Summary

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  • Caselist.RoundClass[13]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[13]

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1		-2016-12-11 21:34:42.964
	1	+2016-12-11 21:34:42.0

Caselist.CitesClass[13]

Cites

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	1	+Police Reform CP
	2	+
	3	+The 1AC's focus on the officer instead of the government overlooks the larger structural issues that allow police violence to add up in the squo- putting on a badge does not turn you into a monster- rather, the problem is how we're training police. Holland 15 Joshua Holland, Are We Training Cops to be Hyper-Aggressive Warriors, 2015
	4	+
	5	+ What got less attention is that less than two weeks before the shooting, the officer who shot Crawford had been trained to respond to “active shooter situations” by shooting first and asking questions later.According to The Guardian, officer Sean Williams and his colleagues were “taught to keep in mind that ‘the suspect wants a body count’ and therefore officers should immediately engage a would-be gunman with ‘speed, surprise and aggressiveness.’” At that training, they were told to imagine that a crazed gunman was threatening their own relatives. Dispatchers led Williams and his partner to believe that an active-shooter situation was underway. Store surveillance videoshowed that Crawford was shot and killed just seconds after police made contact with him, and probably had no idea what was happening. They followed their training, acting with speed, surprise, and aggressiveness. Thanks in large part to pressure brought by Black Lives Matter activists, some police experts are calling for a complete overhaul in the way cops are trained, both as cadets and during the “in-service” training they receive over the course of their careers. There are no national standards for training police, and the amount and quality of their instruction varies from agency to agency. But a survey of 280 police departments conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a Washington, DC–based think tank, found that American cops are given extensive preparation for using violence, and very little guidance on how to avoid it. The median police recruit in the United States will receive 129 hours of instruction on defensive techniques and using his or her gun, baton, OC-spray, and Taser. That cadet will receive another 24 hours of scenario-based training, drilling on things like when to shoot or hold fire. The median trainee also gets 48 hours of instruction on constitutional law and his or her department’s use-of-force policies.But that same future police officer will receive only eight hours of training in conflict de-escalation
	6	+
	7	+Turn case- you move the blame on the wrong group. Lawsuits on police don't lead to any change and just prevent any real reform.  Gilles 2k
	8	+Gilles, Myriam "In defense of making Government pay: the deterrent effect of constitutional tort remedies."
	9	+
	10	+In addition to serving an informational function, municipal liability claims serve a "fault-fixing" function, localizing culpability in the municipality itself, and forcing municipal policymakers to consider reformative measures. To understand how this fault-fixing function operates, it is important to distinguish between the liability a municipality incurs indirectly, through the indemnification of its officers, and the direct liability it may incur under Monell. Indirect liability does not trigger the fault-fixing function. The municipal indemnification of an individual officer for constitutional damage awards levied against him6" does not necessarily force policy-makers to acknowledge municipal fault and take remedial action, for two reasons. First, indemnification is an ex ante benefit given to individual officers as a form of insurance. The determination to indemnify is made at the front end, as the product of collective bargaining arrangements and political lobbying, and not in response to any constitutional claim.64 The act of indemnifying is largely a ministerial one, and indemnification expenses are easily justified as costs of doing business, along with salaries and other items of overhead.65  Second, where municipalities indemnify officers, they "generally write off the misconduct of an individual officer to the 'bad apple theory,' under which municipal governments or their agencies attribute misconduct to aberrant behavior by a single 'bad apple.'60 This "deflects attention from systemic and institutional factors contributing to recurring constitutional deprivations." 