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+===Framework=== |
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+ |
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+====The existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth—that means we must treat others as ends in themselves.==== |
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+**Korsgaard '83** (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS |
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+The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as |
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+AND |
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+-and, in general, to make the highest good our end. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====The standard is consistency with universal law.==== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====Practical reason solves regress—it's impossible to deny reason's authority.==== |
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+**Velleman** (David, "Self To Self", Cambridge University Press, 2006, pg 18-19) |
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+As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source |
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+AND |
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+something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====~~2~~ Only the categorical imperative allows for an autonomous will—my framework is self-imposed by the structure of the will, so the will can be the cause of itself.==== |
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+**Korsgaard** (Christine, Morality as Freedom, http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~~korsgaar/CMK.Morality.as.Freedom.pdf) OS |
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+We are here confronted with a deep problem of a familiar kind. If you |
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+AND |
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+be an autonomous will at all. It has to choose a law. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====All claims to freedom are provisional until brought under the public right. It is a contradiction to will a world in which one's will can be denied—this necessitates an omnilateral will. ==== |
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+**Kant** (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781) ***bracketed for gendered language*** |
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+When I declare (by word or deed), "I will that an external |
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+AND |
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+a thing can be externally yours or mine only in a civil society. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+===Advocacy=== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====I defend the resolution as a general principle. Specific type of limiting is irrelevant—it's a question of the general maxim behind QI. You can link disads to any type of QI limitation.==== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+===Contention 1 is Tort Law=== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====QI stops tort litigation.==== |
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+**Chen 06** |
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+Chen, Alan K. (Professor @ University of Denver Sturm College of Law)"The Facts about Qualified Immunity." Emory Law Journal 55.2 (2006): 229-278. ~~Premier~~ |
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+The law provides a damages action to people whose constitutional rights have been violated |
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+AND |
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+acts. 24 She may still, however, assert qualified immunity. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====That's a violation of universal law—both positive and negative duties obligate us to always pay damages.==== |
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+**Ripstein 04 ** |
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+Arthur, pf of law @ UToronto, PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER NO. 04-02 THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW OF TORT ARTHUR ~~Premier~~ |
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+All of these effects that one person might have on another are consistent with each |
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+AND |
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+to your ability to set and pursue your own conception of the good. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+===Contention 2 is the Constitution=== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====And, QI means we never clearly define constitutional rights, which causes infinite violations over time.==== |
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+**Beerman 9** |
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+Jack Michael Beermann (Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law). "Qualified Immunity And Constitutional Avoidance." Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 09-51 (December 2, 2009). http://www.bu.edu/law/workingpapers-archive/documents/beermannj120209.pdf ~~Premier~~ |
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+Pearson is another entry in the Court's struggle to resolve a serious problem created by |
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+AND |
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+federal courts were required to reach the constitutional merits before deciding on immunity. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+===Contention 3 is Police=== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====Lawsuits solve rights violations.==== |
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+**Gilles '01** (Mirriam, Assistant Professor, Cardozo Law School, "In Defense of making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies," Georgia Law Review, Vol. 35, 2001.) OS bracketed for gender |
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+The question of whether constitutional tort remedies serve any deterrent effect is, I think |
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+AND |
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+the knowledge that a suspect might sue for damages has no inhibitory effect. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+===Underview=== |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====Abstraction is great.==== |
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+**Farr '02** |
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+Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. JDN. |
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+Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of |
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+AND |
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+equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without first exploring its emancipatory potential. |
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+ |
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+ |
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+====The Kantian subject is the embodied subject.==== |
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+**Farr '02** |
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+Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. |
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+One of the most popular criticisms of Kant's moral philosophy is that it is too |
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+AND |
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+choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. |