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+====Moral disagreement means epistemic reliability must be the starting point for ethics.==== |
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+Neil **Sinhababu '13** The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism, Associate Professor of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, Meta-Ethics, Philosophy of Action, Nietzsche, National University of Singapore |
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+While widespread error leaves open the possibility that one has true beliefs, it reduces |
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+AND |
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+. (Thus the pronoun 'we' in 3, 6, and 8.) |
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+====That means util—phenomenal introspection is most epistemically reliable.==== |
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+Neil **Sinhababu '13** The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism, Associate Professor of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, Meta-Ethics, Philosophy of Action, Nietzsche, National University of Singapore |
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+Even though phenomenal introspection only tells me about my own phenomenal states, I can |
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+AND |
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+favors the kind of universal hedonism that supports utilitarianism, not egoistic hedonism. |
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+====Thus, the standard is maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. Additionally:==== |
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+====Moral substitutability is true and only consequentialism explains it.==== |
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+Walter **Sinnott-Armstrong '92** Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics, AN ARGUMENT FOR CONSEQUENTIALISM |
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+Since general substitutability works for other kinds of reasons for action, we would need |
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+AND |
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+explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons. |
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+====We have no unified consciousness.==== |
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+**Parfit '84** (Derek, Reasons and Persons) brackets for gender |
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+Some recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View. Human |
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+AND |
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+, and can receive two different answers written by this person's two hands. |