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1 -XWiki.thomasonj007@gmailcom
1 +XWiki.saeshinjoe@gmailcom
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1 +please contact me before you read disclosure theory, or if there's anything else you need:
2 +Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/sesh.hollendonner
3 +Email: saeshinjoe@gmail.com
4 +512-810-3696
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1 +Part 1 - Resolutional burdens
2 +
3 +There is a difference in prohibition and regulation - a prohibition is to forbid an action or activity by authority or law. In contrast, a regulation is an official rule or law that says how something should be done. The difference in regards to nuclear power is about whether the law will permit any form of nuclear power whatsoever.
4 +The aff only justifies the need for prohibition if they can prove that the harms in their case are inseparable from the production of nuclear power. Otherwise, those harms could be solved through regulations without prohibition. The aff only has ground to win on an advocacy that is a prohibition of nuclear power while the neg has ground to win on regulation. This is because regulations still allow the existence and production of nuclear power that include revisions and innovation whereas prohibition means halting the production immediately halting all potential progress. If the aff only regulates and does not prohibit, they are not meeting the resolution.
5 +To prove that there ought to be no nuclear power whatsoever requires an issue to be presented that is inherent to nuclear power. Otherwise, the need to solve that harm would only justify a regulation because the problem could one day be separated from the production of nuclear power, thus solving the AFF harms. Therefore, the Affirmative burden is to prove that the harms identified in the AFF are necessarily inseparable from nuclear power. The failure to meet that burden means that the aff harms justify a solution that takes the form of a regulation. This is sufficient to negate. If I show they are theoretically separable from the production of nuclear power, then that justifies a regulation, and therefore you negate.
6 +
7 +Part 2 - Offense
8 +I advocate that instead of prohibiting the production of nuclear power, countries ought to enact regulations that only permits the production of nuclear power that doesn’t require mining
9 +Two reasons to negate under the burden structure:
10 +First, as I will demonstrate later in the line-by-line, the AC actually justifies the need to regulate not prohibit because the offense in the AFF comes from solving harms that are not conceptually necessary in producing nuclear power. This straight turns the AFF.
11 +
12 +Second, the affirmative may claim that a prohibition might be overkill but it still solves the problem. However, there are unique harms to using a prohibition to solve problems that could be resolved with well-crafted regulations.
13 +Subpoint A) Prohibition kills research and development
14 +No one would want to develop, or invest in the development of nuclear technologies that are both illegal and impossible to profit from. They would be incentivized not to do so because 1) the technology has already been deemed unacceptable, 2) they would not get their investment back, and 3) it would not be worth running the risk of violating the law and being shut down and losing their ability to research anything. Research and development would violate the terms of the prohibition because prototypes need to be tested at some point in development, and the prohibition would outlaw this practice. Without testing, there is no way to determine whether or not the prototypes work and how to fix the problems in the event that they are unsuccessful. Even if the aff allows modeling the only thing that could exist would be entirely computer based development which is not a viable strategy.
15 +Subpoint B) It is theoretically possible to develop nuclear power that is good under the AFF standard, which is a unique disadvantage to the AFF.
16 +Their own standard proves there is a negative cost to trying to solve these problems by prohibitions when the harms actually justify regulations.
17 +The question is ‘could you imagine a nuclear power technology that doesn't involve doing the aff impacts’- not ‘could you imagine a world without the aff impacts’. Regulations have the ability to resolve the harms of the aff while still maintaining nuclear power as well as research and development. We are not bound to the methods of producing nuclear power that they’re criticizing.
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1 +1. Agency is set apart from other enterprises in that it is inescapable
2 +(Luca Ferrero, “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency”. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV, Jan 12, 2009.(https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/ferrero/www/pubs/ferrero-constitutivism.pdf) Professor of Philosophy, University of Wesconsin at Milwaukee.)
