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1		-
2		-
3		-FUCK YOUR WINGDINGS KEDRICK THIS SHIT IS THE DRAMATIC FUCKING INTERPRETATION
4		-
5		-
6		-Nov/Dec Shitstorm 1AC
7		-
8		-This is not just a regular speech, this is a proposal for change. This is not a white male standing up to win ballots, this is a white male standing up for the people. This is not an idea, this is a real world implication. This is NOT your typical 1AC, this is a movement.
9		-Thus, I affirm, I value morality because the resolution says ought
10		-The standard for the round is minimizing oppression towards marginalized groups through a deontological perspective
11		-First, Morality requires respect for self-ownership
12		-Quinn 89
13		-Quinn, Warren S. “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 98, No. 3, (Jul., 1989), pp. 287-312. JSTOR
14		-Whether we are speaking of ownership or more fundamental forms of possession, something is, morally speaking, his only if his say over what may be done to it (and thereby to him) can override the greater needs of others. A person is constituted by his body and mind. They are parts or aspects of him. For that very reason, it is fitting that he have primary say over what may be done to them-not because such an arrangement best promotes overall human welfare, but because any arrangement that denied him that say would be a grave indignity. In giving him this authority, morality recognizes his existence as an individual with ends of his own—an independent being. Since that is what he is, he deserves this recognition. Were morality to withhold it, were it to allow us to kill or injure him whenever that would be collectively best, it would picture him not as a being in his own right but as a cell in the collective whole. This last point can be illustrated not by thinking of bodies or minds but of lives. The moral sense in which your mind or body is yours seems to be the same as that in which your life is yours. And if your life is yours then there must be decisions concerning it that are yours to make-decisions protected by negative rights. One such matter is the choice of work or vocation. We think there is something morally amiss when people are forced to be farmers or flute players just because the balance of social needs tips in that direction. Barring great emergencies, we think people's lives must be theirs to lead. Not because that makes things go best in some independent sense but because the alternative seems to obliterate them as individuals. This obliteration, and not social inefficiency, is one of the things that strikes us as appalling in totalitarian social projects for example, in the Great Cultural Revolution. None of this, of course, denies the legitimate force of positive rights. They too are essential to the status we want as persons who matter, and they must be satisfied when it is morally possible to do so. But negative rights, for the reasons I have been giving, define the terms of moral possibility. Their precedence is essential to the moral fact of our lives, minds, and bodies really being ours.
15		-
16		-Second, It follows from practical reason that rational beings have inherent value.
17		-Korsgaard 96
18		-Korsgaard, Christine (Prof of Phil @ Harvard). “The Sources of Normativity.” 1996.
19		-This is just a fancy new model of an argument that first appeared in a much simpler form, Kant’s argument for his Formula of Humanity. The form of relativism with which Kant began was the most elementary one we encounter - the relativity of value to human desires and interests. He started from the fact that when we make a choice we must regard its object as good. His point is the one I have been making - that being human we must endorse our impulses before we can act on them. Kant asked what it is that makes these objects good, and, rejecting one form of realism, he decided that the goodness wais not in the objects themselves. Were it not for our desires and inclinations, we would not find their objects good. Kant saw that we take things to be important because they are important to us - and he concluded that we must therefore take ourselves to be important. In this way, the value of humanity itself is implicit in every human choice. If normative skepticism is to be avoided - if there is any such thing as a reason for action - then humanity as the source of all reasons and values must be valued for its own sake.
20		-
21		-
22		-
23		-Contention 1: Constitutionalism
24		-Oversight to police officers is critical yet is inconsistent across the US.
25		-Meltzer 16, Ryan. “Qualified Immunity And Constitutional-Norm Generation In The Post-Saucier Era: 'Clearly Establishing.” Texas Law Review Vol 92 No. 5. April 04, 2014. Web. October 06, 2016. https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=2andved=0ahUK Ewj2hqP18LPAhUEy2MKHejZDwcQFgglMAEandurl=http3A2F2Fwww.texaslrev.com2F wp-content2Fuploads2F20152F082FMeltzer-924.pdfandusg=AFQjCNFzctxOqmFgrXQn77xvda-qUhsvQandsig2=TQ0EGhcgJsWYQUZj_8NpGA.
26		-Civilian oversight represents a critical component of the patchwork of police regulation in the United States. Given the limited effect of constitutional criminal procedure, the problems inherent in internal police oversight mechanisms, and the de jure and de facto barriers to the successful assessment of criminal or civil sanctions on individual police officers or municipalities, external oversight bodies reach police conduct that might otherwise escape reproach. Further, given the rate at which municipalities settle lawsuits arising from police misconduct—in fiscal year 2012, the City of New York settled approximately $152 million in suits against the New York City Police Department (NYPD), arising from 9,570 claims—civilian oversight agencies play a vital role in developing the law of the police by addressing legal claims silenced by settlement in the civil arena. Moreover, civilian oversight has become commonplace in the United States since its emergence in the early twentieth century: There are now over one hundred civilian oversight bodies in the nation, covering cities in thirty-six different states— from Akron, Ohio, to Yonkers, New York.
27		-
28		-Qualified immunity has been designed to limit the routes that citizens can take in their legally allowed civil rights legal claims.
