Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[21]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[19]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[21]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-01-24 15:41:22.387
	1	+2017-01-24 15:41:22.0

Caselist.CitesClass[19]

Cites

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	1	+Hate speech is permissible under the first amendment despite the exceptions
	2	+Volokh 15 ~Eugene Volokh, Law Professor at UCLA, "No, there's no "hate speech" exception to the First Amendment," The Washington Post, May 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.869a0bbb920b
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	4	+I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend. The Supreme Court did, in Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), uphold a “group libel” law that outlawed statements that expose racial or religious groups to contempt or hatred, unless the speaker could show that the statements were true, and were said with “good motives” and for “justifiable ends.” But this too was treated by the Court as just a special case of a broader First Amendment exception — the one for libel generally. And Beauharnais is widely understood to no longer be good law, given the Court’s restrictions on the libel exception. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) (rejecting the view that libel is categorically unprotected, and holding that the libel exception requires a showing that the libelous accusations be “of and concerning” a particular person); Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) (generally rejecting the view that a defense of truth can be limited to speech that is said for “good motives” and for “justifiable ends”); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) (generally rejecting the view that the burden of proving truth can be placed on the defendant); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) (holding that singling bigoted speech is unconstitutional, even when that speech fits within a First Amendment exception); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Beauharnais is no longer good law); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (likewise); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (likewise); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (likewise); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973) (likewise); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1043-45 (4th ed. 2011); Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Law, §12-17, at 926; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 211, 219 (1991); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 330-31 (1988). Finally, “hostile environment harassment law” has sometimes been read as applying civil liability — or administrative discipline by universities — to allegedly bigoted speech in workplaces, universities, and places of public accommodation. There is a hot debate on whether those restrictions are indeed constitutional; they have generally been held unconstitutional when applied to universities, but decisions are mixed as to civil liability based on speech that creates hostile environments in workplaces (see the pages linked to at this site for more information on the subject). But even when those restrictions have been upheld, they have been justified precisely on the rationale that they do not criminalize speech (or otherwise punish it) in society at large, but only apply to particular contexts, such as workplaces. None of them represent a “hate speech” exception, nor have they been defined in terms of “hate speech.” For this very reason, “hate speech” also doesn’t have any fixed legal meaning under U.S. law. U.S. law has just never had occasion to define “hate speech” — any more than it has had occasion to define rudeness, evil ideas, unpatriotic speech, or any other kind of speech that people might condemn but that does not constitute a legally relevant category.
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	7	+Free speech is used to justify hate speech Marcus 08
	8	+Marcus, 08 ( Kenneth, Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College School of Public Affairs, "Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism," 16 Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 1025 (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052andcontext=wmborj
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	10	+During recent years, American college campuses have seen numerous alarming examples8° of the striking resurgence of anti-Semitic activity which is taking place worldwide.8 There appear to be six sources for this resurgence: traditional European, Christian Jew-hatred; aggressive anti-Israelism that crosses the line into anti-Semitism; traditional Muslim anti-Semitism; anti-Americanism and anti-globalism that spill over into anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism; black anti-Semitism; and fundamentalist intolerance.82 Generally speaking, the most significant recent episodes of American campus anti-Semitism have been associated with anti-Israelism or anti-Zionism. 83 In addition to the University of California at Irvine, a few other campuses have become particularly notorious for alleged incidents of anti-Semitism over the last few years." San Francisco State: During one notorious 2002 rally, a large number of pro-Palestinian students surrounded approximately fifty Jewish students, screaming "Get out or we will kill you," and "Hitler did not finish the job."85 When one Jewish professor began to sing peace songs, the crowd yelled, "Go back to Russia, Jew. 86 At about the same time, students distributed a flyer advertising a pro-Palestinian rally which featured a picture of a dead baby with the words, "Canned Palestinian Children Meat-Slaughtered According to Jewish Rites Under American License."87 More recently, a Jewish supporter of Israel alleged that he was, in separate incidents, spat on and assaulted.88 Columbia University: Columbia faculty, especially in the Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures program, have been accused of intimidating and silencing Jewish pro-Israel students.89 In one example, a professor allegedly privately told a pro-Israel Jewish student, "You have no voice in this debate." 