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... ... @@ -1,21 +1,0 @@ 1 -Same FW 2 - 3 -New cards: 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 -====The sovereign must be the one defining meaning in the economy of violence to make the final discriminative judgement, otherwise we have absolute violence. PARRISH Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract 7:4 ~| © 2004 Rick Parrish //AK==== 9 -All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign’s first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign." Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the‘ primary terms in which ~~people~~ men try to conduct their social lives." "The whole raison d’entre of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes," without which humans would "fly off in all directions" and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition. 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 -====Thus the standard is adhering to the will of the sovereign. ==== 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 -====Independently, The sovereign is inevitable. All persons want to become meaning creators and eventually a sovereign will be formed. Parrish 2 Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract 7:4 ~| © 2004 Rick Parrish Quotes are from Hobbes //AK==== 18 -But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that in the state of nature persons must not only try to control as many objects as possible — they must also try to control as many persons as possible. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among ~~persons in the state of nature~~ there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. Persons, as rationally self-interested beings who "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and value themselves above all others, attempt to force that valuation on others. "The human desire for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," is therefore primarily about subsuming others beneath one's own personhood, as direct objects or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that this discursive struggle rapidly becomes physical by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 The ultimate violence, the surest and most complete way of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning. 19 - 20 - 21 -Contention is analytic - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,55 +1,0 @@ 1 -The border is a zone of difference which makes possible violence in the borderland. Rigid distinctions between epistemological systems of thinking cannot account for hybridity. Embracing the borderland resist colonialism within epistemology itself. 2 -KYNČLOVÁ 1 : 3 -Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 4 - 5 -“The border functions 6 -AND 7 -civil war within representation” (xiv).” (2) 8 - 9 -Our approach is not purely grounded in the theoretical. The epistemology of binaries creates categories of normality within both sides of the dualism. This subjugates the lived experiences of those who can’t fit neither side of the border. 10 -KYNČLOVÁ 2 : 11 -Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 12 - 13 -“The physical presence of 14 -AND 15 -methodology of Borderlands/La Frontera.” (3-4) 16 - 17 -The United States is founded on rugged individualism made possible by the colonial gaze of manifest destiny. This sets up the stage for borders and inevitable violence towards those in the borderland. 18 -KYNČLOVÁ 3 : 19 -Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 20 - 21 -“On the metaphorical level, 22 -AND 23 -in my presence (156).” (7) � 24 - 25 -The affirmative’s focus on social norms in the construction of identity is a counterproductive starting point. We relate meaning to our experiences from social norms but these are simply deterritorialized views of the world that do not allow us to see beyond the border. We must embrace new meaning beyond the border of what is socially institutionalized. 26 -KYNČLOVÁ 4 : 27 -Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 28 - 29 -“Further, Slotkin’s theoretical 30 -AND 31 -and struggle for recognition.” (2) 32 - 33 -Prohibition reinscribes domination 34 -Ball n.d: 35 -Ball n.d (Anna, University of Manchester, “Writing in the Margins: Exploring the Borderlands in the Work of Janet Frame and Jane Champion,” Borders and Boundaries, Esharp Issue 5, n.d. http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_41163_en.pdf, TW) 36 - 37 -How might the border, 38 -AND 39 -defended, fought over. (2002, p.198) 40 - 41 -The alternative is to embrace NEPANTLA as a starting point for an epistemology that recognizes the exclusion of the borderland through dualisms. This creates the possibility of bridging the object-subject duality that keeps the mestiza a prisoner by recuperating the possibility of a space in between that allows us to theorize about new forms of becoming and productive epistemologies. 42 -Zaccaria: 43 -PAOLA ZACCARIA Living in El Lugar of Transformations, Translating Vision into Writing UH-DD 44 - 45 -“In my opinion all 46 -AND 47 -multicultural/mestizo/nepantla translationscapes.” (186-191) 48 - 49 -The role of the ballot is to adopt Nepantla pedagogy. Outweighs their role of the ballot – their unquestionable starting point of needing to construct debate through a singular axis rein trenches borders and epistemological colonialism in education. 50 -Abraham: 51 -Abraham, S. (2014). A Nepantla pedagogy: Comparing Anzaldúa’s and Bakhtin’s Ideas for pedagogical and social change. Critical Education, 5(5). University of Georgia UH-DD 52 - 53 -“Nepantla is the site of 54 -AND 55 -school pedagogies and frame our educational research (Gonzalez-Lopez, 2006; Keating, 2006). - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,18 +1,0 @@ 1 -K 2 -Framing - To be coherently critical of the university within the university is always to recognize and be recognized by it, and therefore contained. The AC is an example of the neutrality of the university, allowing more radical theories to be disregarded as unprofessional. Harney and Moten 13: 3 - (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 29) 4 -Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding es- cape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.¶ The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condi- tion of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.¶ Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the uni- versity. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowl- edge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.¶ But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unreg- ulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.¶ A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not pro- gress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Univer- sitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons. 5 - 6 -Links - Fascists are granted protection by the state to promote reactionary views, crying for the lack of free expression, but only using the right as a political tool to promote hatred and fascism. Anon 10: 7 -Not Just Free Speech, but Freedom Itself A Critique of Civil Liberties - Anonymous 2010 - Published originally in the ninth issue ofRolling Thunder magazine; republished in the zine The Divorce of Thought from Deed: Social Conflict, White Supremacy, and Free Speech at UNC-Chapel Hill by the North Carolina Piece Corps. - https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/not-just-free-speech-but-freedom-itself 8 -But anti-authoritarians aren’t the only ones who have taken up the banner of free speech. More recently, the right wing in the US has begun to argue that the failure to give conservative views an equal footing with liberal views constitutes a suppression of their free speech. By accusing “liberal” universities and media of suppressing conservative views—a laughable assertion, given the massive structures of power and funding advancing these—they use First Amendment discourse to promote reactionary agendas. Supposedly progressive campuses reveal their true colors as they mobilize institutional power to defend right-wing territory in the marketplace of ideas, going so far as to censor and intimidate opposition. Extreme right and fascist organizations have jumped onto the free speech bandwagon as well. In the US, Anti-Racist Action and similar groups have been largely effective in disrupting their events and organizing efforts. Consequently, fascists now increasingly rely on the state to protect them, claiming that racist, anti-immigrant, and anti-gay organizing constitutes a form of legally protected speech—and within the framework of the ACLU, it does. Fascist groups that are prevented from publishing their material in most other industrialized democracies by laws restricting hate speech frequently publish it in the United States, where no such laws exist, and distribute it worldwide from here. So in practice, state protection of the right to free expression aids fascist organizing. If defending free speech has come to mean sponsoring wealthy right-wing politicians and enabling fascist recruiting, perhaps it is time for anarchists to reassess this principle. 9 - 10 - 11 -The state uses free speech as a strategy of pacification – the sovereign wants the masses to “blow off steam” instead of devising strategies against the state. We are told to find security in the state, and remain passive to fascist acts. Anon 2: 12 -Appeals to this tradition of unrestricted expression confer legitimacy on groups with views outside the mainstream, and both fascists and radicals capitalize on this. Lawyers often defend anarchist activity by referencing the First Amendment’s provision preventing legislation restricting the press or peaceable assembly. We can find allies who will support us in free speech cases who would never support us out of a shared vision of taking direct action to create a world free of hierarchy. The rhetoric of free speech and First Amendment rights give us a common language with which to broaden our range of support and make our resistance more comprehensible to potential allies, with whom we may build deeper connections over time. But at what cost? This discourse of rights seems to imply that the state is necessary to protect us against itself, as if it is a sort of Jekyll and Hyde split personality that simultaneously attacks us with laws and police and prosecutors while defending us with laws and attorneys and judges. If we accept this metaphor, it should not be surprising to find that the more we attempt to strengthen the arm that defends us, the stronger the arm that attacks us will become. Once freedom is defined as an assortment of rights granted by the state, it is easy to lose sight of the actual freedom those rights are meant to protect and focus instead on the rights themselves—implicitly accepting the legitimacy of the state. Thus, when we build visibility and support by using the rhetoric of rights, we may undercut the possibility of struggle against the state itself. We also open the door for the state to impose others’ “rights” upon us. The Civil Liberties Defense In the US, many take it for granted that it is easier for the state to silence and isolate radicals in countries in which free speech is not legally protected. If this is true, who wouldn’t want to strengthen legal protections on free speech? In fact, in nations in which free speech is not legally protected, radicals are not always more isolated—on the contrary, the average person is sometimes more sympathetic to those in conflict with the state, as it is more difficult for the state to legitimize itself as the defender of liberty. Laws do not tie the hands of the state nearly so much as public opposition can; given the choice between legal rights and popular support, radicals are much better off with the latter. One dictionary defines civil liberty as “the state of being subject only to laws established for the good of the community.” This sounds ideal to those who believe that laws enforced by hierarchical power can serve the “good of the community”—but who defines “the community” and what is good for it, if not those in power? In practice, the discourse of civil liberties enables the state to marginalize its foes: if there is a legitimate channel for every kind of expression, then those who refuse to play by the rules are clearly illegitimate. Thus we may read this definition the other way around: under “civil liberty,” all laws are for the good of the community, and any who challenge them must be against it. Focusing on the right to free speech, we see only two protagonists, the individual and the state. Rather than letting ourselves be drawn into the debate about what the state should allow, anarchists should focus on a third protagonist—the general public. We win or lose our struggle on the terrain of how much sovereignty the populace at large is willing to cede to the state, how much intrusion it is willing to put up with. If we must speak of rights at all, rather than argue that we have the right to free