29		-Hassel 99, Diana. “Living A Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity.” Missouri Law Review Vol 64 Issue 1. 1999. Web. October 06, 2016. http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3402andcontext=mlr.
30		-This current critique of antidiscrimination law can be used to understand how the qualified immunity standard affects the system of compensation for constitutional wrongs. One major similarity is the way in which the existence of Section 1983 siphons off pressure to create some other system of redress. The open-ended language of the Section 1983 statute seems to promise a powerful remedy against governmental abuse. As we have seen, qualified immunity severely limits that remedy, but on a case-by-case basis. There is no general prohibition against certain types of civil rights claims, only the seemingly individualized application of the qualified immunity defense. The fact that some types of claims are destined to fail because of the type of claim they are, not because of the particularized behavior of the defendant, is hidden. Adding to the illusion of a generally available remedy is the spectacular success of a few high profile cases. A few large recoveries in cases that present particularly compelling facts obscure the reality of the fruitlessness of most 36 claims.
31		-
32		-Qualified immunity makes questions of civil rights irrelevant. It shuts down democratic debates about which rights we should value and prevents forms of activism that fight for legal recognition. Hassel ‘99
33		-
34		-Diana Hassel - Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A. 1979, Mount Holyoke College; J.D. 1985, Rutgers, the State University of New JerseyNewark. “Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity.” Missouri Law Review. Winter 1999. http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3402andcontext=mlr JJN
35		-IV. THE COST OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY Qualified immunity has not been universally admired. A large body of literature critiques the defense and calls for its modification, elimination, or expansion. While these critiques serve to illuminate some fundamental problems with the qualified immunity doctrine, they do not address the central problem with qualified immunity-its camouflaging effect. By camouflaging effect, I mean the ability of qualified immunity to make the underlying pattern of civil. rights doctrine undiscernible. The existing critical focus on the strengths and weaknesses of qualified immunity fails to uncover the underlying patterns in the availability of Section 1983 remedies. A. Current Critiques There are vociferous critics of the qualified immunity doctrine who attack the doctrine as a whole. This commentary suggests that the problem with the qualified immunity doctrine is that it is applied to the wrong group of defendants or that it should be eliminated entirely. Those who believe that it should be eliminated entirely generally seek to substitute governmental liability for that of individual government officials. 6 Others believe that the problem is not with the defense but that its application should be available only to a certain small group of government officials." 7 The bulk of the criticism of qualified immunity looks closely at the structure of the defense and argues that it is internally contradictory or should be modified to provide better results. This criticism breaks into two main areas: the problems inherent in the "reasonableness" element". of the qualified immunity defense and the difficulties that result from the attempt to define "clearly established""' 9 law. The complaints concerning the "reasonableness" element note that while the objective reasonableness element is designed to protect the defendant from protracted litigation, the defense does not really quickly resolve a lawsuit. 120 The fact issues raised by the reasonableness element of the defense require a fact-finding hearing which makes it difficult to end lawsuits prior to trial.' 2 ' In a contradictory approach, the objectively reasonable element also has been described as being essentially a bar to judgment for the plaintiff in a civil rights action. Because qualified immunity is designed to protect defendants notjust from liability, but from participation in litigation, some argue that qualified immunity has become essentially indistinguishable from absolute immunity.' 22 The objectively reasonable standard is also seen as a mechanism for the distortion of constitutional law. The focus on the question of what a reasonable official would have understood the law to require leads to a "redefining of the substantive constitutional law" in a way that gives little clear guidance as to what the constitution requires and thus provides little guidance for future actions.'23 Commentators similarly claim that the impact of the clearly established element of the qualified immunity defense is inefficient, distorts the law, and is too difficult a standard for plaintiffs to overcome. It is inefficient and distorting because courts spend their time reconstructing what the law was in the past rather than setting forth clear guidance as to what the law requires. 124 The qualified immunity defense has also been assailed because of its requirement that a constitutional right must be clearly established before any liability can attach. This is a difficult standard to overcome. 2 ' The difficulty in identifying clear legal authority establishing the unlawfulness of a particular official's act may be too difficult a task and thus exclude meritorious claims. 26 There is then a body of literature examining the discrepancy between what the qualified immunity defense was meant to accomplish and how it actually works. The defense does not protect defendants in a meaningful way. At the same time, it makes a judgment for the plaintiff almost impossible to obtain. Therefore, the defense seems to be serving no one's interests. These well documented weaknesses suggest that qualified immunity's role is not to allow for just outcomes, but to provide some other service. What is missing from these critiques is an analysis of what function the current doctrine serves. In the next section, I explain that while qualified immunity often results in unfairness or inefficiency, the doctrine also provides a flexible mechanism by which divisive issues are seemingly resolved. This mechanism, however, has a cost. B. Qualified Immunity as a Disquise The problem with qualified immunity is not so much that the outcomes are sometimes unfair but the fact that qualified immunity blocks a clear view of the real limitations that exist in civil rights law. Civil rights law is, in effect, being designed in the dark. Distinctions are being made about the types of cases that will receive compensation and the types that will not. These distinctions are not articulated as such; instead, the results are understood to be the result of the qualified immunity defense. As we have seen, for example, a procedural complaint in the context of an employment dispute is more likely to survive the qualified immunity defense than is a complaint about whether a police officer used excessive force in the arrest of a dangerous suspect. Rather than organizing civil rights law in these categorical ways, however, qualified immunity makes the civil rights remedial system appear to be about individual cases and the reasonableness of individual defendants. Current qualified immunity doctrine serves as a means to diffuse conflict. Without a clear rule that some kinds of civil rights harms will not be redressed, there is minimal pressure for change. This "hiding of the ball" quality of qualified