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+Deconstructive logic is constitutive of metaphysics. All concepts, identities, and judgements are constructed in opposition to their negative. There can be no conception of good without bad, friendship without betrayal, promises without promise breaking. Ontological violence is foundational to any ethical or political framework. HÄGGLUND: |
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+“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND // UH-DD |
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+“Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has ... of perpetrating the better.” (46-48) |
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+And, deconstructive logic is a criticism of ideal starting points. The logic of opposition is incompatible with universal starting points that do away with violence. HÄGGLUND 2: |
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+“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND // UH-DD |
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+“An possible objection here ... idea of absolute violence.” (49) |
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+Framework Implications: |
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+A. Controls the internal link to every other framework because any theory requires us to choose a conception of the good otherwise they are baseless and cannot prescribe an obligation. So, other theories would have to concede exclusion of beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place. |
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+B. Controls the internal link to any judge obligation. The ballot forces the judge to make a decision between who did the better debating, which inherently entails a judgement of discrimination because any decision assumes a paradigm for what better debating entails, which necessarily discriminates between various interpretations. |
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+Thus, the standard is consistency with deconstructive logic. To clarify, violations of deconstructive logic entail the construction of judgements as pure and without the necessity of an oppositional negative. |
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+Independently prefer: |
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+First, ethics requires answering the question of responsibility otherwise agents can always question why they are subject to the rule i.e “I know that a certain principle is moral, but why should I care about acting morally.” However, any conception of ethical responsibility is rooted in deconstructive logic. HÄGGLUND 3: |
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+“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND // UH-DD |
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+“For the same reason, Derridaʼs ... the necessity of discrimination.” (56) |
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+Second, ethical relationships are mediated through radical alterity. The other is always undecidable and carries the possibility of annihilating me, yet this very condition is necessary to have any relationship whatsoever. This requires a violent opening to ethics. HÄGGLUND 4: |
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+“THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS” MARTIN HÄGGLUND // UH-DD |
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+“Thus, Derrida articulates ... it in Politics of Friendship 122/143.” (Pg. 52) |
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+Contention: Analytic |