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... ... @@ -1,21 +1,0 @@ 1 -Same FW 2 - 3 -New cards: 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 -====The sovereign must be the one defining meaning in the economy of violence to make the final discriminative judgement, otherwise we have absolute violence. PARRISH Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract 7:4 ~| © 2004 Rick Parrish //AK==== 9 -All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign’s first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign." Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the‘ primary terms in which ~~people~~ men try to conduct their social lives." "The whole raison d’entre of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes," without which humans would "fly off in all directions" and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition. 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 -====Thus the standard is adhering to the will of the sovereign. ==== 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 -====Independently, The sovereign is inevitable. All persons want to become meaning creators and eventually a sovereign will be formed. Parrish 2 Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract 7:4 ~| © 2004 Rick Parrish Quotes are from Hobbes //AK==== 18 -But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that in the state of nature persons must not only try to control as many objects as possible — they must also try to control as many persons as possible. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among ~~persons in the state of nature~~ there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. Persons, as rationally self-interested beings who "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and value themselves above all others, attempt to force that valuation on others. "The human desire for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," is therefore primarily about subsuming others beneath one's own personhood, as direct objects or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that this discursive struggle rapidly becomes physical by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 The ultimate violence, the surest and most complete way of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning. 19 - 20 - 21 -Contention is analytic - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,55 +1,0 @@ 1 -The border is a zone of difference which makes possible violence in the borderland. Rigid distinctions between epistemological systems of thinking cannot account for hybridity. Embracing the borderland resist colonialism within epistemology itself. 2 -KYNČLOVÁ 1 : 3 -Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 4 - 5 -“The border functions 6 -AND 7 -civil war within representation” (xiv).” (2) 8 - 9 -Our approach is not purely grounded in the theoretical. The epistemology of binaries creates categories of normality within both sides of the dualism. This subjugates the lived experiences of those who can’t fit neither side of the border. 10 -KYNČLOVÁ 2 : 11 -Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 12 - 13 -“The physical presence of 14 -AND 15 -methodology of Borderlands/La Frontera.” (3-4) 16 - 17 -The United States is founded on rugged individualism made possible by the colonial gaze of manifest destiny. This sets up the stage for borders and inevitable violence towards those in the borderland. 18 -KYNČLOVÁ 3 : 19 -Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 20 - 21 -“On the metaphorical level, 22 -AND 23 -in my presence (156).” (7) � 24 - 25 -The affirmative’s focus on social norms in the construction of identity is a counterproductive starting point. We relate meaning to our experiences from social norms but these are simply deterritorialized views of the world that do not allow us to see beyond the border. We must embrace new meaning beyond the border of what is socially institutionalized. 26 -KYNČLOVÁ 4 : 27 -Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 28 - 29 -“Further, Slotkin’s theoretical 30 -AND 31 -and struggle for recognition.” (2) 32 - 33 -Prohibition reinscribes domination 34 -Ball n.d: 35 -Ball n.d (Anna, University of Manchester, “Writing in the Margins: Exploring the Borderlands in the Work of Janet Frame and Jane Champion,” Borders and Boundaries, Esharp Issue 5, n.d. http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_41163_en.pdf, TW) 36 - 37 -How might the border, 38 -AND 39 -defended, fought over. (2002, p.198) 40 - 41 -The alternative is to embrace NEPANTLA as a starting point for an epistemology that recognizes the exclusion of the borderland through dualisms. This creates the possibility of bridging the object-subject duality that keeps the mestiza a prisoner by recuperating the possibility of a space in between that allows us to theorize about new forms of becoming and productive epistemologies. 42 -Zaccaria: 43 -PAOLA ZACCARIA Living in El Lugar of Transformations, Translating Vision into Writing UH-DD 44 - 45 -“In my opinion all 46 -AND 47 -multicultural/mestizo/nepantla translationscapes.” (186-191) 48 - 49 -The role of the ballot is to adopt Nepantla pedagogy. Outweighs their role of the ballot – their unquestionable starting point of needing to construct debate through a singular axis rein trenches borders and epistemological colonialism in education. 50 -Abraham: 51 -Abraham, S. (2014). A Nepantla pedagogy: Comparing Anzaldúa’s and Bakhtin’s Ideas for pedagogical and social change. Critical Education, 5(5). University of Georgia UH-DD 52 - 53 -“Nepantla is the site of 54 -AND 55 -school pedagogies and frame our educational research (Gonzalez-Lopez, 2006; Keating, 2006). - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,18 +1,0 @@ 1 -K 2 -Framing - To be coherently critical of the university within the university is always to recognize and be recognized by it, and therefore contained. The AC is an example of the neutrality of the university, allowing more radical theories to be disregarded as unprofessional. Harney and Moten 13: 3 - (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 29) 4 -Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding es- cape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.¶ The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condi- tion of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.¶ Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the uni- versity. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowl- edge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.¶ But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unreg- ulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.