7 As I have argued elsewhere, "the bad apple theory' is essentially an institutionalized belief system ensuring that fault for unconstitutional conduct~-~-even when it results in large damage awards against individual officers or city-approved settlements-will never be localized in the culture of the municipal agency itseltf"' with the result that little or no remedial actions are taken.69  Direct liability, on the other hand, does serve a fault-fixing function. Under the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services," municipal liability cannot be based upon principles of vicarious liability; rather, municipal liability will attach only where an identifiable "policy or custom" of the municipality caused plaintiffs constitutional injury." A finding of Monell liability, therefore, fixes the fault of constitutional violations directly on the the municipal entity, which "possesses the resources and broad vantage point with which to identify the particular deficiencies, and... take appropriate corrective action,"72 thereby furthering the deterrence goal of § 1983. Holding the municipality itself liable for injuries caused by its own unconstitutional policies and customs makes it more difficult to take refuge in the "bad apple theory" and more likely that the municipality will take steps to remedy the broader problems.
	11	+Police reform solves the aff and it’s happening right now—maintaining the squo is key to improvements
	12	+Kaste 9/22 Martin Kaste, 9-22-2016, "Police Reform Is Happening, But It's Hard To Track," NPR.org
	13	+"Clearly the high-profile agencies ... the ones that have experienced challenges and are under scrutiny, they clearly have a deep motivation to do this and to make change," Nila says. But there are practical limits to how fast a willingness to reform can translate into concrete change. Nila says there are so many new kinds of training being pushed now — community policing, implicit bias, de-escalation — that some departments are caught in scheduling gridlock, trying to get it all done while still keeping enough cops on the beat. He says people may say it's been two years since Ferguson, but changing ingrained habits is hard. "So while two years may seem like an eternity, when these situations are still continuing today, in the life of muscle memory and retraining heart-set and mindset, that's a blink of an eye," he says. And when it comes to the use of deadly force and the complaint that American police are too quick to shoot, Nila says there's a simple fact here that's often overlooked: Police today are less hands-on than they used to be. When he was on patrol a generation ago, he says, cops were quicker to mix it up. "We were willing to take a punch; we were willing to even get cut," he says. "Even with the things that have happened to me in a fight on the street, it never entered my mind to shoot somebody." In the decades since then, the training has shifted toward a more cautious, standoffish approach — more use of commands shouted from a distance, Tasers and finally guns. Nila says the greater emphasis on self-preservation is understandable, but if Americans want police to show more restraint with deadly force, then we need to be honest about the fact that we're also asking them to take more risks.
	14	+This reform is better than the aff—it occurs within departments, so (a) there’s 100 buy-in from the officers and (b) it’s localized—individual departments know what’s best for themselves more than the Supreme Court does
	15	+Limiting qualified immunity is counterproductive—it paints all officers with the same brush, decreasing internal motivation within police departments by making reform seem impossible.
	16	+Leeuwen 16: Sean Van Leeuwen, Post June 23,2016, "Political rushes to judgement hurt public safety," Sean Van Leeuwen is Vice President of Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs
	17	+Mosby's decision to bury multiple officers under an avalanche of criminal charges was perhaps politically expedient in the wake of rioting that ravaged the city following Gray's funeral. The results of the first three trials should now make it clear to Mosby and everyone else, it was also just plain wrong. Mosby's Legal rhetoric, such as the use of the term, "rough ride," to paints all the officers involved in the case with a broad brush, implying conspiracy and corruption has done long-lasting harm to police nationwide and communities' relationships with their officers. The acquittal of Officer Goodson who faced the most serious criminal charges in Freddie Gray's death, underscores two key elements of the case: the prosecution's politically fueled rush to judgement and the critical need for law enforcement officers to have a collective defense against malicious prosecutions. Law enforcement officers have a solemn duty to protect the public, a duty which ALADS members believe in and exemplify every day. We do not support actions which violate that duty. However, we do support careful, deliberate investigations that are motivated by a search for the truth, not politics. Peace officers are under more intense scrutiny today than ever before. Virtually every action we take is presumed by some to be an over-reaction or brutality. There is a belief that we should be able to handle every encounter without laying hands on a suspect or drawing a weapon. As Heather McDonald documents in her just released book , The War on Cops: How the Attack on Law and Order Makes Everyone Less Safe these continual misguided attacks only cause police to pull back from proactive policing and as a result crime soars. An example of how unhinged from reality these attacks have become is the anti-police rant