speech let us simply assert that the state has no right to suppress us. Better yet, let’s develop another language entirely. Free Speech and Democracy… The discourse of free speech in democracy presumes that no significant imbalances of power exist, and that the primary mechanism of change is rational discussion. In fact, a capitalist elite controls most resources, and power crystallizes upward along multiple axes of oppression. Against this configuration, it takes a lot more than speech alone to open the possibility of social change. There can be no truly free speech except among equals—among parties who are not just equal before the law, but who have comparable access to resources and equal say in the world they share. Can an employee really be said to be as free to express herself as her boss, if the latter can take away her livelihood? Are two people equally free to express their views when one owns a news network and the other cannot even afford to photocopy fliers? In the US, where donations to political candidates legally constitute speech, the more money you have, the more “free speech” you can exercise. As the slogan goes, freedom isn’t free—and nowhere is that clearer than with speech. Contrary to the propaganda of democracy, ideas alone have no intrinsic force. Our capacity to act on our beliefs, not just to express them, determines how much power we have. In this sense, the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor is strikingly apt: you need capital to participate, and the more you have, the greater your ability to enact the ideas you buy into. Just as the success of a few entrepreneurs and superstars is held up as proof that the free market rewards hard work and ingenuity, the myth of the marketplace of ideas suggests that the capitalist system persists because everyone—billionaire and bellboy alike—agrees it is the best idea. …So Long as You Don’t Do Anything But what if, despite the skewed playing field, someone manages to say something that threatens to destabilize the power structure? If history is any indication, it swiftly turns out that freedom of expression is not such a sacrosanct right after all. In practice, we are permitted free speech only insofar as expressing our views changes nothing. The premise that speech alone cannot be harmful implies that speech is precisely that which is ineffectual: therefore anything effectual is not included among one’s rights. During World War I, the Espionage Act criminalized any attempt to “cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty” or to obstruct recruiting for the armed forces. President Woodrow Wilson urged the bill’s passage because he believed antiwar activity could undermine the US war effort. Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman were arrested under this law for printing anarchist literature that opposed the war. Likewise, the Anarchist Exclusion Act and the subsequent Immigration Act were used to deport or deny entry to any immigrant “who disbelieves in or who is opposed to all organized government.” Berkman, Goldman, and hundreds of other anarchists were deported under these acts. There are countless other examples showing that when speech can threaten the foundation of state power, even the most democratic government doesn’t hesitate to suppress it. Thus, when the state presents itself as the defender of free speech, we can be sure that this is because our rulers believe that allowing criticism will strengthen their position more than suppressing it could. Liberal philosopher and ACLU member Thomas Emerson saw that freedom of speech “can act as a kind of ‘safety valve’ to let off steam when people might otherwise be bent on revolution.” Therein lies the true purpose of the right to free speech in the US. 13 -The impact is micro-fascism - As we come to view chaos and disorder as more harms to solve, we are willing to do worse and worse things to the world to preserve our stasis. Though we may achieve some degree of safety, it comes at the cost of mass violence against anything and everything viewed as dangerous which, ultimately is everything in life. The end result is a drive to purity of life that consumes even those that seek security. Seem 81: 14 -Seem, Mark, acupunturist and translator, Translator's Introduction to Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 15 -In confronting and finally overturning the Oedipal rock on which Man has chosen to take his stand, Anti-Oedipus comes as a kind of sequel to another similar venture, the attack on Christ, Christianity, and the herd in Nietzsche's The AntiChrist. For who would deny, AntiOedipus begins, that psychoanalysis was from the start, still is, and perhaps always will be a well-constituted church and a form of treatment based on a set of beliefs that only the very faithful could adhere to, ie., those who believe in a security that amounts to being lost in the herd and defined in terms of common and external goals? But where do such beliefs originate? What are they based on? For it is absolutely hopeless to think in terms of security, as Miller states in Sexus; "there is none. The man who looks for security, even in the mind, is like a man who would chop off his limbs in order to have artificial ones which will give him no pain or trouble" (page 428). No pain, no trouble-this is the neurotic's dream of a tranquilized and conflict-free existence. Such a set of beliefs, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate, such a herd instinct, is based on the desire to be led, the desire to have someone else legislate life. The very desire that was brought so glaringly into focus in Europe with Hitler, Mussolini, and fascism; the desire that is still at work, making us all sick, today. Anti-Oedipus starts by reviving Reich's completely serious question with respect to the rise of fascism: 'How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?' This is a question which the English and Americans are reluctant to deal with directly, tending too often to respond: "Fascism is a phenomenon that took place elsewhere, something that could only happen to others, but not to us; it's their problem." Is it though? Is fascism really a problem for others to deal with? Even revolutionary groups deal gingerly with the fascisizing elements we all carry deep within us, and yet they often possess a rarely analyzed but overriding group 'superego' that leads them to state, much like Nietzsche's man of ressentiment, that the other is evil (the Fascist! the Capitalist! the Communist!), and hence that they themselves are good. This conclusion is reached as an afterthought and a justification, a supremely self-righteous rationalization for a politics that can only "squint" at life, through the thick clouds of foul-smelling air that permeates secret meeting places and "security" councils. The man of ressentiment, as Nietzsche explains, "loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble."? Such a man, Nietzsche concludes, needs very much to believe in some neutral, independent "subject"-the ego-for he is prompted by an instinct of self-affirmation and self-preservation that cares little about preserving or affirming life, an instinct "in which every lie is sanctified.?" This is the realm of the silent majority. And it is into these back rooms, behind the closed doors of the analyst's office, in the wings of the Oedipal theater, that Deleuze and Guattari weave their way, exclaiming as does Nietzsche that it smells bad there, and that what is needed is "a breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world."In examining the problem of the subject, the behind-the-scenes reactive and reactionary man, Anti-Oedipus develops an approach that is decidedly diagnostic ("What constitutes our sickness today?") and profoundly healing as well. What it attempts to cure us of is the cure itself. Deleuze and Guattari term their approach "schizoanalysis," which they oppose on every count to psychoanalysis. Where the latter measures everything against neurosis and castration, schizoanalysis begins with the schizo, his breakdowns and his breakthroughs. For, they affirm, "a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch...." Against the Oedipal and oedipalized territorialities (Family, Church, School, Nation, Party), and especially the territoriality of the individual, Anti-Oedipus seeks to discover the "deterritorialized" flows of desire, the flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes and the neuroticized territorialities, the desiringmachines that escape such codes as lines of escape leading elsewhere. Much like R. D. Laing, Deleuze and Guattari aim to develop a materialistically and experientially based analysis of the "breakdowns" and the "breakthroughs" that characterize some of those labeled schizophrenic by psychiatry. Rather than view the creations and productions of desire-all of desiring-production-from the point of view of the norm and the normal, they force their analysis into the sphere of extremes. From paranoia to schizophrenia, from fascism to revolution, from breakdowns to breakthroughs, what is investigated is the process of life flows as they oscillate from one extreme to the other, on a scale of intensity that goes from 0 ("I never asked to be born ... leave me in peace"), the body without organs, to the nth power ("I am all that exists, all the names in history"), the schizophrenic process of desire. 16 -Alternative - Our response is a response of hopelessness in answer to the sucker’s game of power. It challenges the ruse of power which is the very assumption that our agency matters. Voting negative solves better it’s the disillusionment of the masses AND turns the AFF that assumes we can find security in the squo. Chaloupka 92: 17 - William, Dr. of Strange Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom By William Chaloupk, 92-3 18 -With rare (and often regretted, as in the infamous case of Allan Bloom) exceptions, student reaction to their own campus politics is the purest black hole. This reaction is always interpreted and deplored as "student apathy," a stubbornness to react to all those wonderful lectures and readings, even if these performances have yet to reassure a student body obviously terrified by their (just as obviously) diminishing prospects. On one level, such an analysis is a psychologizing tactic; the student psyche is to blame. But there is a different way to see it. Student politics, much of the time, seems to most students to be a "sucker's game," which one would engage only for psychological reasons, not to address power. In a sucker's game, there is some double bind arrayed, in place of chances to win. Most of the time, students are not able to negotiate with the people who matter most, in the scenes of power. Students don't set most of the taxes or many of the rules, even if the institutions of their governance seem governmental. There isn't even a police force.¶ Students react by going inert. They become a mass, silent. Those who have power over students insist that the wages of representation are responsibilities. An acute student recognizes that the opposite is true; only "irresponsible" behavior produces a real chance to negotiate with those in power. The contradiction means that all utterances about "the students" as a political force on campus will necessarily be metonymic. If a "mature student body" is mentioned, the coded reference is surely to large, always "enthusiastic," always infantilized rooting sections. Surely this irony is not lost on most students; embedded in an institution ostensibly dedicated to "higher" levels of everything —especially maturity and erudition — they discover that the standard by which the institution wishes to judge them is how well they have reverted to the old "school spirit" of their high school days.¶ Given the craziness of the game, as students might put it, they go inert, in just the same way as Baudrillard shows the public reacts to public opinion polls. Both "groups" refuse to be characterized, or at least refuse to participate by responding in the same spirit invited by those in power. Students refuse to participate in student government, and seldom speak of it seriously as a representative mechanism. Student elections continually evoke fake or cynical or self-consciously "just plain dumb" candidates with platforms to match; pranks abound, clearly denoting a refusal to take the charade seriously. For their part, the general public —some of whom may have learned this in college, as the saying goes — starts refusing to play the straight man to the pollster, leading pollsters and social science analysts to conclude that they are ill informed. We could argue, with just as much evidence, that their disappearance is a strategy, a subtle revenge.¶ This demise of representation, its removal from the center of all political acts, is an important development, but it does not necessarily end politics. An expressive practice could deny representation, could intervene in politics instead through disruption and ironic juxtaposition. In our present case, we might begin to wonder whether lifestyle expressions represent a preferred future (as they sometimes claim). Perhaps, instead, the whole system of solemn, serious expression of political positions is somehow undermined by these solemn and serious substitute lifestyles. