Summary

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  • Caselist.RoundClass[27]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[42]

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Caselist.RoundClass[27]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-01-15 05:06:50.154
	1	+2017-01-15 05:06:50.0

Caselist.CitesClass[42]

Cites

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	1	+===Framework===
	2	+
	3	+
	4	+====I value morality.====
	5	+
	6	+
	7	+====Ascertaining a set of reductive criteria to ground ethics is impossible. We cannot possibly derive ethics, nor can we deny it. These principles are not only authoritative but authority itself. ====
	8	+**C.S. Lewis** ~~British novelist, poet, academic, medievalist, literary critic, essayist, lay theologian, and Christian apologist, employed at both Oxford and Cambridge~~ "the Abolition of Man" 1943. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/augustine/arch/lewis/abolition2.htm
	9	+Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be
	10	+AND
	11	+origin for the Tao is a question I am not here concerned with.
	12	+
	13	+
	14	+====In order to assist us, ethics must account for our own epistemic limitations. This is the function of regulative epistemology, which recognizes the plurality of epistemic projects and devotes itself to how we should practically make decisions. This involves determining the best sources for knowledge, i.e. seeking the right way to find the right answer instead of the right answer itself—it is a question of intellectual virtues.====
	15	+**Woods and Roberts '10** (Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models and Arch). January 4, 2010)
	16	+The triviality of standard epistemology's examples is due in part to the historical preoccupation with
	17	+AND
	18	+, with appreciation of the arts, and with the enterprise of education.
	19	+
	20	+
	21	+**====Continued====**
	22	+ Nicholas Wolterstorff distinguishes two kinds of epistemology, which he calls "analytic" and "regulative" . Analytic epistemology aims to produce theories of knowledge, rationality, warrant, justification, and so forth, and proceeds by attempting to define these terms. The English-speaking epistemology of the twentieth century is chiefly of this kind, and all of the virtue epistemologies of the last twenty-five years have been attempts to turn the intellectual virtues to the purposes of analytic epistemology. Regulative epistemology, which is the kind mostly practiced by Locke and Descartes and others of their period, does not aim to produce a theory of knowledge (though something like classical foundationalism does get produced as a by-product by Locke and Descartes). Instead, it tries to generate guidance for epistemic practice, " how we ought to conduct our understandings, what we ought to do by way of forming beliefs" (p. **xvi**). Regulative epistemology is a response to perceived deficiencies in people's epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly practical and social, rather than just an interesting theoretical challenge for philosophy professors and smart students. This kind of epistemology aims to change the (social) world. According to Wolterstorff, Locke's regulative epistemology was a response to the social and intellectual crisis created by the breakup of medieval Christendom's intellectual consensus. As Locke and others saw it, people's intellectual lives needed to be reformed-— based on reason, rather than tradition or passions— because only thus could disagreements about the most fundamental issues, along with the resulting social conflicts, be resolved. But Locke also saw the need for reformation as perennial and genetically human: "I think there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment." Since "we are all short sighted" , seeing things from our own particular angle and not possessing comprehensive faculties, we need to learn the habit and inclination to consult others whose opinions differ from our own and read outside our discipline.21 In effect, Wolterstorff distinguishes two kinds of regulative epistemology, a rule-oriented kind and a habit-oriented kind (see pp. 152—4). Rule oriented epistemology, exemplified by Descartes's Discourse on Method and Rules for the Direction of the Mind, provides procedural directions for acquiring knowledge, avoiding error, and conducting oneself rationally.22 By contrast, Locke's regulative epistemology, as exemplified in Book IV of Ills Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, aims less at the direct regulation of epistemic conduct than at the description of the habits of mind of the epistemicaily rational person. As Locke comments, Nobody is made anything by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory... and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician, extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker, or a strict reasoner, by a set of rules, showing him wherein right reasoning consists. (Conduct, §4, p. 175) We need not rule-books, but a training that nurtures people in the right intellectual dispositions. Wolterstorff emphasizes that Locke focuses not on the belief-producing mechanisms or faculties that are native to the human mind, but instead on the ways in which such natural faculties are employed in more complex intellectual practices, which have a social dimension and are culturally shaped. Locke aims to reform that culture, to reshape the practices, and thus to foster in his contemporaries habits that support the reshaped practices. It is implicit in Locke's discussions, and often explicit as well, that the habits in question are not mere habits, but virtues. Many habits are nothing more than skills— expertise in plying methods and techniques— but the habits that Locke describes are in many cases " habits of the heart" , determinate dispositional states of concern, desire, and pleasure and pain, rather than mere habituated aptitudes. We will return to Locke when we take up the topic of intellectual practices in Chapter 5 The virtues epistemology of this book is a return to this tradition of the seventeenth century, to a regulative epistemology which, like Locke's, describes the personal dispositions of the agent rather than providing direct rules o f epistemic action. It focuses on forming the practitioner's character and is strongly education-oriented. The stress on intellectual virtues that has arisen among us is a start that can be felicitously developed in the regulative direction. Like Locke's, our book is a response to a