¶ A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not pro- gress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Univer- sitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons. 5 - 6 -Links - Fascists are granted protection by the state to promote reactionary views, crying for the lack of free expression, but only using the right as a political tool to promote hatred and fascism. Anon 10: 7 -Not Just Free Speech, but Freedom Itself A Critique of Civil Liberties - Anonymous 2010 - Published originally in the ninth issue ofRolling Thunder magazine; republished in the zine The Divorce of Thought from Deed: Social Conflict, White Supremacy, and Free Speech at UNC-Chapel Hill by the North Carolina Piece Corps. - https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/not-just-free-speech-but-freedom-itself 8 -But anti-authoritarians aren’t the only ones who have taken up the banner of free speech. More recently, the right wing in the US has begun to argue that the failure to give conservative views an equal footing with liberal views constitutes a suppression of their free speech. By accusing “liberal” universities and media of suppressing conservative views—a laughable assertion, given the massive structures of power and funding advancing these—they use First Amendment discourse to promote reactionary agendas. Supposedly progressive campuses reveal their true colors as they mobilize institutional power to defend right-wing territory in the marketplace of ideas, going so far as to censor and intimidate opposition. Extreme right and fascist organizations have jumped onto the free speech bandwagon as well. In the US, Anti-Racist Action and similar groups have been largely effective in disrupting their events and organizing efforts. Consequently, fascists now increasingly rely on the state to protect them, claiming that racist, anti-immigrant, and anti-gay organizing constitutes a form of legally protected speech—and within the framework of the ACLU, it does. Fascist groups that are prevented from publishing their material in most other industrialized democracies by laws restricting hate speech frequently publish it in the United States, where no such laws exist, and distribute it worldwide from here. So in practice, state protection of the right to free expression aids fascist organizing. If defending free speech has come to mean sponsoring wealthy right-wing politicians and enabling fascist recruiting, perhaps it is time for anarchists to reassess this principle. 9 - 10 - 11 -The state uses free speech as a strategy of pacification – the sovereign wants the masses to “blow off steam” instead of devising strategies against the state. We are told to find security in the state, and remain passive to fascist acts. Anon 2: 12 -Appeals to this tradition of unrestricted expression confer legitimacy on groups with views outside the mainstream, and both fascists and radicals capitalize on this. Lawyers often defend anarchist activity by referencing the First Amendment’s provision preventing legislation restricting the press or peaceable assembly. We can find allies who will support us in free speech cases who would never support us out of a shared vision of taking direct action to create a world free of hierarchy. The rhetoric of free speech and First Amendment rights give us a common language with which to broaden our range of support and make our resistance more comprehensible to potential allies, with whom we may build deeper connections over time. But at what cost? This discourse of rights seems to imply that the state is necessary to protect us against itself, as if it is a sort of Jekyll and Hyde split personality that simultaneously attacks us with laws and police and prosecutors while defending us with laws and attorneys and judges. If we accept this metaphor, it should not be surprising to find that the more we attempt to strengthen the arm that defends us, the stronger the arm that attacks us will become. Once freedom is defined as an assortment of rights granted by the state, it is easy to lose sight of the actual freedom those rights are meant to protect and focus instead on the rights themselves—implicitly accepting the legitimacy of the state. Thus, when we build visibility and support by using the rhetoric of rights, we may undercut the possibility of struggle against the state itself. We also open the door for the state to impose others’ “rights” upon us. The Civil Liberties Defense In the US, many take it for granted that it is easier for the state to silence and isolate radicals in countries in which free speech is not legally protected. If this is true, who wouldn’t want to strengthen legal protections on free speech? In fact, in nations in which free speech is not legally protected, radicals are not always more isolated—on the contrary, the average person is sometimes more sympathetic to those in conflict with the state, as it is more difficult for the state to legitimize itself as the defender of liberty. Laws do not tie the hands of the state nearly so much as public opposition can; given the choice between legal rights and popular support, radicals are much better off with the latter. One dictionary defines civil liberty as “the state of being subject only to laws established for the good of the community.” This sounds ideal to those who believe that laws enforced by hierarchical power can serve the “good of the community”—but who defines “the community” and what is good for it, if not those in power? In practice, the discourse of civil liberties enables the state to marginalize its foes: if there is a legitimate channel for every kind of expression, then those who refuse to play by the rules are clearly illegitimate. Thus we may read this definition the other way around: under “civil liberty,” all laws are for the good of the community, and any who challenge them must be against it. Focusing on the right to free speech, we see only two protagonists, the individual and the state. Rather than letting ourselves be drawn into the debate about what the state should allow, anarchists should focus on a third protagonist—the general public. We win or lose our struggle on the terrain of how much sovereignty the populace at large is willing to cede to the state, how much intrusion it is willing to put up with. If we must speak of rights at all, rather than argue that we have the right to free speech let us simply assert that the state has no right to suppress us. Better yet, let’s develop another language entirely. Free Speech and Democracy… The discourse of free speech in democracy presumes that no significant