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,17 +1,0 @@ 1 -CP Text: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought to completely prohibit revenge pornography. 2 -Counter plan is mutually exclusive – the plan allows revenge porn on college campuses because it’s constitutionally protected meaning perms are severance. 3 -The distribution of revenge pornography is constitutionally protected speech – aff allows it on college campuses. 4 -Goldberg 16 Erica Goldberg Columbia Law Review Volume 116, No. 3 April 2016 "FREE SPEECH CONSEQUENTIALISM" 5 -The regulation of revenge porn presents thorny First Amendment issues 6 -… 7 -emotional distress and are considered by some to pos- sess little value; this is nothing more than a call for judges to make whole- sale and retail judgments about the value and harms that flow from particular forms of speech. If revenge porn can be regulated, legislators should not target the victim's emotional distress or the invasion of pri- vacy, as these focal points threaten to undermine strong free speech pro- tections exceptional to America's free speech regime. 8 -CP solves – deters perpetrators and creates a cultural shift. 9 -Citron 14 Danielle Keats Citron, Mary Anne Franks"CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN" 4/21/2014 https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/isp/documents/danielle_citron_-_criminalizing_revenge_porn_-_fesc.pdf 10 -A criminal law solution is essential to deter 11 -… 12 -distribution of certain kinds of sexual images are harmful. 13 -Revenge porn causes chilling effect for victims who are afraid to speak out and are silenced. Causes psychological and irreversible violence to victims. 14 -Citron 14 Danielle Keats Citron Mary Anne Franks 2014 "CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN" Wake Forest Law Review digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2424andcontext=fac_pubs 15 -Victims’ fear can be profound. 16 -… 17 -it constitutes a vicious form of sex discrimination. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,18 +1,0 @@ 1 -Universal rules fail. Any application of rules can never be verified because rules are indeterminate, as they require prior knowledge to understand them, which can never be the basis for truth. 2 -Kripke “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” by Saul A. Kripke Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982 3 -“Normally, when we consider a mathematical rule such as addition, we think of ourselves as guided in our application of it to each new instance. Just this is the difference between someone who computes new values of a function and someone who calls out numbers at random. Given my past intentions regarding the symbol ‘+’, one and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to ‘68+57'. On the other hand, although an intelligence tester may suppose that there is only one possible continuation to the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8,…, mathematical and philosophical sophisticates know that an indefinite number of rules (even rules stated in terms of mathematical functions as conventional as ordinary polynomials) are compatible with any such finite initial segment. So if the tester urges me to respond, after 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., with the unique appropriate next number, the proper response is that no such unique number exists, nor is there any unique (rule determined) infinite sequence that continues the given one. The problem can then be put this way: Did I myself, in the directions for the future that I gave myself regarding plus ‘+’, really differ from the intelligence tester? True, I may not merely stipulate that plus ‘+’ is to be a function instantiated by a finite number of computations. In addition, I may give myself directions for the further computation of plus ‘+', stated in terms of other functions and rules. In turn, I may give myself directions for the further computation of these functions and rules, and so on. Eventually, however, the process must stop, with ‘ultimate’ functions and rules that I have stipulated for myself only by a finite number of examples, just as in the intelligence test. If so, is not my procedure as arbitrary as that of the man who guesses the continuation of the intelligence test? In what sense is my actual computation procedure, following an algorithm that yields ‘125’, more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure that would have resulted in ‘5'? Am I not simply following an unjustifiable impulse?" Of course, these problems apply throughout language and are not confined to mathematical examples, though it is with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly brought out. I think that I have learned the term 'table' in such a way that it will to apply to indefinitely many future items. So I can apply the term to a new situation, say when I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table at the base. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes that by `table' in the past I meant tabair, where a 'tabair' is anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a chair found there?. .” (17-20) 4 -If ethics cannot be based on rules, the ethical project must begin with practices. Unlike rules, practices are followed based on socially accepted procedures, as opposed to an indefinite number of rules. 5 -Mouffe “The Democratic Paradox” by Chantal Mouffe 2000 6 -“This reveals that procedures only exist as complex ensembles of practices. Those practices constitute specific forms of individuality and identity that make possible the allegiance to the procedures. It is because they are inscribed in shared forms of life and agreements in judgements that procedures can be accepted and followed. They cannot be seen as rules that are created on the basis of principles and then applied to specific cases. Rules, for Wittgenstein, are always abridgements of practices, they are inseparable from specific forms of life. The distinction between procedural and substantial cannot therefore be as clear as most liberal theorists would have it. In the case of justice. for instance, it means that one cannot oppose. as so many liberals do, procedural and substantial justice without recognizing that procedural justice already presupposes accep- tance of anain values. It is the liberal conception of justice which posits the priority of the right over the good. but this is already the expression of a specific good. Democracy is not only a mauer of establishing the right procedures independently of the practices that make possible democratic forms of individual- ity. The question of the conditions of existence of democratic forms of individuality and of the practices and language-games in which they are constituted is a central one, even in a liberal- democratic society where procedures playa central role. Procedures always involve substantial ethical commitments. For that reason they cannot work properly if they are not supported by a specific form of ethos.” (68-69) 7 -An ethic based in a practice instead of rules require particularism. The virtuous character does not follow a rule that precedes and guides every context. In a particular context, the virtuous character acts for the right reasons, with the right motives, and at the right time. We agree on the goodness of virtues, and the particular context determines the conditions for virtuous decision making. 8 -Leibowitz PARTICULARISM IN ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS * Uri D. Leibowitz University of Nottingham (Forthcoming in The Journal of Moral Philosophy) 9 -“Following Burnyeat (1980), I understand Aristotle here as engaged in a dialectical inquiry towards first principles 1. This inquiry towards first principles, Aristotle argues, must begin with what is known to us 2. Our starting points, I suggest, are the normative statuses of particular actions. As Burnyeat observes, “the ancient commentators are agreed that Aristotle has in mind knowledge about actions in accordance with the virtues; these actions are the things familiar to us from which we must start, and what we know about them is that they are noble or just” (1980:71- 72). In other words, we must start our moral theorizing from our judgments about particular actions. However, we need not know why those actions have the normative status we identify them as having 4; one can engage in moral theorizing even if one does not know why right acts are right, as long as one can identify that they are right, or as long as one is willing to accept the judgments of “one who speaks well” as one’s starting points 6. This is one reason why Aristotle insists that a competent student is one who has had a good moral upbringing 3. A person who is brought up well should be able to tell apart noble acts from ignoble ones; he is expected to be able to identify courageous acts, or just acts, and he is expected to be able to tell them apart from those acts that are cowardly or unjust. One of Aristotle’s goals in the NE, I propose, is are to teach his students why those acts they identify as right are right. But how could one identify particular actions as right if one doesn’t know why these acts are right? A native speaker of a language can often tell whether a sentence is grammatical even if in cases in which she does not know why it is so. Naturally, only native speakers who have been “brought up well” with respect to language are able to do this correctly and reliably. Aristotle thinks that with a proper moral upbringing one can form habits that would enable one to distinguish right actions from wrong ones 5. This is one reason why in I.3 Aristotle insists that young men are not the target audience for his lectures: “for they are inexperienced in the actions that constitute life, and what is said will start from these and will be about these” (1095a3-4, Rowe trans.). Our discussion, Aristotle tells us, concerns with the rightness of actions but it also starts with correct judgments about which particular actions are right. The ability to identify right acts as right is acquired by habituation and they habits we form depend on the kind of moral upbringing we get. Having correct starting points is vital to a successful dialectical inquiry; if our initial judgments about the normative status of actions are incorrect, then the first principles we discover by way of a dialectical inquiry from these judgments are likely to be false.13 In I.7 Aristotle reminds us that the appropriate degree of precision for each investigation depends on the nature of the subject matter being explored (1098a26-28). He then goes on to say this: 7 One should not demand to know the reason why, either, in the same way in all matters: in some cases, it will suffice if that something is so has been well shown, 8 as indeed is true of starting points; some are grasped by induction, some by perception, some by a sort of habituation, and others in other ways: 9 one must try to get hold of each sort in the appropriate way, and take care that they are well marked out, 10 since they have great importance in relation to what comes later. For the start of something seems to be more than half of the whole, and through it many of the things being looked for seem to become evident. (1098a33-1098b7, Rowe trans.)14 In this passage Aristotle tells us that inquiries can differ not only with respect to their appropriate degree of precision 7, but also in the way in which their starting points are obtained 8.15 Moreover, Aristotle insists that it is important to obtain the starting points for each inquiry in the appropriate way 9. Finally, Aristotle stresses again the importance of having the correct starting points 10. Aristotle’s goal, as I have mentioned above, is to help us understand why those acts that we identify as right—our starting points—are, in fact, right. But he warns us that the kind of explanation we ought to seek should be appropriate to the subject matter we are investigating 7. In geometry we can give demonstrative explanation. But we “should not demand to know the reason why in the same way in all matters.” Explanations of the rightness of actions will take a different forms. “Pure science involves demonstration,” Aristotle tells us, “while things whose starting points or first causes can be other than they are do not admit of demonstrations” (VI.5:1140a34). After reminding us in II.2 that the subject matter of ethics lacks fixity and hence that our account will not be very precise,16 Aristotle goes on to say this: “But though our present account is of this nature we must give what help we can” (1104a10, Ross trans.). What immediately follows, are Aristotle’s observations about the harmful effects of excess and deficiency and the positive effects of the proportionate