immunity is why, in spite of many expressions of dissatisfaction with the system, there had been little effective rallying for change. The reason the discontent of the participants in this system has not led to a significant change is that the terms of the debate are defined by the immunity system rather than by the fundamental question of the extent of rights and liabilities in civil rights actions. The civil rights remedial scheme organized around qualified immunity thus has an inherently self-preserving or stabilizing quality. It allows for tinkering at the margins, but fundamental recasting of the terms of the debate is unlikely. My assertion that qualified immunity has a camouflaging effect on civil rights law is supported by a large body of scholarship that explores legal regimes that define reality in a way that limits the ability of the participants in the system to change it.'27 These scholars argue that when a legal system is accepted as being the only available way to organize an activity and thus seems inevitable, the legal system encourages acceptance of the status quo. 28 The insights gained by scholars working in this area are helpful to apply to the qualified immunity standard in order to explore its hold on the civil rights imagination. This analysis maps out the way a doctrine such as qualified immunity can develop into an obstacle to the very aims it professes to accomplish. Particularly apposite to an analysis of civil rights law is the work that has been done on the change-inhibiting impact of the development of antidiscrimination law.129 In commenting on the effect of the adoption of equal rights rhetoric on the struggle to end racial inequality, Kimberle Crenshaw has concluded that "society's adoption of the ambivalent rhetoric of equal opportunity law has made it that much more difficult for Black people to name their reality. While equal employment opportunity law has been adopted, the material reality of most Black people has not improved."'30 In fact, improvement may be hindered by the existence of the equal opportunity law since it may undermine the political consensus necessary for change.' 3 ' Another commentator has suggested that "the language of rights undermines efforts to change things by absorbing real demands, experiences, and concerns into a vacuous and indeterminate discourse. The discourse abstracts real experience and clouds the ability of those who invoke rights rhetoric to think concretely about real confrontations and real circumstances.' 32 The existence of antidiscrimination law can thus create the appearance of improvements in racial equality while at the same time not encouraging fundamental change. 33 The focus on the intent of the actor in equal protection claims rather than the impact on the person experiencing the discrimination has also been criticized as an inhibitor to the elimination of racial inequality. 3 By paying exclusive attention to the blameworthiness of the defendant, an examination of the impact of the challenged practice on those complaining about it is lost. Fairness to the defendant, rather than eliminating discriminatory effect, is the central concern. These commentators suggest that the economic and social reality of race inequality is obscured by the existence of antidiscrimination law and by the success of a small exceptional group. As Derrick Bell has stated, "Discrimination claims when they are dramatic enough and do not threaten majority concerns, are given a sympathetic hearing, but there is a pervasive sense that definite limits have been set on the weight that minority claims receive when balanced against majority interests."'35 While it is unclear what the alternative to antidiscrimination law is, these critiques strongly argue that antidiscrimination law does not do what it suggests it will do and may, in fact, make a better system more difficult to imagine and thus to create. This current critique of antidiscrmination law can be used to understand how the qualified immunity standard affects the system of compensation for constitutional wrongs. One major similarity is the way in which the existence of Section 1983 siphons off pressure to create some other system of redress. The open-ended language of the Section 1983 statute seems to promise a powerful remedy against governmental abuse. As we have seen, qualified immunity severely limits that remedy, but on a case-by-case basis. There is no general prohibition against certain types of civil rights claims, only the seemingly individualized application of the qualified immunity defense. The fact that some types of claims are destined to fail because of the type of claim they are, not because of the particularized behavior of the defendant, is hidden. Adding to the illusion of a generally available remedy is the spectacular success of a few high profile cases. A few large recoveries in cases that present particularly compelling facts obscure the reality of the fruitlessness of most claims. 36 On the other side of the lawsuit, qualified immunity promises much more to the defendant than it delivers. The defense is supposed to protect government actors not only from liability but also from entanglement with litigation. The promise is often not kept because the qualified immunity defense presents a combination of fact and law questions that cannot be quickly disposed of prior to trial. However, the theoretical protection offered by the defense and the low incidence of actual judgments against government actors lulls government employees into acquiescence to the system. The emphasis that qualified immunity places on the reasonableness of the defendant's actions rather than on whether a constitutional right was violated is another way in which qualified immunity distorts civil rights law. Qualified immunity makes the essential issue of a civil rights claim the question of whether it would be too much of an inhibitor of government action to require a particular defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff. The focus is not, at least initially, on whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated. This emphasis also makes it difficult to discern and consider which rights are or should be protected and which we are content not to protect with monetary compensation. Qualified immunity's harm is that it makes it difficult to see the policy choices made by courts in civil rights actions. Cloaking these policy choices in the qualified immunity doctrine avoids the possibility of an open debate concerning which civil rights should be protected and how. VI. CONCLUSION Given its obvious flaws, the continuation of qualified immunity as the key legal issue in civil rights cases can only be explained by the hidden purpose it serves; it avoids the divisive and perhaps unresolvable conflicts among participants in civil rights litigation. Qualified immunity accomplishes this conflict-avoiding function by giving judges wide latitude in making determinations about its application and by couching the outcomes of civil rights litigation in terms that make the substantive results difficult to perceive. These qualities account for the faithful adherence to a doctrine that is regarded as so unsatisfactory to so many. The problem with this conflict avoidance mechanism is that it allows unarticulated decisions to be made about the extent of liability for civil rights violations. Civil rights litigation does have limitations to it; every case is not given an opportunity to succeed. These determinations are being made; they are just not described as such. Using qualified immunity as a shield from the truth may buy us peace, but it keeps from us the tools required for reform.