imbalances of power exist, and that the primary mechanism of change is rational discussion. In fact, a capitalist elite controls most resources, and power crystallizes upward along multiple axes of oppression. Against this configuration, it takes a lot more than speech alone to open the possibility of social change. There can be no truly free speech except among equals—among parties who are not just equal before the law, but who have comparable access to resources and equal say in the world they share. Can an employee really be said to be as free to express herself as her boss, if the latter can take away her livelihood? Are two people equally free to express their views when one owns a news network and the other cannot even afford to photocopy fliers? In the US, where donations to political candidates legally constitute speech, the more money you have, the more “free speech” you can exercise. As the slogan goes, freedom isn’t free—and nowhere is that clearer than with speech. Contrary to the propaganda of democracy, ideas alone have no intrinsic force. Our capacity to act on our beliefs, not just to express them, determines how much power we have. In this sense, the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor is strikingly apt: you need capital to participate, and the more you have, the greater your ability to enact the ideas you buy into. Just as the success of a few entrepreneurs and superstars is held up as proof that the free market rewards hard work and ingenuity, the myth of the marketplace of ideas suggests that the capitalist system persists because everyone—billionaire and bellboy alike—agrees it is the best idea. …So Long as You Don’t Do Anything But what if, despite the skewed playing field, someone manages to say something that threatens to destabilize the power structure? If history is any indication, it swiftly turns out that freedom of expression is not such a sacrosanct right after all. In practice, we are permitted free speech only insofar as expressing our views changes nothing. The premise that speech alone cannot be harmful implies that speech is precisely that which is ineffectual: therefore anything effectual is not included among one’s rights. During World War I, the Espionage Act criminalized any attempt to “cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty” or to obstruct recruiting for the armed forces. President Woodrow Wilson urged the bill’s passage because he believed antiwar activity could undermine the US war effort. Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman were arrested under this law for printing anarchist literature that opposed the war. Likewise, the Anarchist Exclusion Act and the subsequent Immigration Act were used to deport or deny entry to any immigrant “who disbelieves in or who is opposed to all organized government.” Berkman, Goldman, and hundreds of other anarchists were deported under these acts. There are countless other examples showing that when speech can threaten the foundation of state power, even the most democratic government doesn’t hesitate to suppress it. Thus, when the state presents itself as the defender of free speech, we can be sure that this is because our rulers believe that allowing criticism will strengthen their position more than suppressing it could. Liberal philosopher and ACLU member Thomas Emerson saw that freedom of speech “can act as a kind of ‘safety valve’ to let off steam when people might otherwise be bent on revolution.” Therein lies the true purpose of the right to free speech in the US. 13 -The impact is micro-fascism - As we come to view chaos and disorder as more harms to solve, we are willing to do worse and worse things to the world to preserve our stasis. Though we may achieve some degree of safety, it comes at the cost of mass violence against anything and everything viewed as dangerous which, ultimately is everything in life. The end result is a drive to purity of life that consumes even those that seek security. Seem 81: 14 -Seem, Mark, acupunturist and translator, Translator's Introduction to Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 15 -In confronting and finally overturning the Oedipal rock on which Man has chosen to take his stand, Anti-Oedipus comes as a kind of sequel to another similar venture, the attack on Christ, Christianity, and the herd in Nietzsche's The AntiChrist. For who would deny, AntiOedipus begins, that psychoanalysis was from the start, still is, and perhaps always will be a well-constituted church and a form of treatment based on a set of beliefs that only the very faithful could adhere to, ie., those who believe in a security that amounts to being lost in the herd and defined in terms of common and external goals? But where do such beliefs originate? What are they based on? For it is absolutely hopeless to think in terms of security, as Miller states in Sexus; "there is none. The man who looks for security, even in the mind, is like a man who would chop off his limbs in order to have artificial ones which will give him no pain or trouble" (page 428). No pain, no trouble-this is the neurotic's dream of a tranquilized and conflict-free existence. Such a set of beliefs, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate, such a herd instinct, is based on the desire to be led, the desire to have someone else legislate life. The very desire that was brought so glaringly into focus in Europe with Hitler, Mussolini, and fascism; the desire that is still at work, making us all sick, today. Anti-Oedipus starts by reviving Reich's completely serious question with respect to the rise of fascism: 'How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?' This is a question which the English and Americans are reluctant to deal with directly, tending too often to respond: "Fascism is a phenomenon that took place elsewhere, something that could only happen to others, but not to us; it's their problem." Is it though? Is fascism really a problem for others to deal with? Even revolutionary groups deal gingerly with the fascisizing elements we all carry deep within us, and yet they often possess a rarely analyzed but overriding group 'superego' that leads them to state, much like Nietzsche's man of ressentiment, that the other is evil (the Fascist! the Capitalist! the Communist!), and hence that they themselves are good. This conclusion is reached as an afterthought and a justification, a supremely self-righteous rationalization for a politics that can only "squint" at life, through the thick clouds of foul-smelling air that permeates secret meeting places and "security" councils. The man of ressentiment, as Nietzsche explains, "loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble."? Such a man, Nietzsche concludes, needs very much to believe in some neutral, independent "subject"-the ego-for he is prompted by an instinct of self-affirmation and self-preservation that cares little about preserving or affirming life, an instinct "in which every lie is sanctified.?" This is the realm of the silent majority. And it is into these back rooms, behind the closed doors of the analyst's office, in the wings of the Oedipal theater, that Deleuze and Guattari weave their way, exclaiming as does Nietzsche that it smells bad there, and that what is needed is "a breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world."In examining the problem of the subject, the behind-the-scenes reactive and reactionary man, Anti-Oedipus develops an approach that is decidedly diagnostic ("What constitutes our sickness today?") and profoundly healing as well. What it attempts to cure us of is the cure itself. Deleuze and Guattari term their approach "schizoanalysis," which they oppose on every count to psychoanalysis. Where the latter measures everything against neurosis and castration, schizoanalysis begins with the schizo, his breakdowns and his breakthroughs. For, they affirm, "a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch...." Against the Oedipal and oedipalized territorialities (Family, Church, School, Nation, Party), and especially the territoriality of the individual, Anti-Oedipus seeks to discover the "deterritorialized" flows of desire, the flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes and the neuroticized territorialities, the desiringmachines that escape such codes as lines of escape leading elsewhere. Much like R. D. Laing, Deleuze and Guattari aim to develop a materialistically and experientially based analysis of the "breakdowns" and the "breakthroughs" that characterize some of those labeled schizophrenic by psychiatry. Rather than view the creations and productions of desire-all of desiring-production-from the point of view of the norm and the normal, they force their analysis into the sphere of extremes. From paranoia to schizophrenia, from fascism to revolution, from breakdowns to breakthroughs, what is investigated is the process of life flows as they oscillate from one extreme to the other, on a scale of intensity that goes from 0 ("I never asked to be born ... leave me in peace"), the body without organs, to the nth power ("I am all that exists, all the names in history"), the schizophrenic process of desire. 16 -Alternative - Our response is a response of hopelessness in answer to the sucker’s game of power. It challenges the ruse of power which is the very assumption that our agency matters. Voting negative solves better it’s the disillusionment of the masses AND turns the AFF that assumes we can find security in the squo. Chaloupka 92: 17 - William, Dr. of Strange Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom By William Chaloupk, 92-3 18 -With rare (and often regretted, as in the infamous case of Allan Bloom) exceptions, student reaction to their own campus politics is the purest black hole. This reaction is always interpreted and deplored as "student apathy," a stubbornness to react to all those wonderful lectures and readings, even if these performances have yet to reassure a student body obviously terrified by their (just as obviously) diminishing prospects. On one level, such an analysis is a psychologizing tactic; the student psyche is to blame. But there is a different way to see it. Student politics, much of the time, seems to most students to be a "sucker's game," which one would engage only for psychological reasons, not to address power. In a sucker's game, there is some double bind arrayed, in place of chances to win. Most of the time, students are not able to negotiate with the people who matter most, in the scenes of power. Students don't set most of the taxes or many of the rules, even if the institutions of their governance seem governmental. There isn't even a police force.¶ Students react by going inert. They become a mass, silent. Those who have power over students insist that the wages of representation are responsibilities. An acute student recognizes that the opposite is true; only "irresponsible" behavior produces a real chance to negotiate with those in power. The contradiction means that all utterances about "the students" as a political force on campus will necessarily be metonymic. If a "mature student body" is mentioned, the coded reference is surely to large, always "enthusiastic," always infantilized rooting sections. Surely this irony is not lost on most students; embedded in an institution ostensibly dedicated to "higher" levels of everything —especially maturity and erudition — they discover that the standard by which the institution wishes to judge them is how well they have reverted to the old "school spirit" of their high school days.¶ Given the craziness of the game, as students might put it, they go inert, in just the same way as Baudrillard shows the public reacts to public opinion polls. Both "groups" refuse to be characterized, or at least refuse to participate by responding in the same spirit invited by those in power. Students refuse to participate in student government, and seldom speak of it seriously as a representative mechanism. Student elections continually evoke fake or cynical or self-consciously "just plain dumb" candidates with platforms to match; pranks abound, clearly denoting a refusal to take the charade seriously. For their part, the general public —some of whom may have learned this in college, as the saying goes — starts refusing to play the straight man to the pollster, leading pollsters and social science analysts to conclude that they are ill informed. We could argue, with just as much evidence, that their disappearance is a strategy, a subtle revenge.¶ This demise of representation, its removal from the center of all political acts, is an important development, but it does not necessarily end politics. An expressive practice could deny representation, could intervene in politics instead through disruption and ironic juxtaposition. In our present case, we might begin to wonder whether lifestyle expressions represent a preferred future (as they sometimes claim). Perhaps, instead, the whole system of solemn, serious expression of political positions is somehow undermined by these solemn and serious substitute lifestyles. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,21 @@ 1 +Same FW 2 + 3 +New cards: 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 +====The sovereign must be the one defining meaning in the economy of violence to make the final discriminative judgement, otherwise we have absolute violence. PARRISH Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract 7:4 ~| © 2004 Rick Parrish //AK==== 9 +All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign’s first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign." Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the‘ primary terms in which ~~people~~ men try to conduct their social lives." "The whole raison d’entre of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes," without which humans would "fly off in all directions" and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition. 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 +====Thus the standard is adhering to the will of the sovereign. ==== 14 + 15 + 16 + 17 +====Independently, The sovereign is inevitable. All persons want to become meaning creators and eventually a sovereign will be formed. Parrish 2 Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract 7:4 ~| © 2004 Rick Parrish Quotes are from Hobbes //AK==== 18 +But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that in the state of nature persons must not only try to control as many objects as possible — they must also try to control as many persons as possible. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among ~~persons in the state of nature~~ there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. Persons, as rationally self-interested beings who "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and value themselves above all others, attempt to force that valuation on others. "The human desire for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," is therefore primarily about subsuming others beneath one's own personhood, as direct objects or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that this discursive struggle rapidly becomes physical by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 The ultimate violence, the surest and most complete way of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning. 19 + 20 + 21 +Contention is analytic - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,18 @@ 1 +K 2 +Framing - To be coherently critical of the university within the university is always to recognize and be recognized by it, and therefore contained. The AC is an example of the neutrality of the university, allowing more radical theories to be disregarded as unprofessional. Harney and Moten 13: 3 + (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 29) 4 +Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding es- cape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.¶ The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condi- tion of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.¶ Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the uni- versity. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowl- edge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.¶ But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unreg- ulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.¶ A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not pro- gress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Univer- sitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons. 5 + 6 +Links - Fascists are granted protection by the state to promote reactionary views, crying for the lack of free expression, but only using the right as a political tool to promote hatred and fascism. Anon 10: 7 +Not Just Free Speech, but Freedom Itself A Critique of Civil Liberties - Anonymous 2010 - Published originally in the ninth issue ofRolling Thunder magazine; republished in the zine The Divorce of Thought from Deed: Social Conflict, White Supremacy, and Free Speech at UNC-Chapel Hill by the North Carolina Piece Corps. - https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/not-just-free-speech-but-freedom-itself 8 +But anti-authoritarians aren’t the only ones who have taken up the banner of free speech. More recently, the right wing in the US has begun to argue that the failure to give conservative views an equal footing with liberal views constitutes a suppression of their free speech. By accusing “liberal” universities and media of suppressing conservative views—a laughable assertion, given the massive structures of power and funding advancing these—they use First Amendment discourse to promote reactionary agendas. Supposedly progressive campuses reveal their true colors as they mobilize institutional power to defend right-wing territory in the marketplace of ideas, going so far as to censor and intimidate opposition. Extreme right and fascist organizations have jumped onto the free speech bandwagon as well. In the US, Anti-Racist Action and similar groups have been largely effective in disrupting their events and organizing efforts. Consequently, fascists now increasingly rely on the state to protect them, claiming that racist, anti-immigrant, and anti-gay organizing constitutes a form of legally protected speech—and within the framework of the ACLU, it does. Fascist groups that are prevented from publishing their material in most other industrialized democracies by laws restricting hate speech frequently publish it in the United States, where no such laws exist, and distribute it worldwide from here. So in practice, state protection of the right to free expression aids fascist organizing. If defending free speech has come to mean sponsoring wealthy right-wing politicians and enabling fascist recruiting, perhaps it is time for anarchists to reassess this principle. 9 + 10 + 11 +The state uses free speech as a strategy of pacification – the sovereign wants the masses to “blow off steam” instead of devising strategies against the state. We are told to find security in the state, and remain passive to fascist acts. Anon 2: 12 +Appeals to this tradition of unrestricted expression confer legitimacy on groups with views outside the mainstream, and both fascists and radicals capitalize on this. Lawyers often defend anarchist activity by referencing the First Amendment’s provision preventing legislation restricting the press or peaceable assembly. We can find allies who will support us in free speech cases who would never support us out of a shared vision of taking direct action to create a world free of hierarchy. The rhetoric of free speech and First Amendment rights give us a common language with which to broaden our range of support and make our resistance more comprehensible to potential allies, with whom we may build deeper connections over time. But at what cost? This discourse of rights seems to imply that the