9 When she insisted that she be allowed to express her opinion he disagreed, approaching very close to her and saying, "See, you have green eyes... You're not a Semite .... I'm a Semite. I have brown eyes. You have no claim to the land of Israel."9' These incidents are quite distinct from legitimate criticizing of Israeli politics.92 To the extent that there might be any question, the distinguishing features of antiSemitic anti-Zionism are rapidly becoming conventional: employment of "classic anti-Semitic stereotypes," use of double standards, "drawing comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany," and "holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeliactions" regardless of actual complicity.93 For example, American college students and faculty have recently used the medieval phrase "blood libel" to describe Israeli military practices, 94 ascribed traditional Jewish cultural stereotypes to contemporary Israeli society,95 and attributed demonic characteristics to Israeli leaders and Zionists as those characteristics have historically been related to Jews.96 This spillover of anti-Israelism into anti-Semitism has historical resonance in that it represents the second significant mutation that anti-Semitism experienced in the space of a century.97 Some of this activity, globally and domestically, takes the form of basic hate and bias activity. Much recent anti-Semitism, however, is postracialist or even anti-racist in appearance. 98 While early nineteenth-century antiSemitism was predominantly religious in animus and mid-twentieth-century antiSemitism predominantly racial, twenty-first-century anti-Semitism is predominantly political in character and often purports to address the Jewish state. 99 The nineteenth-century shift from religious to racialist anti-Semitism, attributed largely to German journalist Wilhelm Marr and his colleagues, was essentially a deliberative effort to justify continued adherence to anti- Jewish attitudes in the face of changing social attitudes towards religion and religious discrimination." Significantly, the religious-racialist mutation served an evolutionary function: the anti-Semitism virus evolved to adapt to changing environmental conditions. The racialist-political mutation, in which racialist anti-Semitism evolved into political anti-Semitism, represented a similar example of adaptive behavior in the twentieth century: Jew-hatred adapted to a post-Holocaust environment in which explicit race-hatred was socially unacceptable unless repackaged to appear political in nature.'0' In many cases, age-old anti-Semitic stereotypes and defamations are recast in contemporary political terms, castigating Israel and Zionism in terms historically used to denigrate Jews and Judaism. 10 2 In this formulation, Israel-mordantly characterized as "the 'Jew' of the nations'' a is made the repository of age-old stereotypes and defamations classically equated with Jews: as "a pariah;" as "supernaturally powerful and crafty;" as conspiratorial; and as a malignant force responsible for the world's evils.' 4 This political turn in anti-Semitism has had another consequence however. Where political speech has social and legal protection, such as on the American college campus, politically inflected hate and bias incidents are more difficult to police without implicating constitutional protections and academic freedom concerns. 05 Indeed, virtually any form of abuse may be considered protected-and its opposition deemed censorious-when the context is an academic campus and the perpetrator is careful to adopt the tropes of political discourse."° This has been an enormous challenge for civil rights enforcement in this area.
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	12	+Dominating language creates the conditions that allow violence to occur – we solve the root cause of your harms.
	13	+Summy 98
	14	+Ralph. Director of the Matsunaga Institute for Peace @ U of Hawaii. “Nonviolent Speech” Peace Review, Vol 10 No 4, Lexis
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	16	+By accepting the introduction of violence into the language, people are contributing to the affirmation of a paradigm that condemns them to the ranks of the dominated and the world at large to a political system of circulating elites and perpetual violence. Thus any action, no matter how small, that can counter the legitimization of violence in all its multifaceted forms will be undermining the foundations of elite domination. Conversely, if the elites can successfully promote the acceptance of legitimate violence, mainly through their control of the institutions of education and communication, their position is assured. Not surprisingly, their focus is thus not directed at reducing the cultural violence of language and media~-~-a violence that rationalizes and helps to sustain the dominant paradigm~-~-but is primarily confined to decreasing the overt violence that can destabilize their position.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-01-24 15:41:24.276

Judge

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	1	+Katie Sheldon

Opponent

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	1	+Brookfield East NA

ParentRound

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	1	+21

Round

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	1	+4

Team

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	1	+Appleton East Moorhead Neg

Title

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	1	+JANFEB- Hate Speech DA

Tournament

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	1	+CFL Quals