36		-
37		-
38		-
39		-
40		-Part of the problem with qualified immunity is that it places to much burden on the defendant- this stifles civil rights action.
41		-Hassel 99, Diana. “Living A Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity.” Missouri Law Review Vol 64 Issue 1. 1999. Web. October 06, 2016. http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3402andcontext=mlr.
42		-The emphasis that qualified immunity places on the reasonableness of the defendant's actions rather than on whether a constitutional right was violated is another way in which qualified immunity distorts civil rights law. Qualified immunity makes the essential issue of a civil rights claim the question of whether it would be too much of an inhibitor of government action to require a particular defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff. The focus is not, at least initially, on whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated. This emphasis also makes it difficult to discern and consider which rights are or should be protected and which we are content not to protect with monetary compensation. Qualified immunity's harm is that it makes it difficult to see the policy choices made by courts in civil rights actions. Cloaking these policy choices in the qualified immunity doctrine avoids the possibility of an open debate concerning which civil rights should be protected and how.
43		-
44		-
45		-Qualified immunity has allowed brutal practices such as chokeholds to persist within police departments.
46		-Rudovsky 16, David. “The Qualified Immunity Doctrine In The Supreme Court: Judicial Activism And The Restriction of Constitutional Rights.” Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. 1989. Web. October 06, 2016. http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2508andcontext=faculty_sc holarship.
47		-The issue of governmental authorization is also an integral factor in the constitutional calculus regarding standing in equitable actions under § 1983. The Court has ruled that plaintiffs have standing in § 1983 injunctive actions only where they can demonstrate a likelihood of future harm.6 ° In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court refused to grant injunctive relief to a plaintiff who had suffered permanent physical injuries when a police officer administered a “chokehold” in effecting an arrest, even though the record demonstrated that this police practice was commonly used in circumstances not justifying such force. The practice had caused sixteen deaths during a period of several years. The Court determined that the past injury had no continuing effects sufficient to provide standing for prospective relief and that the plaintiff was unable to show that he, as opposed to any other citizen, would again suffer the same unconstitutional conduct. Of particular significance to the Court was Lyons' failure to show that the chokehold was authorized by city policy. The Court viewed the use of the chokehold in the circumtances of the particular case, in which the plaintiff alleged no provocation or resistance on his part, as aberrational and unauthorized. Equitable relief was justified only if ”the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.”
48		-
49		-Contention 2: Racism (eric gardner, tamir rice)
50		-
51		-Qualified immunity reflects a culture of policing that justifies terrorizing black neighborhoods and lets police know they can get away with anything. Carter ‘15
52		-Tom Carter – WSWS Legal Correspondent, a lawyer (https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/24/cart-f24.html). “US Supreme Court Expands Immunity for Killer Cops.” Center for Research on Globalization. November 12, 2015. http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-supreme-court-expands-immunity-for-killer-cops/5488366 JJN
53		-When a civil rights case is summarily dismissed by a judge on the grounds of “qualified immunity,” the case is legally terminated. It never goes to trial before a jury and is never decided on its constitutional merits. In March of 2010, Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Chadrin Mullenix climbed onto an overpass with a rifle and, disobeying a direct order from his supervisor, fired six shots at a vehicle that the police were pursuing. Mullenix was not in any danger, and his supervisor had told him to wait until other officers tried to stop the car using spike strips. Four shots struck Israel Leija, Jr., killing him and causing the car, which was going 85 miles per hour, to crash. After the shooting, Mullenix boasted to his supervisor, “How’s that for proactive?” The Luna v. Mullenix case was filed by Leija’s family members, who claimed that Mullenix used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights. The district court that originally heard the case, together with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied immunity to Mullenix on the grounds that his conduct violated clearly established law. The Supreme Court intervened to uphold the Mullenix’s entitlement to immunity—a decision that will set a precedent for the summary dismissal of civil rights lawsuits against police brutality around the country. This is the Supreme Court’s response to the ongoing wave of police mayhem and murder. The message is clear: The killings will continue. Do not question the police. If you disobey the police, you forfeit your life. So far this year, more than 1,000 people have been killed by the police in America. Almost every day, there are new videos posted online showing police shootings, intrusions into homes and cars, asphyxiations, beatings and taserings. Last week, two police officers in Louisiana opened fire on Jeremy Mardis, a six-year-old autistic boy, and his father Chris Few. The boy’s father had his hands up during the shooting and is currently hospitalized with serious injuries. His son succumbed to the police bullets while still buckled into the front seat of the car. The Supreme Court’s decision reflects the fact that in the face of rising popular anger over police killings, the entire political apparatus—including all of the branches of government—is closing ranks behind the police. This includes the establishment media, which has largely remained silent about Monday’s pro-police