libertarian Muslim student at the University of Michigan whose satirical newspaper article led to demands for his firing because people felt “unsafe.” “Speech is not in itself dangerous,” Powers declared emphatically. Kohn retorted that both her and Powers’ white, upper-middle-class upbringings cloud their vision on the issue, claiming that speech that may not be threatening to them may nonetheless be threatening to someone else.“Feelings are valid,” she mused. “I’m never going to argue with people’s feelings.” Powers next spoke of the chilling effect that occurs when unpopular viewpoints are silent, arguing that people do not learn when everybody is like them. Kohn, however, believes this is largely a good thing, especially in the case of conservatives who do not hold progressive social views, saying, “If they feel like they can no longer speak against positive social change, good.” Once again, Powers insisted that diversity of thought and diversity of ideas are just as important as any other type of diversity, but Kohn refused to concede the point, arguing that some ideas are less deserving of protection than others.“They think diversity is dumbing down humanity, or the greatness and exceptionalism of America,” Kohn said. “I’m happy that’s under assault.”
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1 +2017-01-14 18:17:32.0
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1 +Dan Armitage
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1 +Notre Dame DS
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1 +5
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1 +1
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1 +Cupertino Kumar Aff
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1 +1NC R1 Harvard Westlake
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1 +Harvard Westlake
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1 +4
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1 +2017-01-14 18:16:08.0
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1 +Shania Hunt
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1 +Brentwood JD
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1 +6
RoundReport
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1 +1AC Resistance Aff
2 +1NC Hate Speech DA Legal Realism K answers to case
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1 +CPS
Caselist.RoundClass[5]
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1 +5
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1 +2017-01-14 18:17:30.0
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1 +Dan Armitage
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1 +Notre Dame DS
Round
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1 +1
RoundReport
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1 +1AC Colonialism K aff
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1 +Harvard Westlake

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