3 + The initial appeal of the shmagency objection rests on the impression that there is a close analogy between agency and ordinary enterprises. If one can stand outside of chess and question whether there is any reason to play this game, why couldnʼt one stand outside of agency and wonder whether there is any reason to play the agency game? The problem with this suggestion is that the analogy does not hold. Agency is a very special enterprise. Agency is distinctively ʻinescapable.ʼ This is what sets agency apart from all other enterprises and explains why constitutivism is focused on it rather than on any other enterprise. 3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluation of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.133.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency. Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15 3.4 To sum up, agency is special because of two distinctive features. First, agency is not the only game in town, but it is the biggest possible one. In addition to instances of bare intentional agency, any engagement in an ordinary enterprise is ipso facto an engagement in the enterprise of agency. Second, agency is closed under rational reflection. It is closed under the self- directed application of its distinctive discursive operation, the asking for and the giving of reasons for action. The combination of these features is what makes agency inescapable. This is the kind of nonoptionality that supports the viability of constitutivism.
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5 +
6 +2. Analytic
7 +3.''
8 +4.''
9 +5.''
10 +6.''
11 +7. Traditional framing mechanisms don’t assign intrinsic value to special obligations which breaks down reasonability, when a promise is made or you owe a group something it creates a special obligation.
12 +SEP, 2014, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public, Special Obligations, First published Thu Oct 17, 2002; substantive revision Sun Jan 5, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/#
13 + What is special about special obligations? One way to answer this question is to contrast special obligations with some type of duty or obligation that is not special. One example of such a ‘non-special’ type of duty or obligation is that recognized by consequentialists. (Special obligations can also be contrasted with another type of non-special duty. See section III). According to one version of consequentialism, the right action is that action which, of all alternatives available to the agent, produces the greatest net sum of intrinsic value, where intrinsic value is value as an end or for its own sake and not merely as a means to something other than itself. (There are, of course, many forms of consequentialism. The important feature of such views for our purposes is that they understand right action as a function of and solely of the consequences (actual, probable, or possible) of the action and its alternatives. (The following discussion presupposes a version of actual consequence act-consequentialism. But the points made apply mutatis mutandis to other versions of consequentialism.) But now consider how, according to the consequentialist, I ought to treat my friends (or family members, or colleagues, ...). If my friend's well-being is no more intrinsically valuable than the well-being of any other person, then I ought to be impartial, at least in my actions, between promoting the good of my friend and promoting the good of a complete stranger. Thus, the mere fact that someone is my friend (or my mother, or my colleague, or my fellow citizen) does not imply that I have any obligations to such a person that I do not have to any and all persons. Similarly, the mere fact that I have promised someone to benefit her in some way does not, considered in itself, imply that I have any obligation to benefit that person: my promisee's good carries no greater weight than does the good of any other person. On the other hand, commonsense morality, in contrast with consequentialism, seems to regard the mere fact that a person is my friend or that I made a promise to that person as morally significant. For example, most people do not think that I am justified in breaking a promise merely because slightly more good would result from my breaking the promise than from my keeping the promise. Similarly, most people think that if I have a choice between benefitting a friend or providing an equal benefit to a stranger that I ought to benefit my friend. Consequentialism, in so far as it diverges from commonsense morality on these points, strikes many as an unacceptable moral theory. Of course, the consequentialist has more than one possible reply to these sorts of worries about her view. First, the consequentialist can argue that, in fact, each person acting so as to benefit her friends, loved ones, promisees, etc., will have the best overall consequences. Promising, for example, is an instrumentally valuable institution, and each of us should do her part to support that institution: one thing that each of us can do is to keep her own promises. Promises also create expectations in their recipients, and the harm of unrealized expectations or hopes needs to be taken into account when we consider whether the breaking of a promise has better consequences than the keeping of a promise. Similarly, each of us ought to take special care of her loved ones, because friendship is a valuable institution. Also, we are well positioned to take care of our loved ones: our efforts are more likely to be efficacious than if we were to attempt to benefit persons distant from us whom we do not know and people often experience greater emotional harm when they are slighted by their intimates than when they are slighted by strangers. As John Stuart Mill remarked in Utilitarianism, “few hurts which human beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than when that on which they habitually and with full assurance relied fails them in the hour of need” (59).