Supreme Court decision. The police operate with almost total impunity, confident that no matter what they do, they will have the backing of the state. Two weeks ago, a South Carolina grand jury refused to return an indictment against the officer who was caught on video killing 19-year-old Zachary Hammond. This follows the exoneration of the police who killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Eric Garner in New York City and Tamir Rice in Cleveland. The Obama administration’s position regarding the surge of police violence was most clearly and simply articulated by FBI director James Comey in aspeech on October 23. “May God protect our cops,” Comey declared. He went on to accuse those who film the police of promoting violent crime. Meanwhile, in virtually every police brutality case that has come before the federal courts, the Obama administration has taken the side of the police. On Monday, the Supreme Court went out of its way to cite approvingly anamicus curiae (friend of court) brief filed by the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO), which defended Mullenix. With this citation, notwithstanding its ostensible role as a neutral arbiter and guarantor of the Constitution, the Supreme Court sent a clear signal as to which side it is on. During the imposition of de facto martial law in Ferguson last year, NAPO issued statements vociferously defending Michael Brown’s killer, labeling demonstrators as “violent outsiders,” and denouncing “the violent idiots on the street chanting ‘time to kill a cop!’” “Qualified immunity” is a reactionary doctrine invented by judges in the later part of the 20th century to shield public officials from lawsuits. As a practical matter, this doctrine allows judges to toss out civil rights cases without a jury trial if, in the judge’s opinion, the official misconduct in question was not “plainly incompetent” or a “knowing violation of clearly established law.” Over recent decades, the doctrine has been stretched to Kafkaesque proportions to shield police officers from accountability. In the landmark case ofTennessee v. Garner (1985), the Supreme Court held that it violates the Constitution to shoot an “unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect,” and required an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury before the police could open fire. But the Supreme Court in its decision on Monday dismissed this language as constituting a “high level of generality” that was not “particular” enough to “clearly establish” any particular constitutional rights. Since cases that are dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity do not result in decisions on the constitutional issues, this circular pseudo-logic ensures that no rights will ever be “clearly established.” It also ensures that, instead of the democratic procedure of a jury trial, cases involving the police will be decided by judges. The Supreme Court issued Monday’s decision without full briefing or oral argument, designating it “per curiam,” i.e., in the name of the court, not any specific judges. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, displaying his trademark sophistry. According to Scalia, Mullenix did not use “deadly force” within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s prior cases, since he was shooting at a car, not a person. (Four bullets struck Leija, but none of the six shots struck the engine block at which Mullenix was supposedly aiming.) Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed the sole dissent, noting that this decision “renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow,” and sanctions a “shoot first, think later” approach to policing. However, Sotomayor wrote that she would have used a “balancing” analysis instead, in which a “particular government interest” would need to be “balanced” against the use of deadly force. This “balancing” rhetoric mirrors the Obama administration’s justifications for assassination and domestic spying, according to which national security is balanced against democratic rights. The Bill of Rights itself—that old, yellow, forgotten piece of paper—does not make itself contingent on the subjective mental states of police officers, “clearly established law,” or the “balancing” of “government interests.” America confronts a massive social crisis. Decades of endless war and occupations abroad, the degradation of wages and living conditions at home, the enrichment of a tiny layer of financial criminals at the expense of the rest of the society, rampant speculation and corruption at the highest levels—these factors contribute to mounting social tensions and the danger, from the standpoint of the ruling class, of the growth of social opposition. Such opposition can already be seen, in its earliest stages, in the struggle by autoworkers against the sellout contract being imposed by the United Auto Workers union. Like the tyrant who proposes to solve the problem of hunger by imposing a hefty fine on everyone who starves, the Supreme Court’s decision Monday confirms that the entire social system has nothing to offer by way of a solution to the crisis except more of the same. The abrogation of democratic rights, torture, military commissions, drone assassinations, unlimited surveillance, the lockdown of entire cities, internment camps, beatings, murder, martial law, war—this is how the ruling class plans to deal with the social crisis. Notwithstanding the epidemic of police violence, the flow of unlimited cash and military hardware to police departments from the Department of Homeland Security and the Pentagon continues unabated. The buildup of the police as a militarized occupation force operating outside the law, pumped up and ready to kill, must be seen as a part of preparations by the ruling class for mass repression and dictatorship in response to the growth of working class opposition.
54		-
55		-The court has a long history of discounting the interests of minority populations–qualified immunity just exacerbates racism entrenched in the system.
56		-Reinhardt 15
57		-Stephen R. Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, “The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Lim-itations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 113, 2015.