state is necessary to protect us against itself, as if it is a sort of Jekyll and Hyde split personality that simultaneously attacks us with laws and police and prosecutors while defending us with laws and attorneys and judges. If we accept this metaphor, it should not be surprising to find that the more we attempt to strengthen the arm that defends us, the stronger the arm that attacks us will become. Once freedom is defined as an assortment of rights granted by the state, it is easy to lose sight of the actual freedom those rights are meant to protect and focus instead on the rights themselves—implicitly accepting the legitimacy of the state. Thus, when we build visibility and support by using the rhetoric of rights, we may undercut the possibility of struggle against the state itself. We also open the door for the state to impose others’ “rights” upon us. The Civil Liberties Defense In the US, many take it for granted that it is easier for the state to silence and isolate radicals in countries in which free speech is not legally protected. If this is true, who wouldn’t want to strengthen legal protections on free speech? In fact, in nations in which free speech is not legally protected, radicals are not always more isolated—on the contrary, the average person is sometimes more sympathetic to those in conflict with the state, as it is more difficult for the state to legitimize itself as the defender of liberty. Laws do not tie the hands of the state nearly so much as public opposition can; given the choice between legal rights and popular support, radicals are much better off with the latter. One dictionary defines civil liberty as “the state of being subject only to laws established for the good of the community.” This sounds ideal to those who believe that laws enforced by hierarchical power can serve the “good of the community”—but who defines “the community” and what is good for it, if not those in power? In practice, the discourse of civil liberties enables the state to marginalize its foes: if there is a legitimate channel for every kind of expression, then those who refuse to play by the rules are clearly illegitimate. Thus we may read this definition the other way around: under “civil liberty,” all laws are for the good of the community, and any who challenge them must be against it. Focusing on the right to free speech, we see only two protagonists, the individual and the state. Rather than letting ourselves be drawn into the debate about what the state should allow, anarchists should focus on a third protagonist—the general public. We win or lose our struggle on the terrain of how much sovereignty the populace at large is willing to cede to the state, how much intrusion it is willing to put up with. If we must speak of rights at all, rather than argue that we have the right to free speech let us simply assert that the state has no right to suppress us. Better yet, let’s develop another language entirely. Free Speech and Democracy… The discourse of free speech in democracy presumes that no significant imbalances of power exist, and that the primary mechanism of change is rational discussion. In fact, a capitalist elite controls most resources, and power crystallizes upward along multiple axes of oppression. Against this configuration, it takes a lot more than speech alone to open the possibility of social change. There can be no truly free speech except among equals—among parties who are not just equal before the law, but who have comparable access to resources and equal say in the world they share. Can an employee really be said to be as free to express herself as her boss, if the latter can take away her livelihood? Are two people equally free to express their views when one owns a news network and the other cannot even afford to photocopy fliers? In the US, where donations to political candidates legally constitute speech, the more money you have, the more “free speech” you can exercise. As the slogan goes, freedom isn’t free—and nowhere is that clearer than with speech. Contrary to the propaganda of democracy, ideas alone have no intrinsic force. Our capacity to act on our beliefs, not just to express them, determines how much power we have. In this sense, the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor is strikingly apt: you need capital to participate, and the more you have, the greater your ability to enact the ideas you buy into. Just as the success of a few entrepreneurs and superstars is held up as proof that the free market rewards hard work and ingenuity, the myth of the marketplace of ideas suggests that the capitalist system persists because everyone—billionaire and bellboy alike—agrees it is the best idea. …So Long as You Don’t Do Anything But what if, despite the skewed playing field, someone manages to say something that threatens to destabilize the power structure? If history is any indication, it swiftly turns out that freedom of expression is not such a sacrosanct right after all. In practice, we are permitted free speech only insofar as expressing our views changes nothing. The premise that speech alone cannot be harmful implies that speech is precisely that which is ineffectual: therefore anything effectual is not included among one’s rights. During World War I, the Espionage Act criminalized any attempt to “cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty” or to obstruct recruiting for the armed forces. President Woodrow Wilson urged the bill’s passage because he believed antiwar activity could undermine the US war effort. Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman were arrested under this law for printing anarchist literature that opposed the war. Likewise, the Anarchist Exclusion Act and the subsequent Immigration Act were used to deport or deny entry to any immigrant “who disbelieves in or who is opposed to all organized government.” Berkman, Goldman, and hundreds of other anarchists were deported under these acts. There are countless other examples showing that when speech can threaten the foundation of state power, even the most democratic government doesn’t hesitate to suppress it. Thus, when the state presents itself as the defender of free speech, we can be sure that this is because our rulers believe that allowing criticism will strengthen their position more than suppressing it could. Liberal philosopher and ACLU member Thomas Emerson saw that freedom of speech “can act as a kind of ‘safety valve’ to let off steam when people might otherwise be bent on revolution.” Therein lies the true purpose of the right to free speech in the US. 13 +The impact is micro-fascism - As we come to view chaos and disorder