published by the Washington Post, following Officer Goodson's not guilty verdict. The author, Jon O. Newman, is a sitting Federal Appellate judge, who urged Congress to abolish qualified immunity for law enforcement, and to appoint United States Attorneys to bring civil suits against police officers on behalf of plaintiffs. Clearly, this jurist does not understand or more likely refuses to accept the rationale for qualified immunity which states if a police officer's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights a reasonable person would have known of, there should not be civil liability. In fact, the judge in Officer Goodson's case, who unlike Newman, listened to and gave careful consideration to all the evidence ruled, "Having found that a reasonable person would act similarly to the defendant, the Court does not find that his actions were reckless and, therefore, finds that there is no criminal liability under the theory that the defendant's failure to act recklessly endangered Mr. Gray." If you want to see active policing plummet, tell law enforcement officers they will be civilly liable for conduct which no reasonable person could have foreseen was a violation of any rights! Here's an idea. Let's make Federal Appellate Court judges civilly liable for every decision they have reversed by the Supreme Court. Unlike cops, who have to make real time decisions affecting legal rights, often under life-threatening circumstances, judges have the luxury of time, law clerks and quiet, safe, well-appointed chambers to make sure their legal decisions are correct. Why shouldn't they be accountable for rendering legal opinions the Supreme Court determines are wrong?
	18	+Turns the case and outweighs on (1) probability—reforms are going to happen, but there’s no guarantee that plaintiffs will win the case and (2) scope—the Court only has jurisdiction over federal courts, and there’s many more state courts it doesn’t affect, but it derails reforms in state and local departments nationwide.
	19	+
	20	+Marijuana CP
	21	+
	22	+The United States should enact a legalization of marihuana.
	23	+Disproportionate law enforcement is the cause of racism—a staunch system of racial hierarchy is created by the drug war
	24	+DPA 2014 (Drug Policy Alliance, independent think tank committed to a reasonable rollback of the war on drugs, http://www.drugpolicy.org/race-and-drug-war)
	25	+The drug war has produced profoundly unequal outcomes across racial groups, manifested through racial discrimination by law enforcement and disproportionate drug war misery suffered by communities of color. Although rates of drug use and selling are comparable across racial lines, people of color are far more likely to be stopped, searched, arrested, prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated for drug law violations than are whites. Higher arrest and incarceration rates for African Americans and Latinos are not reflective of increased prevalence of drug use or sales in these communities, but rather of a law enforcement focus on urban areas, on lower-income communities and on communities of color as well as inequitable treatment by the criminal justice system. We believe that the mass criminalization of people of color, particularly young African American men, is as profound a system of racial control as the Jim Crow laws were in this country until the mid-1960s.¶ The Drug Policy Alliance is committed to exposing disproportionate arrest rates and the systems that perpetuate them. We work to eliminate policies that result in disproportionate incarceration rates by rolling back harsh mandatory minimum sentences that unfairly affect urban populations and by repealing sentencing disparities. Crack cocaine sentencing presents a particularly egregious case. Since the 1980s, federal penalties for crack were 100 times harsher than those for powder cocaine, with African Americans disproportionately sentenced to much lengthier terms. But, in 2010, DPA played a key role in reducing the crack/powder sentencing disparity from 100:1 to 18:1, and we are committed to passing legislation that would eliminate the disparity entirely.¶ The life-long penalties and exclusions that follow a drug conviction have created a permanent second-class status for millions of Americans, who may be prohibited from voting, being licensed, accessing public assistance and any number of other activities and opportunities. The drug war’s racist enforcement means that all of these exclusions fall more heavily on people and communities of color. DPA is committed to ending these highly discriminatory policies and to combating the stigma attached to drug use and drug convictions.
	26	+Marijuana violations push people of color into the prison pipeline—sustains nefarious relationship between law enforcement and prison industrial complex
	27	+Lennerd 2011 (Natasha, http://www.salon.com/2011/04/20/racially_biased_marijuana_policing/)