58		-
59		-The Court has often remarked that “to perform its high function in the best way, ’justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”‘6 In a country in which a disproportionate number of individ-uals who are behind bars or have been treated unlawfully by law enforcement are minorities-indeed, a country in which black juveniles are more than four times as likely as white juveniles to be incarcerated, even though evidence shows that they commit many offenses at similar rates’ 66-satisfying the appearance of justice means ensuring that individuals do not remain in prison in violation of the Constitution or face excessive force at the hands of law enforcement without a proper remedy. On this score, the Court has simply failed in its mission. Unfortunately, the Court’s recent treatment of federal habeas law and qualified immunity shows a lack of sensitivity to the unequal treatment of minorities in our criminal justice system similar to that which has pervaded many of the Court’s decisions following the end of the Warren Court. The Burger Court, for example, effectively prevented federal courts from enjoining police forces from using dangerous chokeholds’ 67-the very practice that led to the death of Eric Garnerl 68-while show-ing no regard for the fact that black men make up 9 of Los Angeles’s population at the time, but “account for 75 of the deaths resulting from the use of chokeholds.” 69 The Rehnquist Court saw no Equal Protection Clause issue with the death penalty despite being presented with evidence that “defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.”17o Nor was the Rehnquist Court will-ing to allow black defendants to proceed on a claim of race-based, selective prosecution, despite the fact that prosecutions for distributing cocaine base under the harsher federal statute, rather than the more lenient state statute, were seemingly reserved for black defendants alone.171
60		-
61		-Qualified immunity stacks the deck against minorities
62		-Reinhardt 15
63		-Stephen R. Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, “The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Lim-itations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 113, 2015.
64		-This is an especially unfortunate time to be limiting the opportunities of those who have been unconstitutionally convicted or sentenced by the courts to gain their freedom. It is an equally unfortunate time to be preventing those who have been unlawfully treated by law enforcement from seeking the remedies provided under one of our first civil rights acts.‘6’ Both movements are taking our law in the wrong direction. Confidence in our legal system is probably at an all-time low among minorities, while their belief that they receive unfair and unequal treatment at the hands of law enforcement may well be at an all-time high. This is a particularly sensitive matter, as so disproportionate a number of those incarcerated in our penal institutionsl62 and so disproportionate a number of those subjected to excessive force by law enforcement are members of minority groups.‘6 3 The clear perception of the minority community, right or wrong, is that justice in this nation is stacked against them.’”
65		-
66		-Contention 3: Queer Oppression
67		-Judges fail to protect queer bodies under heavy usage of qualified immunity
68		-Wagner 14
69		-Robin B. Wagner, (J.D. Candidate 2014, DePaul University College of Law.) Are Gay Rights Clearly Established?: The Problems with the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 63 DePaul L. Rev. 869 (2014) Available at: http://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol63/iss3/7
70		-Therefore, when three cases on facts that easily sufficed for allegations¶ of equal protection violations came before
71		-three courts in three¶ different circuits in the same year and resulted in three different outcomes,¶ it is clear that there is a problem with the qualified immunity¶ doctrine. Under the Roberts Court, the qualified immunity doctrine¶ has become more generous to defendants with an increasing requirement¶ for circuit unanimity and an emerging approach to rational-basis¶ review that protects decision makers’ discretion. The problems arising¶ in qualified immunity doctrine are particularly apparent when evaluating¶ constitutional rights related to queer bodies, because the key Supreme Court cases did not rely wholly on the established methodologies¶ for equal protection and due process analysis.¶ In the hands of judges who under no consent apply precedent or¶ wish to avoid hot-button social policy topics, the qualified immunity¶ doctrine can prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their rights and further¶ weaken the “private attorney general” approach to rights claims.¶ During the civil rights
72		-era, the courts played a leading role in recognizing¶ and expanding civil rights for people of color. In this era of gay¶ civil rights, the courts should not be the slower and less reliable vehicle¶ for recognizing implicit rights. If courts were to more regularly¶ apply the prong-one analysis of qualified immunity and faithfully adhere¶ to the actual holdings of Supreme Court precedent, the law related¶ to civil rights violations under § 1983 could provide both parties¶ with the predictability they need and deserve from the law.