as more harms to solve, we are willing to do worse and worse things to the world to preserve our stasis. Though we may achieve some degree of safety, it comes at the cost of mass violence against anything and everything viewed as dangerous which, ultimately is everything in life. The end result is a drive to purity of life that consumes even those that seek security. Seem 81: 14 +Seem, Mark, acupunturist and translator, Translator's Introduction to Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 15 +In confronting and finally overturning the Oedipal rock on which Man has chosen to take his stand, Anti-Oedipus comes as a kind of sequel to another similar venture, the attack on Christ, Christianity, and the herd in Nietzsche's The AntiChrist. For who would deny, AntiOedipus begins, that psychoanalysis was from the start, still is, and perhaps always will be a well-constituted church and a form of treatment based on a set of beliefs that only the very faithful could adhere to, ie., those who believe in a security that amounts to being lost in the herd and defined in terms of common and external goals? But where do such beliefs originate? What are they based on? For it is absolutely hopeless to think in terms of security, as Miller states in Sexus; "there is none. The man who looks for security, even in the mind, is like a man who would chop off his limbs in order to have artificial ones which will give him no pain or trouble" (page 428). No pain, no trouble-this is the neurotic's dream of a tranquilized and conflict-free existence. Such a set of beliefs, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate, such a herd instinct, is based on the desire to be led, the desire to have someone else legislate life. The very desire that was brought so glaringly into focus in Europe with Hitler, Mussolini, and fascism; the desire that is still at work, making us all sick, today. Anti-Oedipus starts by reviving Reich's completely serious question with respect to the rise of fascism: 'How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?' This is a question which the English and Americans are reluctant to deal with directly, tending too often to respond: "Fascism is a phenomenon that took place elsewhere, something that could only happen to others, but not to us; it's their problem." Is it though? Is fascism really a problem for others to deal with? Even revolutionary groups deal gingerly with the fascisizing elements we all carry deep within us, and yet they often possess a rarely analyzed but overriding group 'superego' that leads them to state, much like Nietzsche's man of ressentiment, that the other is evil (the Fascist! the Capitalist! the Communist!), and hence that they themselves are good. This conclusion is reached as an afterthought and a justification, a supremely self-righteous rationalization for a politics that can only "squint" at life, through the thick clouds of foul-smelling air that permeates secret meeting places and "security" councils. The man of ressentiment, as Nietzsche explains, "loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble."? Such a man, Nietzsche concludes, needs very much to believe in some neutral, independent "subject"-the ego-for he is prompted by an instinct of self-affirmation and self-preservation that cares little about preserving or affirming life, an instinct "in which every lie is sanctified.?" This is the realm of the silent majority. And it is into these back rooms, behind the closed doors of the analyst's office, in the wings of the Oedipal theater, that Deleuze and Guattari weave their way, exclaiming as does Nietzsche that it smells bad there, and that what is needed is "a breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world."In examining the problem of the subject, the behind-the-scenes reactive and reactionary man, Anti-Oedipus develops an approach that is decidedly diagnostic ("What constitutes our sickness today?") and profoundly healing as well. What it attempts to cure us of is the cure itself. Deleuze and Guattari term their approach "schizoanalysis," which they oppose on every count to psychoanalysis. Where the latter measures everything against neurosis and castration, schizoanalysis begins with the schizo, his breakdowns and his breakthroughs. For, they affirm, "a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch...." Against the Oedipal and oedipalized territorialities (Family, Church, School, Nation, Party), and especially the territoriality of the individual, Anti-Oedipus seeks to discover the "deterritorialized" flows of desire, the flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes and the neuroticized territorialities, the desiringmachines that escape such codes as lines of escape leading elsewhere. Much like R. D. Laing, Deleuze and Guattari aim to develop a materialistically and experientially based analysis of the "breakdowns" and the "breakthroughs" that characterize some of those labeled schizophrenic by psychiatry. Rather than view the creations and productions of desire-all of desiring-production-from the point of view of the norm and the normal, they force their analysis into the sphere of extremes. From paranoia to schizophrenia, from fascism to revolution, from breakdowns to breakthroughs, what is investigated is the process of life flows as they oscillate from one extreme to the other, on a scale of intensity that goes from 0 ("I never asked to be born ... leave me in peace"), the body without organs, to the nth power ("I am all that exists, all the names in history"), the schizophrenic process of desire. 16 +Alternative - Our response is a response of hopelessness in answer to the sucker’s game of power. It challenges the ruse of power which is the very assumption that our agency matters. Voting negative solves better it’s the disillusionment of the masses AND turns the AFF that assumes we can find security in the squo. Chaloupka 92: 17 + William, Dr. of Strange Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom By William Chaloupk, 92-3 18 +With rare (and often regretted, as in the infamous case of Allan Bloom) exceptions, student reaction to their own campus politics is the purest black hole. This reaction is always interpreted and deplored as "student apathy," a stubbornness to react to all those wonderful lectures and readings, even if these performances have yet to reassure a student body obviously terrified by their (just as obviously) diminishing prospects. On one level, such an analysis is a psychologizing tactic; the student psyche is to blame. But there is a different way to see it. Student politics, much of the time, seems to most students to be a "sucker's game," which one would engage only for psychological reasons, not to address power. In a sucker's game, there is some double bind arrayed, in place of chances to win. Most of the time, students are not able to negotiate with the people who matter most, in the scenes of power. Students don't set most of the taxes or many of the rules, even if the institutions of their governance seem governmental. There isn't even a police force.