perception of deficiency in the epistemic agents of our time. But it is not a response to any particular historical upheaval or social crisis. We see a perennial set of deficiencies which in every generation need to be corrected, and a perennial positive need for formation in dispositions o f intellectual excellence. Our response to pluralism of belief systems differs from that of Locke and his fellow promoters of the life of " reason" . Our regulative epistemology does not aim at quieting fundamental disagreement. Virtues presuppose one or another particular metaphysical or world-view background, and the prospect of securing universal agreement about that is dim. However, several of the virtues that we will discuss in Part II broaden minds and civilize intellectual exchange. The formation of excellent intellectual agents is clearly the business of schools and parents. They are the chief educators of character. But Locke and Descartes think that philosophers have a role as well, and we agree. What is that role, and how does it work? How do philosophers contribute to the regulation of intellectual character? The role that we picture for ourselves both resembles and diverges from the one that epistemologists in the twentieth century implicitly accepted for themselves.
	23	+
	24	+
	25	+====Thus, any educational activity should pursue intellectual virtues. Virtues, such as humility, require one to recognize cognitive limitations and epistemic authority of experts. We need to learn what authorities to trust, not to move away from trust in authorities.====
	26	+**Woods and Roberts '10** (Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models and Arch). January 4, 2010)
	27	+Thomas Reid pointed out that we humans tend to believe what we're told. He
	28	+AND
	29	+come close to collecting all the truths they need to function well intellectually.
	30	+
	31	+
	32	+**====They continue====**
	33	+The threat posed by an undisciplined credulity disposition is gullibility, but in some intellectual ambiences a wholesale fastidiousness about belief formation may be the problem. Plantinga's discussion of testimony is less polemical than his discussion of self-knowledge, but it might have been directed against a tendency suggested by some of the writings of Descartes, Locke, and Kant. These epistemologists are suspicious of testimony because it seems to compromise the principle that each person should be responsible for his own cognitions and because testimony may seem to be a generally low-grade kind of evidence. But, given natural human limitations, and the way things go according to the human cognitive design plan, the early modern tendency to prescribe a general suspicion of tradition and testimony could be read as an endorsement of epistemic arrogance and fastidiousness an insistence on the right and duty always to "see for oneself" . A character that made us generally suspicious of testimony or overly insistent on having in our own possession all the evidence supporting each of our beliefs, would be a paralyzing intellectual paranoia, a hyperindividualism that would be both unrealistic and, to the extent that it actually got instantiated as a personality trait, detrimental to our cognitive functioning. The virtues of intellectual humility and gratitude could be regarded as a liberation of the credulity disposition from unwarranted intellectual suspicion and distrust, and thus as dispositions promoting warrant in testimony circumstances.
	34	+
	35	+
	36	+====The standard is appealing to qualified moral authorities====
	37	+
	38	+
	39	+====Weighing appeals to intuitions – ignore calc indicts – intuitions are inescapable.====
	40	+**Huemer** (http://spot.colorado.edu/~~huemer/5.htm)
	41	+Other things being equal, it is reasonable to assume that things are the way
	42	+AND
	43	+, which are based upon what seems to the skeptic to be true.
	44	+
	45	+
	46	+====Rule-based ethics fail—future applications are indeterminate.====
	47	+**McGinnis '06** (Nicholas McGinnis 6 PhD, successfully defended his dissertation, On Philosophical Intuitions, at the University of Western Ontario in the Spring of 2015 under the supervision of Dr. Robert Stainton. He was born in Montreal, Canada and attended Concordia University where he completed both his B.A. (honours) and M.A. in philosophy. He is a member of the Rotman Institute of Science and Values. His work focuses on philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, metaphysics, and non-classical logic, "Wittgenstein's Influence on the Development of Virtue Ethics", A Thesis In The Department of Philosophy Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada, August 2006) OS
	48	+McDowell begins with Wittgenstein's example at §185 of PI (though, for Wittgenstein
	49	+AND
	50	+interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following argument and the consequences drawn from it.
	51	+
	52	+
	53	+===Contention 1 is MLK===
	54	+
	55	+
	56	+==== His philosophy on social justice compels him to affirm.====
	57	+**Moshman '16** (David, Intellectual freedom activist, "Martin Luther King on the First Amendment," Huff, 1/4, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-moshman/martin-luther-king-on-the_b_8911848.html) OS
	58	+The fall 2015 semester saw two overlapping student movements: one for intellectual and emotional
	59	+AND
	60	+whatever their cause, should recognize and insist on intellectual freedom for all.
	61	+
	62	+
	63	+===Contention 2 is Obama===
	64	+
	65	+
	66	+====He affirms—college students shouldn't be shielded.====
	67	+**Byrnes '15** (The Hill, Jesse, "Obama hits 'coddled' liberal college students," 9/15, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/253641-obama-hits-coddled-liberal-college-students) OS
	68	+President Obama is weighing in on the discussion over political dialogue on college campuses,
	69	+AND
	70	+to be coddled and protected from different points of views," he said.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-01-15 05:06:52.146

Judge

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	1	+sophia caldera

Opponent

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	1	+scarsdale ml

ParentRound

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	1	+27

Round

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	1	+4

Team

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	1	+Cambridge Rindge Sussman Aff

Title

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	1	+jf - 1ac - testimony

Tournament

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	1	+lex