	28	+A California-focused report Levine helped produce for The Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) in 2010 called “Targeting Blacks for Marijuana” argued that racially-biased arrest numbers are not largely a result of personal racism on the part of individual police officers, but rather that there is “a system-wide phenomenon,” occurring in every county and nearly every police department in California, New York and elsewhere.¶ “The mistake I see in the mainstream press is talking about ‘bad apple’ police,” Levine told Salon. “They love bad apples. But everyday in New York, for example, there are 100 marijuana arrests, which are overwhelmingly of black people… It doesn’t make sense to talk about bad apples.”¶ In many states, including New York, Ohio, Oregon, Maine, California and more, marijuana possession is not illegal. Crucially, however, even in such states, being caught possessing even one joint can have devastating consequences.¶ In California, for example, people arrested for marijuana possession are only charged with a misdemeanor (usually for violating section 11357 of the California Health and Safety Code), but these misdemeanors are nonetheless legally “crimes” and produce criminal records.¶ Such records are nearly impossible to expunge and are almost always checked by employers and often landlords.¶ “For young, low-income African Americans and Latinos — who use marijuana less than young whites, and who already face numerous barriers and hurdles — a criminal record for the “drug crime” of marijuana possession can seriously harm their life chances. Some officials, such as U.S. Representatives Steve Cohen and Sheila Jackson Lee, have termed the stigmatizing effect of criminal records for marijuana possession a modern ‘scarlet letter’,” the Drug Policy Alliance report noted.¶ The question of what can be done to change this pattern is a difficult one. As Levine put it, marijuana arrests are now “an intrinsic part of policing”. He noted that in 2010, one in seven arrests in New York City were marijuana possession arrests and Baltimore, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Dallas and many other cities have similarly high rates.¶ What is clear, however, is that the media must stop talking about “bad apples” and pay attention to the statistics, which point to a disturbingly widespread racial-bias when it comes to who is punished over marijuana.
	29	+No mass arrests of whites for marijuana use—shows racial disparity and racial characters of the law
	30	+Karlin 2013 (Mark, Editor at TruthOut, http://www.truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/packing-jails-with-minorities-for-marijuana-violations-is-racist/18039-packing-jails-with-minorities-for-marijuana-violations-is-racist)
	31	+Let's stop beating around the bush.¶ The ongoing and daily police sweeps arresting minorities for marijuana use, sales and distribution is institutional racism, pure and simple.¶ There are no daily suburban police massive arrests of suburban white youth for marijuana violations, are there? BuzzFlash at Truthout hasn't read about or heard of any.¶ But it's more than that. As BuzzFlash posted a couple weeks back, the ACLU issued a report that found,¶ Black people are 3.7 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white people despite comparable usage rates, according to a report released today by the American Civil Liberties Union. The report also found that marijuana possession arrests now make up nearly half of all drug arrests, with police making over 7 million marijuana possession arrests between 2001 and 2010. "The War on Marijuana in Black and White: Billions of Dollars Wasted on Racially Biased Arrests" is the first-ever report to examine nationwide state and county marijuana arrest data by race.¶ Of this racist use of drug arrests to incarcerate and subjugate black males in urban areas where there are few jobs beyond drugs – and where drugs are an opiate for lack of job opportunity – the only benefit to society is those who profit from or are employed by the prison-industrial complex.¶ If you think that BuzzFlash at Truthout is "radical" for making such an assertion, we are joined in our perspective by the New York Times (NYT). The NYT editorial board wrote on June 16:¶ Federal data, included in a study by the American Civil Liberties Union, now shows that the problem of racially biased arrests is far more extensive that was previously known — and is getting worse. The costly, ill-advised “war on marijuana” might fairly be described as a tool of racial oppression. Italics inserted by BuzzFlash.¶ The study, based on law enforcement data from 50 states and the District of Columbia, is the most detailed of its kind so far. Marijuana arrests have risen sharply over the last two decades and now make up about half of all drug arrests in the United States. Of the more than eight million marijuana arrests made between 2001 and 2010, nearly 90 percent were for possession. There were nearly 900,000 marijuana arrests in 2010 — 300,000 more than for all violent crimes combined.¶ Nationally, African-Americans are nearly four times as likely to be arrested for marijuana possession as whites. The disparity is even more pronounced in some states, including Illinois, Iowa and Minnesota, where African-Americans are about eight times as likely to be arrested. And in some counties around the country, blacks are 10, 15 or even 30 times as likely to be arrested.