¶ Students react by going inert. They become a mass, silent. Those who have power over students insist that the wages of representation are responsibilities. An acute student recognizes that the opposite is true; only "irresponsible" behavior produces a real chance to negotiate with those in power. The contradiction means that all utterances about "the students" as a political force on campus will necessarily be metonymic. If a "mature student body" is mentioned, the coded reference is surely to large, always "enthusiastic," always infantilized rooting sections. Surely this irony is not lost on most students; embedded in an institution ostensibly dedicated to "higher" levels of everything —especially maturity and erudition — they discover that the standard by which the institution wishes to judge them is how well they have reverted to the old "school spirit" of their high school days.¶ Given the craziness of the game, as students might put it, they go inert, in just the same way as Baudrillard shows the public reacts to public opinion polls. Both "groups" refuse to be characterized, or at least refuse to participate by responding in the same spirit invited by those in power. Students refuse to participate in student government, and seldom speak of it seriously as a representative mechanism. Student elections continually evoke fake or cynical or self-consciously "just plain dumb" candidates with platforms to match; pranks abound, clearly denoting a refusal to take the charade seriously. For their part, the general public —some of whom may have learned this in college, as the saying goes — starts refusing to play the straight man to the pollster, leading pollsters and social science analysts to conclude that they are ill informed. We could argue, with just as much evidence, that their disappearance is a strategy, a subtle revenge.¶ This demise of representation, its removal from the center of all political acts, is an important development, but it does not necessarily end politics. An expressive practice could deny representation, could intervene in politics instead through disruption and ironic juxtaposition. In our present case, we might begin to wonder whether lifestyle expressions represent a preferred future (as they sometimes claim). Perhaps, instead, the whole system of solemn, serious expression of political positions is somehow undermined by these solemn and serious substitute lifestyles. - EntryDate
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... ... @@ -1,0 +1,55 @@ 1 +The border is a zone of difference which makes possible violence in the borderland. Rigid distinctions between epistemological systems of thinking cannot account for hybridity. Embracing the borderland resist colonialism within epistemology itself. 2 +KYNČLOVÁ 1 : 3 +Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 4 + 5 +“The border functions 6 +AND 7 +civil war within representation” (xiv).” (2) 8 + 9 +Our approach is not purely grounded in the theoretical. The epistemology of binaries creates categories of normality within both sides of the dualism. This subjugates the lived experiences of those who can’t fit neither side of the border. 10 +KYNČLOVÁ 2 : 11 +Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 12 + 13 +“The physical presence of 14 +AND 15 +methodology of Borderlands/La Frontera.” (3-4) 16 + 17 +The United States is founded on rugged individualism made possible by the colonial gaze of manifest destiny. This sets up the stage for borders and inevitable violence towards those in the borderland. 18 +KYNČLOVÁ 3 : 19 +Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 20 + 21 +“On the metaphorical level, 22 +AND 23 +in my presence (156).” (7) � 24 + 25 +The affirmative’s focus on social norms in the construction of identity is a counterproductive starting point. We relate meaning to our experiences from social norms but these are simply deterritorialized views of the world that do not allow us to see beyond the border. We must embrace new meaning beyond the border of what is socially institutionalized. 26 +KYNČLOVÁ 4 : 27 +Tereza Jiroutová Kynčlová, « Elastic, Yet Unyielding: The U.S.-Mexico Border and Anzaldúa’s Oppositional Rearticulations of the Frontier », European journal of American studies Online, Vol 9, No 3 | 2014, document 3, Online since 23 December 2014, connection on 17 August 2016. URL : http://ejas.revues.org/10384 ; DOI : 10.4000/ Special Issue: Transnational Approaches to North American Regionalism UH-DD 28 + 29 +“Further, Slotkin’s theoretical 30 +AND 31 +and struggle for recognition.” (2) 32 + 33 +Prohibition reinscribes domination 34 +Ball n.d: 35 +Ball n.d (Anna, University of Manchester, “Writing in the Margins: Exploring the Borderlands in the Work of Janet Frame and Jane Champion,” Borders and Boundaries, Esharp Issue 5, n.d. http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_41163_en.pdf, TW) 36 + 37 +How might the border, 38 +AND 39 +defended, fought over. (2002, p.198) 40 + 41 +The alternative is to embrace NEPANTLA as a starting point for an epistemology that recognizes the exclusion of the borderland through dualisms. This creates the possibility of bridging the object-subject duality that keeps the mestiza a prisoner by recuperating the possibility of a space in between that allows us to theorize about new forms of becoming and productive epistemologies. 42 +Zaccaria: 43 +PAOLA ZACCARIA Living in El Lugar of Transformations, Translating Vision into Writing UH-DD 44 + 45 +“In my opinion all 46 +AND 47 +multicultural/mestizo/nepantla translationscapes.” (186-191) 48 + 49 +The role of the ballot is to adopt Nepantla pedagogy. Outweighs their role of the ballot – their unquestionable starting point of needing to construct debate through a singular axis rein trenches borders and epistemological colonialism in education. 50 +Abraham: 51 +Abraham, S. (2014). A Nepantla pedagogy: Comparing Anzaldúa’s and Bakhtin’s Ideas for pedagogical and social change. Critical Education, 5(5). University of Georgia UH-DD 52 + 53 +“Nepantla is the site of 54 +AND 55 +school pedagogies and frame our educational research (Gonzalez-Lopez, 2006; Keating, 2006). - EntryDate
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