14 +
15 +8. Analytic
16 +
17 +
18 +Special Obligations are agent relative reasons for the government to act
19 +SEP, 2014, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public, Special Obligations, First published Thu Oct 17, 2002; substantive revision Sun Jan 5, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/#
20 + The discussion of the previous section stressed that the alleged difficulties that consequentialism has in accommodating the commonsense understanding of special obligations arise from the fact that the consequentialist can allow only derivatively, not genuinely, special obligations. Another way to express this point is to say that the consequentialist allows only agent-neutral reasons, whereas special obligations, as understood by commonsense, are agent-relative reasons. Derek Parfit understand ds agent-neutral as opposed to agent-relative reasons in the following way: Suppose we claim that there is a reason to relieve some person's suffering. This reason is objective if it is a reason for everyone – for anyone who could relieve this person's suffering. I call such reasons agent-neutral. ... When I call some reason agent-relative, I am not claiming that this reason cannot be a reason for other agents. All that I am claiming is that it may not be (143). Thomas Nagel explicates the difference between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons in a slightly different way: If a reason can be given a general form which does not include an essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-neutral reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone to do or want something that it would reduce the amount of wretchedness in the world, then that is a neutral reason. If on the other hand the general form of a reason does include an essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-relative reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone to do or want something that it would be in his interest, then that is a relative reason. In such a case, if something were in Jones's interest but contrary to Smith's, Jones would have reason to want it to happen and Smith would have the same reason to want it not to happen (1986 152–153). Thus, special obligations would be understood by Parfit and Nagel as agent-relative reasons: my reason to take care of my friend by giving her encouraging words may not be shared by anyone else (even when in a position which makes it possible for her to do that), and the “form of the reason … includes an essential reference to the person who has it” – I have reason to give my friend encouraging words. Another way to define agent-neutral reasons is as follows: Agent-Neutral Reason: S’s reason to do or to promote p is an agent-neutral reason if and only if, necessarily, for any Q, Q would also have a reason to do or to promote p if Q were in a causal position to do or to promote p. All other reasons are agent-relative. Notice that on this definition of agent-neutrality and its correspondent definition of agent-relativity, nearness in space cannot be an ultimate ground of an agent-relative reason. When we think of nearness affecting our moral obligations, it seems that it does so by affecting our causal efficacy in providing aid: we are standing on the bank of a river in which someone is drowning, someone has had a heart attack in the room where we are and we know CPR, etc. In all of these cases, if someone else had been in our spatial position, he or she would have been in our causal position and so would have had the same duty to aid as we do. And spatial position does not seem to have any other significance beyond its effect on causal position. After all, if someone had been further away but able to push a button to activate a machine that would save the one drowning, then she would have had the same duty to aid as we did. (See Orsi for a discussion of nearness and obligations.)
21 +
22 +Special obligations as a guide to good and bad creates moral danger, therefore they can’t hold moral value or else moral reasoning breaks down.
23 +SEP, 2014, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public, Special Obligations, First published Thu Oct 17, 2002; substantive revision Sun Jan 5, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/#
24 + Special relationships take many forms, and the parties to those relationships range across the entire spectrum of moral character (at least according to some views), from the extremely virtuous to the downright bad, with most of us falling somewhere in the middle of that range. This fact about the human beings who make promises, stand in familial relationships, and have friends, leads to the worry that special obligations, in certain circumstances, will license, and perhaps even require, very bad behavior. Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett, in their “Friendship and Moral Danger,” offer a case in which one friend, Carl, calls upon another, Dave, to help him to hide the body of someone whom he has killed (279–280). What ought Dave to do in such a circumstance? The worry is that if Dave has special obligations to his friend Carl, then it seems that Dave ought to help Carl to hide the body. But, in the absence of special obligations, it seems clear that Dave ought to alert the police to what Carl has done. Does the friendship between Dave and Carl provide them with a license or even a requirement to act immorally (or, in a way such that in the absence of the friendship, it would count as immoral) in order to protect one another? Similarly, do Nazis have special obligations to one another to help each other with their genocidal plans? Do parents have obligations to protect their children, no matter what terrible crimes their children have committed? Cocking and Kennett regard the claims or obligations of friendship as non-moral claims. They use the likelihood of ‘moral danger’ within friendship to undermine what they call “highly-moralized” accounts of friendship (280ff). Thus, for them, the demands created by special relationships are not moral demands. So, on their view, the non-moral special obligations of friendship may certainly conflict with moral obligations, just as, presumably, reasons of self-interest or prudence may conflict with moral demands. We then are left with the familiar problem of how we ought to balance moral and non-moral reasons against one another.
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