¶ In a widely ignored protest on June 17, black leaders gathered in DC to denounce the racially biased charade of the "war on drugs":¶ A group of social justice activists, including Rev. Jesse Jackson, rallied in Washington Monday to protest the Obama administration and its so-called "war on drugs," which they say has unfairly targeted black communities across the country.¶ The Institute of the Black World 21st Century's "Day of Direct Action" drew a crowd of more than 500 grassroots leaders and community advocates on the 42nd anniversary of the war on drugs, which they say has become a "pipeline" for mass incarceration in black communities….¶ "State and local governments have aggressively enforced marijuana laws selectively against black people and communities, needlessly ensnaring hundreds of thousands of people in the criminal justice system at tremendous human and financial cost," said Ezekiel Edwards, director of the Criminal Law Reform Project at the ACLU and one of the primary authors of the study, in a release. "The aggressive policing of marijuana is time-consuming, costly, racially biased, and doesn't work."¶ A news release about the DC protest ~-~- which targeted President Obama in terms of his administration's continued backing of the alleged "War on Drugs" ~-~- stated how grievous an impact it has had on minorities:¶ Declaring the crises in distressed Black communities a "State of Emergency," Dr. Ron Daniels, President of IBW states: "there is a direct connection between the so called War on Drugs as a racially biased strategy and the devastation, death and destruction in America's 'dark ghettos.'¶ The recent ALCU Study of marijuana arrests clearly confirms what we have known for some time, 'the War on drugs is a war on us,' a war that has severely damaged Black communities across the country. We need President Obama to go beyond lecturing us about 'personal responsibility' and declare the State of Emergency in America's dark ghettos a moral and political crisis which requires immediate action!"¶ This egregious injustice has been a state of emergency for years and now is lamentably accepted as the social status quo.
	32	+
	33	+Legal marijuana leads to prison closures – Colorado Proves
	34	+Imse 13 (“Fewer inmates means Colorado may close more prisons”, Ann Imse, Colorado Public News POSTED: 01/27/2013 mjb)
	35	+Colorado's prison population is falling so quickly that state officials are once again considering closing prisons — a tough discussion given that prisons are often big employers in the counties where they are located. "It looks like the whole system should be shrinking," said state Sen. Kent Lambert, R-Colorado Springs, at a recent legislative hearing where Joint Budget Committee members discussed the decline in inmates and a consultant's ongoing study of which prisons should be closed or repurposed. The study is due June 30. In December, there were 2,109 empty beds in prisons across Colorado. Most were in private prisons, and the state is no longer paying for the space. Budget and criminal-justice statisticians predict the number of unoccupied beds will rise to between 2,600 and 3,600 by June 2014. Eliminating that much capacity could shut down two to 10 prisons, depending on the size of the facilities. Colorado is already at 7,500 fewer inmates than it once expected in 2013 and has closed three state prisons. "We think that is a really, really big deal," said Roxane White, chief of staff to Gov. John Hickenlooper, referring to both the continuing decline in prisoners and the prospect of saving money with further prison closures. The choice of which prisons to close is complicated, state corrections officials and legislators say. The state must still have a mix of minimum- to maximum-security facilities. Some prisons are designed to use fewer guards, which reduces operating costs. It's not generally easy for prison staff to move from one city to another. Maintenance and energy use vary from prison to prison. Colorado, for example, still operates two prisons that opened more than a century ago. "We are wrestling with what beds do we not need," Department of Corrections Director Tom Clements told a legislative committee recently. The decline in prisoners is good news for the state, which saves tens of millions of dollars in the cost of housing them. But closing prisons can be bad news for the small towns that rely on them for jobs. Olney Springs in southeastern Colorado, for example, has a population of less than 400. A private prison there has room for 1,700 inmates. "Unfortunately, a lot of those smaller communities were sold a bill of goods about (how) this is going to be good for your community — and it did create an economic boom for them," said Douglas Wilson, the state's chief public defender. "But now with the populations going down, I think the legislature's going to have to make some tough decisions about if they close, and if so, where do they close the prisons." Experts point to a mix of reasons for the decline in prison population — including fewer prosecutions and changes