amount, or the mean. These observations, Aristotle tells us, hold true for health and strength as well as for characteristics like temperance, courage, and other virtues. To act in accordance with the mean is not only the way to acquire virtuous characteristics, but is also the mark of virtuous actions. Aristotle seems to think that his comments on the mean are helpful. But what kind of help does he think these comments provide? Broadie (1991) proposes the following hypothesis: Aristotle could be deceived into thinking the doctrine of the mean useful in ways in which in fact it is not. This may be what happens in NE II.2, where he bewails the impossibility of giving exact rules for correct particular responses (1104a5-9); then says that he must give what help he can (1104a10- 11); and then goes on to discuss, not responses, but dispositions.” (101-2) If Aristotle had thought that his comments on the mean can help us to identify the right response in various situations, then, like Broadie, I think he was mistaken about their usefulness. However, I doubt that this is what Aristotle had in mind. Indeed, in VI.1 Aristotle explicitly tells us that he does not think that his remarks on the mean can help us to identify what we ought to do: We stated earlier that we must choose the median, and not excess or deficiency, and that the median is what right reason dictates...but this statement, true though it is, lacks clarity. In all other fields of endeavor in which scientific knowledge is possible, it is indeed true to say that we must exert ourselves or relax neither too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as right reason demands. But if this is the only thing a person knows, he will be none the wiser: he will, for example, not know what kind of medicines to apply to his body, if he is merely told to apply whatever medical science prescribes and in a manner in which a medical expert applies them.” (VI.1:1138b19-35) So what kind of help are these comments on the mean supposed to provide? I propose that these remarks are meant to help us to explain why those acts that we already know are virtuous are virtuous. If we can tell—as we must be able to in order to obtain starting points for our ethical inquiry—that an particular act is courageous, for instance, we now know that this action it lies in the mean. So we can explain its rightness by pointing out that this act is neither excessive nor deficient. This, of course, is a rudimentary sketch of an explanatory schema but we can now already identify the basic structure of the explanation: if an act is right, then we should be able to identify a scale on which it is neither excessive nor deficient. Aristotle recognizes that what he has given us so far is extremely undeveloped and he goes on to expound on this explanatory model in several phases. First, after presenting the bare bones of his explanatory schema, Aristotle discusses some general features of the virtues: he tells us that a mark of an action performed virtuously is that the agent of the action takes pleasure in performing the action (II.3); he distinguishes between a virtuous action and an action performed virtuously (II.4); and he identifies the genus and differentia of virtue (II.5-6). By the end of II.6 we get Aristotle’s definition of virtue: “We may thus conclude that virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it” (1106b35-1107a1). We now know a bit more about the proper explanation of the virtuousness of a particular action. Consider: “Why is this action of standing one’s ground in battle courageous?” The proper answer will take the following form: “This action is courageous because the agent chose to perform it, and it is located in the mean (relative to the agent)17 of some relevant scale.” What we have so far is a sketch of an explanatory schema and we must now learn how to properly fill in this schema in order to provide satisfactory explanations of the rightness of individual actions. Aristotle turns to this in II.7: However, this general statement is not enough; we must also show that it fits particular instances. For in a discussion of moral actions, although the general statements have a wider range of application, statements on particular points have more truth in them: actions are concerned with particulars and our statements must harmonize with them.” (1107a28-33) We already know that in order to explain why a particular act is virtuous we must locate this action in the mean of some relevant scale—this statement has a wide range of application—but in order to appreciate its truth, we must see how it applies to particular virtuous actions, since we are, most fundamentally, concerned with the rightness of individual actions. Aristotle, then, wants to show us that by applying his schema properly we can generate adequate explanation of the rightness of particular actions. In the remainder of II.7 Aristotle lists the various scales that are relevant to each virtue. And whenever possible he introduces the relevant vocabulary we should use in our explanation. For example, if we want to explain why an act is courageous, we should locate the agent’s emotional state while performing the action as a mean on a scale (or scales)18 of fear and confidence; the agent might be reckless if he exceeds in confidence, or cowardly if he is deficient in confidence. If we want to explain why an action is generous we should locate the action as a mean on a scale ranging from stinginess to extravagance. Aristotle goes on to list relevant scales for other virtues. Yet he is well aware that even now we have only been given a sketch—“For our present purposes, we must rest content with an outline and a summary, but we shall later define these qualities more precisely” (II.7:1107b15). By the end of II.7, if we are asked, for example, why Ms. Smith’s act of donating $100,000 to cancer research is generous, we could say that she chose to perform this action, and that given her economic and social situation, donating $100,000 to this cause was neither stingy nor extravagant. Moreover, we know that if she did not take pleasure in her generous donation, then she did not act generously. This explanatory schema does not generate deductive explanations. From the fact that Ms. Smith’s action was neither stingy nor extravagant it does not follow that her action was right or virtuous; there may have been other, more urgent, causes to which to donate, or there could have been good reasons not to donate to the particular organization that she had chosen. So explanations produced by applying Aristotle’s explanatory schema do not guarantee the truth of the explanandum.19 But as we have seen, Aristotle insists that we “should not demand to know the reason why in the same way in all matters,” and that explanations in ethics “do not admit of demonstrations.” This is why it is important for Aristotle that we already know that the action is right before we explain why it is right; that the act is right is part of the data we have at our disposal when we explain its rightness. The reading of Aristotle I propose helps us to make sense of several features of Aristotle’s work that commentators have found perplexing. First, it helps us to understand the importance of the doctrine of the mean for Aristotle’s project. Some readers of the NE are puzzled by the seriousness with which Aristotle approaches the doctrine of the mean. As Broadie (1991) puts it: Aristotle regards the doctrine of the mean as an important contribution, to judge by the solemnity with which he introduces it and the many pages where he strains over the details of its application. Yet the doctrine often gets a disappointed reception. It seems at first to offer special illumination, but in the end, according to its critics, it only deals with truisms together with a questionable taxonomy of virtues and vices. (95) On my reading the doctrine of the mean plays an important explanatory role which lies at the heart of Aristotle’s project. Although the doctrine of the mean doesn’t identify for us the features that make right actions right, it does tell us what a proper explanation of the rightness of a particular action should look like. We obtain a satisfactory explanation only when we replace the truisms about the harmful effects of excess and deficiency and the positive effects of the proportionate amount with the specific features of the action/situation; i.e., we must identify the relevant scale on which the action lies in the mean, and we have to identify the mean relative to the agent of the action and the situation in which the act is performed. This is why Aristotle methodically lists not only those virtues and vices that have names, but also those that do not have names, and this is why he identifies those qualities that resemble virtues but are not quite virtues. The proper explanation of the rightness of each individual action depends on the specific features of the particular act in question. “What sort of things are to be chosen and in return for what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular cases” (III.1:1110b8, Ross trans.). There is no algorithm that we can use to generate adequate explanations, as Aristotle emphasizes again in III.4: “What is good and pleasant differs with different characteristics and conditions, and perhaps the chief distinction of a man of high moral standards is his ability to see the truth in each particular moral question, since he is, as it were, the standard and measure for such questions” (1113a31-34). This is why Aristotle gives us many examples of how to generate explanations by substituting the truisms in the generic explanatory schema with particular features of actions. In his discussion of courage Aristotle specifies different possible objects of fear (e.g., death, poverty, disease), and various contexts in which one could exemplify courage (e.g., in battle, at sea, in illness). “sHe is courageous,” we are told, who endures and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right manner, and at the right time, and who displays confidence in similar ways. For a courageous man feels and acts according to the merits of each case and as reason guides him.” (III.7:1115b19-20) When we explain the rightness of a particular courageous action, we must replace the hedges (“the right things,” “in the right manner,” etc.) with specific features of the action in question; for example, his action was courageous because he left his family in order to join the army and he risked his life in order to protect his country when no non-military option was available to resolve the conflict.” (7-14) 10 -Thus, the standard is appealing to virtuous character clarified by the moral complexities of specific situations. To clarify, the standard is not consequentialist since that would rely on the rule of maximizing utility preceding every context that it applies to. Virtuous character requires commitment to particularistic decision making, so the rule of maximizing utility in every context cannot frame how to do actions. 11 - 12 -Analytic 13 - 14 -Analytic . 15 - 16 -Third, even if the AC specifies instances where constitutionally protected speech is good, it’s still a universal application of those instances, since there are still scenarios that fall outsides of the practice. Remember, the NC doesn’t appeal to rules, and there is no universal structure to practices. 17 -DANCY: “Ethics Without Principles” by Jonathan Dancy 2004 18 -Deductive reasoning is like this; an inference, once logically valid, remains so no matter what one adds as a premise (even if it be the negation of one of the original premises). Brandom's in the example is non- monotonic, since the cogent inference in (1) is reversed by the addition of the further consideration that the match is in a strong electromagnetic field. If one allows that this sort of thing can happen, is one therefore a holist in my sense? One would be a holist if the fact that I am striking a dry, well-made match is functioning as a reason for believing that it will light in the first case, but not in the second or the fourth. But Brandom is not trying to allude to that sort of possibility by his example. His point is rather the sort of phenomenon we find in chemistry: a feature may have a certain effect when alone, even though its combination with another feature will have the opposite effect. One could call this a ‘holistic’ point perfectly sensibly, but it is not holistic in my sense of that term. Holism in my sense is the claim that a feature which has a certain effect when alone can have the opposite effect in a combination. It is one thing to say, as Brandom does, that though a alone speaks in favour of action, a+b speaks as a whole against it; it is another to say that though a speaks in favour of action when alone, it speaks against action when in combination. The difference lies in what is doing the speaking against in cases where features are combined. In the former case (Brandom's) it is the combination; in the latter case (mine) it is the feature that originally spoke in favour. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,21 @@ 1 +Same FW 2 + 3 +New cards: 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 +====The sovereign must be the one defining meaning in the economy of violence to make the final discriminative judgement, otherwise we have absolute violence. PARRISH Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract 7:4 ~| © 2004 Rick Parrish //AK==== 9 +All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign’s first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign." Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the‘ primary terms in which ~~people~~ men try to conduct their social lives." "The whole raison d’entre of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes," without which humans would "fly off in all directions" and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition. 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 +====Thus the standard is adhering to the will of the sovereign. ==== 14 + 15 + 16 + 17 +====Independently, The sovereign is inevitable. All persons want to become meaning creators and eventually a sovereign will be formed. Parrish 2 Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract 7:4 ~| © 2004 Rick Parrish Quotes are from Hobbes //AK==== 18 +But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that in the state of nature persons must not only try to control as many objects as possible — they must also try to control as many persons as possible. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among ~~persons in the state of nature~~ there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. Persons, as rationally self-interested beings who "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and value themselves above all others, attempt to force that valuation on others. "The human desire for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," is therefore primarily about subsuming others beneath one's own personhood, as direct objects or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that this discursive struggle rapidly becomes physical by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 The ultimate violence, the surest and most complete way of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning. 19 + 20 + 21 +Contention is analytic - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,18 @@ 1 +K 2 +Framing - To be coherently critical of the university within the university is always to recognize and be recognized by it, and therefore contained. The AC is an example of the neutrality of the university, allowing more radical theories to be disregarded as unprofessional. Harney and Moten 13: 3 + (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 29) 4 +Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding es- cape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.¶ The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condi- tion of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.¶ Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the uni- versity. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowl- edge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.¶ But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unreg- ulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.¶ A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not pro- gress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Univer- sitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons. 5 + 6 +Links - Fascists are granted protection by the state to promote reactionary views, crying for the lack of free expression, but only using the right as a political tool to promote hatred and fascism. Anon 10: 7 +Not Just Free Speech, but Freedom Itself A Critique of Civil Liberties - Anonymous 2010 - Published originally in the ninth issue ofRolling Thunder magazine; republished in the zine The Divorce of Thought from Deed: Social Conflict, White Supremacy, and Free Speech at UNC-Chapel Hill by the North Carolina Piece Corps. - https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/not-just-free-speech-but-freedom-itself 8 +But anti-authoritarians aren’t the only ones who have taken up the banner of free speech. More recently, the right wing in the US has begun to argue that the failure to give conservative views an equal footing with liberal views constitutes a suppression of their free speech. By accusing “liberal” universities and media of suppressing conservative views—a laughable assertion, given the massive structures of power and funding advancing these—they use First Amendment discourse to promote reactionary agendas. Supposedly progressive campuses reveal their true colors as they mobilize institutional power to defend right-wing territory in the marketplace of ideas, going so far as to censor and intimidate opposition. Extreme right and fascist organizations have jumped onto the free speech bandwagon as well. In the US, Anti-Racist Action and similar groups have been largely effective in disrupting their events and organizing efforts. Consequently, fascists now increasingly rely on the state to protect them, claiming that racist, anti-immigrant, and anti-gay organizing constitutes a form of legally protected speech—and within the framework of the ACLU, it does. Fascist groups that are prevented from publishing their material in most other industrialized democracies by laws restricting hate speech frequently publish it in the United States, where no such laws exist, and distribute it worldwide from here. So in practice, state protection of the right to free expression aids fascist organizing. If defending free speech has come to mean sponsoring wealthy right-wing politicians and enabling fascist recruiting, perhaps it is time for anarchists to reassess this principle. 9 + 10 + 11 +The state uses free speech as a strategy of pacification – the sovereign wants the masses to “blow off steam” instead of devising strategies against the state. We are told to find security in the state, and remain passive to fascist acts. Anon 2: 12 +Appeals to this tradition of unrestricted expression confer legitimacy on groups with views outside the mainstream, and both fascists and radicals capitalize on this. Lawyers often defend anarchist activity by referencing the First Amendment’s provision preventing legislation restricting the press or peaceable assembly. We can find allies who will support us in free speech cases who would never support us out of a shared vision of taking direct action to create a world free of hierarchy. The rhetoric of free speech and First Amendment rights give us a common language with which to broaden our range of support and make our resistance more comprehensible to potential allies, with whom we may build deeper connections over time. But at what cost? This discourse of rights seems to imply that the state is necessary to protect us against itself, as if it is a sort of Jekyll and Hyde split personality that simultaneously attacks us with laws and police and prosecutors while defending us with laws and attorneys and judges. If we accept this metaphor, it should not be surprising to find that the more we attempt to strengthen the arm that defends us, the stronger the arm that attacks us will become. Once freedom is defined as an assortment of rights granted by the state, it is easy to lose sight of the actual freedom those rights are meant to protect and focus instead on the rights themselves—implicitly accepting the legitimacy of the state. Thus, when we build visibility and support by using the rhetoric of rights, we may undercut the possibility of struggle against the state itself. We also open the door for the state to impose others’ “rights” upon us. The Civil Liberties Defense In the US, many take it for granted that it is easier for the state to silence and isolate radicals in countries in which free speech is not legally protected. If this is true, who wouldn’t want to strengthen legal protections on free speech? In fact, in nations in which free speech is not legally protected, radicals are not always more isolated—on the contrary, the average person is sometimes more sympathetic to those in conflict with the state, as it is more difficult for the state to legitimize itself as the defender of liberty. Laws do not tie the hands of the state nearly so much as public opposition can; given the choice between legal rights and popular support, radicals are much better off with the latter. One dictionary defines civil liberty as “the state of being subject only to laws established for the good of the community.” This sounds ideal to those who believe that laws enforced by hierarchical power can serve the “good of the community”—but who defines “the community” and what is good for it, if not those in power? In practice, the discourse of civil liberties enables the state to marginalize its foes: if there is a legitimate channel for every kind of expression, then those who refuse to play by the rules are clearly illegitimate. Thus we may read this definition the other way around: under “civil liberty,” all laws are for the good of the community, and any who challenge them must be against it. Focusing on the right to free speech, we see only two protagonists, the individual and the state. Rather than letting ourselves be drawn into the debate about what the state should allow, anarchists should focus on a third protagonist—the general public. We win or lose our struggle on the terrain of how much sovereignty the populace at large is willing to cede to the state, how much intrusion it is willing to put up with. If we must speak of rights at all, rather than argue that we have the right to free speech let us simply assert that the state has no right to suppress us. Better yet, let’s develop another language entirely. Free Speech and Democracy… The discourse of free speech in democracy presumes that no significant imbalances of power exist, and that the primary mechanism of change is rational discussion. In fact, a capitalist elite controls most resources, and power crystallizes upward along multiple axes of oppression. Against this configuration, it takes a lot more than speech alone to open the possibility of social change. There can be no truly free speech except among equals—among parties who are not just equal before the law, but who have comparable access to resources and equal say in the world they share. Can an employee really be said to be as free to express herself as her boss, if the latter can take away her livelihood? Are two people equally free to express their views when one owns a news network and the other cannot even afford to photocopy fliers? In the US, where donations to political candidates legally constitute speech, the more money you have, the more “free speech” you can exercise. As the slogan goes, freedom isn’t free—and nowhere is that clearer than with speech. Contrary to the propaganda of democracy, ideas alone have no intrinsic force. Our capacity to act on our beliefs, not just to express them, determines how much power we have. In this sense, the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor is strikingly apt: you need capital to participate, and the more you have, the greater your ability to enact the ideas you buy into. Just as the success of a few entrepreneurs and superstars is held up as proof that the free market rewards hard work and ingenuity, the myth of the marketplace of ideas suggests that the capitalist system persists because everyone—billionaire and bellboy alike—agrees it is the best idea. …So Long as You Don’t Do Anything But what if, despite the skewed playing field, someone manages to say something that threatens to destabilize the power structure? If history is any indication, it swiftly turns out that freedom of expression is not such a sacrosanct right after all. In practice, we are permitted free speech only insofar as expressing our views changes nothing. The premise that speech alone cannot be harmful implies that speech is precisely that which is ineffectual: therefore anything effectual is not included among one’s rights. During World War I, the Espionage Act criminalized any attempt to “cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty” or to obstruct recruiting for the armed forces. President Woodrow Wilson urged the bill’s passage because he believed antiwar activity could undermine the US war effort. Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman were arrested under this law for printing anarchist literature that opposed the war. Likewise, the Anarchist Exclusion Act and the subsequent Immigration Act were used to deport or deny entry to any immigrant “who disbelieves in or who is opposed to all organized government.” Berkman, Goldman, and hundreds of other anarchists were deported under these acts. There are countless other examples showing that when speech can threaten the foundation of state power, even the most democratic government doesn’t hesitate to suppress it. Thus, when the state presents itself as the defender of free speech, we can be sure that this is because our rulers believe that allowing criticism will strengthen their position more than suppressing it could. Liberal philosopher and ACLU member Thomas Emerson saw that freedom of speech “can act as a kind of ‘safety valve’ to let off steam when people might otherwise be bent on revolution.” Therein lies the true purpose of the right to free speech in the US. 13 +The impact is micro-fascism - As we come to view chaos and disorder as more harms to solve, we are willing to do worse and worse things to the world to preserve our stasis. Though we may achieve some degree of safety, it comes at the cost of mass violence against anything and everything viewed as dangerous which, ultimately is everything in life. The end result is a drive to purity of life that consumes even those that seek security. Seem 81: 14 +Seem, Mark, acupunturist and translator, Translator's Introduction to Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 15 +In confronting and finally overturning the Oedipal rock on which Man has chosen to take his stand, Anti-Oedipus comes as a kind of sequel to another similar venture, the attack on Christ, Christianity, and the herd in Nietzsche's The AntiChrist. For who would deny, AntiOedipus begins, that psychoanalysis was from the start, still is, and perhaps always will be a well-constituted church and a form of treatment based on a set of beliefs that only the very faithful could adhere to, ie., those who believe in a security that amounts to being lost in the herd and defined in terms of common and external goals? But where do such beliefs originate? What are they based on? For it is absolutely hopeless to think in terms of security, as Miller states in Sexus; "there is none. The man who looks for security, even in the mind, is like a man who would chop off his limbs in order to have artificial ones which will give him no pain or trouble" (page 428). No pain, no trouble-this is the neurotic's dream of a tranquilized and conflict-free existence. Such a set of beliefs, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate, such a herd instinct, is based on the desire to be led, the desire to have someone else legislate life. The very desire that was brought so glaringly into focus in Europe with Hitler, Mussolini, and fascism; the desire that is still at work, making us all sick, today. Anti-Oedipus starts by reviving Reich's completely serious question with respect to the rise of fascism: 'How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?' This is a question which the English and Americans are reluctant to deal with directly, tending too often to respond: "Fascism is a phenomenon that took place elsewhere, something that could only happen to others, but not to us; it's their problem." Is it though? Is fascism really a problem for others to deal with? Even revolutionary groups deal gingerly with the fascisizing elements we all carry deep within us, and yet they often possess a rarely analyzed but overriding group 'superego' that leads them to state, much like Nietzsche's man of ressentiment, that the other is evil (the Fascist! the Capitalist! the Communist!), and hence that they themselves are good. This conclusion is reached as an afterthought and a justification, a supremely self-righteous rationalization for a politics that can only "squint" at life, through the thick clouds of foul-smelling air that permeates secret meeting places and "security" councils. The man of ressentiment, as Nietzsche explains, "loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble."? Such a man, Nietzsche concludes, needs very much to believe in some neutral, independent "subject"-the ego-for he is prompted by an instinct of self-affirmation and self-preservation that cares little about preserving or affirming life, an instinct "in which every lie is sanctified.?" This is the realm of the silent majority. And it is into these back rooms, behind the closed doors of the analyst's office, in the wings of the Oedipal theater, that Deleuze and Guattari weave their way, exclaiming as does Nietzsche that it smells bad there, and that what is needed is "a breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world."In examining the problem of the subject, the behind-the-scenes reactive and reactionary man, Anti-Oedipus develops an approach that is decidedly diagnostic ("What constitutes our sickness today?") and profoundly healing as well. What it attempts to cure us of is the cure itself. Deleuze and Guattari term their approach "schizoanalysis," which they oppose on every count to psychoanalysis. Where the latter measures everything against neurosis and castration, schizoanalysis begins with the schizo, his breakdowns and his breakthroughs. For, they affirm, "a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch...." Against the Oedipal and oedipalized territorialities (Family, Church, School, Nation, Party), and especially the territoriality of the individual, Anti-Oedipus seeks to discover the "deterritorialized" flows of desire, the flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes and the neuroticized territorialities, the desiringmachines that escape such codes as lines of escape leading elsewhere. Much like R. D. Laing, Deleuze and Guattari aim to develop a materialistically and experientially based analysis of the "breakdowns" and the "breakthroughs" that characterize some of those labeled schizophrenic by psychiatry. Rather than view the creations and productions of desire-all of desiring-production-from the point of view of the norm and the normal, they force their analysis into the sphere of extremes. From paranoia to schizophrenia, from fascism to revolution, from breakdowns to breakthroughs, what is investigated is the process of life flows as they oscillate from one extreme to the other, on a scale of intensity that goes from 0 ("I never asked to be born ... leave me in peace"), the body without organs, to the nth power ("I am all that exists, all the names in history"), the schizophrenic process of desire. 16 +Alternative - Our response is a response of hopelessness in answer to the sucker’s game of power. It challenges the ruse of power which is the very assumption that our agency matters. Voting negative solves better it’s the disillusionment of the masses AND turns the AFF that assumes we can find security in the squo. Chaloupka 92: 17 + William, Dr. of Strange Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom By William Chaloupk, 92-3 18 +With rare (and often regretted, as in the infamous case of Allan Bloom) exceptions, student reaction to their own campus politics is the purest black hole. This reaction is always interpreted and deplored as "student apathy," a stubbornness to react to all those wonderful lectures and readings, even if these performances have yet to reassure a student body obviously terrified by their (just as obviously) diminishing prospects. On one level, such an analysis is a psychologizing tactic; the student psyche is to blame. But there is a different way to see it. Student politics, much of the time, seems to most students to be a "sucker's game," which one would engage only for psychological reasons, not to address power. In a sucker's game, there is some double bind arrayed, in place of chances to win. Most of the time, students are not able to negotiate with the people who matter most, in the scenes of power. Students don't set most of the taxes or many of the rules, even if the institutions of their governance seem governmental. There isn't even a police force.¶ Students react by going inert. They become a mass, silent. Those who have power over students insist that the wages of representation are responsibilities. An acute student recognizes that the opposite is true; only "irresponsible" behavior produces a real chance to negotiate with those in power. The contradiction means that all utterances about "the students" as a political force on campus will necessarily be metonymic. If a "mature student body" is mentioned, the coded reference is surely to large, always "enthusiastic," always infantilized rooting sections. Surely this irony is not lost on most students; embedded in an institution ostensibly dedicated to "higher" levels of everything —especially maturity and erudition — they discover that the standard by which the institution wishes to judge them is how well they have reverted to the old "school spirit" of their high school days.¶ Given the craziness of the game, as students might put it, they go inert, in just the same way as Baudrillard shows the public reacts to public opinion polls. Both "groups" refuse to be characterized, or at least refuse to participate by responding in the same spirit invited by those in power. Students refuse to participate in student government, and seldom speak of it seriously as a representative mechanism. Student elections continually evoke fake or cynical or self-consciously "just plain dumb" candidates with platforms to match; pranks abound, clearly denoting a refusal to take the charade seriously. For their part, the general public —some of whom may have learned this in college, as the saying goes — starts refusing to play the straight man to the pollster, leading pollsters and social science analysts to conclude that they are ill informed. We could argue, with just as much evidence, that their disappearance is a strategy, a subtle revenge.¶ This demise of representation, its removal from the center of all political acts, is an important development, but it does not necessarily end politics. An expressive practice could deny representation, could intervene in politics instead through disruption and ironic juxtaposition. In our present case, we might begin to wonder whether lifestyle expressions represent a preferred future (as they sometimes claim). Perhaps, instead, the whole system of solemn, serious expression of political positions is somehow undermined by these solemn and serious substitute lifestyles. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,18 @@ 1 +Universal rules fail. Any application of rules can never be verified because rules are indeterminate, as they require prior knowledge to understand them, which can never be the basis for truth. 2 +Kripke “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” by Saul A. Kripke Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982 3 +“Normally, when we consider a mathematical rule such as addition, we think of ourselves as guided in our application of it to each new instance. Just this is the difference between someone who computes new values of a function and someone who calls out numbers at random. Given my past intentions regarding the symbol ‘+’, one and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to ‘68+57'. On the other hand, although an intelligence tester may suppose that there is only one possible continuation to the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8,…, mathematical and philosophical sophisticates know that an indefinite number of rules (even rules stated in terms of mathematical functions as conventional as ordinary polynomials) are compatible with any such finite initial segment. So if the tester urges me to respond, after 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., with the unique appropriate next number, the proper response is that no such unique number exists, nor is there any unique (rule determined) infinite sequence that continues the given one. The problem can then be put this way: Did I myself, in the directions for the future that I gave myself regarding plus ‘+’, really differ from the intelligence tester? True, I may not merely stipulate that plus ‘+’ is to be a function instantiated by a finite number of computations. In addition, I may give myself directions for the further computation of plus ‘+', stated in terms of other functions and rules. In turn, I may give myself directions for the further computation of these functions and rules, and so on. Eventually, however, the process must stop, with ‘ultimate’ functions and rules that I have stipulated for myself only by a finite number of examples, just as in the intelligence test. If so, is not my procedure as arbitrary as that of the man who guesses the continuation of the intelligence test? In what sense is my actual computation procedure, following an algorithm that yields ‘125’, more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure that would have resulted in ‘5'? Am I not simply following an unjustifiable impulse?" Of course, these problems apply throughout language and are not confined to mathematical examples, though it is with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly brought out. I think that I have learned the term 'table' in such a way that it will to apply to indefinitely many future items. So I can apply the term to a new situation, say when I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table at the base. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes that by `table' in the past I meant tabair, where a 'tabair' is anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a chair found there?. .” (17-20) 4 +If ethics cannot be based on rules, the ethical project must begin with practices. Unlike rules, practices are followed based on socially accepted procedures, as opposed to an indefinite number of rules. 5 +Mouffe “The Democratic Paradox” by Chantal Mouffe 2000 6 +“This reveals that procedures only exist as complex ensembles of practices. Those practices constitute specific forms of individuality and identity that make possible the allegiance to the procedures. It is because they are inscribed in shared forms of life and agreements in judgements that procedures can be accepted and followed. They cannot be seen as rules that are created on the basis of principles and then applied to specific cases. Rules, for Wittgenstein, are always abridgements of practices, they are inseparable from specific forms of life. The distinction between procedural and substantial cannot therefore be as clear as most liberal theorists would have it. In the case of justice. for instance, it means that one cannot oppose. as so many liberals do, procedural and substantial justice without recognizing that procedural justice already presupposes accep- tance of anain values. It is the liberal conception of justice which posits the priority of the right over the good. but this is already the expression of a specific good. Democracy is not only a mauer of establishing the right procedures independently of the practices that make possible democratic forms of individual- ity. The question of the conditions of existence of democratic forms of individuality and of the practices and language-games in which they are constituted is a central one, even in a liberal- democratic society where procedures playa central role. Procedures always involve substantial ethical commitments. For that reason they cannot work properly if they are not supported by a specific form of ethos.” (68-69) 7 +An ethic based in a practice instead of rules require particularism. The virtuous character does not follow a rule that precedes and guides every context. In a particular context, the virtuous character acts for the right reasons, with the right motives, and at the right time. We agree on the goodness of virtues, and the particular context determines the conditions for virtuous decision making. 8 +Leibowitz PARTICULARISM IN ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS * Uri D. Leibowitz University of Nottingham (Forthcoming in The Journal of Moral Philosophy) 9 +“Following Burnyeat (1980), I understand Aristotle here as engaged in a dialectical inquiry towards first principles 1. This inquiry towards first principles, Aristotle argues, must begin with what is known to us 2. Our starting points, I suggest, are the normative statuses of particular actions. As Burnyeat observes, “the ancient commentators are agreed that Aristotle has in mind knowledge about actions in accordance with the virtues; these actions are the things familiar to us from which we must start, and what we know about them is that they are noble or just” (1980:71- 72). In other words, we must start our moral theorizing from our judgments about particular actions. However, we need not know why those actions have the normative status we identify them as having 4; one can engage in moral theorizing even if one does not know why right acts are right, as long as one can identify that they are right, or as long as one is willing to accept the judgments of “one who speaks well” as one’s starting points 6. This is one reason why Aristotle insists that a competent student is one who has had a good moral upbringing 3. A person who is brought up well should be able to tell apart noble acts from ignoble ones; he is expected to be able to identify courageous acts, or just acts, and he is expected to be able to tell them apart from those acts that are cowardly or unjust. One of Aristotle’s goals in the NE, I propose, is are to teach his students why those acts they identify as right are right. But how could one identify particular actions as right if one doesn’t know why these acts are right? A native speaker of a language can often tell whether a sentence is grammatical even if in cases in which she does not know why it is so. Naturally, only native speakers who have been “brought up well” with respect to language are able to do this correctly and reliably. Aristotle thinks that with a proper moral upbringing one can form habits that would enable one to distinguish right actions from wrong ones 5. This is one reason why in I.3 Aristotle insists that young men are not the target audience for his lectures: “for they are inexperienced in the actions that constitute life, and what is said will start from these and will be about these” (1095a3-4, Rowe trans.). Our discussion, Aristotle tells us, concerns with the rightness of actions but it also starts with correct judgments about which particular actions are right. The ability to identify right acts as right is acquired by habituation and they habits we form depend on the kind of moral upbringing we get. Having correct starting points is vital to a successful dialectical inquiry; if our initial judgments about the normative status of actions are incorrect, then the first principles we discover by way of a dialectical inquiry from these judgments are likely to be false.13 In I.7 Aristotle reminds us that the appropriate degree of precision for each investigation depends on the nature of the subject matter being explored (1098a26-28). He then goes on to say this: 7 One should not demand to know the reason why, either, in the same way in all matters: in some cases, it will suffice if that something is so has been well shown, 8 as indeed is true of starting points; some are grasped by induction, some by perception, some by a sort of habituation, and others in other ways: 9 one must try to get hold of each sort in the appropriate way, and take care that they are well marked out, 10 since they have great importance in relation to what comes later. For the start of something seems to be more than half of the whole, and through it many of the things being looked for seem to become evident. (1098a33-1098b7, Rowe trans.)14 In this passage Aristotle tells us that inquiries can differ not only with respect to their appropriate degree of precision 7, but also in the way in which their starting points are obtained 8.15 Moreover, Aristotle insists that it is important to obtain the starting points for each inquiry in the appropriate way 9. Finally, Aristotle stresses again the importance of having the correct starting points 10. Aristotle’s goal, as I have mentioned above, is to help us understand why those acts that we identify as right—our starting points—are, in fact, right. But he warns us that the kind of explanation we ought to seek should be appropriate to the subject matter we are investigating 7. In geometry we can give demonstrative explanation. But we “should not demand to know the reason why in the same way in all matters.” Explanations of the rightness of actions will take a different forms. “Pure science involves demonstration,” Aristotle tells us, “while things whose starting points or first causes can be other than they are do not admit of demonstrations” (VI.5:1140a34). After reminding us in II.2 that the subject matter of ethics lacks fixity and hence that our account will not be very precise,16 Aristotle goes on to say this: “But though our present account is of this nature we must give what help we can” (1104a10, Ross trans.). What immediately follows, are Aristotle’s observations about the harmful effects of excess and deficiency and the positive effects of the proportionate amount, or the mean. These observations, Aristotle tells us, hold true for health and strength as well as for characteristics like temperance, courage, and other virtues. To act in accordance with the mean is not only the way to acquire virtuous characteristics, but is also the mark of virtuous actions. Aristotle seems to think that his comments on the mean are helpful. But what kind of help does he think these comments provide? Broadie (1991) proposes the following hypothesis: Aristotle could be deceived into thinking the doctrine of the mean useful in ways in which in fact it is not. This may be what happens in NE II.2, where he bewails the impossibility of giving exact rules for correct particular responses (1104a5-9); then says that he must give what help he can (1104a10- 11); and then goes on to discuss, not responses, but dispositions.” (101-2) If Aristotle had thought that his comments on the mean can help us to identify the right response in various situations, then, like Broadie, I think he was mistaken about their usefulness. However, I doubt that this is what Aristotle had in mind. Indeed, in VI.1 Aristotle explicitly tells us that he does not think that his remarks on the mean can help us to identify what we ought to do: We stated earlier that we must choose the median, and not excess or deficiency, and that the median is what right reason dictates...but this statement, true though it is, lacks clarity. In all other fields of endeavor in which scientific knowledge is possible, it is indeed true to say that we must exert ourselves or relax neither too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as right reason demands. But if this is the only thing a person knows, he will be none the wiser: he will, for example, not know what kind of medicines to apply to his body, if he is merely told to apply whatever medical science prescribes and in a manner in which a medical expert applies them.” (VI.1:1138b19-35) So what kind of help are these comments on the mean supposed to provide? I propose that these remarks are meant to help us to explain why those acts that we already know are virtuous are virtuous. If we can tell—as we must be able to in order to obtain starting points for our ethical inquiry—that an particular act is courageous, for instance, we now know that this action it lies in the mean. So we can explain its rightness by pointing out that this act is neither excessive nor deficient. This, of course, is a rudimentary sketch of an explanatory schema but we can now already identify the basic structure of the explanation: if an act is right, then we should be able to identify a scale on which it is neither excessive nor deficient. Aristotle recognizes that what he has given us so far is extremely undeveloped and he goes on to expound on this explanatory model in several phases. First, after presenting the bare bones of his explanatory schema, Aristotle discusses some general features of the virtues: he tells us that a mark of an action performed virtuously is that the agent of the action takes pleasure in performing the action (II.3); he distinguishes between a virtuous action and an action performed virtuously (II.4); and he identifies the genus and differentia of virtue (II.5-6). By the end of II.6 we get Aristotle’s definition of virtue: “We may thus conclude that virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it” (1106b35-1107a1). We now know a bit more about the proper explanation of the virtuousness of a particular action. Consider: “Why is this action of standing one’s ground in battle courageous?” The proper answer will take the following form: “This action is courageous because the agent chose to perform it, and it is located in the mean (relative to the agent)17 of some relevant scale.” What we have so far is a sketch of an explanatory schema and we must now learn how to properly fill in this schema in order to provide satisfactory explanations of the rightness of individual actions. Aristotle turns to this in II.7: However, this general statement is not enough; we must also show that it fits particular instances. For in a discussion of moral actions, although the general statements have a wider range of application, statements on particular points have more truth in them: actions are concerned with particulars and our statements must harmonize with them.” (1107a28-33) We already know that in order to explain why a particular act is virtuous we must locate this action in the mean of some relevant scale—this statement has a wide range of application—but in order to appreciate its truth, we must see how it applies to particular virtuous actions, since we are, most fundamentally, concerned with the rightness of individual actions. Aristotle, then, wants to show us that by applying his schema properly we can generate adequate explanation of the rightness of particular actions. In the remainder of II.7 Aristotle lists the various scales that are relevant to each virtue. And whenever possible he introduces the relevant vocabulary we should use in our explanation. For example, if we want to explain why an act is courageous, we should locate the agent’s emotional state while performing the action as a mean on a scale (or scales)18 of fear and confidence; the agent might be reckless if he exceeds in confidence, or cowardly if he is deficient in confidence. If we want to explain why an action is generous we should locate the action as a