73		-LGBTQ Rights are crucial
74		-Tatchell ’89
75		-Peter Tatchell - is a British human rights campaignerbest known for his work with LGBT social movements, was selected as Labour Party Parliamentary candidate for Bermondsey. “Gay Liberation is Central to Human Emancipation.” Peter Tatchell.net. However, note at the bottom: “An edited version of this article was published in "Labour Briefing", 1989. See also "Beyond lesbian and gay rights", Interlink. May /June 1989.” http://www.petertatchell.net/masculinity/gay_liberation.htm JJN *bracketed for offensive language
76		-Lesbian and gay LGTBQ liberation is of critical importance to the broader project of human emancipation. It is not merely a minority issue, nor purely a question of civil rights and sexual freedom. The ultimate aim is a cultural revolution to end heterosexual supremacism and the concomitant cult of heterosexual masculinity which underpins all relations of oppression and exploitation. This was the revolutionary agenda of the lesbian and gay liberation movement which emerged 20 years ago following the Stonewall Riots in New York in June 1969. In contrast to earlier liberal-oriented movements for homosexual equality, the lesbian and gay liberation movement did not seek to ape heterosexual values or secure the acceptance of homosexuals within the existing sexual conventions. Indeed, it repudiated the prevailing sexual morality and institutions - rejecting not only heterosexism but also heterosexual masculinity with its oppressive predisposition to rivalry, toughness and aggression (most potently symbolised by the rapist and the queer-basher). In contrast the "radical drag" and''gender-bender" politics of the Gay Liberation Front glorified male gentleness. It was a conscious, if sometimes exaggerated, attempt to renounce the oppressiveness of masculinity and subvert the way masculinity functions to buttress the subordination of women and gay men. Lesbian and gay liberation is therefore truly revolutionary because it specifically rejects the male heterosexual cult of masculine competitiveness, domination and violence. Instead, it affirms the worthwhileness of male sensitivity and affection between men and, in the case of lesbians, the intrinsic value of an eroticism and love independent of heterosexual men. By challenging heterosexual masculinity, the politics of lesbian and gay liberation has profound radical implications for oppressed peoples everywhere: it actively subverts the male heterosexual machismo' values which lie at the heart of all systems of domination, exploitation and oppression. Lesbian and gay liberation is therefore not an issue which is peripheral. It is, indeed absolutely central to revolutionary change and human liberation in general. Without the successful construction of a cult of heterosexual masculinity and a mass of aggressive male egos, neither sexual, class, racial, species, nor imperialist oppression are possible. All these different forms of oppression depend on two factors for their continued maintenance. First, on specific economic and political structures. And second, on a significant proportion of the population, mainly heterosexual men, being socialised into the acceptance of harsh masculine values which involve the legitimisation of aggression and the suppression of gentleness and emotion. The embracing of these culturally-conditioned macho values, whether consciously or unconsciously, is what makes so many millions of people able to participate in repressive regimes. (This interaction between social structures, ideology and individual psychology was a thesis which the communist psychologist, Wilhelm Reich, was attempting to articulate nearly 60 years ago in his book, The Mass Psychology of Fascism). In the case of German fascism, what Nazism did was merely awake and excite the latent brutality which is intrinsic to heterosexual masculinity in class societies. It then systematically manipulated and organised this unleashed masculine violence into a fascist regime of terror and torture which culminated in the holocaust. Since it is the internalisation of the masculine cult of toughness and domination which makes people psychologically suited and willing to be part of oppressive relations of exploitation and subjection, repressive states invariably glorify masculine "warrior" ideals and legally and ideologically suppress those men - mainly homosexuals - who fail to conform to them. Given that this internalisation of masculine aggression within the male population is a prerequisite for injustice and tyranny, love and tenderness between men ceases to be a purely private matter or simply a question of personal lifestyle. Instead, it objectively becomes an act of subversion which undermines the very foundations of oppression. Hence the Nazis' vilification of gay men as "sexual subversives" and "sexual saboteurs" who, in the words of Heinrich Himmler, had to be "exterminated- root and branch." In conclusion: the goal of eradicating injustice and exploitation requires us to change both the social structure and the individual personality to create people who, liberated from masculinity, no longer psychologically crave the power to dominate and exploit others and who are therefore unwilling to be the agents of oppressive regimes (whether as soldiers, police, gaolers and censors or as routine civil servants and state administrators who act as the passive agents of repression by keeping the day-to-day machinery of unjust government ticking over). By challenging the cult of heterosexual masculinity, lesbian and gay liberation politics is about much more than the limited agenda of human rights. It offers a unique and revolutionary contribution to the emancipation of the whole of humanity from all forms of oppression and subjugation.
77		-
78		-Contention 4: Ableism (Latonya Davis)
79		-Qualified immunity goes against actions for damages brought under American’s with disabilities
80		-Gildin 99
81		-Gildin, Gary S. (Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
82		-University.) "Dis-Qualified Immunity for Discrimination against the Disabled." University of Illinois Law Review 1999.3 (1999): 897-948.
83		-In his article Professor Gildin challenges the applicability of¶ the qualified immunity defense in actions brought under the federal¶ disability statutes. Specifically, he contends that the qualified immunity¶ defense should not be available in actions for damages¶ brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities¶ Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.¶ Although these acts are very powerful tools to protect the rights of¶ disabled individuals, lower courts have slowly eviscerated a key enforcement¶ mechanism-the remedy of money damages-by transferring¶ the qualified immunity defense permitted in § 1983 actions¶ to actions brought under
84		-these acts. In support of his thesis, Professor¶ Gildin analyzes the text and legislative histories of these acts¶ and argues that neither of these supports the existence of the qualified¶ immunity defense. He also finds that there is no historical¶ linkage between § 1983 and the disability statutes that justifies borrowing¶ qualified immunity from § 1983. Finally, Professor Gildin¶ argues that judges should not legislate this defense as Congress at¶ the time it enacted the disability statutes did not intend for this defense¶ to be available.
85		-
86		-Qualified immunity is totally unjustified in this context – prevents discrimination suits
87		-Gildin 99
88		-Gildin, Gary S. (Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
89		-University.) "Dis-Qualified Immunity for Discrimination against the Disabled." University of Illinois Law Review 1999.3 (1999): 897-948.