in the way the prison system is run. The state's felony crime rate dropped by a third from 2002 to 2011, Clements said. Possible reasons for that include reductions in punishment for marijuana-related crimes, successes of youth and gang-intervention programs, and an aging population that has resulted in fewer young people getting in trouble. In addition, Clements, who became the state's corrections chief under Hickenlooper, brought a very different attitude from his predecessors, Wilson said. Parole and probation officers are giving second chances for minor infringements, like a single failed drug test or failure to show up for an appointment. Those offenders are not being sent back to prison. A new state law also allows prisoners to earn more time off their sentences for good behavior, Clements said. Another new law lowered the penalties for minor drug possession, Wilson said. There is no longer a 24-year sentence for a parolee who walks away from his registered address at a homeless shelter. The savings to Colorado taxpayers will vary significantly with the state's choices on what to cut. Not sending an inmate to a private prison saves the state about $20,000 a year. Closing the Fort Lyon prison in Las Animas saved nearly $27,000 per inmate. Shutting down one wing at the Trinidad prison has saved $5,800 per prisoner. White told a health conference six weeks ago in Denver that the governor hopes to move the prison savings into health care, including better care in prisons. That might reduce prison population further, as a third of Colorado's inmates have mental illnesses.
	36	+
	37	+Fewer prisons means less lobbying –the counterplan meaningfully eradicates the financial base of the prison industrial complex
	38	+Cavanaugh 11 (“Prison Guards Union Locks Up Benefits, Politicians, People”, Tim Cavanaugh|Jun. 7, 2011, http://reason.com/blog/2011/06/07/prison-guards-union-locks-up-b#ixzz3BQ2KqVrd, mjb)
	39	+The CCPOA has played a significant role in advocating pro-incarceration policies and opposing pro-rehabilitative policies in California. In 1980, CCPOA’s 5,600 members earned about $21,000 a year and paid dues of about $35 a month. After the rapid expansion of the prison population beginning in the 1980s, CCPOA’s 33,000 members today earn approximately $73,000 and pay monthly dues of about $80. These dues raise approximately $23 million each year, of which the CCPOA allocates approximately $8 million to lobbying. As author Joan Petersilia explains, “The formula is simple: more prisoners lead to more prisons; more prisons require more guards; more guards means more dues-paying members and fund-raising capability; and fund-raising, of course, translates into political influence.”
	40	+
	41	+Body Cameras CP
	42	+
	43	+CP Text: The USFG should pass legislation to increase the use of body cameras for police officers
	44	+
	45	+Multiple studies have found that body cameras make police act without undue measure or force.
	46	+Wasserman, Howard. “Moral Panics And Body Cameras.” Washington University Law Review. 2015. Web. October 06, 2016. https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=1andved=0ahUKEwiU86DY7MLPAhUWwWMKHRhNBRcQFggeMAAandurl=http3A2F2Fopenscholarship.wustl.edu2Fcgi2Fviewcontent.cgi3Farticle3D613626context3Dlaw _lawreviewandusg=AFQjCNFuX6hOO2BRpqssdJv6XlYEvbkzgand sig2=ctgVDle8ve2Wk0wIyc-RSw.
	47	+
	48	+Two studies offer some preliminary answers. The first examined a pilot program in Mesa, Arizona, in which 50 officers were given cameras and fifty were not. The study made three key findings: (1) Camera-equipped officers conducted “significantly” fewer stop-and-frisks and made significantly fewer arrests than their non-camera-equipped colleagues; (2)camera-equipped officers wrote more tickets and citations; and (3) camera-equipped officers were more likely to initiate contact with citizens on the street, but less likely than non-camera-equipped colleagues to respond to dispatched calls.37 In fact, the percentage difference in stop- and-frisks between the groups was larger than the actual percentage of stop-and-frisks by the camera-equipped officers.38 Mesa also saw fewer total complaints against officers with cameras and nearly three times as many complaints against officers without cameras.39 A second study examined camera use in the Rialto Police Department in California. It found that, when wearing cameras, officers were less likely to use weapons and less likely to initiate physical contact with suspects, doing so only when physically threatened; when not wearing cameras, officers were more likely to initiate physical contact and more likely to use force even when not physically threatened. The study similarly found a significant reduction in citizen complaints and use-of- force incidents compared with the previous twelve months.40
	49	+
	50	+Eye witnesses are faulty- would not be a good standard to overcome qualified immunity
	51	+Nunes, Iesha. ““HANDS UP, DON’T SHOOT”: POLICE MISCONDUCT AND THE NEED FOR BODY CAMERAS.” Florida Law Review Vol 76-1812. 2015. Web. https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=10andved=0ahU KEwip5K7o6cbPAhVM-2MKHfS_DsQFghiMAkand url=http3A2F2Fwww.floridalawreview.com2Fwpcontent 2Fuploads2F11- Nunesandusg=AFQjCNH3ax5D9OQANUSrE_TgQyW3EdXwgand sig2=36cEJD9crma04TkF5B1Lmw.