mean on a scale ranging from stinginess to extravagance. Aristotle goes on to list relevant scales for other virtues. Yet he is well aware that even now we have only been given a sketch—“For our present purposes, we must rest content with an outline and a summary, but we shall later define these qualities more precisely” (II.7:1107b15). By the end of II.7, if we are asked, for example, why Ms. Smith’s act of donating $100,000 to cancer research is generous, we could say that she chose to perform this action, and that given her economic and social situation, donating $100,000 to this cause was neither stingy nor extravagant. Moreover, we know that if she did not take pleasure in her generous donation, then she did not act generously. This explanatory schema does not generate deductive explanations. From the fact that Ms. Smith’s action was neither stingy nor extravagant it does not follow that her action was right or virtuous; there may have been other, more urgent, causes to which to donate, or there could have been good reasons not to donate to the particular organization that she had chosen. So explanations produced by applying Aristotle’s explanatory schema do not guarantee the truth of the explanandum.19 But as we have seen, Aristotle insists that we “should not demand to know the reason why in the same way in all matters,” and that explanations in ethics “do not admit of demonstrations.” This is why it is important for Aristotle that we already know that the action is right before we explain why it is right; that the act is right is part of the data we have at our disposal when we explain its rightness. The reading of Aristotle I propose helps us to make sense of several features of Aristotle’s work that commentators have found perplexing. First, it helps us to understand the importance of the doctrine of the mean for Aristotle’s project. Some readers of the NE are puzzled by the seriousness with which Aristotle approaches the doctrine of the mean. As Broadie (1991) puts it: Aristotle regards the doctrine of the mean as an important contribution, to judge by the solemnity with which he introduces it and the many pages where he strains over the details of its application. Yet the doctrine often gets a disappointed reception. It seems at first to offer special illumination, but in the end, according to its critics, it only deals with truisms together with a questionable taxonomy of virtues and vices. (95) On my reading the doctrine of the mean plays an important explanatory role which lies at the heart of Aristotle’s project. Although the doctrine of the mean doesn’t identify for us the features that make right actions right, it does tell us what a proper explanation of the rightness of a particular action should look like. We obtain a satisfactory explanation only when we replace the truisms about the harmful effects of excess and deficiency and the positive effects of the proportionate amount with the specific features of the action/situation; i.e., we must identify the relevant scale on which the action lies in the mean, and we have to identify the mean relative to the agent of the action and the situation in which the act is performed. This is why Aristotle methodically lists not only those virtues and vices that have names, but also those that do not have names, and this is why he identifies those qualities that resemble virtues but are not quite virtues. The proper explanation of the rightness of each individual action depends on the specific features of the particular act in question. “What sort of things are to be chosen and in return for what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular cases” (III.1:1110b8, Ross trans.). There is no algorithm that we can use to generate adequate explanations, as Aristotle emphasizes again in III.4: “What is good and pleasant differs with different characteristics and conditions, and perhaps the chief distinction of a man of high moral standards is his ability to see the truth in each particular moral question, since he is, as it were, the standard and measure for such questions” (1113a31-34). This is why Aristotle gives us many examples of how to generate explanations by substituting the truisms in the generic explanatory schema with particular features of actions. In his discussion of courage Aristotle specifies different possible objects of fear (e.g., death, poverty, disease), and various contexts in which one could exemplify courage (e.g., in battle, at sea, in illness). “sHe is courageous,” we are told, who endures and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right manner, and at the right time, and who displays confidence in similar ways. For a courageous man feels and acts according to the merits of each case and as reason guides him.” (III.7:1115b19-20) When we explain the rightness of a particular courageous action, we must replace the hedges (“the right things,” “in the right manner,” etc.) with specific features of the action in question; for example, his action was courageous because he left his family in order to join the army and he risked his life in order to protect his country when no non-military option was available to resolve the conflict.” (7-14) 10 +Thus, the standard is appealing to virtuous character clarified by the moral complexities of specific situations. To clarify, the standard is not consequentialist since that would rely on the rule of maximizing utility preceding every context that it applies to. Virtuous character requires commitment to particularistic decision making, so the rule of maximizing utility in every context cannot frame how to do actions. 11 + 12 +Analytic 13 + 14 +Analytic . 15 + 16 +Third, even if the AC specifies instances where constitutionally protected speech is good, it’s still a universal application of those instances, since there are still scenarios that fall outsides of the practice. Remember, the NC doesn’t appeal to rules, and there is no universal structure to practices. 17 +DANCY: “Ethics Without Principles” by Jonathan Dancy 2004 18 +Deductive reasoning is like this; an inference, once logically valid, remains so no matter what one adds as a premise (even if it be the negation of one of the original premises). Brandom's in the example is non- monotonic, since the cogent inference in (1) is reversed by the addition of the further consideration that the match is in a strong electromagnetic field. If one allows that this sort of thing can happen, is one therefore a holist in my sense? One would be a holist if the fact that I am striking a dry, well-made match is functioning as a reason for believing that it will light in the first case, but not in the second or the fourth. But Brandom is not trying to allude to that sort of possibility by his example. His point is rather the sort of phenomenon we find in chemistry: a feature may have a certain effect when alone, even though its combination with another feature will have the opposite effect. One could call this a ‘holistic’ point perfectly sensibly, but it is not holistic in my sense of that term. Holism in my sense is the claim that a feature which has a certain effect when alone can have the opposite effect in a combination. It is one thing to say, as Brandom does, that though a alone speaks in favour of action, a+b speaks as a whole against it; it is another to say that though a speaks in favour of action when alone, it speaks against action when in combination. The difference lies in what is doing the speaking against in cases where features are combined. In the former case (Brandom's) it is the combination; in the latter case (mine) it is the feature that originally spoke in favour. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,55 @@ 1 +The border is a zone of difference which makes possible violence in the borderland. Rigid distinctions between epistemological systems of thinking cannot account for hybridity. Embracing the borderland resist colonialism within epistemology itself. 2 +KYNČLOVÁ 1 : 3 +Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 4 + 5 +“The border functions 6 +AND 7 +civil war within representation” (xiv).” (2) 8 + 9 +Our approach is not purely grounded in the theoretical. The epistemology of binaries creates categories of normality within both sides of the dualism. This subjugates the lived experiences of those who can’t fit neither side of the border. 10 +KYNČLOVÁ 2 : 11 +Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 12 + 13 +“The physical presence of 14 +AND 15 +methodology of Borderlands/La Frontera.” (3-4) 16 + 17 +The United States is founded on rugged individualism made possible by the colonial gaze of manifest destiny. This sets up the stage for borders and inevitable violence towards those in the borderland. 18 +KYNČLOVÁ 3 : 19 +Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 20 + 21 +“On the metaphorical level, 22 +AND 23 +in my presence (156).” (7) � 24 + 25 +The affirmative’s focus on social norms in the construction of identity is a counterproductive starting point. We relate meaning to our experiences from social norms but these are simply deterritorialized views of the world that do not allow us to see beyond the border. We must embrace new meaning beyond the border of what is socially institutionalized. 26 +KYNČLOVÁ 4 : 27 +Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 28 + 29 +“Further, Slotkin’s theoretical 30 +AND 31 +and struggle for recognition.” (2) 32 + 33 +Prohibition reinscribes domination 34 +Ball n.d: 35 +Ball n.d (Anna, University of Manchester, “Writing in the Margins: Exploring the Borderlands in the Work of Janet Frame and Jane Champion,” Borders and Boundaries, Esharp Issue 5, n.d. http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_41163_en.pdf, TW) 36 + 37 +How might the border, 38 +AND 39 +defended, fought over. (2002, p.198) 40 + 41 +The alternative is to embrace NEPANTLA as a starting point for an epistemology that recognizes the exclusion of the borderland through dualisms. This creates the possibility of bridging the object-subject duality that keeps the mestiza a prisoner by recuperating the possibility of a space in between that allows us to theorize about new forms of becoming and productive epistemologies. 42 +Zaccaria: 43 +PAOLA ZACCARIA Living in El Lugar of Transformations, Translating Vision into Writing UH-DD 44 + 45 +“In my opinion all 46 +AND 47 +multicultural/mestizo/nepantla translationscapes.” (186-191) 48 + 49 +The role of the ballot is to adopt Nepantla pedagogy. Outweighs their role of the ballot – their unquestionable starting point of needing to construct debate through a singular axis rein trenches borders and epistemological colonialism in education. 50 +Abraham: 51 +Abraham, S. (2014). A Nepantla pedagogy: Comparing Anzaldúa’s and Bakhtin’s Ideas for pedagogical and social change. Critical Education, 5(5). University of Georgia UH-DD 52 + 53 +“Nepantla is the site of 54 +AND 55 +school pedagogies and frame our educational research (Gonzalez-Lopez, 2006; Keating, 2006). - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,17 @@ 1 +CP Text: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought to completely prohibit revenge pornography. 2 +Counter plan is mutually exclusive – the plan allows revenge porn on college campuses because it’s constitutionally protected meaning perms are severance. 3 +The distribution of revenge pornography is constitutionally protected speech – aff allows it on college campuses. 4 +Goldberg 16 Erica Goldberg Columbia Law Review Volume 116, No. 3 April 2016 "FREE SPEECH CONSEQUENTIALISM" 5 +The regulation of revenge porn presents thorny First Amendment issues 6 +… 7 +emotional distress and are considered by some to pos- sess little value; this is nothing more than a call for judges to make whole- sale and retail judgments about the value and harms that flow from particular forms of speech. If revenge porn can be regulated, legislators should not target the victim's emotional distress or the invasion of pri- vacy, as these focal points threaten to undermine strong free speech pro- tections exceptional to America's free speech regime. 8 +CP solves – deters perpetrators and creates a cultural shift. 9 +Citron 14 Danielle Keats Citron, Mary Anne Franks"CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN" 4/21/2014 https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/isp/documents/danielle_citron_-_criminalizing_revenge_porn_-_fesc.pdf 10 +A criminal law solution is essential to deter 11 +… 12 +distribution of certain kinds of sexual images are harmful. 13 +Revenge porn causes chilling effect for victims who are afraid to speak out and are silenced. Causes psychological and irreversible violence to victims. 14 +Citron 14 Danielle Keats Citron Mary Anne Franks 2014 "CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN" Wake Forest Law Review digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2424andcontext=fac_pubs 15 +Victims’ fear can be profound. 16 +… 17 +it constitutes a vicious form of sex discrimination. - EntryDate
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