| ... |
... |
@@ -1,97
+1,0 @@ |
| 1 |
|
-===Framework=== |
| 2 |
|
- |
| 3 |
|
- |
| 4 |
|
-====The existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth—that means we must treat others as ends in themselves.==== |
| 5 |
|
-**Korsgaard '83** (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS |
| 6 |
|
-The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as |
| 7 |
|
-AND |
| 8 |
|
--and, in general, to make the highest good our end. |
| 9 |
|
- |
| 10 |
|
- |
| 11 |
|
-====The standard is consistency with universal law.==== |
| 12 |
|
- |
| 13 |
|
- |
| 14 |
|
-====Practical reason solves regress—it's impossible to deny reason's authority.==== |
| 15 |
|
-**Velleman** (David, "Self To Self", Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg 18-19) |
| 16 |
|
-As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source |
| 17 |
|
-AND |
| 18 |
|
-something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons. |
| 19 |
|
- |
| 20 |
|
- |
| 21 |
|
-====~~2~~ Only the categorical imperative allows for an autonomous will—my framework is self-imposed by the structure of the will, so the will can be the cause of itself.==== |
| 22 |
|
-**Korsgaard** (Christine, Morality as Freedom, http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~~korsgaar/CMK.Morality.as.Freedom.pdf) OS |
| 23 |
|
-We are here confronted with a deep problem of a familiar kind. If you |
| 24 |
|
-AND |
| 25 |
|
-be an autonomous will at all. It has to choose a law. |
| 26 |
|
- |
| 27 |
|
- |
| 28 |
|
-====All claims to freedom are provisional until brought under the public right. It is a contradiction to will a world in which one's will can be denied—this necessitates an omnilateral will. ==== |
| 29 |
|
-**Kant** (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781) ***bracketed for gendered language*** |
| 30 |
|
-When I declare (by word or deed), "I will that an external |
| 31 |
|
-AND |
| 32 |
|
-a thing can be externally yours or mine only in a civil society. |
| 33 |
|
- |
| 34 |
|
- |
| 35 |
|
-===Advocacy=== |
| 36 |
|
- |
| 37 |
|
- |
| 38 |
|
-====I defend the resolution as a general principle. Specific type of limiting is irrelevant—it's a question of the general maxim behind QI. You can link disads to any type of QI limitation.==== |
| 39 |
|
- |
| 40 |
|
- |
| 41 |
|
-===Contention 1 is Tort Law=== |
| 42 |
|
- |
| 43 |
|
- |
| 44 |
|
-====QI stops tort litigation.==== |
| 45 |
|
-**Chen 06** |
| 46 |
|
-Chen, Alan K. (Professor @ University of Denver Sturm College of Law)"The Facts about Qualified Immunity." Emory Law Journal 55.2 (2006): 229-278. ~~Premier~~ |
| 47 |
|
-The law provides a damages action to people whose constitutional rights have been violated |
| 48 |
|
-AND |
| 49 |
|
-acts. 24 She may still, however, assert qualified immunity. |
| 50 |
|
- |
| 51 |
|
- |
| 52 |
|
-====That's a violation of universal law—both positive and negative duties obligate us to always pay damages.==== |
| 53 |
|
-**Ripstein 04 ** |
| 54 |
|
-Arthur, pf of law @ UToronto, PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER NO. 04-02 THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW OF TORT ARTHUR ~~Premier~~ |
| 55 |
|
-All of these effects that one person might have on another are consistent with each |
| 56 |
|
-AND |
| 57 |
|
-to your ability to set and pursue your own conception of the good. |
| 58 |
|
- |
| 59 |
|
- |
| 60 |
|
-===Contention 2 is the Constitution=== |
| 61 |
|
- |
| 62 |
|
- |
| 63 |
|
-====And, QI means we never clearly define constitutional rights, which causes infinite violations over time.==== |
| 64 |
|
-**Beerman 9** |
| 65 |
|
-Jack Michael Beermann (Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law). "Qualified Immunity And Constitutional Avoidance." Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 09-51 (December 2, 2009). http://www.bu.edu/law/workingpapers-archive/documents/beermannj120209.pdf ~~Premier~~ |
| 66 |
|
-Pearson is another entry in the Court's struggle to resolve a serious problem created by |
| 67 |
|
-AND |
| 68 |
|
-federal courts were required to reach the constitutional merits before deciding on immunity. |
| 69 |
|
- |
| 70 |
|
- |
| 71 |
|
-===Contention 3 is Police=== |
| 72 |
|
- |
| 73 |
|
- |
| 74 |
|
-====Lawsuits solve rights violations.==== |
| 75 |
|
-**Gilles '01** (Mirriam, Assistant Professor, Cardozo Law School, "In Defense of making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies," Georgia Law Review, Vol. 35, 2001.) OS bracketed for gender |
| 76 |
|
-The question of whether constitutional tort remedies serve any deterrent effect is, I think |
| 77 |
|
-AND |
| 78 |
|
-the knowledge that a suspect might sue for damages has no inhibitory effect. |
| 79 |
|
- |
| 80 |
|
- |
| 81 |
|
-===Underview=== |
| 82 |
|
- |
| 83 |
|
- |
| 84 |
|
-====Abstraction is great.==== |
| 85 |
|
-**Farr '02** |
| 86 |
|
-Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. JDN. |
| 87 |
|
-Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of |
| 88 |
|
-AND |
| 89 |
|
-equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without first exploring its emancipatory potential. |
| 90 |
|
- |
| 91 |
|
- |
| 92 |
|
-====The Kantian subject is the embodied subject.==== |
| 93 |
|
-**Farr '02** |
| 94 |
|
-Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. |
| 95 |
|
-One of the most popular criticisms of Kant's moral philosophy is that it is too |
| 96 |
|
-AND |
| 97 |
|
-choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. |