	52	+
	53	+Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in United States v. Wade, wrote, “The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”100 He attributed this phenomenon to a “degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.”101 Although in this case the U.S. Supreme Court only highlighted the unreliability of eyewitness identification, eyewitness accounts of events are also often faulty.102 Human memory and perception is untrustworthy103 and subject to the same suggestive influences mentioned by Justice Brennan. Since the 1970s, psychological researchers have “consistently articulated concerns about the accuracy of eyewitness identification.”104 Characteristics of the witness, the event, and the testimony all impact the reliability of eyewitness testimony.105 Young children and the elderly are more likely than younger adults to be mistaken and produce errors regarding their testimony.106 Witnesses are also “better able to recognize faces of their own race or ethnic group than faces of another race or ethnic group.”107 Moreover, the characteristics of the event can negatively impact the validity of eyewitness testimony.108 Many factors impact the reliability of eyewitness testimony including the amount of time a witness saw the culprit, the lighting, the presence of a disguise, “the distinctiveness of the culprit’s appearance,” and “the presence or absence of a weapon.”109 A simple disguise, such as covering the hair, can significantly impair eyewitness identification.110 Even more chilling, eyewitnesses that mistakenly describe the facts of an event may hold strong certainty in their testimony.
	54	+
	55	+Body cameras are extremely successful in reducing excessive force- statistics show.
	56	+Nunes, Iesha. ““HANDS UP, DON’T SHOOT”: POLICE MISCONDUCT AND THE NEED FOR BODY CAMERAS.” Florida Law Review Vol 76-1812. 2015. Web. https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=10andved=0ahU KEwip5K7o6cbPAhVM-2MKHfS_DsQFghiMAkand url=http3A2F2Fwww.floridalawreview.com2Fwpcontent 2Fuploads2F11- Nunesandusg=AFQjCNH3ax5D9OQANUSrE_TgQyW3EdXwgand sig2=36cEJD9crma04TkF5B1Lmw.
	57	+In the first twelve months of the study, the department experienced an “88 percent decline in the number of complaints filed against officers.”190 The officers also used force “nearly 60 percent less often.”191 Interestingly enough, officers that did use force were twice as likely to have gone without body cameras during that shift.192 Although the location of this study has a small population of only 100,000 people,193 the results support the notion that using body cameras benefits police officers and departments alike. Body cameras are currently undergoing numerous tests across the country to further determine their efficiency.
	58	+*Extensions*
	59	+The counterplan spills over – police officers without body cameras will still improve their behavior to compete with officers who have them.
	60	+Force Science Institute. “7 Findings From First-ever Study On Body Cameras.” PoliceOne.com. February 02, 2015. Web. October 07, 2016. https://www.policeone.com/use-offorce/ articles/8218374-7-findings-from-first-ever-study-on-body-cameras/.
	61	+The study revealed an interesting “spillover effect.” Overall, the use of force and citizen complaints declined both when cameras were in use and when they weren’t, the researchers point out. They speculate that this may reflect a conscious effort by officers without cameras during a given shift to competitively improve their behavior to favorably match that of fellow officers who had the “advantage” of wearing a body cam.
	62	+Body cameras are extremely successful in reducing excessive force- statistics show.
	63	+Nunes, Iesha. ““HANDS UP, DON’T SHOOT”: POLICE MISCONDUCT AND THE NEED FOR BODY CAMERAS.” Florida Law Review Vol 76-1812. 2015. Web. https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=10andved=0ahU KEwip5K7o6cbPAhVM-2MKHfS_DsQFghiMAkand url=http3A2F2Fwww.floridalawreview.com2Fwpcontent 2Fuploads2F11- Nunesandusg=AFQjCNH3ax5D9OQANUSrE_TgQyW3EdXwgand sig2=36cEJD9crma04TkF5B1Lmw.
	64	+In the first twelve months of the study, the department experienced an “88 percent decline in the number of complaints filed against officers.”190 The officers also used force “nearly 60 percent less often.”191 Interestingly enough, officers that did use force were twice as likely to have gone without body cameras during that shift.192 Although the location of this study has a small population of only 100,000 people,193 the results support the notion that using body cameras benefits police officers and departments alike. Body cameras are currently undergoing numerous tests across the country to further determine their efficiency.
	65	+
	66	+Civilian Review Boards CP
	67	+
	68	+Plan Text: Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
	69	+-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
	70	+-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
	71	+-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