90		-The legislative instruction that the Acts be broadly construed to¶ afford relief to victims of disability discrimination obviously repudiates¶ a qualified immunity defense that does not appear on the face of¶ the statutes. Rather than promote relief, the qualified immunity defense¶ deprives the victim of a damage remedy against the government¶ official who intentionally engaged in the proscribed discrimination on¶ the basis of
91		-disability. In fact, in two circumstances the immunity defense¶ would have the effect of entirely barring recovery of the damages¶ caused by intentional discrimination. First, because damages may not be obtained from the federal government¶ under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA,165 a disabled person¶ would be left without compensation for harms suffered as a¶ consequence of intentional discrimination caused by a federal official¶ who successfully asserts the qualified immunity defense. Second, immunity¶ may have the effect of precluding recovery of damages for
92		-discriminatory¶ acts of state and local officials. Although state and local¶ governmental entities are not sheltered by any immunity, the courts¶ may require that plaintiff prove that the discrimination was inflicted¶ pursuant to a governmental
93		-custom or policy before the entity will be¶ held liable.166 If the discriminatory acts of a public official do not represent¶ governmental custom or policy, the entity may not be liable. If¶ at the same time the state or local official is exonerated under the¶ qualified immunity defense, the risk of loss from violations of the disability¶ discrimination statutes will be borne by the least appropriate¶ party, the victim of discrimination. Congress has repeatedly made¶ plain its intent that the Acts should be construed, without exception,¶ to afford relief when public officials discriminate against the disabled.¶ Because qualified immunity impedes, and in some cases defeats, recovery of the damages caused by violation of the Acts, the defense¶ must not be made available to those who discriminate.
94		-
95		-Underview
96		-Limiting qualified immunity is key for change
97		-Wright 15 Sam Wright (Public Interest Lawyer). “Want to Fight Police Misconduct? Reform Qualified Immunity.” Above the Law. 3 November 2015. http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/
98		-
99		-In order to truly hold police accountable for bad acts, civilians must be able to bring, and win, civil rights suits themselves — not rely on the Department of Justice, or special prosecutors, or civilian review boards to hold officers accountable. And in order to both bring and win civil rights suits, civilians need a level playing field in court. Right now, they don’t have one. Instead, police officers have recourse to the broad protections of the judicially established doctrine of qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, state actors are protected from suit even if they’ve violated the law by, say, using excessive force, or performing an unwarranted body cavity search — as long as their violation was not one of “clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would be aware.” In other words, if there’s not already a case where a court has held that an officer’s identical or near-identical conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation, there’s a good chance that even an officer will avoid liability — will avoid accountability. To bring about true accountability and change police behavior, this needs to change. And change should begin with an act of Congress rolling back qualified immunity. Removing the “clearly established” element of qualified immunity would be a good start — after all, shouldn’t it be enough to deviate from a basic standard of care, to engage in conduct that a reasonable officer would know is illegal, without having to show that that conduct’s illegality has already been clearly established in the courts? That’s just a start. There are plenty of other reforms that could open up civil rights lawsuits and help ensure police accountability for bad conduct. Two posts (one, two) at Balkinization by City University of New York professor Lynda Dodd provide a good overview. Campaign Zero should consider adding civil rights litigation reform to its platform, our policymakers should consider making civil rights litigation more robust, and, if we want to see justice done, we should push to make it happen.
100		-The AFF changes culture – it is a form of social condemnation that validates the claims of the survivor. Armacost 98
101		-Aramco’s 98 Barbara Armacost, Vanderbilt Law Review, April, 1998, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=90852, “Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused,” WP
102		-If constitutional rights are especially valued in comparison with other kinds of rights, it follows that constitutional violations would be viewed by society as especially serious and deserving of opprobrium. There is reason to think this is so. Constitutional violations, especially those that are likely to give rise to section 1983 suits, involve abuses of power by governmental actors. The implications of official misconduct go far beyond the concrete harm to persons or property suffered by any one individual. Public officials are, after all, charged with upholding and enforcing the law and acting for the public good. When officials use their public offices to engage in lawbreaking, there is a betrayal of trust that is experienced not only by the individual, but by the entire community. n432 Consider, for example, *675 the public outcry that was engendered by the beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles police officers. The image of a circle of uniformed law enforcement officials beating an unarmed man lying crumpled on the ground is troubling in a way that a private beating is not. Similar reactions accompanied recent allegations that New York City police officers openly beat and sodomized (with a toilet plunger) a young Haitian immigrant in the bathroom at the police station. n433 When the malefactor is a governmental official whose injurious conduct was made possible by her official authority and position, "ordinary injury is augmented by the abuse of governmental power." n434 In such cases wrongdoing that could "be described as trespass, assault and battery, false imprisonment, or defamation takes on new urgency." n435 If the law-enforcers cannot be trusted to conduct themselves according to the law, then who can? Governmental abuse of power creates a sense of indignation on the part of the governed, and special opprobrium is reserved for abusers of the public trust. n436∂ If individual liability for constitutional violations entails wrongdoing and signals societal condemnation, then it would make sense to retain such liability even if the financial burden is ultimately borne by the governmental employer rather than by the individual official. n437 Indeed, in the criminal context it has been argued that the *676 moral blame entailed by a criminal conviction is more important in discouraging antisocial conduct than the threat of official sanctions. n438 One need not go that far to accept that the human desire to avoid societal opprobrium plays an important role in gaining compliance with the criminal law. n439 Similarly, the societal condemnation accompanying damages liability for constitutional violations enhances the law's power to reduce unconstitutional conduct and reinforce constitutional norms. Moreover, the stigma entailed in such liability plays an important role in communicating those norms, not only through final verdicts in courts but through public reaction to reported allegations of clear constitutional impropriety.

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