	72	+-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
	73	+-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
	74	+-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies
	75	+
	76	+CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
	77	+Meltzer, JD, 14
	78	+(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
	79	+In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)
	80	+
	81	+
	82	+The CP Solves the Case
	83	+1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
	84	+Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
	85	+This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
	86	+Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
	87	+Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
	88	+The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
	89	+For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325
	90	+2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations
	91	+Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
	92	+First, even a highly effective LOPRB providing quality policy recommendations to a police department would likely encounter some department resistance to the civilian oversight. This resistance may be created because of police department views of a civilian entity "meddling" or just the potential perception of an adversarial relationship between the *1058 LOPRB and police department. n207 However, the structure of LOPRBs help overcome most of this resistance traditionally leveled against civilian oversight from police departments. The emphasis on policy review, rather than complaint review, means that LOPRBs will not directly regulate individual police officers but rather the department as a whole. This change in focus will likely reduce the intensity of any police department resistance because the potential adversarial relationship will be between the LOPRB and the police department instead of individual officers. n208 Furthermore, any resistance can be ameliorated by public pressure on police departments to enact the LOPRB's policy recommendations. The LOPRB's outreach will inform the local community of the use of data-collection technologies, potentially generating popular support behind LOPRB recommendations. LOPRBs can thus indirectly enforce their recommendations through utilizing that popular support and pressure on police departments. That indirect pressure on police departments will help reduce potential police department resistance because policy changes brought about through public pressure will be a reaction by the police department to the public at large, rather than directly reacting to the adversarial LOPRB. Thus, while police department resistance likely cannot be completely overcome, LOPRBs can ameliorate this traditional civilian oversight problem.
	93	+
	94	+
	95	+3. The CRB doesn’t have to work- it creates a deterrent effect
	96	+Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
	97	+3. Individual Deterrence and Systemic Correction. - Finally, civilian oversight has some meaningful deterrence on individual actors while also providing a functioning mechanism to address local systemic issues. n163 Individual police officers are more likely to undertake regulation of their own behavior when the officer knows that they are being watched by an oversight body. n164 External civilian oversight can ensure greater accountability not only among rank-and-file officers, but also among command officers, and can also address systemic issues facing dys-functional departments. n165 Approximately two-thirds of civilian oversight entities undertake policy review in addition to complaint review, n166 allowing civilian oversight bodies to review general policies and advocate for systemic reform. n167 Samuel Walker, a scholar whose work focuses on police accountability, emphasized that successful civilian oversight bodies "take a proactive view of their role and actively seek out the underlying causes of police misconduct or problems in the complaint process." n168 If civilian oversight mechanisms continually provide policy recommendations to police departments, those recommendations as a whole can have a significant effect on police misconduct, while at the same time making the police department more "accustomed to input from outsiders." n169 Civilian oversight thus can have a transformative impact on entire police departments rather than only correcting the actions of a singular officer.
	98	+
	99	+
	100	+4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
	101	+Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
	102	+A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-11 21:34:44.541

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	1	+Any

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	1	+Any

ParentRound

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	1	+13

Round

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	1	+2

Team

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	1	+Appleton East Moorhead Neg

Title

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	1	+NOVDEC- All CPs

Tournament

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	1	+NOVDEC